Did Göring EVER target the Radar Stations during the Battle of Britain?

[Torretta13]

I ask because I have read conflicting statements from several historians. Some have said that the Germans NEVER realized the importance of the British radar stations, and NEVER focused on them. Others have written that the Luftwaffe DID target the radar stations for a brief time, but that they let up too soon, thereby allowing the British to repair them. So, does anyone know if the Luftwaffe EVER attempted to systematically knock out all of the British radar stations? If so, just how close did they come to accomplishing this goal???

[steverodgers801]

there were some attacks on the stations the first day, but none were disabled long term. there was no follow up on the attacks. The Germans never understood the advantage the radar gave the British.

[Ironmachine]

The following quotes more or less summarize the whole affair:

[...]by listening to British radio transmissions during the preceding months, it was discovered that British pilots were directed from control centers on the ground, and apparently the Germans finally realized that those tall towers were the radar antennas.
Consequently, four of the first missions on August 12 were directed against these RDF stations and were generally successful. One station was completely destroyed and three others damaged. The Germans tried to destroy the antennas, but the structures proved quite resilient. The Germans ignored the wooden shacks dispersed near the antennas on the assumption that these were administrative buildings and not worth the expenditure of bombs. It stood to reason that the real equipment and control centers were deep in the ground under several feet of concrete. They were wrong. Besides, the British managed to have the three damaged stations properly functioning again in less than two hours. For the destroyed on, in a place called Ventnor, the British used deception. They quickly put in a transmitter (without the receiver) that worked on the correct wavelength. As an operational radar it was of course useless, since it could only make noise and see nothing, but the Germans did not know that. Their conclusion was that damaged British radar stations could be put back in operation after less than two hours and that therefore the four missions against them were in essence wasted. The effort should then be directed against the real targets -the airfields and aircraft of Fighter Command. Three days later, two more RDF stations were destroyed, but because of the overlapping of the stations and the fact that the Germans did not figure out the free (from observation) corridors, if there were any, the defense was not affected. As a result, after the attacks on August 15, Goering declared, "it is doubtful whether there is any point in continuing the attacks on radar sites, in view of the fact that not one of those attacked has so far been put out of action."

Quoted from Misguided Weapons: Technological Failure and Surprise on the Battlefield by Azriel Lorber.

[...]the Luftwaffe attacked the [Radar] Chain as well as airfields in its attempt at 'destroying his ground organization.' Heavy attacks were made on six stations in the southeast on 12 August, with considerable damage done; one, Ventnor, was knocked out for eleven days, but an ordinary radio transmitter was soon putting out pulses on the same frequency and 'though these produced no echo, the enemy, hearing them, coudl only suppose that the station had been repaired.' Meanwhile, the Reichsmarschall cancelled any furter attacks on radar targers, arguing, 'It is doubtful whether there is any point in continuing the attacks on radar sites, in view of the fact that not one of those attacked has so far been put out of action.'

Quoted from The Crucible of War, 1939-1945, Volume 3 by Brereton Greenhous.

[Sheldrake]

I ask because I have read conflicting statements from several historians. Some have said that the Germans NEVER realized the importance of the British radar stations, and NEVER focused on them. Others have written that the Luftwaffe DID target the radar stations for a brief time, but that they let up too soon, thereby allowing the British to repair them. So, does anyone know if the Luftwaffe EVER attempted to systematically knock out all of the British radar stations? If so, just how close did they come to accomplishing this goal???

There are two issues here.

1. The Germans did target the Radar installations on 15th and 16th August 1940 "Eagle Day". The radar stations at Dover, Forness,Rye and Ventonr were put out of action. The raid on then 16th putting Ventnor out of action for weeks.

https://battleofbritainblog.com/2010/08 ... 15th-1940/
https://battleofbritainblog.com/2010/08 ... 16th-1940/

These were heavily defended by low level AA weapons - by 1940 standards.

