Polish Karpaty Army !

[Bohusz]

11 Infantry Division was part of the "Krakow" Army.
September 9, 1939 was created "Malopolska" Army from "Karpaty" Army and some formation from "Krakow" Army including 11 Infantry Division.

[Andy H]

Thanks, do you have any info on the 11th Infantry Division?

Andy

[Bohusz]

11 Infantry Division "Karpacka" commander col. B. Prugar-Ketling

- 48 Infantry Regiment "Strzelcow Kresowych"
- 53 Infantry Regiment "Strzelcow Kresowych"
- 49 Rifleman Regiment "Huculski"
- 11 Light Art. Regiment
- 11 Heavy Art. Squadron
- 11 AA Battery
- 11 Engineer Battalion
- 11 Telefonic Company
- Divisional Cavalry
- AA HMG Company
- 11 Cyclists Company

September 16, 1939 near Janow 11 Infantry Division disrupted SS "Germania" Motorized Infantry Regiment and leater was defended Przemysl.

[Musashi]

11 Infantry Division "Karpacka" commander col. B. Prugar-Ketling

- 48 Infantry Regiment "Strzelcow Kresowych"
- 53 Infantry Regiment "Strzelcow Kresowych"
- 49 Rifleman Regiment "Huculski"
- 11 Light Art. Regiment
- 11 Heavy Art. Squadron
- 11 AA Battery
- 11 Engineer Battalion
- 11 Telefonic Company
- Divisional Cavalry
- AA HMG Company
- 11 Cyclists Company

HQ (or home city) of 11th Infantry Division was Stanis³awów (present Ivano-Frankovsk in Ukraine).

September 16, 1939 near Janow 11 Infantry Division was disrupted SS "Germania" Motorized Infantry Regiment and leater was defended Przemysl.

Exactly 49th Mountain Rifles Regiment.
Regards

[Musashi]

11 Infantry Division was part of the "Krakow" Army.
September 9, 1939 was created "Malopolska" Army from "Karpaty" Army and some formation from "Krakow" Army including 11 Infantry Division.

No, amigo,
11th Infantry Division was a part of "Karpaty" Army. I can understant it, the borders between "Karpaty" and "Kraków" Armies were not clear. It started to unload from the trains (together with 24th Infantry Division) under German bombs in September 5th.
Regards

[Andy H]

Thank you Musashi & Bohusz for the Info on the OoB

Andy

[Musashi]

Thank you Musashi & Bohusz for the Info on the OoB

Andy

Ninguno problema
Saludo

[kmociak]

Can anyone give me some details of the 48th Infantry regiment of the Polish Army of WW2. I believe it was stationed in Stanislawow and all soldiers captured on the 17 Sept 1939 by the Germans. My father served with the group and I trying to learn anything I can.

[Piotr Kapuscinski]

Hi Kmociak. 48th Infantry Regiment was stationed in Stanislawow only during peacetime.

In September 1939, after mobilization, it was part of 11th Infantry Division and fought together with it.

Even if somehow your father stayed in Stanislawow, he couldn't be captured by the Germans because Stanislawow was never captured by them - it was captured by Soviet 23rd Tank Brigade on 19 September 1939.

Can you tell us something more about your father's service - it will be easier to identify in which unit he served.

Because 48th Infantry Regiment mobilized also several other, reserve units.

[tigre]

Hello to all ; taking advantage of this old thread...............................

The "Carpathian" Army.

Plans of employment and Army capabilities.

The Carpathian Army ("Karpaty") was the youngest operational organization to oppose the Wehrmacht under the "West" („Zachód”) operational plan. The order that established it was issued on July 11, 1939, when his duties were assigned to the then Army Inspector in Lwow (Lviv), Gen. dyw. Kazimierz Fabrycy. The army was tasked with defending the southern border of the country in the Carpathians, from Czorsztyn to the border with Hungary. In addition to protect the central industrial district and the wing and rear of the Army "Krakow" by closing the passages that go from Slovakia to Rzeszów and Krakow in the Carpathians, recognizing the enemy and vigorously opposing from the same border; maintain contact with the "Krakow" Army; monitor the directions leading from Hungary to the east of Little Poland (Małopolskę), and in particular to the Borysław oil basin, organizing reconnaissance at the Carpathian crossings and retarding the opponent with available forces.

