Chemical Warfare Coys, R.E. post-Dunkirk 1940

[Gooner1]

You really don't know much about how the British army in 1940 - or any other army at any other time - operated, do you? The NZ Division had clear and explicit orders to "counterattack vigorously" in case of enemy landings by air or sea. Which means they could, and presumably would, do so without the need for any additional blessing by Thorne, Williams (Eastern Command), Brooke, Churchill, or the Archbishop of Canterbury.

NZ Division is under XII Corps command, so I don't think they would be moving without Thorne's blessing and instructions (unless he takes too long!) which isn't really a problem, XII Corps HQ will be the information 'clearing house' of all enemy activity in their area so no-one is going to have a better picture of the invasion landings at that point than Thorne.

[Gooner1]

Am I REALLY going to have to go so low as to illustrate the areas in question by map to show where in relation to the sea they were?

No doubt you will :roll: But first why don't you consider that according to your crazy logic that only troops landed by air can threaten Dover and Folkestone what-if, again, the paratroops were dropped elsewhere, but German troops landed by sea were attacking Dover and Folkestone the NZ Division could just ignore their instructions?

Really? HOW long did it take the FJ to "collect their weapons and sort themselves out" in the Albert bridges drop in May 1940? The Hague drop in May 1940? Or the Corinth bridge drop in 1941?

Why don't you tell us? Example from first drop for a battalion sized force to heading underway to their main objective please.

That's not an answer; are you really saying that the MILFORCE "advance Guard" will be up to 4-5 miles in front of the MILFORCE "main force"....who will be in turn ANOTHER (up to) 4-5 miles in front of the main force THEY are the "advance guard and covering force" for I.E. 2 NZ?

Well done a total comprehension fail! .

[phylo_roadking]

No doubt you will But first why don't you consider that according to your crazy logic that only troops landed by air can threaten Dover and Folkestone what-if, again, the paratroops were dropped elsewhere, but German troops landed by sea were attacking Dover and Folkestone the NZ Division could just ignore their instructions?

Is that the version of their orders that you used, the one that had the specific geographical locations where 2NZ was to operate conveniently left out?

And no, this "... crazy logic that only troops landed by air can threaten Dover and Folkestone what-if" is the complete obverse of what I'm saying; what I'm saying is that in the geographical locations specifically listed in INSTRUCTION No.4 with respect to Dover and Folkestone, it would only BE airborne landings that the 2NZ counterattack could deal with, because...

...but German troops landed by sea were attacking Dover and Folkestone the NZ Division could just ignore their instructions?

...if you read the instructions again, very carefully - and look at a relief/topographical map of the area - then you'll know why they're written how they're written.

NZ Division is under XII Corps command, so I don't think they would be moving without Thorne's blessing and instructions (unless he takes too long!) which isn't really a problem, XII Corps HQ will be the information 'clearing house' of all enemy activity in their area so no-one is going to have a better picture of the invasion landings at that point than Thorne

...which is of course the point I was making earlier - where, how far up the line, and dependent on how much received intelligence would that decision be made? There's going to be a lot of apparently contradictory intelligence received in the first hours of that morning - I wonder how long it would take them to work out there were TWO large blocking forces dropped? Or would they jump (sic) and make a premature and possibly incorrect decision...

That's not an answer; are you really saying that the MILFORCE "advance Guard" will be up to 4-5 miles in front of the MILFORCE "main force"....who will be in turn ANOTHER (up to) 4-5 miles in front of the main force THEY are the "advance guard and covering force" for I.E. 2 NZ?

Well done a total comprehension fail!

Another pointless "non-answer" - either that IS the situation.... or the MILFORCE "main force" would not be spaced 4-5 miles behind the MILFORCE advance guard in front....the Divisional Cavalry etc...and the 2NZ main force 4-5 miles behind MILFORCE.
I know which one *I* believe it to be.

Really? HOW long did it take the FJ to "collect their weapons and sort themselves out" in the Albert bridges drop in May 1940? The Hague drop in May 1940? Or the Corinth bridge drop in 1941?

Why don't you tell us?

