Dieter Wisliceny at Nuremberg and Mufti / Holocaust quote

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The Black Rabbit of Inlé
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Dieter Wisliceny at Nuremberg and Mufti / Holocaust quote

Post by The Black Rabbit of Inlé » 30 Aug 2011 19:05

It is claimed in many published books:
http://www.google.co.uk/search?q=The+Mu ... BQ&prmdo=1

SS-Hauptsturmführer Dieter Wisliceny testified (a variation of) the following at the Nuremberg Trials

In my opinion, the Grand Mufti, who has been in Berlin since 1941, played a role in the decision of the German government to exterminate the European Jews, the importance of which must not be disregarded. He has repeatedly suggested to the various authorities with whom he has been in contact, above all before Hitler, Ribbentrop and Himmler, the extermination of European Jewry. He considered this as a comfortable solution for the Palestine problem.

In his messages broadcast from Berlin, he surpassed us in anti-Jewish attacks. He was one of Eichmann's best friends and has constantly incited him to accelerate the extermination measures. I heard him say that, accompanied by Eichmann, he has visited incognito the gas chamber in Auschwitz."


The same article which appears in two newspapers dated Sept 15, 1947, attributes the quote to him.
http://news.google.com/newspapers?id=oC ... 8%2C781581
http://news.google.com/newspapers?id=ag ... 3%2C457546


Dieter Wisliceny did testify at the IMT (main trial) at Nuremberg on Jan 3rd, 1946, but he didn't mention the Mufti.
Blue Series Volume IV page 355-373
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/01-03-46.asp#wisliceny

Did SS-Hauptsturmführer Dieter Wisliceny testify at any of the 12 subsequent Nuremberg Trials, and did he really state this of the Mufti?
.

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Re: Dieter Wisliceny at Nuremberg and Mufti / Holocaust quot

Post by David Thompson » 30 Aug 2011 21:57

The Black Rabbit of Inlé -- What result did you get from checking the footnotes to the quote in the books you listed at http://www.google.co.uk/search?q=The+Mu ... BQ&prmdo=1

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Re: Dieter Wisliceny at Nuremberg and Mufti / Holocaust quot

Post by The Black Rabbit of Inlé » 30 Aug 2011 22:33

The Black Rabbit of Inlé -- What result did you get from checking the footnotes to the quote in the books you listed

Mostly they're quoting other books:

Alan Dershowitz in "The Case Against Israel's Enemies" cites another of his other books "Icon of Evil" in that book he cites The Mufti and the Fuhrer, Schechtman. David G. Dalin in The myth of Hitler's Pope also cites The Mufti and the Fuhrer, Schechtman. Unfortunately The Mufti and the Fuhrer, by Schechtman (1965) isn't viewable anywhere online.

The Black Rabbit of Inlé
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Re: Dieter Wisliceny at Nuremberg and Mufti / Holocaust quot

Post by The Black Rabbit of Inlé » 30 Aug 2011 22:41

Shortly after the war Kastner submitted an affidavit to British authorities in which he claimed that Eichmann's subordinate Dieter Wisliceny had told Kastner he was convinced that the mufti had "played a central role in the decision to exterminate the Jews." Rather than indict Husseini at Nuremberg, the British dismissed this and other charges as Zionist propaganda. (Philip Mattar, The Mufti of Jerusalem [NY: Columbia University Press, 1988], pp. 105-107)
http://www.ihr.org/jhr/v20/v20n4p11_Okeefe.html

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Re: Dieter Wisliceny at Nuremberg and Mufti / Holocaust quot

Post by David Thompson » 30 Aug 2011 23:03

Well, it appears that in addition to his IMT testimony, Wisliceny gave a number of affidavits and at least one deposition, which are referenced in NMT proceedings vol. 5 (WVHA case), p. 810 (with an extract in the trial report); NMT proceedings, vol. 14 (Ministries case), p. 663 (mentioned, but no copy or extract given in the trial report) and in the Eichmann trial at http://www.nizkor.org/hweb/people/e/eic ... 16-03.html ; http://www.nizkor.org/hweb/people/e/eic ... 50-06.html ; http://www.nizkor.org/hweb/people/e/eic ... 50-07.html and elsewhere. We also don't know if he testified or offered any statements at his 1948 trial at Bratislava, in which he was convicted, sentenced to death, and subsequently executed.

There are extracts from The Mufti and the Fuehrer online at http://aval31.free.fr/lemuftietlefuhrer ... fuhrer.htm which show, but do not reproduce, the author's footnotes. According to that book, Eichmann's position at his trial was that Wisliceny had indeed written the passages you referred to, but was lying, exaggerating or was mistaken about the extent of Eichmann's participation in conferences with the Mufti.

