How would you actually defeat and conquer the USSR during WW2?

[ljadw]

About the 5 million : 16 million Soviet citizens were evacuated in 1941/1942

[Phaing]

One should look at the results of collectivisation and the result is that the big famine of 1932 was the last one (with exception of the small one of 1946),although the collectivisation remained . Why were there no more famines ? No one knows .

Are you kidding?

Food imports from the rest of the world, particularly the USA. Didn't you know about that?

[ljadw]

1 ) these food imports started only some 20 years after the end of the war

2) they were limited

3 ) there is no proof that without these imports,there would be a famine in the SU

[Phaing]

The Soviet leadership was always mismanaging the country. In late 1940s and 1950s the USSR population was always close to starvation as the economy was recovering after the war, but in the 1960s Khrushchev commited a number of criminally insane blunders in agriclture (like replacing wheat for corn in a number of regions, or killing all cattle in a number of regions, again, to replace pastures for corn fields). In the regions, which were traditionally wheat-growing, there were hunger riots which were suppressed by the armed forces. Then, Brezhnev was importing wheat as he had to find a way to feed the people. After 1991, overall management improved dramatically.
No Communism = a healthier population, in more ways than one!

https://www.indexmundi.com/agriculture/ ... ph=imports

Note the cyclic nature of the imports, in reaction to shortages caused by the same old things; bad weather and VERY bad policy.

[ljadw]

In late 1940s and 1950s the USSR population was always close to starvation as the economy was recovering after the war,


but in the 1960s Khrushchev commited a number of criminally insane blunders in agriclture (like replacing wheat for corn in a number of regions, or killing all cattle in a number of regions, again, to replace pastures for corn fields).

In the regions, which were traditionally wheat-growing, there were hunger riots which were suppressed by the armed forces.


Then, Brezhnev was importing wheat as he had to find a way to feed the people.

1) there is no proof for this claim :between 1950 and 1960 the grain production increased from 81 to 107 million ton

2 ) these blunders were not insane : they were attempts to increase the production but who failed

3 ) proof that there were hunger riots that were suppressed by the army ? Between 1960 and 1965 the grain production increased from 107 million ton to 165 million ton
4)the imports started earlier, before the adv ent of Brezhnev


There were already grain imports when Stalin ruled (250000 ton in 1950) but they remained proportionally very low til 1958 =less than 1 % of the production .

The first crisis arrived in 1958 when the grain production fell by 20 million ton and when 5.8 million ton were imported;when in 1963 the production fell again by 31 million ton,3.6 million ton were imported and Nikita K . was fired the next year .The big imports continued in 1964,1965,1966,although the production was going up .And between 1971 and 1975 there were again big imports.

Is there a correlation between grain imports and bad harvest ? Yes and no

Between 1957 and 1958 the harvest fell from 112 to 92 million ton and the imports increased from 1.2 million to 5.8 million,but the opposite happened also :the 1963 harvest was 96 million, the 1964 harvest 135 million,but the imports increased from 3.6 to 8.9 and the 1973 harvest was the biggest since the war,but the imports were also the biggest24.4 million .Between 1981/1985 the harvests were 250 million, but the imports remained at 18/20 million .

Source for the figures :estimates for soviet grain imports in 1980/1985 Alternative approaches P 45 .

An explanation is :before 1953 (Stalin ruling ) the harvests were much lower, but people did not riot ,because of the presence of the Cheka .

Everything changed after the death of Stalin :there was now a dictatorship without secret police ,and, while the war generation remained calm, there was a lot to fear that the younger generation would no longer be satisfied : for the "old " the increase of the agricultural production fortified their loyalty to the regime, but the young generation who had not experienced the privations of the war,would not be satisfied . They wanted more : more food, more luxury, more freedom . Rationing was out of the question intervention of the secret police/ of the army was out of the question : the only solution was to buy the loyalty ,satisfaction of the population.

Between 1950/1960 total agricultural output was increasing between 1950/1960 by 50 %,,between 1960/1970 by 35 % only,between 1970/1975 it decreased by 10 % .

The USSR was in 1975 in a zone of alarm,and the old men of the Politbureau knew it, but they had only 3 options :

Return of the Cheka, which meant their death-sentence

liberalization,which meant the end of the regime

or food imports, which only delayed the inevitable .