A battalion-sized drop??? Well - Schulz' battalion-sized drop at Rotterdam had MG teams arriving at Schulz' position and setting up fire positions just as he signalled his location on the ground by flare after landing

[Gooner1]

No doubt you will But first why don't you consider that according to your crazy logic that only troops landed by air can threaten Dover and Folkestone what-if, again, the paratroops were dropped elsewhere, but German troops landed by sea were attacking Dover and Folkestone the NZ Division could just ignore their instructions?

Is that the version of their orders that you used, the one that had the specific geographical locations where 2NZ was to operate conveniently left out?

And no, this "... crazy logic that only troops landed by air can threaten Dover and Folkestone what-if" is the complete obverse of what I'm saying; what I'm saying is that in the geographical locations specifically listed in INSTRUCTION No.4 with respect to Dover and Folkestone, it would only BE airborne landings that the 2NZ counterattack could deal with, because...

"...but German troops landed by sea were attacking Dover and Folkestone the NZ Division could just ignore their instructions?"

Err... what?

No, don't answer.

...if you read the instructions again, very carefully - and look at a relief/topographical map of the area - then you'll know why they're written how they're written.

No. The Instruction is written, as one might expect :roll: , with precision and brevity. When it says 'landings by sea and/or air', that is what it means

...which is of course the point I was making earlier - where, how far up the line, and dependent on how much received intelligence would that decision be made? There's going to be a lot of apparently contradictory intelligence received in the first hours of that morning - I wonder how long it would take them to work out there were TWO large blocking forces dropped? Or would they jump (sic) and make a premature and possibly incorrect decision...

Well how much information do they need? Landings are happening here and there but not there. "Plan B and best of luck old boy".

"large blocking forces"? You realise that the whole airborne drop would be the equivalent of 4 weak battalions?

Another pointless "non-answer" - either that IS the situation.... or the MILFORCE "main force" would not be spaced 4-5 miles behind the MILFORCE advance guard in front....the Divisional Cavalry etc...and the 2NZ main force 4-5 miles behind MILFORCE.
I know which one *I* believe it to be.

Yeah and I've already answered this, not my fault you can't understand it. *You* will believe whatever you think is most stupid for the British to do.

A battalion-sized drop??? Well - Schulz' battalion-sized drop at Rotterdam had MG teams arriving at Schulz' position and setting up fire positions just as he signalled his location on the ground by flare after landing

So what's that then? A few points i. The weapons are dropped seperately from the men ii. Take it for granted that local opposition has to be dealt with first iii. They will have to assume some sort of tactical formation iv. The enemy is expecting them

[phylo_roadking]

...if you read the instructions again, very carefully - and look at a relief/topographical map of the area - then you'll know why they're written how they're written.

No. The Instruction is written, as one might expect :roll: , with precision and brevity.

No. Take a look at the exact wording - with one eye on a relief map of the area.

When it says 'landings by sea and/or air', that is what it means

Except it doesn't...

4. Tasks in general.

The tasks of N.Z. Div. in order of priority are:
(a) to counter attack vigorously any enemy landing in 1 Lon.
Div. area, especially in the area North and N.W. of DOVER
and FOLKESTONE.
(b) To re-establish the line of ROYAL MILITARY CANAL eastwards
of HAM STREET.
(c) Concurrently with the above, to deal with any hostile air
borne landings in the area SITTINBOURNE - FAVERSHAM -
CHARING - MAIDSTONE.

6. Tasks in particular.

(a) N.Z. Div. less 7 Inf. Bde. Gp. is to be prepared to counter-
attack enemy in area:
(i) North and N.W. of DOVER south of the line SANDWICH (7776)-
WINGHAM (6875) from the direction of CANTERBURY. This will
be known as plan "A".
(ii) N.W. of FOLKESTONE from the direction of SELLINGE (5356)
Plan "B".
(iii) POSTLING GREEN (5153) LYMINGE (6059) - Plan "C"
(b) 7 Inf. Bde. Gp. is to be prepared to:
(i) Attack enemy air-borne landings in the area
SITTINGBOURNE - FAVERSHAM - CHARING - MAIDSTONE.
(ii) From petions [sic] on high ground immediately North of
road HARRIETSHAM (3171) - CHARING - to provide A.A. L.M.G.
defence for move of 5 Inf. Bde. Gp. on that road.
(iii) Support remainder of Div. in Plans "A" "B" OR "C".