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Re: Dieter Wisliceny at Nuremberg and Mufti / Holocaust quot

Post by The Black Rabbit of Inlé » 31 Aug 2011 00:04

David Thompson -- Many thanks for all that

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Re: Dieter Wisliceny at Nuremberg and Mufti / Holocaust quot

Post by steve248 » 31 Aug 2011 12:25

A slightly different perspective from Klaus-Michael Mallmann/Martin Cüppers, "Halbmond und Hakenkreuz. Das Dritte Reich, die Araber und Palästina", WBG Darmstadt, 2006, pp 116-117

"Ende 1942 verhandelte Dieter Wisliceny, der deutsche 'Judenberater' bei der slowakischen Regierung, mit der Pressburger Vertreteung des Joint über die Emigrationsmöglichkeit jüdischer Kinder aus der Slowakei, Polen und Ungarn nach Palästina. Dabei war ein Austausch gegen deutsche Zivilinternierte unter Einschaltung des Roten kreuzes in Aussicht genommen. 'Da wurde ich von Eichmann nach Berlin berufen, der mir eröffnete, dass der Grossmufti von der geplanten Aktion durch seinen Nachrichtendienst in Palästina Kenntnis bekommen habe', erklärte Wisliceny 1946. 'Er habe daraufhin bei Himmler schärfstens protestiert mit der Begründung, dass diese jüdischen Kinder in einigen Jahre ja erwachsen wären und eine Stärkung des jüdischen Elements in Palästine bildeten. Himmler habe daraufhin die ganze Aktion verboten und auch für künftige Fälle ein Verbot erlassen, dass noch irgend ein Jude aus den von Deutschland beherrschten Gebietn nach Palästina ausreisen dürfe.' [Fn 1] Endre Steiner, der von jüdischer Seite die Verhandlungen mit Wisliceny geführt hatte, bestätigte diesen Sachverhalt im selben Jahr: 'Er [Wisliceny] erklärte, der Mufti stünde in engster Verbindung und Mitarbeit mit Eichmann und es könne daher, um vor dem Mufti nicht desavoui[e]rt zu werden, von einer deutschen Stelle das Endziel Palästina nicht akzeptiert werden.' Der Mufti sei - so Wisliceny - 'ein unerbittlicher Erzfeind der Juden und sei auch seit jeher der Vorkämpfer des Gedankens der Ausrottung der Juden." [Fn 2]

Fn 1: deposition, Dieter Wisliceny, 26.7.1946, Yad Vashem Archives, TR 3/129
Fn 2: affidavit, Endre Steiner, 6.2.1946, Yad Vashem Archives, TR 3/281

I am sure YVA are not the only source of Wisliceny's affidavit.

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Re: Dieter Wisliceny at Nuremberg and Mufti / Holocaust quot

Post by little grey rabbit » 04 Sep 2011 07:55

I think Dieter Wisliceny would in time agree to everything that was in Kastner's affidavit that was put to him. I think something called prison psychosis would soon develop.

There is a lengthy interrogation of Dieter Wisliceny in The Holocaust: Documents in 18 Volumes. Volume 12. It was taken in November 1945 over several sessions. The Mufti, of course, is not mentioned.

Nevertheless there are plenty of indications that Wislicency was coerced into saying things that were not true.

As one example
A. Yes. I came to know about a number of such extermination camps.
Q. Their names?
A. The largest one was Auschwitz, Maidenek, near Lublin. In the immediate vicinity of Lublin there were several other such camps.
Q. Do you remember their names?
A. No, because the designations for these transports always went by the name of Lublin. Maidenek too, was never mentioned by name, but was always referred to in the record by Camp M. It was only by accident that I learned one time that this camp M. was Maidenek.
Q. How did that come about?
A. When the Russians took over the camp at Maidenek with all of its devices, Eichmann once mentioned that this camp, Maidenek, was our Camp M.
Q. He said that to you in a conversation?
A. Yes.
Q. What designation did Auschwitz have?
A. Auschwitz was commonly known as Camp A.
Q. What was Camp T?
A. If I correctly recollect, that belonged to the complex Lublin system. I remember having heard the designation Camp T.
Q. Was that also an annihilation camp?
A. Yes, sir
Q. Were there others?
A. As far as I can remember now, there were none.


Notice how the interrogator brings up "Camp T" before the Wisliceny has mentioned it - ie he knows the answers Wisliceny is expected to give. I don't believe that KL Lublin would ever have been referred to as Camp M, besides it is seen as having a relatively minor role in the extermination of the Jews.