[BDV]

1 ) these food imports started only some 20 years after the end of the war

2) they were limited

3 ) there is no proof that without these imports,there would be a famine in the SU

There was the pillaging of the Eastern Europe agriculture. Eastern European serfs starved ("the quota system") so that the Bolshevik could feast.

Khrushchev fell when the 20-years reparations' system ended and Soviet Union found itself suddenly facing a great food shortage.

[Stiltzkin]

You cannot easily starve out the USSR (map from 82, showing the primary agricultural hubs).

Cuts in the civillian sector were already pretty drastic, but you certainly cannot starve out the Army:

You would have to do it before 42. The only chance of winning would rest in a greater and more reliable alliance, a country with the additional manpower of Italy or France would have turned the tide. It all comes down to this, nothing else. This is also the very reason why Britain refused to protect their asian colonies in the long run, Britain could not afford to bleed against the Asian populations (Japan was industrially weaker than Britain).

You need the manpower to engage Allied convoys and to occupy vast territories of the USSR, while also fighting the Red Army. The Axis would need to be more coherent and as strong as the Allied GDP and manpower accumulation.
You have to keep in mind that losing manpower for a western nation has a much greater impact on economy than for communist regimes.

There is also another way of defeating the Soviets, isolation. Isolate them just like Reagan did during the Cold War.

[alecsandros]

USSR would have been easily taken out of the war IF Japan focused on it, instead of absolutely every other potential Pacific enemy (USA, Britain, France, Netherlands, etc). USSR was strictly dependent on imports of bauxite and alluminum from US companies, imports that were made via Vladivostok and (later) through Murmansk , Arhanghelsk, and (even later on) , via the PErsian Corridor.

[ljadw]

How would Japan block the import of aluminium via Murmansk ?

[stg 44]

How would Japan block the import of aluminium via Murmansk ?

Bushido clearly.

[alecsandros]

Supplying through Murmansk started in late 1941/early 1942 (and the harbor did not have the capacity to absorb extra shipment to compensate for Vladivostok),
by then Japan could have blocked Vladivostok shipments, naturaly.

[ljadw]

The Murmansk route was the shortest route but also the most dangerous one : 23 % of LL passed through Murmansk

The ME route was long:27 % of LL

The Pacific Route was the longest :it took weeks to move goods from Wladiwostok to Moscow : 50 % of LL,but only non-military goods .

Saying that Japan could have blocked the Pacific shipments is an assumption founded on the assumption that Japan would have tried to do this . And this assumption is unlikely : why should Japan in a war against the SU and the USA try to block US shipments heading to Moscow for a war between the SU and Germany ?

[ljadw]

About the aluminium/bauxite : this was 56 % of what the SU produced,when there was a shortage, the SU used wood . Besides : if Wladiwostock was blocked, bauxite would be transported through Murmank .

[alecsandros]

The Murmansk route was the shortest route but also the most dangerous one : 23 % of LL passed through Murmansk

Murmansk was opened in late 1941/early 1942 (sevral months after the invasion of USSR), and did not have the capacity to absorb the materials rerouted from Vladivostok, in the event in which Vladivostok would have been blocked.

The Pacific Route was the longest :it took weeks to move goods from Wladiwostok to Moscow : 50 % of LL,but only non-military goods .

Such as alluminum and bauxite, of which USA companies had 91% of total WORLD extraction

And this assumption is unlikely : why should Japan in a war against the SU and the USA try to block US shipments heading to Moscow for a war between the SU and Germany ?

Because Japan was ALLIED with Germany as part of the tri-partite pact (that formed the "Axis"), and was militarily obliged to help her ally, which formaly requested military intervention in the east of USSR. It was also a logcal step, as in helping Germany defeat USSR, Japan would be free in invading Asia, while, if not , and if Germany were defeated, Japan would have been facing the daunting task of trying to take Asia on herself (and thus being required to defeat USSR on it's own - hardly conceivable considering the 1938/1939 engagements).

[alecsandros]

About the aluminium/bauxite : this was 56 % of what the SU produced,when there was a shortage, the SU used wood . Besides : if Wladiwostock was blocked, bauxite would be transported through Murmank .

Wood ain't going to build no modern Yaks or Sturmoviks.

USSR (and the rest of the world) was completely dependent on imports of alluminum and bauxite from USA-based companies (which bought most of the world bauxite-ore locations from ex-British collonial companies in the 1920s and 1930s).