...which is of course the point I was making earlier - where, how far up the line, and dependent on how much received intelligence would that decision be made? There's going to be a lot of apparently contradictory intelligence received in the first hours of that morning - I wonder how long it would take them to work out there were TWO large blocking forces dropped? Or would they jump (sic) and make a premature and possibly incorrect decision...

Well how much information do they need? Landings are happening here and there but not there. "Plan B and best of luck old boy".

Ahem...the FSRs? Pre-reconnoitered vehicle parks? Maps annoted with routes by bound AND suitable recovery circuits back if the way ahead was blocked etc.?

And a bit of a cock-up if on first receipt of word they're prematurely sent off on Plan C on word received from Hawkinge...only to run into the blocking force across their route in the "Plan B" area miles short of "POSTLING GREEN (5153) LYMINGE (6059)" ...

Not to mention sending them off on the correct "Plan"...instead of off towards Canterbury and Sandwich across the Downs!

"large blocking forces"? You realise that the whole airborne drop would be the equivalent of 4 weak battalions?

"Blocking forces"...fighting from cover and ambush - with hours to dig in before 2NZEF get there? Half a company of FJ were enough to keep the Norwegian and British forces apart at Dombas in April 1940...

Yeah and I've already answered this, not my fault you can't understand it. *You* will believe whatever you think is most stupid for the British to do.

No, you've made no answer at all...just ridiculed my requests for your opinion on which of the two possible options they'd be carrying out. That's avoiding giving an answer.

A battalion-sized drop??? Well - Schulz' battalion-sized drop at Rotterdam had MG teams arriving at Schulz' position and setting up fire positions just as he signalled his location on the ground by flare after landing

So what's that then? A few points i. The weapons are dropped seperately from the men

They were at Rotterdam too...

ii. Take it for granted that local opposition has to be dealt with first

Er....no; the dealing with the "local opposition" at Rotterdam happened AFTER that rendezvous and formating on the ground.

iii. They will have to assume some sort of tactical formation

As above...

iv. The enemy is expecting them

What enemy??? Look at the location of their planned drops - there were no "enemy" formations there except the various artillery positions we've discussed elsewhere, and any Home Guard or Nodal Points. There was going to be nothing "in the field" there in the broad countryside until 2 NZEF arrives...that's why 2NZEF were supposed to do what they were instructed to do

[Gooner1]

No. Take a look at the exact wording - with one eye on a relief map of the area.

Read the exact wording and then make a bizarre deduction based on what is NOT written? Very Phyloesque

Ahem...the FSRs? Pre-reconnoitered vehicle parks? Maps annoted with routes by bound AND suitable recovery circuits back if the way ahead was blocked etc.?

Uh, none of that would be XII Corps responsibility. :roll:

And a bit of a cock-up if on first receipt of word they're prematurely sent off on Plan C on word received from Hawkinge...only to run into the blocking force across their route in the "Plan B" area miles short of "POSTLING GREEN (5153) LYMINGE (6059)" ...

That would be a cock-up.

"Blocking forces"...fighting from cover and ambush - with hours to dig in before 2NZEF get there?

Still with this hours to dig in malarkey? Milforce is about 11 miles away from Sellindge or Lyminge. The Advance Guards Mobile Troops of Milforce could be a half an hour away and shooting long before the Germans have even managed to take those places from their Home Guard and/or army garrisons.

I am still mystified as to how precisely you think the Germans are supposed to stop Matilda tanks. Fear at the sheer ubermenschness of the paratroopers?

Er....no; the dealing with the "local opposition" at Rotterdam happened AFTER that rendezvous and formating on the ground.

The opposition can't have been that local then

I am still trying to get an idea of how long it would take the German paratroopers from when the first plane drops to the battalion advancing to its objectives.
Remember that at Arnhem it took 1st Parachute Brigade over an hour and that was considered quick.

