Robert William Davies,Mark Harrison,S. G. Wheatcroft p.286


Those 2 bad harvests 1931 and 1932 are the main cause for the famine.
Truth is that the procurements in terms of proportion ( % ) of the harvest were sky-rocketed comparing with what the state got its hand on during NEP or even war-communism era.The common thesis is that the famine of 1932/33 was caused by extraordinary grain confiscations in this year. In fact, as the table shows, the amount of grain removed from households of peasants (either individual or collectivized) was extraordinary low and was smaller than in any other year after 1930.
And ? What does that tell you ? Do you know what that equals to ? Well let me tell you.From memory, the export from the harvest of 1932 was about 10% of the total grain collections or some 1 800 thousands tons.
There is a diference between "famine" and "millions escess deaths". On the territory of the USSR (excluding Kazakstan, for which demographic statistics is problematic, as far as I understand) the latter occcured only in 1933. Native population of Kazakhstan was engaged in agriculture on a limited scale, the famine in this case was caused mainly by decline of livestock poplulation, the situation with grain was hardly of primary importance. There was indeed a rise of mortality in the summer of 1932, but not nearly of the scale of the next year.Chinaski1917 wrote: Famine and millions of starving people emigrating was secretly documented even before the first half of 1933. Kazakhstan was a living hell from 1932.
The thesis advanced by Davies and Wheatcroft as far as I understand it is that there was a negative influence of high procurements on the size of the harvest. That is a serious argument, though again correlation between the collections and harvests after 1933 shows that this influence wasn't fatally predetermined. However, I talk about the effect of removal of a part of the harvest, I specially emphasized it. There is no doubt that under normal conditions (that is the average harvest), the grain collections of 1932 won't lead to large-scale famine.either Mark Tauger nor RW Davies and S.Wheatcroft claim that high procurements FOR 1931 weren't responsible.
It shows to what extent procurements could be lowered without comprimising domestic consumption. About 1,6 millions tons of grain were exported from the harvest of 1932 (I've checkhed the number), hence a complete refusal from export would result in grain procurements of about 17 millions tons. That is less than 10% lower of the actual number and anyway higher than NEP level. One of the obvious reasons for that was the rapid rise of urban, non-agricultural population. According to the census of 1926 the urban population of the USSR was equal to 26 millions, in 1932 it was already estimated as 40 millions, a 50% higher. All these people needed food, and there needs were mostly supplied by the state. So the return to the level of grain collections of late 20s was not a realistic strategy. A realistic strategy IMO would be accumulation of sufficient grain reserves in early 30s, instead of all-out export of excessive grain. But, as you probably know, I didn't happen.And ? What does that tell you ?
And may I ask why this happened ? Was it maybe (a naive question) due to all-out collectivization pursued by Stalin who wanted to collectivize all peasants in a mere 4-5 years while up to 1929 only 1% had joined kolkhozs ?One of the obvious reasons for that was the rapid rise of urban, non-agricultural population. According to the census of 1926 the urban population of the USSR was equal to 26 millions, in 1932 it was already estimated as 40 millions, a 50% higher.
the proletariat... must as government take measures through which the peasant finds his condition immediately improved, so as to win him for the revolution; measures which will at least provide the possibility of easing the transition from private ownership of land to collective ownership, so that the peasant arrives at this of his own accord, from economic reasons. It must not hit the peasant over the head, as it would e.g. by proclaiming the abolition of the right of inheritance or the abolition of his property.
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/wo ... -notes.htm
a. so 7 million+ starved to sow a harvest, no it was from over collectivization and Stalins mythical thinking peasants where hiding grainIt was enacted having in mind :
a)That if all leave the villages there would and even worse situation as there would be no one to sow and harvest so the famine will hit the cities even worse.
b)Overcrowding of cities by typhus infested peasants would bring more hell.
was this not the end result? and could both be scene and known to be happening...while excess grain was not sent back to the Ukraine in 1932-33 as it was forbidden to organize relief. The SU exported 4.8 million ton of grain in 1930, 5.2 million in 1931 and 2 million in 1932-33. In fact there were stores of grain in the Ukraine itself, some of it in locale granaries under armed guard-much of it in large heaps piled in the open (for example at Kiev-Petrovka station), where it was left to rot, still under armed guard. source Victor Kravchenko "I choose freedom" page 130And another thing , the internal passport and the punishment of leaving a certain area wasn't enacted because Stalin or his government wanted people to starve out.