Your link requires me to purchase the article for $ 36.00 US or it gives me the option to recommend it to my local library, which, at present, is under financial constraints.
and was translated in Firefox (I tried the Chrome as well, but it returned even worse results) as thus:
Bent Jensen: The long liberation. Bornholm occupied and liberated 1945-1946. (Odense University Press, 1996). 345 p, 250 kr
The subject of Bent Jensen's book is one of the most fluctuating and dramatic chapters in the history of Bornholm, nernlig the Soviet liberation / occupation of klippeoen, launched air strikes on 7 and 8 May 1945 and completed approx. a scar later, when the Russian troops cleared his throat island.
The drama took place during the period between ophoret pa the heat and the beginning of the Cold War. Therefore the book, in an international perspective, also an interesting contribution to this period's history.
The author makes the first any question that the Danish public has circled about the last 50 years: 1 Why was the Soviet and not British forces who came to Bornholm in May 1945? Second Why was the Soviet forces said lasngc and saw large numbers of pa island? and 3 Why did the Russians island said unexpectedly and quickly in the spring of 1946? Responses formar author largely to afdaskke a systematic afsogning of relevant British, American, Swedish, Danish and Russian
The deposition of the files in the respective countries' archives fort cells a part of Bornholmssporgsmalets significance for the respective countries: for smastaten Bornholm, Denmark was the paramount issue in 1945-46 in relation to the mighty Soviet Union. For Sweden, the Russian presence pa Bornholm highly troubling. Britain enbetragtede Denmark as its intcresseomrade Bornholmssporgsmalet and followed with great interest. For the United States was sporgsmalet pretty remote, but General Eisenhower befattede in his capacity as overstkommanderende for SHAEF problem in the drama first phase. Last but not least, parades matter of course the local pa Bornholm. It was bathing the general population, OENS elected officials and the government's local representative, the county magistrate. Bent Jensen's book is one in besides, successful attempts pa investigating all these levels and merge them together. He shows how the decisions and considerations in German, British, American, Danish and Soviet departments and staffs had direct implications for the common Bornholm.
The Soviet Union was the drama hovedaktor. Detergents therefore regrettable that the author does not fully udstnekning first became archive access here. Still seems the Soviet behavior quite well documented. Bent Jensen sandsynliggor that seen from Moscow in a sense, found a kaplob place on Denmark in the war's final phase, although it acknowledged that Denmark was a British interesseomrade. Moscow wanted in some udstrtekning to take part in the liberation of Denmark in order to fa indtlydelse pa post-war developments in the area. Montgomery appeared to Liibeck, 2 May 1945, however, precluded any possible. Russian frcmrykning at Jutland. But there was stacligva. 'K Bornholm!
Already in the summer of 1944 pointed to a Soviet memorandum pa Bornholm as a nyitig military base. Bornholm was not viewed in isolation but in
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conjunction with the Danish stranding you, Kiel Canal and South Schleswig. Painted was to reinforce the Soviet security ostersoomradet. Since the war evolution took off around the turn of the year 1944-45 was sporgsmalet about the liberation of Danrnark more patraengende: How did Soviet troops take part in the 'beginning with a Bornholm, "as it was called in a memorandum to Molotov in December 1944. After Soviet troops in March 1945 had taken the German fladebaseKohlberg south of Bornholm, anbefalededen Soviet foreign service that the Red Army would fill Bornholm.Argumentet was purely political, that it could secure Moscow indflydelsepa developments in post-war Denmark and pa country's foreign policy orientation.
The seventh and 8 May 1945 Bornholm was exposed to Russian air raids and dropping leaflets urged the German commander to surrender to the Russians. It refused the German commandant, simply because that Bent Jensen anforer it was contrary to his express orders and formally also against bestemmmelserne the delkapitulation which the Germans had arrangements with Montgomery with effect from 5 May on the morning. First night of the 8th and 9 May stepped totalkapitulationen into force, and when Russian troops arrived in the island of Bornholm in the afternoon of the 9th May, the German troops surrendered without loosening a shot.