What enemy??? Look at the location of their planned drops - there were no "enemy" formations there except the various artillery positions we've discussed elsewhere, and any Home Guard or Nodal Points. There was going to be nothing "in the field" there in the broad countryside until 2 NZEF arrives...that's why 2NZEF were supposed to do what they were instructed to do

Yes apart from the Nodal Points, the Vital Points, the various anti-aircraft, anti-tank, field, medium, heavy and super heavy artillery positions, the Home Guard, the Observer Corps posts, the Commandos, the anti-parachutist motorcycle platoons, the infantry companies in armoured trucks, what enemy?!

[Knouterer]

To return to the original subject of the thread if I may: as noted before, according to Philson (Order of Battle for 30.9.1940), No. 1 C.W. Group, consisting of the 58th, 61st and 62nd Coys, came directly under Eastern Command, while Nos. 2 (64, 65, 66, 67 Coys) and 3 (68, 69, 70 Coys) Groups were part of Southern Command.

According to Philson’s Order of Battle for the BEF, the HQ of a Chemical Warfare Group (WE III/1931/14B/1) consisted of 3 officers and 40 ORs (mostly signallers and drivers), plus 1 attached medical officer. Transport: 4 motorcycles, 1 car, 6 trucks and lorries. Weapons: 9 pistols, 35 rifles, 1 LMG, 1 AT rifle.

A Chemical Warfare Company (WE III/1931/15/3) consisted of a HQ and 3 sections, each consisting of a HQ and 4 subsections with 20 projectors.
Such a company was (theoretically) 230 strong, armed with 14 pistols, 216 rifles, 4 LMGs, 4 AT rifles. Transport: 9 motorcycles and no less than 63 trucks and lorries (mostly 15 cwt).

However, as with other units after Dunkirk, motor transport was nowhere near establishment in No. 1 Chemical Warfare Group.

At the beginning of July, No. 1 Group was working on the Taunton Stop Line (which ran through Somerset, Dorset and Devon), preparing demolitions, AT ditches, gun pits for 6pdr guns, etc., and then moved to Barton Stacey (Hampshire), where “training in projector work continued, experiments being made with air bursts, drums being filled with dye, ammonal or cordite” (War Diary WO 166/3430).
29-31 July: “Meanwhile instructions were received that 1 C.W. Group should be prepared to fire projectors on beaches in case of enemy landings. Recces were made of beaches at HIGHCLIFFE, STUDLAND and PORTLAND, 62 Coy being warned to move at short notice.”

Apparently, only one company could be made more or less mobile at this time, there is a reference to 61 Coy handing over vehicles to 62 Coy.

Operation Order No. 10 of 31 July:
“5. 62 C.W. Coy will prepare to move at short notice with a task of firing projectors using either high explosive or Y (i.e. mustard gas – K) (…) 62 C.W. Coy will draw 160 empty drums and 2 tons of Ammonal from R.Q.M.S. and fill the drums with 27 lbs of ammonal each.
6. All sections of 62 Coy will carry full war ammunition (drums filled Y). Two sections will carry in addition drums filled with ammonal.
(…)
8. If the whole of the war equipment transport has not been delivered to 62 Coy before they move they will move in two journeys.”

The training schedule for this period (end of July) included, apart from firing projectors at ranges of about 1500-1800 yards, demonstrations of a B.C.V. (bulk contamination vehicle – see IWM photo H 25575), chemical mines and ground bombs, all with mustard gas.

In early August, one section of 58 Coy was detached and sent to an experimental station of the Petroleum Warfare Dept. at Moody’s Down Farm “… to experiment with flame warfare devices especially flame traps for destruction of tanks.” 62 Coy at the same time marked out positions for projectors at Christchurch (the airfield, presumably), and 61 Coy moved into Eastern Command to prepare positions in the Dover-Margate area.
By the end of Aug. “mobilization (…) was very nearly complete, all the vehicles and essential stores having been delivered.”

