Comparative air force performance & a/c production

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Guaporense
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Re: German vs. Allied war-making potential

Post by Guaporense » 22 Feb 2010 21:03

The_Enigma wrote:In regards to Normandy air force casualties:

Major Ellis notes that 163,403 allied sorties were flown between 6-30 June; his info is a little confusing so am not to sure if he is suggesting the 1,508 planes lost was the complete total. He states these losses are from Bomber Command and 8th Air force however his sortie table includes 2TAF, ADGB, Costal Command, and 9th AF.
These sorties were over the entire continent, not just normandy. Over normandy most of these sorties were flew, second to Strategy for Defeat, 130,000.
In comparion between these dates the Luftwaffe flew 13,829 sorties for the loss of 808 aircraft.
That was Luftflotte 3 over normandy.
480,317 sorties flown by the various Allied air forces (2TAF, ADGB, Bomber Command, Costal Command, 8AF and 9AF) for the loss of 4,101 aircraft between 6 June and 31 August)
That was nearly the entire number of sorties that the luftwaffe flew in 1944 (524,487).
"In tactics, as in strategy, superiority in numbers is the most common element of victory." - Carl von Clausewitz

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Guaporense
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Re: German vs. Allied war-making potential

Post by Guaporense » 22 Feb 2010 21:05

RichTO90 wrote:USAAF losses (combat and accident) in theaters versus Germany during 1944 were 13,868. Another 807 were 2nd Line losses. USAAF losses on combat missions in theaters versus Germany during 1944 were 11,618. Of those, 2,465 were to other causes (accident and unknown). Losses to enemy action included 4,063 to enemy aircraft and 5,190 to flak.
So, combat aircraft losses were 11,618 in 1944 versus Germany. Plus British, we get to over 20,000. Assuming that your 12,600 statistic for the luftwaffe includes only combat losses then we would have about 16,500 losses including accidents. About 12,000 in the western front and 4,500 in the eastern front.
Guaporense wrote:Strategy for defeat gives: 4,080 fighter losses due to accident and combat in the first half of 1944. If losses increased by 15% in the second half of 1944, we get: 8,728 fighter losses, for accident and combat in 1944. You gave 9,407 fighter losses. So, I think this number refers to accident and combat losses.
Why do you insist on trying to compute losses for months where you have no data on months were you have data? Why do you think losses "increased by 15% in the second half of 1944"? Why not 5%? Or 25%?
Did you read my post? I have clearly explained why.
Last edited by Guaporense on 22 Feb 2010 21:30, edited 1 time in total.
"In tactics, as in strategy, superiority in numbers is the most common element of victory." - Carl von Clausewitz

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Re: German vs. Allied war-making potential

Post by ljadw » 22 Feb 2010 21:06

On the other hand,Hootton (Eagle in Flames ) gives for 1940 3710 fighters and for 1944 30885 .
Some one could enlighten me ?

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Guaporense
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Re: German vs. Allied war-making potential

Post by Guaporense » 22 Feb 2010 21:08

ljadw wrote:Guaporense:German fighter production in 1940 was 2746,in 1944 25285 (or maybe you are counting ground-attack aircraft as fighters ?)Source :The Luftwaffe War Diaries (C.Bekker)Appendix XIII
Well, clearly, you are using more specific figures than I am. My figures come from the British Bombing Survey.
"In tactics, as in strategy, superiority in numbers is the most common element of victory." - Carl von Clausewitz

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Re: German vs. Allied war-making potential

Post by ljadw » 22 Feb 2010 21:37

Meyer wrote:
Guaporense wrote:
Since fighters only made up about 13% of all aircraft in the eastern front in 1944 (400 out of 3000 (1)).

(1) http://www.lesbutler.ip3.co.uk/jg26/thtrlosses.htm
I don't see those numbers in Don Caldwell's page. And they are wrong, according to http://sturmvogel.orbat.com/LWOB.html#Jagdwaffe
I counted 541 fighters "on hand" for a total of 2355 aircraft in the "East" (including Norway, Finland and the Balkans). That would represent a 23%, and I did not include any night fighters or the Focke-Wulfs of the SG units...
Hooton (Eagle in flames )is giving on 31 may 1944 for the East (Lflt 1,6, 4):390 figthers on a total of 2199
I think it is useless to use as date 1944 :there were a lot of fluctuations

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Re: German vs. Allied war-making potential

Post by The_Enigma » 22 Feb 2010 21:47

Guaporense wrote:
The_Enigma wrote:In regards to Normandy air force casualties:

Major Ellis notes that 163,403 allied sorties were flown between 6-30 June; his info is a little confusing so am not to sure if he is suggesting the 1,508 planes lost was the complete total. He states these losses are from Bomber Command and 8th Air force however his sortie table includes 2TAF, ADGB, Costal Command, and 9th AF.
These sorties were over the entire continent, not just normandy. Over normandy most of these sorties were flew, second to Strategy for Defeat, 130,000.
Quite correct i didnt read that first table correctly; In direct and indirect support of the operation they flew: 131,263 sorties that month. No mention of specific losses during those sorties.