Initially, the only units received by the Army were the 1st Podhale Rifle Regiment in Nowy Sącz, two Border Protection Corps (KOP) regiments and the independent KOP "Żytyń" battalion, with minimal support from artillery and other formations. Two air squadrons (31st Reconnaissance Squadron, 56th Observation Squadron) and a platoon of liaison aircraft were assigned to the army.

Even during the Marshal's conversation with General Fabrycy, the former emphasized the role of fortifications and destruction that could hinder the advance of enemy forces in the mountainous area. However, there was not enough time for more serious work in this area.

In August, it was planned to create a "Tarnów" reserve with the force of two infantry divisions to support the Carpathian Army. However, the most important role in defending the southern border of the state was played by the "Krakow" Army, established in March 1939. Its importance was particularly evident in light of the "West" defense plan.

It was to constitute a "hinge" in the Polish defense group, which was to withdraw to the southeast in the second phase of operations. According to the plans of August 1939, the "Krakow" Army was to have at its disposal 7 infantry divisions, a cavalry brigade and a motorized cavalry brigade.

Meanwhile, the German forces that would attack from Upper Silesia and from the south were assessed at 9-12 infantry divisions, 2-3 rapid divisions, against which Poland could oppose 9 infantry divisions (including 2 from the reserve) , a cavalry brigade and a motorized cavalry brigade. In light of the tasks assigned to the "Krakow" Army, it should be noted that the tasks that were put before it were very difficult. On the other hand, the Carpathian Army, which only had cover troops without artillery, was in fact a fictitious army.

Sources: Armia „Karpaty”. Piotr Chmielowiec. Dodatek historyczny Instytutu Pamięci Narodowej. Oddział w Rzeszowie.

Cheers. Raúl M .

[tigre]

Hello to all ; more...............................

The "Carpathian" Army.

Plans of employment and Army capabilities.

How did General Kazimierz Fabrycy plan to carry out the tasks entrusted to his army? Due to the weakness of his forces, almost devoid of anti-tank weapons, he saw the only option in trying to stop the enemy right on the border with Slovakia, where the terrain facilitated defense. This objective was to be achieved by destroying the following ways: creating huge craters in roads and highways in places where detours cannot be made and the blowing up of bridges on all the roads in the front; the creation of barriers by mines in front of the sections defended by the infantry; dig in back roads and clearings in the woods. He wrote this in his post-war account, where he clearly stated that the chances of resistance existed only in the strip south of the line: Stary Sącz-Grybów-Gorlice-Żmigród-Dukla-Rymanów-Bukowsko-Baligród.

It was not possible further north, where the terrain made possible the development of the German forces. The second place that, according to General Fabrycy, gave the opportunity to stop the enemy with little means and forces was the Dunajec valley. The Poprad Valley created poorer defense possibilities and the assessment of defense possibilities south of Dukla and Rymanów was poor. Better on the other hand, in the Baligród region, that is, the Łupkowska and Nad Roztokami pass. The general's post-war report also mentions the possibility of an offensive securing the border with Slovakia, which would mean the need to occupy the northern part of it.

He was referring to an offensive towards Poprad and then the Hungarian border. This would make it possible to paralyze German plans to use Slovakia to attack Poland. This plan was probably not taken into account by Marshal Rydz-Śmigły, for political reasons. On the other hand, neither the commander of the "Karpaty" Army nor the "Krakow" Army had forces that could be used for this purpose. The considerations also included General Fabrycy's reflections on the possibility of organizing a diversion in Slovakia.

What fortification works were carried out until the outbreak of war in the area under the jurisdiction of the "Karpaty" Army? In June and July 1939, a special commission of the General Staff under the leadership of Colonel. dipl. Marian Porwit, selected four locations where permanent fortifications were planned to be built. For economic reasons, the works were postponed until 1940. The only option that remained was to build field fortifications and prepare the damages. Among the objects prepared to be blown up, there was the łupkowski tunnel and the road junctions: Polany, Tylawa and Jaśliska. A company of sappers from the 22nd Sapper Battalion was sent to build the field fortifications, and soldiers from the National Defense (ON) battalions were used in the second half of August. Local people also helped with the works. This allowed for firing trenches, machine gun positions, and barbed wire placement. At the positions of the main line of defense, positions were created for machine guns, anti-tank guns and anti-tank obstacles. These works could not be completed before the war broke out. Among the reserve units that were to strengthen the "Karpaty" Army, none arrived in this area before the outbreak of the war.