[phylo_roadking]

What enemy??? Look at the location of their planned drops - there were no "enemy" formations there except the various artillery positions we've discussed elsewhere, and any Home Guard or Nodal Points. There was going to be nothing "in the field" there in the broad countryside until 2 NZEF arrives...that's why 2NZEF were supposed to do what they were instructed to do

Yes apart from the Nodal Points, the Vital Points, the various anti-aircraft, anti-tank, field, medium, heavy and super heavy artillery positions, the Home Guard, the Observer Corps posts, the Commandos, the anti-parachutist motorcycle platoons, the infantry companies in armoured trucks, what enemy?!

Impressive list...

NOW remember exactly what I said -

...there were no "enemy" formations there except the various artillery positions we've discussed elsewhere, and any Home Guard or Nodal Points. There was going to be nothing "in the field" there in the broad countryside

The Commandos are down on the coast. At Dover and Littlestone.

The Nodal Points etc. are defended points - the forces (sic) there were there to defend them, not carry out counterattacks in the dead ground between them.

The Home Guard were still, as of September 1940, also very much at the point defence stage; they weren't to be anything like a field force until 1941 at the earliest.

The Observer Corps posts? Were they even armed???

The "infantry companies" in armoured trucks? What infantry companies were these? The armoured trucks with a/t rifles were used in place of 2pdrs in the main in a/t companies. In fact, there is a distinct possibility that the A/T company attached to MILFORCE was STILL using them rather than 2pdrs...

"The various anti-aircraft, anti-tank, field, medium, heavy and super heavy artillery positions" - you're saying they're going to abandon their positions and guns and start chasing down paratroopers? When we already know they were often short on small arms?

As for these - "the anti-parachutist motorcycle platoons" - I'd LOVE to see more detail on those. We've seen "anti-TANK motorcycle platoons" in the area, let's see details of what anti-parachutist motorcycle platoons were in the are the FJ were to drop...

"Blocking forces"...fighting from cover and ambush - with hours to dig in before 2NZEF get there?

Still with this hours to dig in malarkey? Milforce is about 11 miles away from Sellindge or Lyminge.

They're at least an hour...by their instructions...away; AFTER the word to move and which direction to move in is given...

....The Advance Guards Mobile Troops of Milforce could be a half an hour away and shooting long before the Germans have even managed to take those places from their Home Guard and/or army garrisons. [/b][/i]

...and that's the Divisional Cavalry consisting of Vickers Light tanks and bren gun carriers, and one troop of Matildas. No infantry EXCEPT the few in the carriers. MILFORCE's one (1) company of infantry are with the MILFORCE "main force". Do you not appreciate the problem with using those tanks and carriers in the "Advance Guard of MILFORCE" against "blocking" paratroop forces?

Ahem...the FSRs? Pre-reconnoitered vehicle parks? Maps annoted with routes by bound AND suitable recovery circuits back if the way ahead was blocked etc.?

Uh, none of that would be XII Corps responsibility.

No - but it'll have to factor into XII Corps decisionmaking process that morning.

And last - but VERY much not least...

No. Take a look at the exact wording - with one eye on a relief map of the area.

Read the exact wording and then make a bizarre deduction based on what is NOT written? Very Phyloesque

At least I'm doing something that YOU aren't - two somethings, actually -

1/ looking at a map, and

2/...

*You* will believe whatever you think is most stupid for the British to do.

...I'm doing something YOU aren't doing - crediting the British Army with being able to read and understand what a map is telling them.

I think it's that time...

[Knouterer]

The "infantry companies" in armoured trucks? What infantry companies were these? The armoured trucks with a/t rifles were used in place of 2pdrs in the main in a/t companies. In fact, there is a distinct possibility that the A/T company attached to MILFORCE was STILL using them rather than 2pdrs...

The Bedford OXA A/T lorries were only issued to the Brigade A/T coys (infantry), as far as is known, not to batteries of the A/T Regiments (artillery). The 7th (NZ) Anti-tank Regiment had only two batteries (31 and 32). Freyberg reported to his government in August that his force was more or less completely equipped, except for 2pdr guns, of which he had "50%, or ten". So it seems clear that the 31st Battery was (almost) fully equipped with A/T guns while the 32nd with Milforce was organized and equipped as infantry, as the documents say.

