Why did Hitler send so many units to Tunisia after Torch ?

[Jon G.]

From pp 312 ff of C. B. A. Behrens' book, referenced above:

Originally, the British shipping component for the Torch forces were estimated at 66 ships per month, but as it turned out the War Office had miscalculated how many vehicles were needed - and therefore underestimated the per-man cargo space needed - so in fact the average number of ships sailing from Britain for North Africa was 106 per month for the months from October 1942 thru January 1943: 128 sailings in October; 131 in November; 73 in December, and 91 in January.

Apparently due to continued enemey resistance, the build-up phase continued for months longer than anticipated; the last major British formation to be shipped to NW Africa was the 1st Airborne Division, which was sent as late as April 1943.

'Maintenance levels' (that is, shipping needed post-build up) were estimated at 30 ships per month, but again this estimate proved wrong, chiefly due to continued enemy resistance. Instead of the planned 30 sailings per month, 92 ships were sent in February; 75 in March; 38 in April, and 80 in May.

Put together, that put a serious drain on British shipping - the NW Africa-bound convoys couldn't bring anything of use back (in a certain sense cutting their usefulness in half); NW Africa-bound ships even had to bring their own ballast for the return voyage.

Combined, the shipping requirements of Operation Torch were enough to put WO use of shipping under intense scrutiny (as civilian use of shipping had been rationalized earlier); British imports fell to the lowest levels hitherto seen during the war (national levels of consumption could only be maintained by eating into stocks), and other convoys had to take very wide detours due to the shortage of escorts.

To varying degrees, all that can be taken as an indirect effect of the Axis decision to fight it out for Tunisia. It was probably also cause for the extreme fixation on shipping which the British showed at Casablanca, when they pressed for (and got) approval of the invasion of Sicily.

[Dave Bender]

It's not like the 250K POW bag from Tunis was made up of first-class combat troops who would otherwise have been available for the defense of Fortress Europe. A good chunk of them (though I don't know precisely how many) were made up of various rear-echelong types, Organisation Todt and the like, in the nice-to-have-but-easy-to-replace category.

Rear echelon troops typically require longer training then combat troops. Consequently they are more expensive to produce. Furthermore they typically operate equipment more expensive then that issued to a WWII era German infantryman. The grunts won't want to hear this but if someone must be sacrificed it should be the infantry. Not the more expensive combat support personnel and their more expensive equipment.

Let's look at modern U.S. Army course lengths as they are much easier to find then WWII German course lengths.
http://www.coloradoguard.army.mil/mos-list.pdf
4.5 weeks. 11B Infantryman.
6 weeks. 88M Truck driver.
7.5 weeks. 21W Carpenter.
8.5 weeks. 42A Personnel services specialist.
8.5 weeks. 21E Heavy construction equipment operator.
8.5 weeks. 92G Food service specialist
14 weeks. 15Q Air traffic control.
14 weeks. 68E Dental specialist.
16.5 weeks. 35F Intelligence analyst.
14.5 weeks. 15G Aircraft structural repairer.
17 weeks. 31B Military police.
17.5 weeks. 15B & 15D Aircraft powerplant repairer (i.e. aircraft engine mechanic).
17.5 weeks. 35N Signals intelligence analyst.
18 weeks. 21U Topographic analyst.
52 weeks. 68J Medical logistics specialist.

[Jon G.]

It's not like the 250K POW bag from Tunis was made up of first-class combat troops who would otherwise have been available for the defense of Fortress Europe. A good chunk of them (though I don't know precisely how many) were made up of various rear-echelong types, Organisation Todt and the like, in the nice-to-have-but-easy-to-replace category.

Rear echelon troops typically require longer training then combat troops. Consequently they are more expensive to produce. Furthermore they typically operate equipment more expensive then that issued to a WWII era German infantryman. The grunts won't want to hear this but if someone must be sacrificed it should be the infantry. Not the more expensive combat support personnel and their more expensive equipment.