Despite seemingly confessing to Eichmann ordering the destruction of 5 million Jews, Wisliceny seems at one point to be attempting to protect him.

Q. What happened to Eichmann after that?
A. I know positively he was in Theresienstadt in April, 1945, because I telephoned him there and they said he had just left. At that time, Count Bernadotte, head of the International Red Cross, was visiting the Theresienstadt. I was to conduct Count Bernadotte, on this occasion, on his visit to Theresienstadt. But I did not go to Theresienstadt. I called Eichmann at that time and wanted to see him, but he had already left Theresienstadt. I spoke to Eichmann the last time in February and he said, "If things go wrong, I will go to Prague and will shoot my wife, my children and myself."
Since that time I have heard nothing more from him, either from him or about him.
Q. Why did you understand Eichmann intended to kill himself and his family.
A. He himself told me in February "If things go wrong, I will go to Prague and shoot my wife, children and myself."
Q. Why did he consider it necessary to kill himself and his family?
A. That is quite explainable; because he realized that he bore the main responsibility for the death of five million people.
Q. How did he arrive at that figure?
A. I know this rather exactly by way of calculations.
Q. Tell us the basis of your exact calculations.
A. We established this calculation with Dr. Kastner.
Q. What do you mean by "we"?
A. Dr Kastner and I had made this computation. Dr Kastner was the delegate of the Joint Distribution Committee. We made this calculation last fall in Hungary.
Q. What was the occasion?
A. As far as I recall, Dr Kastner was gathering material for a comprehensive report to be submitted to Roosevelt. Mr. McCleland, a deputy of President Roosevelt for Refugees, was in Switzerland. Dr Kastner called him. The figure consisted of the number of Jews in Poland, about one-half million persons and of one-half million Jews from Hungary, Jews from France, Belgium and Holland, from Slovakia, Greece, Denmark, Germany Bohemia and Moravia. Not included in this number are the Jews from the Russian territory.
We - that is, Dr Kastner and I - discussed these figures at the time and so far as I was able, I checked up the figures.


Coincidentally or not, Eichmann's wife tried to have Eichmann declared dead in Prague, the claim he said he was going to kill his family doesn't seem credible. Also it strains belief that Wiscilency would be doing such calculations with Dr. Kastner - at least not before the collapse.

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Re: Dieter Wisliceny at Nuremberg and Mufti / Holocaust quot

Post by David Thompson » 05 Sep 2011 01:48

little grey rabbit -- You wrote: (1)
I think Dieter Wisliceny would in time agree to everything that was in Kastner's affidavit that was put to him. I think something called prison psychosis would soon develop.

Of course, our readers understand that you may personally disbelieve -- or want to disbelieve -- Wisliceny's statements. The other 41,925 members of the forum may have their own opinions as well. But what is the evidence for Wisliceny's "prison psychosis", which you think would soon develop, given the fact that the syndrome is thought to be "rare" or "extremely rare":

Ganser syndrome is a rare dissociative disorder previously classified as a factitious disorder. It is characterized by nonsensical or wrong answers to questions or doing things incorrectly, other dissociative symptoms such as fugue, amnesia or conversion disorder, often with visual pseudohallucinations and a decreased state of consciousness. It is also sometimes called nonsense syndrome, balderdash syndrome, syndrome of approximate answers, pseudodementia, hysterical pseudodementia or prison psychosis. This last name, prison psychosis, is sometimes used because the syndrome occurs most frequently in prison inmates, where it may represent an attempt to gain leniency from prison or court officials.

Ganser is an extremely rare variation of dissociative disorder. It is a reaction to extreme stress and the patient thereby suffers from approximation or giving absurd answers to simple questions. The syndrome can sometimes be diagnosed as merely malingering, however, it is more often defined as dissociative disorder.

Symptoms include a clouding of consciousness, somatic conversion symptoms, confusion, stress, loss of personal identity, echolalia, and echopraxia. The psychological symptoms generally resemble the patient's sense of mental illness rather than any recognized category. Individuals also give approximate answers to simple questions. For example, "How many legs are on a cat?", to which the subject may respond '?

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ganser_syndrome

You also wrote (2)
Nevertheless there are plenty of indications that Wislicency was coerced into saying things that were not true.

You then quote a relatively brief passage from one of his interrogations. There is no indication of coercion in it, nor is there any indication (other than your opinion) that it is untrue. Do you have any evidence to back up your claim?