As with other artillery units, A/T batteries did not have rifles for every man, but they did have 14 Brens according to War Establishment, one per gun crew and two with the battery HQ, the idea being that when there were no tanks in sight the gunners could make themselves useful by contributing to AA defence.

[Gooner1]

Impressive list...

Not really, I could have added RASC, RAOC, Pioneer, Docks Operating Group, Searchlight, Field Company and Field Park Coy RE, Cavalry training units and of course Chemical Warfare Coys, RE.

The Commandos are down on the coast. At Dover and Littlestone.

The Nodal Points etc. are defended points - the forces (sic) there were there to defend them, not carry out counterattacks in the dead ground between them.

The Home Guard were still, as of September 1940, also very much at the point defence stage; they weren't to be anything like a field force until 1941 at the earliest.

The Observer Corps posts? Were they even armed???

The "infantry companies" in armoured trucks? What infantry companies were these? The armoured trucks with a/t rifles were used in place of 2pdrs in the main in a/t companies. In fact, there is a distinct possibility that the A/T company attached to MILFORCE was STILL using them rather than 2pdrs...

"The various anti-aircraft, anti-tank, field, medium, heavy and super heavy artillery positions" - you're saying they're going to abandon their positions and guns and start chasing down paratroopers? When we already know they were often short on small arms?

As for these - "the anti-parachutist motorcycle platoons" - I'd LOVE to see more detail on those. We've seen "anti-TANK motorcycle platoons" in the area, let's see details of what anti-parachutist motorcycle platoons were in the are the FJ were to drop...

The Commandos were protecting the coastal and super heavy batteries.

Nodal Points are not merely for defence but a base for offensive action.

The great enthusiasm behind the creation of LDV were as anti-parachute volunteers! AFAIK one of the chief roles of the Home Guard was still to attack parachutists or if they landed in large numbers to trail them.

Yes the infantry company in armoured trucks - a typical reserve formation at brigade. They may have been from the brigade anti-tank company but that was always an infantry unit anyway not Royal Artillery.

"3 armoured cars will shortly come under command 55 Field Regt, their main task will be to take on parachutists in the rear Sectors of the Marsh."
http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... s#p1868216

Ask Knouterer about the Motorcycle platoon. FYI the Carrier platoon and the Motorcycle platoon of 6th SLI were part of the garrison of Burmarsh fortress.

[Gooner1]

...and that's the Divisional Cavalry consisting of Vickers Light tanks and bren gun carriers, and one troop of Matildas. No infantry EXCEPT the few in the carriers. MILFORCE's one (1) company of infantry are with the MILFORCE "main force". Do you not appreciate the problem with using those tanks and carriers in the "Advance Guard of MILFORCE" against "blocking" paratroop forces?

No Matildas with the Advance Guard Mobile Troops. The paratroopers are going to have a lot more problems than the Kiwis.

No - but it'll have to factor into XII Corps decisionmaking process that morning.

Uh, no it won't

[phylo_roadking]

The "infantry companies" in armoured trucks? What infantry companies were these? The armoured trucks with a/t rifles were used in place of 2pdrs in the main in a/t companies. In fact, there is a distinct possibility that the A/T company attached to MILFORCE was STILL using them rather than 2pdrs...

The Bedford OXA A/T lorries were only issued to the Brigade A/T coys (infantry), as far as is known, not to batteries of the A/T Regiments (artillery).

In the British Army, yes.

The 7th (NZ) Anti-tank Regiment had only two batteries (31 and 32). Freyberg reported to his government in August that his force was more or less completely equipped, except for 2pdr guns, of which he had "50%, or ten". So it seems clear that the 31st Battery was (almost) fully equipped with A/T guns while the 32nd with Milforce was organized and equipped as infantry, as the documents say.

As with other artillery units, A/T batteries did not have rifles for every man, but they did have 14 Brens according to War Establishment, one per gun crew and two with the battery HQ, the idea being that when there were no tanks in sight the gunners could make themselves useful by contributing to AA defence.

.......which just means they'd have Boyes a/t rifles and Brens in the OXAs, and small arms...as per infantry.

Don't worry, the OXA wrinkle doesn't come from me, it comes from someone a LOT more informed on the NZEF and its OOB.

