How would you actually defeat and conquer the USSR during WW2?

[Stiltzkin]

Wood ain't going to build no modern Yaks or Sturmoviks.

That might be true to some extent but they were not vital for the victory over Germany. Airpower was a small fraction of the overall Soviet firepower, plus AA guns were sufficient to harass and cause enough damage - then you had the WAllies dealing with the rest of the Luftwaffe anyway.

[alecsandros]

It's difficult to obtain victory without air superiority, if not supremacy. Without modern air , the USSR could do little to thwart Luftawffe's push , and could not stage effective counterattacks , as they would be heavily hit from the air (weather permitting).

[Stiltzkin]

It's difficult to obtain victory without air superiority, if not supremacy. Without modern air , the USSR could do little to thwart Luftawffe's push , and could not stage effective counterattacks

That might be partially correct but even the OKL/OKW/OKH realized that Luftwaffe personnel was too large and was gradually cut in 1941-42 for ground forces. Airpower is going to lower casualties, disrupt/harass and give valuable recon, besides that the Soviets would have been able to do without it and rely on capturing airfields. Soviet Airpower inflicted probably less than 3% of total casualties.

[ljadw]

The Murmansk route was the shortest route but also the most dangerous one : 23 % of LL passed through Murmansk

Murmansk was opened in late 1941/early 1942 (sevral months after the invasion of USSR), and did not have the capacity to absorb the materials rerouted from Vladivostok, in the event in which Vladivostok would have been blocked.

The Pacific Route was the longest :it took weeks to move goods from Wladiwostok to Moscow : 50 % of LL,but only non-military goods .

Such as alluminum and bauxite, of which USA companies had 91% of total WORLD extraction

And this assumption is unlikely : why should Japan in a war against the SU and the USA try to block US shipments heading to Moscow for a war between the SU and Germany ?

Because Japan was ALLIED with Germany as part of the tri-partite pact (that formed the "Axis"), and was militarily obliged to help her ally, which formaly requested military intervention in the east of USSR. It was also a logcal step, as in helping Germany defeat USSR, Japan would be free in invading Asia, while, if not , and if Germany were defeated, Japan would have been facing the daunting task of trying to take Asia on herself (and thus being required to defeat USSR on it's own - hardly conceivable considering the 1938/1939 engagements).

Japan was NOT obliged to help Germany (and it did not ) and Germany was not obliged to help Japan,and it did not : on 3 september 1941 a German merchant ship was leaving Germany with direction China,loaded with military material for China . And it was not attacked by the RN .

[ljadw]

About the aluminium/bauxite : this was 56 % of what the SU produced,when there was a shortage, the SU used wood . Besides : if Wladiwostock was blocked, bauxite would be transported through Murmank .

Wood ain't going to build no modern Yaks or Sturmoviks.

USSR (and the rest of the world) was completely dependent on imports of alluminum and bauxite from USA-based companies (which bought most of the world bauxite-ore locations from ex-British collonial companies in the 1920s and 1930s).

Wood was used to build the Mosquito

[ljadw]

Such as alluminum and bauxite, of which USA companies had 91% of total WORLD extraction

.

this is meaningless : the part of the aluminium production owned by US companies is irrelevant for the SU : what was relevant for the SU was the amount of aluminium it could produce and the amount of aluminium that was needed . And there are no figures for the amount that was needed .

[Guaporense]

It's difficult to obtain victory without air superiority, if not supremacy. Without modern air , the USSR could do little to thwart Luftawffe's push , and could not stage effective counterattacks , as they would be heavily hit from the air (weather permitting).

The USSR did not have air superiority until 1944, yet they turned the tide already in 1942.

Air superiority played a more psychological role than anything: aircraft were small lightweight and delicate machines that served to scare the enemy, in terms of firepower they represented around 1-2% of all casualties inflicted, their main effect was not in "hitting enemies" but scaring then. Even today with modern tech airpower is not the miracle some Anglo Saxon people think it is.