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Re: Dieter Wisliceny at Nuremberg and Mufti / Holocaust quot

Post by michael mills » 09 Sep 2011 02:38

Steven Tyas posted excerpts from these two depositions:

Fn 1: deposition, Dieter Wisliceny, 26.7.1946, Yad Vashem Archives, TR 3/129
Fn 2: affidavit, Endre Steiner, 6.2.1946, Yad Vashem Archives, TR 3/281



The problem is that at present we have no background to the two depositions. What we need to know, for the purpose of assessing the historical value of thew depositions, is the circumstances under which they were made. For example, who were the depositions made to? Who was interrogating Wisliceny, and who was interrogating Steiner? Were they being interrogated by the same person or authority, or by entirely different authorities?

I find it noteworthy that Endre Steiner gave his deposition before Wisliceny; his was given in February 1946, Wisliceny's not until six months later, in July 1946. That raises the possibility that Wisliceny's deposition was linked somehow to Steiner's previous deposition, ie he was interrogated on the basis of Steiner's deposition and asked to confirm it.

Unfortunately, we have no information on who Steiner was, all that is stated is that he was the Jewish representative in negotiations held with Wisliceny at the end of 1942 on the possible release of Jewish children from Slovakia, Hungary and Poland and their transport to Palestine. The material quoted by Tyas suggests that Steiner was the representative in Pressburg ( = Bratislava, then and now the capital of Slovakia) of the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee.

As a representative of the Joint, was Steiner under the protection of the United States? What happened to him after the 1942 negotiations with Wisliceny? Did he go to the United States? Did he go to Palestine? The answers to those questions are crucial for the circumstances in which he made his deposition in February 1946.

It needs to be borne in mind that Steiner appears to have had no personal knowledge of Haj Amin al-Husayni, the former Mufti of Jerusalem, in 1942 a refugee in Germany under the protection of the German Government. In his deposition, Steiner merely makes statements about Al-Husayni that he claims Wisliceny made to him. That deposition therefore has very little value as a historical source, since it is hearsay.

The most important claim made in Steiner's deposition is that Wisliceny had told him that (my translation from the German quoted by Tyas):

"The Mufti was an implacable arch-enemy of the Jews and was also from time immemorial the protagonist of the idea of exterminating the Jews".

Quite a serious accusation! Steiner is implying that Al-Husayni was one of the main instigators of the million-fold massacre of East European Jewry that had been perpetrated only a couple of years previously.

The political circumstances in which Steiner made his deposition are crucial. At that time, in February 1946, the Zionists were preparing for the forthcoming conflict with the Palestinian Arabs over control of the territory of Palestine; they were already in conflict with the British Mandatory Power, for the purpose of forcing it to give up its control over the country.

Accordingly, it was very much in the interest of the Zionist leadership to portray Al-Husayni, who before the war had been the leader of the Palestinian Arabs in their struggle agains both the British and the Zionists, as bearing guilt for the massacre of the Jews of Europe. Steiner's statement about what Wisliceny allegedly told him might then be interpreted as propaganda in support of Zionist objectives.

It is for that reason that the circumstances surrounding Steiner's deposition are crucial to its evaluation. Did he make the deposition to Zionist authorities, or to authorities sympathetic to the Zionist cause?

Steiner's deposition of February 1946 appears to receive support from Wisliceny's deposition of July of that same year, in which it is stated that Himmler's cancellation of the deal for the release of the Jewish children was due to pressure from Al-Husayni. But it may well be that Wisliceny was questioned on the basis of Steiner's earlier deposition, and his interrogators wanted him to endorse Steiner's claim about Al-Husayni.

It is noteworthy that Wisliceny does not claim to have direct knowledge of the alleged intervention by Al-Husayni; he merely cdlaims that he was told about it by Eichmann. So Steiner claims Wisliceny told him something about Al-Husayni, and Wisliceny then says that that something was something he was told by Eichmann. It is all hearsay.

It is for the above reasons that we need to know the precise circumstances of the depositions by Steiner and Wisliceny. In the absence of such knowledge, not much value can be assigned to the two depositions in regard to Al-Husayni.

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Re: Dieter Wisliceny at Nuremberg and Mufti / Holocaust quot

Post by michael mills » 09 Sep 2011 06:22

There is good reason to doubt the claim made by Endre Steiner in February 1946 that Wisliceny had told him, at the end of 1942, that Haj Amin al-Husayni was one of the main instigators of the idea of exterminating the Jews.

if Wisliceny had indeed said such a thing to steiner at the end of 1942, in the course of negotiations on the release of Jewish children, it would have been tantamount to admitting to a Jewish representative that Germany was implementing an extermination program, which it is highly unlikely he, as a representative of the German Government, would have doen.

At the time, the end of 1942, the official position of the German Government in relation to the deportation of Jews from Germany, Slovakia and other places, as expressed in offical communiques, was that the deported Jews were being resettled in Ukraine and other conquered Soviet territories. It is unlikely that Wisliceny would have departed from that official position in any way.