The Germans did not realise how effective their attacks had been. The British hit the extent of the damage by deployiny a less effective mobile radar and deploying a transmitter, which, even without a received gave the impression that no damage had been caused.

2. The Germans did not understand how Dowding's system worked. It was not just aboput radar. Radar gave early warning of high fling aircraft fdrom about 150 miles out to the coast. It gave no information about height nor about the passaage of aircraft once they reached the British coast. Dowding had created an "integrated air defence system" Its real strength was the C3 system which collected information from radar, wireless intercepts, the observer corps and other sources, assessed this information and used the information to give real time directions to aircraft, AA guns and the civil defence system. Impressive stuff without any computers. There was also a degree of redundancy.

The Germans missed the weakest links in the Air defence network. This was not the radars, which were hard to hit and well defended, but the sector control stations which directed up to four squadrons to raids. The sector stations had to be built on Air Ministry land and were typically in wooden huts. The Germans hit the sector station at Biggin Hill crippling the station until an alternative could be occupied outside the base.

[wm]

To be quite correct, Chain Home was able to determine height although at reduced range.
Similarity analog computers were used, the so called Fruit Machines.

Another possibility not mentioned are the German jamming efforts in July 1940 and in September 1940 using the Breslau I jamming stations. The efforts weren't properly coordinated with ith the Battle of Britain, unnecessary giving the British time to develop countermeasures.
The Germans used sophisticated and unforeseen by the British techniques, so properly used jamming had a real chance to shut down the entire Chain Home network for weeks.

[stg 44]

I ask because I have read conflicting statements from several historians. Some have said that the Germans NEVER realized the importance of the British radar stations, and NEVER focused on them. Others have written that the Luftwaffe DID target the radar stations for a brief time, but that they let up too soon, thereby allowing the British to repair them. So, does anyone know if the Luftwaffe EVER attempted to systematically knock out all of the British radar stations? If so, just how close did they come to accomplishing this goal???

Understand that German strategy was to draw out British fighters so that they could be destroyed in combat, so the radars actually assisted Germany its efforts there, so why bomb them? They were never effectively able to put them out of commission for a significant period when they did bomb them, so why not just use them draw out the RAF and kill them?

[wm]

A nice plan, but ceding the initiative to the enemy is rarely a good idea.
You will be wandering aimlessly as the enemy thanks to their radars will be able to choose the place, the weapons, and the time of the fight. And will be able to place superior forces above you, again thanks to their radars.

[firefox0085]

The Germans didn't bomb, b/c they thought that the controller's area would be a bunker deep below ground, which they felt they could not destroy.


They did not realize the radar controllers had a little wooden hut next to the towers...

[Sheldrake]

A nice plan, but ceding the initiative to the enemy is rarely a good idea.
You will be wandering aimlessly as the enemy thanks to their radars will be able to choose the place, the weapons, and the time of the fight. And will be able to place superior forces above you, again thanks to their radars.

True, and more besides. If the German aim was to draw the RAF into air combat under unfavourable circumstances then destroying the early warning system tilts the balance in the attackers favour.

Given numerical parity, the balance of air fighting is in favour of the defender, who will recover far more damaged aircraft and bailed pilots. In order to compensate for the defender's ability to recover damaged aircraft and bailed pilots the attackeing Germans would need to shoot down a minimum of 3 defending RAF fighters for every aircraft they lost, just to maintain a parity.

However, the attacker can choose when to attack and can mass all fighters for each raid.

With early warning of a raid, the defender can hold all fighters on the ground and then respond with as many as can be vectored onto the raiders.

Without early warning the defender needs to maintain a combat air patrol over likely targets. This cannot be fore than about 1/3 of fighters to allow for aircraft to refuel and climb to station and leaves the defender facing a numerically superior escorts.

It would have been very difficult for the Germans to "win" the battle of Britain unless they could knock out the early warning system.