[Guaporense]

It's difficult to obtain victory without air superiority, if not supremacy. Without modern air , the USSR could do little to thwart Luftawffe's push , and could not stage effective counterattacks

That might be partially correct but even the OKL/OKW/OKH realized that Luftwaffe personnel was too large and was gradually cut in 1941-42 for ground forces. Airpower is going to lower casualties, disrupt/harass and give valuable recon, besides that the Soviets would have been able to do without it and rely on capturing airfields. Soviet Airpower inflicted probably less than 3% of total casualties.

According to Dupiy's NPW only 4.2% of the WAllies firepower was airpower on average of 78 engagements in 1943 and 1944. The Soviets utilized airpower to a much smaller degree than the WAllies relative to the number of ground troops (they had about 1 aircraft for 600 men in the frontlines whie the WAllies had 1 for every 150 troops). So that would imply that only about 1% of the Soviet firepower was airpower.

Airpower played no decisive role in WW2. Ground armies did, in France 1940 and the Eastern front in 1942-1943, during the decisive engagements airpower was just a small complement to ground troops.

The only case where I think airpower played a decisive role was in Italy in 1944 when the WAllies had massive air superiority but only limited numerical superiority on the ground against a small German force. According to Dupuy's estimations most Allies victories in the set of engagements he analized would be defeats without Allied airpower (German ground firepower would be 3/4 of WAllied firepower without airpower and hence not enough difference to permit victory for the Allies). But in other fronts in other times ground firepower always played the decisive role, specially in the Eastern front were there were 10 million soldiers in the frontlines making the thousands of aircraft deployed look like mosquitoes bitting on elephants.

[Michael Kenny]

Airpower played no decisive role in WW2.

More ill-informed nonsense. One only has to look to the 'decisive' total failure of the Luftwaffe in 1940. Their inability to gain air superiority to counter the RN meant a sea assault would be destroyed. That is about as clear a definition of decisive one can get.

[Stiltzkin]

More ill-informed nonsense. One only has to look to the 'decisive' total failure of the Luftwaffe in 1940. Their inability to gain air superiority to counter the RN meant a sea assault would be destroyed. That is about as clear a definition of decisive one can get.

There was never a "sea assault" planned, at least not before the defeat of the USSR. Seelöwe was hardly achievable without it. Also, when Dieppe was launched the RAF suffered a similar fate.

[Michael Kenny]

in terms of firepower they represented around 1-2% of all casualties inflicted

Indeed. In fact one can say the German Concentration Camps were far more effective than the combined might of the Western Allies because they (the camps) killed some 4-6 million.
GIGO.

[Michael Kenny]

There was never a "sea assault" planned, at least not before the defeat of the USSR. Seelöwe was hardly achievable without it

Did I not just say that?
That the failure to achieve air superiority was decisive in ending all hope of a sea assault. That is without the elimination of the RN the whole invasion force would be destroyed.

[Stiltzkin]

Did I not just say that?
That the failure to achieve air superiority was decisive in ending all hope of a sea assault. That is without the elimination of the RN the whole invasion force would be destroyed.

No you stated that the assault failed due to the inability to achieve air superiority, I said due to the inabililty to bring the Red Army to its knees and political reasons which sound more rational. Also, I think the user above has you on his ignore list that is why hes incapable of responding, should be clear by now.

[Michael Kenny]

No you stated that the assault failed due to the inability to achieve air superiority, I said due to the inabililty to bring the Red Army to its knees and political reasons which sound more rational.

So the failure to bring the 'Red Army' to its knees in the summer of 1940 was the real reason?
My error is in thinking Hitler did not attack Russia until 1941!

The fact that the RN would send the invasion force to the bottom of the channel was the reason Hitler got cold feet.

[Stiltzkin]

So the failure to bring the 'Red Army' to its knees in the summer of 1940 was the real reason?
My error is in thinking Hitler did not attack Russia until 1941!

No, it was because their attention was already turned elsewhere. Britain was "incidental". The idea that there was some kind of large invasion force waiting for the occupation of England is made up by British "overpatriotic" literature.