Furthermore, any such alleged statement by Wisliceny would have been totally out of proportion with the actual role played by Al-Husayni while a refugee in Germany. Hitler had no great interest in the Arab peoples or in the Middle East in general, seeing the area as Italy's zone of influence, in which Germany would only intervene where needed to help Italy out of difficulties. For Hitler, Al-Husayni's sole usefulness was as a propagandist for Germany among the Muslim peoples of the Balkans and the Soviet Union, helping to mobilise those people's against the Soviet Government and other enemies of Germany, a role in which Al-Husayni actually had a certain amount of success.

Given the role assigned to Al-Husayni as a puppet working the German interest, it is inconceivable that he could have had any influence whatever on German Government policy, whether in relation to the treatment of the Jews or any other matter, as allegedly claimed by Wisliceny.

The most likely reason for the breakdown of the 1942 negotiations between Wisliceny and Jewish representatives was the unwillingness of the Allied Governments to allow interned German nationals to return to Germany, and also to the unwillingness of either Allied Governments or Jewish organisations to "ransom" Jews with US currency, which was the basis of the so-called Europa Plan that was being promoted by Wisliceny in 1942.

There is also a discrepancy between the Steiner and Wisliceny versions of what was allegedly said about the role of Al-Husayni at the end of 1942.

Steiner claims that Wisliceny told him personally that Al-Husayni's intervention was the reason for the collapse of the negotiations, and that Al-Husayni was a major instigator of the extermination of the Jews.

Wisliceny, in his statement made six months after that of Steiner, did not admit to having said any such thing to Steiner. Rather he claims that he was told by Eichmann of the alleged role played by Al-Husayni, implying that he did not have personal knowledge of that alleged role, and therefore could not have told Steiner about it.

Accordingly, we may safely dismiss Steiner's claim about what Wisliceny allegedly told him in 1942 about the role of Al-Husayni, and also Wisliceny's subsequent partial confirmation of that role.

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Re: Dieter Wisliceny at Nuremberg and Mufti / Holocaust quot

Post by kiseli » 09 Sep 2011 09:13

NEW YORK – A newly released report by the US National Archives details the close collaborative relationship between Nazi leaders and the grand mufti of Jerusalem, Haj Amin al-Husseini, indicating that Nazi authorities planned to use Husseini as their leader after their conquest of Palestine.

Husseini was paid handsomely by the Nazis for his efforts, recruited Muslims for the SS and was promised that he would be made Palestine’s leader after its Jewish population of 350,000 had been murdered.

The report, Hitler’s Shadow: Nazi War Criminals, US Intelligence and the Cold War, was prepared on the basis of thousands of documents declassified under the 1998 Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act.

“Hitler’s Shadow” is an addendum to a 2004 US government report, US Intelligence and the Nazis.

The new report’s authors, Norman J.W. Goda of the University of Florida and Richard Breitman of American University, said the addendum was particularly important.

“We thought the information was significant and detailed,” Breitman told The Jerusalem Post regarding the newly uncovered facts on the Jerusalem mufti in particular.

“We thought the April 1945 contract between the [German] Foreign Office and Husseini was striking evidence of an ideological collaboration both sides hoped would continue after the war.”

Husseini, who died in Beirut in 1974, was apparently paid 50,000 marks per month, and 80,000 additional marks a month for living expenses, according to a contract with the Germans. This was a time when a German field officer typically earned 25,000 marks a year.

According to the report, on November 28, 1941, Adolf Hitler told Husseini that the Afrika Korps would “liberate” Arabs in the Middle East and that “Germany’s only objective there would be the destruction of the Jews.”

“SS leaders and Husseini both claimed that Nazism and Islam had common values as well as common enemies – above all, the Jews,” the report states.


In fall 1943, it says, Husseini went to the Croatia, a German ally, to recruit Muslims for the Waffen-SS.

“During that trip he told the troops of the newly formed Bosnian-Muslim 13th Mountain Waffen-SS division that the entire Muslim world ought to follow their example,” the report states.

Husseini also organized a 1944 mission in which Palestine Arabs and Germans would carry out sabotage and propaganda after German planes dropped them into Palestine by parachute.

“Husseini insisted that the Arabs take command after they landed and direct their fight against the Jews of Palestine, not the British authorities,” according to the report.

As late as 1945, the German Foreign Office rewrote its contracts with Husseini.

At that point, the outcome of the war was no longer in question, and therefore the contracts are significant as indications of Nazi intentions to work with the mufti in future political-ideological campaigns in Arab lands.