[phylo_roadking]

The Commandos were protecting the coastal and super heavy batteries.

Indeed. Which puts them where in relation to the main FJ drops under discussion? That would be -

A/ many miles away on the coast and right then under attack from the first amphibious forces, and B/ somewhat tied to the super heavy batteries - unless they abandon them and go chasing paratroopers

The great enthusiasm behind the creation of LDV were as anti-parachute volunteers! AFAIK one of the chief roles of the Home Guard was still to attack parachutists or if they landed in large numbers to trail them.

Oh, they can feel free to trail a battalion of FJ across a few miles of Kent countryside No matter how "short" said battalion, remember we already know from Knouterer that the Home Guard units in the area were small and thin on the ground, because of the sparse population.

And the only Home Guard trailing anyone anywhere would be the ones NOT slated to be sent into various "Fortresses" and Nodal Points to assist the defenders...

Yes the infantry company in armoured trucks - a typical reserve formation at brigade. They may have been from the brigade anti-tank company but that was always an infantry unit anyway not Royal Artillery.

Yes? See above. Now - where was there any of these...and their Boyes a/t rifles and Brens and short on small arms...in relation to where the FJ were going to be dropping in force? Don't magic this stuff out of thin air...find them. It should be all recorded.

And anyway - where were they going to be sent first? As the brigade antitank company? Oh yes....down towards where the enemy tanks were coming ashore...

"3 armoured cars will shortly come under command 55 Field Regt, their main task will be to take on parachutists in the rear Sectors of the Marsh."
http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... s#p1868216

a/ that comment was dated "September"....and

b/ we don't know if it ever happened. And of course...

c/ only one small section of FJ are dropping in "the rear Sectors of the Marsh" - ALL the rest are dropping way out of sight and a long distance away behind the escarpment behind the RMC that marks the rear boundary of the Marsh You really should look at those maps.

Ask Knouterer about the Motorcycle platoon. FYI the Carrier platoon and the Motorcycle platoon of 6th SLI were part of the garrison of Burmarsh fortress.

As per C above... if only to refresh your memory where Burmarsh was in relation to the FJ battalion drops.

No Matildas with the Advance Guard Mobile Troops.

Quite correct...remember the long discussion had about the FJ and Vickers Light tanks? And their vulnerability to grenades and AP rifle/MG rounds?

[MarkN]

Gentlemen,

I am confused...

Ninety-seven of the 127 A.11 built were lost in France. Another two - at least, were sent to Egypt as training vehicles. So, at most, there were 28 left in England.

...and...

One prototype and 139 production models were ordered, but AVIA 46/188 and AVIA 22/456-514 are contradictory with the number actually completed and accepted by the War Office, showing 127.

...followed by ...

The WD of "Milforce" states quite clearly that as of 18 Sept. C squadron 8 RTR had Mk II Matildas and the other two squadrons, which would follow on behind later, Mk Is. There's no question about that.

If A and B coy 8RTR had Mk I Matildas, that's a total of 32.

How can 8RTR have 32 when only 28 existed? You can't both be right.

Remember, the establishment of an Army Tank Coy was:-
Coy HQ: 1 x Light Tank and 1 x Infantry Tank with 5 off troops of 3 Infantry Tanks each.
Coy total: 1 x Light Tank, 16 x Infantry Tank

Please help!

[RichTO90]

How can 8RTR have 32 when only 28 existed? You can't both be right.

Remember, the establishment of an Army Tank Coy was:-
Coy HQ: 1 x Light Tank and 1 x Infantry Tank with 5 off troops of 3 Infantry Tanks each.
Coy total: 1 x Light Tank, 16 x Infantry Tank

Please help!

Sorry, you may have missed it in all the Sturm und Drang, but 23 A.12 was plenty to fully equip C Squadron and provide a few more for RHQ and A and B Squadron, which would still have the 27 A.11 as reported. 8 RTR reported 27 A.11 and 23 A. 12. For a total of 50 "I" Tanks under the establishment they were on then. The likely layout was:

Rgt. HQ 2 A. 12
A & B Squadron 5 A. 12 and 27 A. 11
C Squadron 16 A. 12