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Re: German vs. Allied war-making potential

Post by Guaporense » 22 Feb 2010 23:30

Here we have total and partial losses of single engine fighters to all causes:
Image

Losses in 1944 were 16,000, quite low considering production.

The Red Air Force was quite weak in breaking the luftwaffe. The losses inflicted on german fighters in the eastern front were almost insignificant.
"In tactics, as in strategy, superiority in numbers is the most common element of victory." - Carl von Clausewitz

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Re: German vs. Allied war-making potential

Post by Guaporense » 23 Feb 2010 00:09

But, now look at the relative strenghts of opposing strategic bombing operations:
Image

We can see a vast allied increase between 1943 and 1944, while german strength doesn't increase. That's because of lack of pilots, particularly in 1944. Second to the American Strategic Bombing survey:

"Enemy opposition to the bomber raids had grown very little numerically in the last nine months. The number of bombers in US task forces had multiplied by four in the same period, and fighter escort numbers also had become four times as great (Figure 4). For example, in the fall of 1943, 300 bombers and 200 escort fighters had been opposed by 200 or more enemy fighters. In May 1944 comparative figures show 1,000 bombers with 900 escort fighters opposed by some 300 enemy interceptors."

Why German fighter strength didn't increase, since production nearly tripled between 1943 and 1944? Well:

"The enemy situation is confirmed in an interview with Lieutenant General Karl Koller, Chief of Staff of the Luftwaffe, who stated that In addition to the lack of suitable fighter aircraft, the Luftwaffe was handicapped by lack of petroleum and of well-trained pilots. When General Seller became Chief of the Air Staff in 1943 he found that the total aviation gasoline alloted to pilot training was 10,000 tone a month. By February 1944, he had increased this allotment to 50,000 tons. Thereafter, the progressive difficulties in production caused by air attack made it necessary to curtail training and finally to cease training altogether. (Reference Note 6)"

If they allocated 50,000 tons of fuel to training one year earlier... They literally failed to plant pilot trees!

50,000 tons of fuel is not that much, german oil supplies were 800,000-900,000 tons per month before may 1944, german aircraft fuel production was 200,000 tons per month before the bombings.

German single engine fighter production:

January 1944 1,316
February 1944 1,016
March 1944 1,377
April 1944 1,696
May 1944 1,907
Juno 1944 2,177
July 1944 2,687
August 1944 2,779
September 1944 3,031
October 1944 2,735
November 1944 2,776
December 1944 2,424

Note that production reach turning tide levels only in may, by that time however, fuel production colapsed and they couldn't train the pilots to use the aircraft nor actually use them.

Compare the trends of force strength between the USAF and the german interceptors:
Image
German strength peaked in mid 1944, when aircraft fuel reserves were ending.
Last edited by Guaporense on 23 Feb 2010 00:50, edited 2 times in total.
"In tactics, as in strategy, superiority in numbers is the most common element of victory." - Carl von Clausewitz

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Re: German vs. Allied war-making potential

Post by Meyer » 23 Feb 2010 00:28

Guaporense wrote:
Why German fighter strength didn't increase, since production nearly tripled between 1943 and 1944? Well:
.
What is missing in this equation?

hint: starts with a "L"

Otherwise, I have no idea what is being discussed here.

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Guaporense
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Re: German vs. Allied war-making potential

Post by Guaporense » 23 Feb 2010 00:35

Meyer wrote:
Guaporense wrote:
Why German fighter strength didn't increase, since production nearly tripled between 1943 and 1944? Well:
.
What is missing in this equation?

hint: starts with a "L"

Otherwise, I have no idea what is being discussed here.
German fighter losses in 1944 were smaller than in 1943 in proportion to production! Also, US losses in 1944 were higher than in 1943 (3 times higher!), and by a larger extent than german losses.

Yes, you don't have any idea of my argument here.
"In tactics, as in strategy, superiority in numbers is the most common element of victory." - Carl von Clausewitz

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Re: German vs. Allied war-making potential

Post by Meyer » 23 Feb 2010 01:03

Guaporense wrote: Yes, you don't have any idea of my argument here.
I guess not. But, I'm gonna take a shot: are you suggesting that by, let's say, January 1945, the LW had thousands and thousands of fighters stored, waiting for pilots to be available? :roll:

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Re: German vs. Allied war-making potential

Post by Meyer » 23 Feb 2010 04:44

ljadw wrote:
Meyer wrote:
Guaporense wrote:
Since fighters only made up about 13% of all aircraft in the eastern front in 1944 (400 out of 3000 (1)).