In October 1945, the report said, the British head of Mandatory Palestine’s Criminal Investigation Division told the US assistant military attaché in Cairo that the mufti might be able to unite Palestine’s Arabs and “cool off the Zionists. Of course, we can’t do it, but it might not be such a damn bad idea at that.”
\Husseini’s CIA file, the report states, indicates that wartime Allied intelligence organizations gathered a “healthy portion” of the incriminating evidence against him.

This evidence “is significant in light of Husseini’s lenient postwar treatment,” the report notes. Husseini was allowed to flee to Syria after the war despite enough evidence to bring him to trial as a war criminal.

“Together, the Army and CIA records will keep scholars of World War II and the Cold War busy for many years,” the report’s authors conclude.


www.archives.gov/iwg/reports/hitlers-shadow.pdf

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Re: Dieter Wisliceny at Nuremberg and Mufti / Holocaust quot

Post by David Thompson » 09 Sep 2011 15:11

Thanks, kiseli, for that url link to the text of Hitler’s Shadow: Nazi War Criminals, US Intelligence and the Cold War.

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Re: Dieter Wisliceny at Nuremberg and Mufti / Holocaust quot

Post by michael mills » 10 Sep 2011 04:26

I have read the section on Al-Husayni in the on-line version of "Hitler's Shadow" linked by kiseli.

Unfortunately, it does not give us an impartial summary of what is actually contained in the released documents; rather it gives us the ideological spin put on those documents by the two authors, Breitman and Goda.

A particularly egregious example of that spin is contained in this paragraph:

In the spring of 1945, a German Foreign Office official reached agreement with Gailani effective April 1: his cash payments were raised to 85,000 marks, but Gailani would repay the Germans after his forces reconquered Iraq. Similarly, according to a newly declassified document, the Foreign Office and Husseini signed a contract for subsidies of up to 12,000 marks per month to continue after April 1, 1945, with the Mufti pledging to repay these amounts later. In April 1945 neither side could have had much doubt about the outcome of the war. The continuing contractual relationships meant that Nazi officials and the two Arab leaders hoped to continue their joint or complementary political-ideological campaign in the postwar period.18


Goda and Breitman are implying that the two Arab leaders, Al-Husayni and Al-Gailani of Iraq, had some sort of political and ideological affinity with National Socialism, and that they were trying to promote in the post-war world.

Any intellectually honest observer of the connections between the wartime German Government and various Arab nationalists will conclude that there was no ideological affinity between the two, nor could there be since the racial ideology of National Socialism inevitably placed the Arabs, as a clearly "non-Aryan" people, in a subordinate position, ie in the position of colonial subjection from which the Arab nationalists were trying to escape. The collaboration of Arab nationalists with the German Government was in no way ideological but purely pragmatic, based on the fact that they were in conflict with a common enemy, Britain (and even that conflict with Britain had different causes, in the case of the Arab nationalists because Britain was the colonial occupier, in the case of the German Government because Britian was opposing Germany's expansionist aims).

The fact that the German Foreign Office was willing to sign contracts with Al-Husayni and Al-Gaylani in April 1945, when Germany was on the verge of defeat, most probably reflects the refusal to face reality that affected the whole German administration at the time, rather than any hard-headed planning for a post-war conspiracy. The willingness of Al-Gailani and Al-Husayni to accept those contracts is hardly indicative of any desire on their part to pursue the ideological goals of the German Government; more probably they were just glad to grab whatever cash the German Foreign Office was silly enough to give them before they abandoned the sinking ship.

Goda and Breitman also claim, based on a book "Nazi Propaganda for the Arab World" by Jeffrey Herf, that Al-Husayni and the SS had common values and common enemies, above all the Jews. That ignores the fact the opposition of Al-Husayni and other Arab nationalists to Jews was not ideological in origin but entirely pragmatic, a reaction to the objective fact of Jewish settlement in Palestine in pursuit of the declared objective of creating a Jewish state in that territory at the expense of the Arab inhabitants.

Apart from the above, the book does not tell us anything new about the activities of Al-Husayni while a refugee in Germany. It is well known that his main activity was helping to recruit Balkan Muslims as soldiers in the service of Germany.