1 day from 5 to 9 May, efforts through various channels and lines of command from bathing the head of Special Forces in Denmark, Ole Lippmann, the German commander pa Bornholm and prefetch Stemann pa reformatting British to send just a little militaerdetachement to Bornholm to receive the German surrender. But all inquiries to General Dewing, who was chief of the British militaermission in Denmark, were unsuccessful. Not because he and the British were uninterested in Bornholm, but because it overstbefalende for SHAEF, General Eisenhower, back in april 1945 had decided not to send troops to Bornholm without prior consent from the Russian side. As Bent Jensen paviser, was Eisenhower's reluctance, that there were EMI, whether an actual agreement with the Russians on Bornholm, but the general accepted Bornholm location in Russian operationsomrade. Eisenhower wanted not to challenge the Russians unnecessarily. Renewed contacts with the Eisenhower between 5 and 8 May not be fundamentally altered his attitude. Which contributed to Eisenhower's hesitation pointing Bent Jensen also pa that Frihedsradets envoy in Moscow, Dossing, SHAEF had given rise to the inference that there was actually pagaet Danish-Russian negotiations on a Russian liberation of the island. Bent Jensen does not have much good to say about Dossing, even after it had been the liberation government's official embassy in Moscow. The source material seems to retfserdiggore author's characterization of Dossings work, which was marked by equal parts of ignorance and excessive devotion to Moscow.
Bent Jensen is in general not impressed by the Danish Government HANDLING of Bornholm case. Until the Soviet establishment pa Bornholm, he fa eye pa redeeming moments, eg. the Western Allies restraint, but then, the Danish government's (lack of) HANDLING gennemsyretaf excessive smastatspolitik. Foreign Christmas Moller father no pluses in the grade book, and efterfolgerenGustav Rasmussen star forward almost like a vain hare, not daring to seize upon the opportunities for an unloading Bornholmssporgsmalet actually good for. The Danish regeringgik
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geringgiksa very pa cat paws that not even daring to raise the issue directly with Moscow. The government lsenede in place up against the British, who in reality did not accord EJornholm no vital strategic importance, even if you are interested follow the proceedings. The Danish tactic was consistently fa-chain a request to Moscow for a Russian withdrawal, together with a British withdrawal from Denmark. It was the Danish government's position that no matte 'gores difference' pa befrierne.Briterne became increasingly irritated by the Danish petitions for a British Forchromning of Danrnark and was at all surprised the Danish passivity towards Moscow. Even a smooth Russian Forchromning from northern Norway after Norwegian request did not give the Danish government an opportunity to forsogenoget similar to Bornholm vedkommende.Da the Danish government endeligi February 1946 directly asked Moscow for a Forchromning, it happened naermestefter British pressure.
Although the Danish Government to the public the impression that negotiations with the Russians was extremely delicate and difficult, Bent Jensen shows that it was by no means tilfaddet. The Russians cleared his throat island without any fuss, according to Bent Jensen because the Russians probably under the impression of bathing the Danish domestic politics and the major political developments had come to the conclusion that bessettelsen of Bornholm did not give the habede political gain. Instead preferring Moscow on goodwill romningen could medfore. The Russians were apparently not attached any conditions to which heist romningen, yet refused the Danish government after joining the NATO consistently giving allied forces access to the island in any form as a heist. For example. rejected the Danish government said late as 1982 to allow a U.S. military tier orchestra entertain pa klippeoen!
Bathing Russian, Danish and the British government expressed itself for various tactical reasons only begnenset extent publicly about Bornholmssporgsmalet and as almost always with wool in the mouth. As Bent Jensen paviser, gave ground for allehande assumptions and theories, not least among Bornholm. who had the problem completely in pa life. Also the Government's spot repnesentant, prefect Stemann who was russernc assume the title of 'governor', became increasingly desperate, swim over the manglcnde information from K.obenhavn and the government's inaction against Moscow. Stemann sat like a burr pa to his superiors in Copenhagen. In his reports he wondered says straight out of Kobenhavns dispositions and offered to constantly ask her qualifications to available. Virtually matt he nojes to do with his "sauce pot" fool Kobenhavn sometimes gently tried to mark Bornholm tilhorsforhold at various events and visits pa Bornholm. A main ingredient in the arrangements was pompous (and probably pretty much well-intentioned) bilateral to speak. The Danish representatives praised Stalin and the Bargain arms, and the Russian commander said something pient on the common struggle against fascism.