Sources: Armia „Karpaty”. Piotr Chmielowiec. Dodatek historyczny Instytutu Pamięci Narodowej. Oddział w Rzeszowie.

Cheers. Raúl M .

[tigre]

Hello to all ; more...............................

The "Carpathian" Army.

War.

After the announcement of the emergency mobilization, the forces under the "Karpaty" Army, supported by the ON battalions, were transformed into the 2nd and 3rd Mountain Brigades. In the first days of the war, there were only border clashes between the elements of the 2nd Mountain Brigade (BG) and the Border Guard, and Slovak units. It was a mistake to prohibit the bombing of the recognized Spišská Nová Ves airport in eastern Slovakia, from where German bomber planes operated. The order of the General Staff also prohibited the bombing of the column of the 4th Light Division (DL) detected in this area. This was due to pre-war agreements with the British and British government that forbade the bombing of living targets on enemy territory.

Only after the 4th DL crossed the state border, its column was attacked on the Nowy Targ-Chabówka road through the 31st ER. On September 2, two-day fights with German troops began in the Dunajec valley. In fact, the units of the German 2nd Mountain Division (GD) were stopped in this area by the unit of Capt. Roman Wróblewski, composed of the KOP "Żytyń" battalion and the ON "Limanowa" battalion. The defense of Dunajec and Poprad, organized on September 5 by the 2nd BG in Nowy Sącz, was worse. By an arbitrary decision of Col. Aleksander Stawarza, the unit was withdrawn to the line of the Biała River. The commander assessed that without the support of artillery he had little chance of defense. Thus, there was a danger that the position of the "Karpaty" Army would be circumvented from Małopolska.

The course of hostilities in the Army "Kraków" section was particularly disturbing, where German troops threatened the entire army, which had a real impact on the entire defense plan "West". The beginning of the withdrawal of the "Kraków" Army to the east on September 3 brought a decision to Marshal Rydz-Śmigły, entrusting the defense of the Dunajec line to the "Karpaty" Army.

For this purpose, it was subordinated to the 24th Infantry Division (DP), which was directed to the Tarnów-Dębica area. The division was mobilized in the Podkarpackie garrisons in the general mobilization and intended for the Guard of the Commander-in-Chief. In the region of Jasło, however, most of the units of the 11th Carpathian Infantry Division (KDP) were unloaded. Unfortunately, the main defense effort in the southern part of Podkarpacie still rested on the KOP and ON battalions without the support of artillery. Meanwhile, the German side introduced further mountain units here.

Sources: Armia „Karpaty”. Piotr Chmielowiec. Dodatek historyczny Instytutu Pamięci Narodowej. Oddział w Rzeszowie.

Cheers. Raúl M .

[tigre]

Hello to all ; more...............................

The "Carpathian" Army.

War.

September 6 was marked by a successful defense of the 24th Infantry Division on the Dunajec line with the approaching reconnaissance units from the German 4th LeDiv, but this effort was thwarted at dusk by General Fabrycy's order that ordered the withdrawal of the division beyond the Wisłoka. The decision turned out to be fateful. It was not possible to connect with the approaching "Krakow" Army units, and the columns of the 24th Infantry Division marching during the day suffered casualties near Tuchow by German motorized units. On the basis of the first incomplete information about the breakdown of the division, as well as additionally on the losses suffered by the Army "Krakow" units in Dunajec, General Fabrycy decided to continue the withdrawal behind the San. The time required for the infantry divisions to reach the river was to be provided by the 10th Cavalry Brigade (BK), which was tasked with delaying the German armored and motorized forces between Rzeszów and Jarosław.

Following the wrong decision of the army commander, the commanders of the infantry divisions subordinate to him, who on September 8 arbitrarily abandoned their positions on the Wisłoka River, avoided fighting, at least temporarily. Leaving them Brig. Gen. Bronisław Prugar-Ketling explained the negative assessment of the capacity of the Wisłoka River area for defense. Under the new command of the 24th Infantry Division, on September 12 he participated in the bloody battle with the units of the 2. GD near Bircza. The 11th KDP was also involved in the attack, unfortunately the joint operation was canceled by the commander of Task Force "Południowa (South)", Brig. Kazimierz Łukoski. General Fabrycy's order on the return of the group's units to Przemyśl contributed to this. However, no one informed Colonel Bolesław Schwarzenberg-Czerny about the change in plans. 10 km west of Bircza, the last battle was fought by the 17th Infantry Regiment. While breaking the German siege on Borownica, its commander, Lieutenant Colonel Dipl. Benjamin Kotarba fell and the regiment dispersed.