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Re: Dieter Wisliceny at Nuremberg and Mufti / Holocaust quot

Post by kiseli » 10 Sep 2011 08:18

Any intellectually honest observer of the connections between the wartime German Government and various Arab nationalists will conclude that there was no ideological affinity between the two, nor could there be since the racial ideology of National Socialism inevitably placed the Arabs, as a clearly "non-Aryan" people, in a subordinate position, ie in the position of colonial subjection from which the Arab nationalists were trying to escape. The collaboration of Arab nationalists with the German Government was in no way ideological but purely pragmatic, based on the fact that they were in conflict with a common enemy, Britain (and even that conflict with Britain had different causes, in the case of the Arab nationalists because Britain was the colonial occupier, in the case of the German Government because Britian was opposing Germany's expansionist aims).


http://www.expatica.com/de/news/local_n ... 29259.html
http://atlasshrugs2000.typepad.com/atla ... jews-.html
http://bigjournalism.com/pgeller/2010/0 ... holocaust/
http://newstime.co.nz/muhammad-the-firs ... s-man.html

No. 515
Fl/0018-24
Memorandum ־by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat

Füh. 57a. g Rs. BERLIN, November 30, 1941.

RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE FÜHRER AND THE GRAND MUFTI OF JERUSALEM ON NOVEMBER 28, 1941, IN THE PRESENCE OF REICH FOREIGN MINISTER AND MINISTER GROBBA IN BERLIN