Let's look at modern U.S. Army course lengths as they are much easier to find then WWII German course lengths.
http://www.coloradoguard.army.mil/mos-list.pdf
4.5 weeks. 11B Infantryman.
6 weeks. 88M Truck driver.
7.5 weeks. 21W Carpenter.
8.5 weeks. 42A Personnel services specialist.
8.5 weeks. 21E Heavy construction equipment operator.
8.5 weeks. 92G Food service specialist
14 weeks. 15Q Air traffic control.
14 weeks. 68E Dental specialist.
16.5 weeks. 35F Intelligence analyst.
14.5 weeks. 15G Aircraft structural repairer.
17 weeks. 31B Military police.
17.5 weeks. 15B & 15D Aircraft powerplant repairer (i.e. aircraft engine mechanic).
17.5 weeks. 35N Signals intelligence analyst.
18 weeks. 21U Topographic analyst.
52 weeks. 68J Medical logistics specialist.

How many dentists and food service specialists did the Germans lose at Tunisgrad?

Yes, specialists take longer to train than ordinary infantrymen, but a) 1940s era specialists can't be considered equal to present-day highly specalized support troops, and b) many auxiliary services were outsourced anyway - the loss of, eg. Organisation Todt dockhands would be detrimental to the German war effort in the wider picture, but not really to the fighting power of the Wehrmacht.

I can't find the page reference, but I recall Tooze mentioning (in TWoD) that Germans trained to drive trucks were handed their licenses after two hours' worth of driving. Clearly, present-day training times for US Army specialists will not tell us much about training times for comparable German specialists.

[Dili]

I am not convinced that Tunisia was the better option for Axis . All that German Divisions and even the good trained Italian Units in NA contributing to fortification of Sicily could have postponed the invasion, most of them would be veterans not the tripwire garrison Italian Coastal Divisions.
Sicily was if i am not mistaken was one of biggest invasion ever, put there more 3 capable divisions and it would even bigger. For each competent Axis Division Allies need to bring 2 at least. So we are talking about 6 more divisions added to Invasion Force plus support.

[Dave Bender]

How many dentists and food service specialists did the Germans lose at Tunisgrad?

I have no idea. However I've got to assume they had a general hospital and dental clinic in Tunisia. They probably also had workshops for major repairs to vehicles, aircraft, radios, artillery pieces etc. Certainly they had supply dumps (mostly empty!) staffed by supply personnel. And construction engineers with heavy equipment like bulldozers, dump trucks etc. All such vulnerable but expensive to produce support units should have been evacuated ahead of any infantry evacuations.

[merdiolu]

How many dentists and food service specialists did the Germans lose at Tunisgrad?

I have no idea. However I've got to assume they had a general hospital and dental clinic in Tunisia. They probably also had workshops for major repairs to vehicles, aircraft, radios, artillery pieces etc. Certainly they had supply dumps (mostly empty!) staffed by supply personnel. And construction engineers with heavy equipment like bulldozers, dump trucks etc. All such vulnerable but expensive to produce support units should have been evacuated ahead of any infantry evacuations.

Mocking German combat personnel in Tunis as "dentists" is a little bit unfair. A lot of soldiers send to Panzer Armee Africa were picked due to their durability in North African climate and should be in good pyschical health and adaptable to local fighting conditions. I 'd say they were good soldiers. Yes there were some second class German and Italian units like 999th Inf. Division , a punishment unit for criminal offenders in Wehrmacht. But there were also elite fighting units like 10th Panzer Div. , Hermann Göring Panzer Div and Ramcke Parachute Brigade

[Carl Schwamberger]

However you cut it the Axis lost around 250,000 men in Africa in April/May. I am curious as to how many were lost from November to March. For these I'd include killed, captured, missing, & permanently maimed. Adding that to the total, then subtracting the strength of Axis forces in Africa at the end of October (this assumes they could not be saved to Europe) would give a approximation of the actual Axis cost for the Tunisian Bridgehead in manpower.

Looking at the cost for the Allied side the variable is if one thinks the Allied armies & air forces could have been better used elsewhere. Most folk dismiss the Roundup option as impractical, which leaves one searching for a more efficient place to use that Allied arm group committed to the Tunisian battle in 1943. Norway? Burma? South Pacifc? Alteutians? Any other ideas on a better place?