As of September 7, the forces of the German 1. GD began decisive actions south of Krępna, which soon led to the rejection of the ON battalions located there, supported by the KOP "Żytyń" regiment. In the next three days, German mountain units seized the southern part of Podkarpacie, occupying Gorlice, Jasło, Krosno, and Sanok. A particularly surprising event for the Polish team took place in Krosno. The Germans stormed the market square at night, where the Staff of the 2nd BG (mountain brigade) was having dinner at a nearby restaurant. Some of the brigade personnel were taken prisoner and their forces were disorganized. As early as the afternoon of September 9, German mountain riflemen crossed the San, thus beginning operations on its eastern bank. They were not countered by units of the 38th Reserve Infantry Division and the 11th KDP on the north side of the German Mountain Corps.

On the contrary, General Fabrycy ordered them to march to Przemyśl. The following day the 3rd BG, after brief struggles at Dobromil and Sambor, left for Stary Sambor to reorganize its ranks. Thus, the way to Lwow / Lemberg was opened for the German pursuit unit. On September 10, the 4. LeDiv also captured the bridgeheads on the right bank of the San River in the Radymno region, which in the short term finally interrupted the strategic plans to defend this line. The defense of Przemyśl on September 14 was to give time for the troops of the Southern Front, commanded by General Kazimierz Sosnkowski (since September 11) to retreat to Lwow.

Sources: Armia „Karpaty”. Piotr Chmielowiec. Dodatek historyczny Instytutu Pamięci Narodowej. Oddział w Rzeszowie.

Cheers. Raúl M .

[tigre]

Hello to all ; more...............................

The "Carpathian" Army.

Keep the line of the San.

In the plans for the war with Germany, which was hastily prepared by the Polish General Staff in the spring of 1939, the main line of southern defense of Poland was the Carpathian range and the Dunajec River. The first three days of the war painfully revised the original plan to conduct a border battle.

Preparations to defend the San line were associated with the unfavorable development of the situation on the front and the desire to recreate a continuous and stable line of defense. On September 6, the Commander-in-Chief, Marshal Edward Rydz-Śmigły, decided to withdraw all units on the left bank of the river across the Vistula. The idea was to create a continuous front line based on the river line: Narew-Biebrza-middle Vistula. The southern section of the defense was to be based on the Dunajec River, and then on the San.

The defense of the Dunajec and Vistula lines to Annopol were to be carried out by the combined forces of the Army "Karpaty" and the Army "Kraków" under the general command of Gen. Kazimierz Fabrycy. If it was not possible to maintain this line, the troops were to retreat to the east, relying on the San.

On the morning of September 7, General Fabrycy issued the first operational order, outlining the general intentions of the command of the “Małopolska” Army. The army was divided into two groups: the "Kraków" Army (under Gen. Antoni Szylling) and the "Southern" Operational Group (under Gen. Kazimierz Łukoski). The latter included two infantry divisions (11th and 24th) and two mountain brigades (2nd and 3rd). The order generally outlined the rules of the retreat east.

The end result of the reversal maneuver was to defend the line Vistula – San. The army commander's reserve was to be concentrated in the Przemyśl region, and it was to include the motorized 10th Cavalry Brigade, transferred from the Army "Kraków". The commander of sappers in the army of "Małopolska" was to organize the transfer of all non-inspection units of sappers beyond the San, where, with the use of civilian labor forces provided by the commander of the rear area, he would immediately start building obstacles and fortifications.

General Fabrycy also gave orders regarding the temporary manning of the defense line on the San River. In view of the rapidly changing situation on the front, the intention to create secondary parts of large units failed, especially those whose place of concentration was to be western and central Poland. The subunits mobilized at the beginning of September 1939 in the near garrisons, directly from the barracks or from railway transports, were directed to fill the defense lines on the San river, or to the advanced positions of individual objectivs.

For example, the 22nd light artillery regiment stationed in Przemyśl formed two artillery groups: for the 36th Reserve Infantry Division (DPRez.) and for the "Prussia" Army. The first of the groups (II. / 40) on September 8 was unloaded from a transport at the railway station in Leżajsk and sent to the defense of Jarosław; the second (50) remained in Przemyśl to support the city's defense.