The Grand Mufti began by thanking the Führer for the great honor he had bestowed by receiving him. He wished to seize the opportunity to convey to the Führer of the Greater German Reich, admired by the entire Arab world, his thanks for the sympathy which he had always shown for the Arab and especially the Palestinian cause, and to which he had given clear expression in his public speeches. The Arab countries were firmly convinced that Germany would win the war and that the Arab cause would then prosper. The Arabs were Germany's natural friends because they had the same enemies as had Germany, namely the English, the Jews, and the Communists. They were therefore prepared to cooperate with Germany with all their hearts and stood ready to participate in the war, not only negatively by the commission of acts of sabotage and the instigation of revolutions, but also positively by the formation of an Arab Legion. The Arabs could be more useful to Germany as allies than might be apparent at first glance, both for geographical reasons and because of the suffering inflicted upon them by the English and the Jews. Furthermore, they had close relations with all Moslem nations, of which they could make use in behalf of the common cause. The Arab Legion would be quite easy to raise. An appeal by the Mufti to the Arab countries and the prisoners of Arab, Algerian, Tunisian, and Moroccan nationality in Germany would produce a great number of volunteers eager to fight. Of Germany's victory the Arab world was firmly convinced, not only because the Reich possessed a large army, brave soldiers, and military leaders of genius, but also because the Almighty could never award the victory to an unjust cause.
In this struggle, the Arabs were striving for the independence and unity of Palestine, Syria, and Iraq. They had the fullest confidence in the Führer and looked to his hand for the balm on their ■wounds which had been inflicted upon them by the enemies of Germany.
The Mufti then mentioned the letter he had received from Germany, which stated that Germany was holding no Arab territories and understood and recognized the aspirations to independence and freedom of the Arabs, just as she supported the elimination of the Jewish national home.
A public declaration in this sense would be very useful for its propagandistic effect on the Arab peoples at this moment. It would rouse the Arabs from their momentary lethargy and give them new courage. It would also ease the Mufti's work of secretly organizing the Arabs against the moment when they could strike. At the same time, he could give the assurance that the Arabs would in strict discipline patiently wait for the right moment and only strike upon an order from Berlin,
With regard to the events in Iraq, the Mufti observed that the Arabs in that country certainly had by no means been incited by Germany to attack England, but solely had acted in reaction to a direct English assault upon their honor.
The Turks, he believed, would welcome the establishment of an Arab government in the neighboring territories because they would prefer weaker Arab to strong European governments in the neighboring countries, and, being themselves a nation of 7 millions, they had moreover nothing to fear from the 1,700,000 Arabs inhabiting Syria, Transjordan, Iraq, and Palestine.
France likewise would have no objections to the unification plan because she had conceded independence to Syria as early as 1936 and had given her approval to the unification of Iraq and Syria under King Faisal as early as 1933.
In these circumstances he was renewing his request that the Führer make a public declaration so that the Arabs would not lose hope, which is so powerful a force in the life of nations. With such hope in their hearts the Arabs, as he had said, were willing to wait. They were not pressing for immediate realization of their aspirations; they could easily wait half a year or a ,whole year. But if they were not inspired with such a hope by a declaration of this sort, it could be expected that the English would be the gainers from it.
The Führer replied that Germany's fundamental attitude on these questions, as the Mufti himself had already stated, was clear. Germany stood for uncompromising war against the Jews. That naturally included active opposition to the Jewish national home in Palestine, which was nothing other than a center, in the form of a state, for the exercise of destructive influence by Jewish interests. Germany was also aware that the assertion that the Jews were carrying out the function of economic pioneers in Palestine was a lie. The work there was done only by the Arabs, not by the Jews. Germany was resolved, step by step, to ask one European nation after the other to solve its Jewish problem, and at the proper time direct a similar appeal to non-European nations as well.
Germany was at the present time engaged in a life and death struggle with two citadels of Jewish power: Great Britain and Soviet Russia. Theoretically there was a difference between England's capitalism and Soviet Russia's communism; actually, however, the Jews in both countries were pursuing a common goal. This was the decisive struggle; on the political plane, it presented itself in the main as a conflict between Germany and England, but ideologically it was a battle between National Socialism and the Jews. It went without saying that Germany would furnish positive and practical aid to the Arabs involved in the same struggle, because platonic promises were useless in a war for survival or destruction in which the Jews were able to mobilize all of England's power for their ends,
The aid to the Arabs would have to be material aid. Of how little help sympathies alone were in such a battle had been demonstrated plainly by the operation in Iraq, where circumstances had not permitted the rendering of really effective, practical aid. In spite of all the sympathies, German aid had not been sufficient and Iraq was overcome by the power of Britain, that is, the guardian of the Jews.
The Mufti could not but be aware, however, that the outcome of the struggle going on at present would also decide the fate of the Arab world. The Führer therefore had to think and speak coolly and deliberately, as a rational man and primarily as a soldier, as the leader of the German and allied armies. Everything of a nature to help in this titanic battle for the common cause, and thus also for the Arabs, would have to be done. Anything, however, that might contribute to weakening the military situation must be put aside, no matter how unpopular this move might be.
Germany was now engaged in very severe battles to force the gateway to the northern Caucasus region. The difficulties were mainly with regard to maintaining the supply, which was most difficult as a result of the destruction of railroads and highways as well as of the oncoming winter. If at such a moment, the Führer were to raise the problem of Syria in a declaration, those elements in France which /־ were under de Gaulle's influence would receive new strength. They would interpret the Führer's declaration as an intention to break up France's colonial empire and appeal to their fellow countrymen that they should rather make common cause with the English to try to save what still could be saved. A German declaration regarding Syria would in France be understood to refer to the French colonies in general, and that would at the present time create new troubles in western Europe, which means that a portion of the German armed forces would be immobilized in the west and no longer be available for the campaign in the east.
The Führer then made the following statement to the Mufti, enjoining him to lock it in the uttermost depths of his heart:
1. He (the Führer) would carry on the battle to the total destruction of the Judeo-Communist empire in Europe.
2. At some moment which was impossible to set exactly today but which in any event was not distant, the German armies would in the course of this struggle reach the southern exit from Caucasia.
3. As soon as this had happened, the Führer would on his own give the Arab world the assurance that its hour of liberation had arrived. Germany's objective would then be solely the destruction of the Jewish element residing in the Arab sphere under the protection of British power. In that hour the Mufti would be the most authoritative spokesman for the Arab world. It would then be his task to set off the Arab operations which he had secretly prepared. When that time had come, Germany could also be indifferent to French reaction to such a declaration.
Once Germany had forced open the road to Iran and Iraq through Rostov, it would be also the beginning of the end of the British world empire. He (the Führer) hoped that the coming year would make it possible for Germany to thrust open the Caucasian gate to the Middle East. For the good of their common cause, it would be better if the Arab proclamation were put off for a few more months than if Germany were to create difficulties for herself without being able thereby to help the Arabs.
He (the Führer) fully appreciated the eagerness of the Arabs for a public declaration of the sort requested by the Grand Mufti. But he would beg him to consider that he (the Führer) himself was the Chief of State of the German Reich for 5 long years during which he was unable to make to his own homeland the announcement of its liberation. He had to wait with that until the announcement could be made on the basis of a situation brought about by the force of arms that the Anschluss had been carried out.
The moment that Germany's tank divisions and air squadrons had made their appearance south of the Caucasus, the public appeal requested by the Grand Mufti could go out to the Arab world.
The Grand Mufti replied that it was his view that everything would come to pass just as the Führer had indicated. He was fully reassured and satisfied by the words which he had heard from the Chief of the German State. He asked, however, whether it would not be possible, secretly at least, to enter into an agreement with Germany of the kind he had just outlined for the Führer.
The Führer replied that he had just now given the Grand Mufti precisely that confidential declaration.
The Grand Mufti thanked him for it and stated in conclusion that he was taking his leave from the Führer in full confidence and with reiterated thanks for the interest shown in the Arab cause.

SCHMIDT


Record of the Conversation Between the Fuhrer and the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem on November 28, 1941, in the Presence of Reich Foreign Minister and Minister Grobba in Berlin, Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945, Series D, Vol. XIII, London

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