The fraternal tone despite sa Bornholmers like the Russian troops away, and Bent Jensen portrays the small and big problems that the Russian tilstedeva.Melsemed approx. 9,000 man medfortefor locals. The Russians suffered a umadelig thirst, and the German soldiers loved the Danish flodeskumskager.Tyverier occurred isasr was armbandsureeftertragtede and there was enkeltetilfaelde of voldtttgt. But all in all, leaving the writer knowing that there was a relatively disciplined occupation and that
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the relationship between Russian troops and lokalbefolkningi al overwhelmingly was peaceful. A contributory factor was that the Russian troops remained in isolated forkegninger.
In his book on Bornholm, Bent Jensen delivered a solid and well written work that has both a logical europe, a national and a local dimension. The book's consistent and cash analysis sastter many things in place. Kontanthed is a virtue, but it contains also the risk of simplification, and it appears notifying the author a few times due to it.
In what could be called a myth crushing Section characterizes Bent Jensen, for example. delkapitulationsaftalen of 4 May is utterly unambiguous, also in relation to Bornholm. He categorically rejects the interpretation that the kapitulationsaftalen on 4 May meant Bornholm surrender, because surrender to Montgomery did not include the German war navy, as the garrison pa Bornholm heard under. Bent Jensen relies here on the wording of kapitulationsaftalen, which speaks of "all German armed forces ... This is two include all naval ships in disse områder "(Holland, Northwest Germany and Denmark). For Bent Jensen's saledes no doubt that krigsmarinen in the area was covered by delkapitulationen, and moreover, as something quite fundamental ^ that Denmark also included the island. The garrison pa Bornholm after delkapitulationen exclusive should have ordered the krigsmarinen are rejected besides, by Bent Jensen.
Formally speaking, Bent Jensen was right pa all points, but there were several things that probably could give rise to interpretation and confusion: Of course were Bornholm territorial seen a part of Denmark and Bent Jensen paviser it, this was known to bathe in cheese and in the west. But pa due OENS geographical location put altsa even General Eisenhower a parenthesis of Bornholm. This seemed the Russians also have done the act. Although the German High Command on 5 May 1945 to General Lindemann in Silkeborg signified that Bornholm also was his ansvarsomrade (along with MOK Cheese in Kiel) had Bornholm, as far as the notifier's knowledge, never had command lines for Lindemann or admiral Wurmbach in Arhus. Pa due OENS the military situation had hardly been a part of Denmark. About the whole German war Marine 'in the area "covered by delkapitulationen, seems also to have given rise to interpretation and confusion. Covered Agreement also fartojer in the lake, especially in international waters? For example. commanded the German sokrigsledelse that all applicable German ships in the harbor of Copenhagen had to stab the sow before delkapitulationen came into force on 5 May on the morning. The ships would take part in the movements of refugees from east to west. Mon those ships including had to navigate the island of Bornholm, who was an important point in the German evacuation? Helps to draw a picture of confusion and ambiguity are also many German übade as the fifth and 6 May the shared sailed through the inner Danish waters, bound for Norway, which was not covered by delkapitulationen. And British planes had explicit orders to attack these übade. Saledes was the last übad in Danish waters lowered the RAF said late as the sixth May
All these questions regarding the German client / interpretation kapitulationsaftalen could Bent Jensen mask be resolved by a closer scrutiny of the German source material.
But in any event, sa ma probably with Bent Jensen note that had just a British uniform, made landing pa Bornholm, would the liberation of the island to have shaped up as the rest of the country.
As you can see, not exactly readable in English.
Fortunately,being able to read a little German, I'm able to decipher a bit more of the untranslated text, due to some of the similarities of the languages.
What I found was this synopsis of Bent Jensen's research here: 
Fortunately,being able to read a little German, I'm able to decipher a bit more of the untranslated text, due to some of the similarities of the languages.