On the other hand, in Jarosław, based on the 39th Infantry Regiment of Lwow Rifles, the 3rd Battalion of the 154th Infantry Regiment (commander Lt. Col. Franciszek Herzog) was mobilized, which, due to new orders, was sent to Nowosielec near Przeworsk, to defend the Kraków-Lwow road (now the road national number 94). Lt. Col. Herzog held positions until the evening of September 9, when he was ordered to leave his posts and staff in the suburbs in Kuryłówka. It is worth noting that the secondary units in terms of equipment were full-fledged combat units. Their weakness was the fact that organized within the framework of universal mobilization, they needed harmonization and coordination of individual sub-units. Much worse was the equipment of the marching battalions formed in the garrisons near the San, which were insufficiently equipped with artillery and machine weapons. Also in this case, the chemistry of the troops left a lot to be desired.

Sources: Armia „Karpaty”. Piotr Chmielowiec. Dodatek historyczny Instytutu Pamięci Narodowej. Oddział w Rzeszowie.

Cheers. Raúl M .

[tigre]

Hello to all ; more...............................

The "Carpathian" Army.

Keep the line of the San.

The importance of the organized defense on the San river increased and became urgent after September 7, when, as a result of the mistakes made by General Fabrycy, Jarosław's 24th Infantry Division (DP) was partially dispersed on the Tuchów area by heavy armored raids by the German 4. Light Division (DL). The Commander of the 24th Infantry Division (DP), Colonel Dipl. Bolesław Krzyżanowski Arbitrarily decided to change the axis of withdrawal, moving it further south, to the Frysztak-Wysoka-Strzyżów line.

German fast units of the XXII Mot Corps followed by units of the XVII Army Corps (44th and 45th Infantry Divisions) began to pour into the gap between the "Krakow" Army and the GO "Południe" troops. The advances of the German fast units were tried to stop with the Colonel's dipl. Stanislaw Maczek 10th Motorized Cavalry Brigade. However, the Polish unit was too weak to put up stiff resistance against an outnumbered enemy and could only hamper their advance. On the same day, the German 1. Mountain Division near Krępna and Gładyszów broke through the border defense of the 2nd and 3rd Mountain Brigades and broke into Polish territory.

On September 9, Fabrycy, from the command post of Army "Małopolska" in Siedliska, near Przemyśl, issued new orders to defend the San line: from the river estuary to Jarosław, the defense would be led by General Mieczysław Boruta-Spiechowicz (Commander of the Operational Group "Boruta" of the Army of "Krakow"); the defense of the river from Jarosław to Przemyśl was to be carried out by Brig. Wacław Wieczorkiewicz, while direct command of the defense of Przemyśl was taken by General Jan Chmurowicz; the defense of the San line in the Sanok region (from Mrzygłód to Lesko) was organized by the CO of the 3rd Mountain Brigade, Colonel Jan Stefan Kotowicz.

On the afternoon of September 9, an order arrived at the General Staff of the Army "Małopolska", which concisely defined the main task of this army: Hold the general line between Jarosław-Przemyśl and further south to the border with Hungary. Prevent the opponent from penetrating beyond the San line from Jarosław to Sandomierz. The success of all planned activities of the Supreme Command depended on the completion of this task. The cited Supreme Command order also contained information that the 35th Infantry Division and Brig.Gen. Józef Olszyna-Wilczyński (10 infantry battalions and 5 artillery batteries) and two motorized squadrons of the heavier artillery would reinforce the sector. However, these forces were unable to reach their defensive positions until a few days later.

The novelty in General Fabrycy's order was that the defense line south of Przemyśl did not have to be based on the San River. When the Headquarters of Army "Małopolska", established in the Siedliska fort near Przemyśl, received the order, the vanguards of the German XXII Mot Corps reached Rokietnica, just 20 kilometers from the San River. Furthermore, on the evening of September 9, the Germans seized Sanok and mountain hunter patrols crossed the San, because in the summer of 1939 the river was not a major obstacle in the terrain.

Sources: Armia „Karpaty”. Piotr Chmielowiec. Dodatek historyczny Instytutu Pamięci Narodowej. Oddział w Rzeszowie.

Cheers. Raúl M .