(1) http://www.lesbutler.ip3.co.uk/jg26/thtrlosses.htm
I don't see those numbers in Don Caldwell's page. And they are wrong, according to http://sturmvogel.orbat.com/LWOB.html#Jagdwaffe
I counted 541 fighters "on hand" for a total of 2355 aircraft in the "East" (including Norway, Finland and the Balkans). That would represent a 23%, and I did not include any night fighters or the Focke-Wulfs of the SG units...
Hooton (Eagle in flames )is giving on 31 may 1944 for the East (Lflt 1,6, 4):390 figthers on a total of 2199
I think it is useless to use as date 1944 :there were a lot of fluctuations
Sorry, missed this post. Actually, those figures are very similar to the ones I quoted, it's just that you have to add the Luftflotte 5 and the Luftwaffenkommando Südost to compare apples with apples. Since those formations are more "fighter heavy", if not included the fighter percentage would be lower. I guess it depends on how "east" is defined.
Anyway, that figure also shows that the 13% was wrong...

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Re: German vs. Allied war-making potential

Post by RichTO90 » 23 Feb 2010 05:18

Guaporense wrote:These sorties were over the entire continent, not just normandy. Over normandy most of these sorties were flew, second to Strategy for Defeat, 130,000.
Surreal... :roll:

Air activity in the Battle of Normandy 1- 18 July (AIR 41/67 "The Liberation of North-West Europe Volume IV, 12 June to 30 September 1944")

Luftwaffe Sorties 8,840
Luftwaffe Losse Reported 355
Allied Claims 329
Allied Sorties in Luftflotte 3 Area 55,747
Allied Losses Reported 312
German Claims 314

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Re: German vs. Allied war-making potential

Post by bf109 emil » 23 Feb 2010 07:28

Why German fighter strength didn't increase, since production nearly tripled between 1943 and 1944?
paret of the problem lies with the Luftwaffe itself...

Production in the early years of the war was small, primarily because Luftwaffe requirements were modest -- in 1941 according to captured minutes of German staff conferences, General Jeschonneck, then chief of the air staff, opposed a suggested increase in fighter plane production with the remark that he wouldn't know what to do with a monthly production of more than 360 fighters. However, in the autumn of 1943 plans then current called for a steadily increasing output of fighters.

Germany was never pre-pared not even in the early stages of war had provisions for a large fighter force...

total German aircraft production for 1944 including all types of aircraft taken from sources after the war where said to be...

Detailed production data for this period, as for others, were taken by the Survey, and German air generals, production officials, and leading manufacturers, including Messerschmitt and Tank (of Focke-Wulf) were interrogated at length. Production was not knocked out for long. On the contrary, during the whole year of 1944 the German air force is reported to have accepted a total of 39,807 aircraft of all types -- compared with 8,295 in 1939, or 15,596 in 1942 before the plants suffered any attack

coupled with the earlier reply by Jeschonneck shows the complete failure in a sorts for Germany to increase both training and lack of preparedness

The Defeat of the German Air Force

The seeming paradox of the attack on the aircraft plants is that, although production recovered quickly, the German air force after the attacks

was not again a serious threat to Allied air superiority. The attacks in the winter of 1944 were escorted by P-51's and P-47's and with the appearance of these planes in force a sharp change had been ordered in escort tactics. Previously the escort planes had to protect the bomber force as their primary responsibility. They were now instructed to invite opposition from German fighter forces and to engage them at every opportunity. As a result, German fighter losses mounted sharply. The claimed losses in January were 1,115 German fighters, in February 1,118 and in March 1,217. The losses in planes were accompanied by losses in experienced pilots and disorganization and loss of the combat strength of squadrons and groups. By the spring of 1944 opposition of the Luftwaffe had ceased to be effective.

German air generals responsible for operations in France stated under interrogation that on D-day the Luftwaffe had only 80 operational planes with which to oppose the invasion. At no time between D-day and the breakthrough at St. Lo did reinforcements offset losses and increase the size of this force.

German fighter production continued to increase during the summer of 1944, and acceptances reached a peak of 3,375 in September. Although it has studied the problem with considerable care, the Survey has no clear answer as to what happened to these planes; the differences of opinion between German air generals, it might be added, are at least as great as between those who have searched for the explanation. Certainly only a minority of the planes appeared in combat. Possibly the remainder were lost in transit from factory to combat bases, destroyed on the fields, or grounded because of a shortage of gasoline or pilots. Conceivably some are part of an inflation of German production figures. The answer is not clear.

After September, German aircraft production declined gradually until December, when 3,155 planes were accepted, and in January 1945, because of the shortage of gasoline, production of
Page 8

all except jet types was virtually discontinued.
the preceding source being
THE UNITED STATES STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY...Summary Report...(European War)...September 30, 1945

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Re: German vs. Allied war-making potential

Post by The_Enigma » 23 Feb 2010 10:05

RichTO90 wrote:
Guaporense wrote:These sorties were over the entire continent, not just normandy. Over normandy most of these sorties were flew, second to Strategy for Defeat, 130,000.
Surreal... :roll:

Air activity in the Battle of Normandy 1- 18 July (AIR 41/67 "The Liberation of North-West Europe Volume IV, 12 June to 30 September 1944")

Luftwaffe Sorties 8,840
Luftwaffe Losse Reported 355
Allied Claims 329
Allied Sorties in Luftflotte 3 Area 55,747
Allied Losses Reported 312
German Claims 314
Hi Rich, what was Luftflotte 3's area?

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