Strategic options after Hitler's death

Discussions on High Command, strategy and the Armed Forces (Wehrmacht) in general.
jesk
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Re: Strategic options after Hitler's death

Post by jesk » 02 Sep 2017 07:35

MarkF617 wrote:Initially there were few divisions in Normandy and a good deception plan kept some in the Pas de Calais but before the breakout most of the western divisions were in Normandy along with others from the Ost front. The panzers were in the line due to lack of infantry and excellent use of the British Armoured divisions by Monty. Every time the Germans tried to mass armour for an attack Monty attacked with his armour forcing the panzers to defend the line. The Allied airforces prevented manouver warfare not to mention lack of transport for many units. The Allies could easily out manouver the Germans by this point.

I may not be as well read as some on this forum, but I have read quite a bit and know that to blame Hitler for everything is very simple and outdated history. If you believe so strongly about this can you give any specific examples of Hitler's errors?

Mark.
Errors of Hitler are described in the memoirs of Warlimont. Read the book in its entirety and you are in the subject.

Hitler in June 1944 was waiting for the Allies to land more. He did not allow prematurely to join the battle of the 15th Army and the tank divisions of the SS.

http://dlx.b-ok.org/genesis/905000/363c ... k.org).pdf

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jesk
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Re: Strategic options after Hitler's death

Post by jesk » 02 Sep 2017 07:45

What Hitler did on the example of Nordwind. He gave Americans a week to regroup and pull up reserves. They cut the front line, tightening the defense and strengthening it. But for this, the initial blow of the Germans should not be particularly strong.

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viewtopic.php?p=2095942#p2095942
Hitler has traditionally sprayed German forces into the operation.
1) The prohibition of 1 and 19 army attacks simultaneously.
2) 2 hits in the 1st Army belt.
3) The prohibition on the entry into the battle until January 7 of the reserve 39 panzer corps with 21 and 25 panzer divisions.

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Re: Strategic options after Hitler's death

Post by Kelvin » 02 Sep 2017 08:47

jesk wrote:
Kelvin wrote:
If he waited for transfer of troops from other areas, suprise and weather factor will be eclipsed.
There is no connection between the transfer of troops from other countries and the unexpectedness of the offensive. The Germans could increase the number of soldiers in Germany, at the same time keep the preparation of the offensive in secret.
And some Pz/PG divisions were not combat ready in term of equipment and supplies like 17.SS and 10.SS, 21 Pz and 25 PG divisions.

These divisions were used in Operation Nordwind.
Transfer of troop from Poland and East Prussia will bring another Bagration fiasco again.
Yugoslavia, Italy, Norway, Kurland. From Poland, no one was going to withdraw troops.
Of course, much more armored units will reinforce victory anyway.
Tanks in the Ardennes were many. The infantry divisions did not have enough to cover the flanks, and wrote already, the war in the mountains, where tanks are not effective enough.
In 1940, Hitler could concentrate 45 divisions in one Ardennes thrust because his empire was small and he was on good terms with USSR and Polish border was safe which he only kept 10 divisions there. It was another story in late 1944. Anglo-Amercian troops had occupied the half of Italy and threatened southern French border. A large number of Ostheer garrisoned in Poland, East Prussia, Hungary and Latavia to forstall Russian invasion from East. Over 350,000 strong garrison were stationed in Norway to guard German northern flank. Ardennes was really a gamble.
Who were they guarding there? Polar bears? All German generals asked Hitler to withdraw troops from Norway. Hitler refused.

Surprise and weather factor is really matter in Ardennes offensive, Bad weather in mid 1944 brought allied air superiority to a halt, abeit in very short period of time.enabled German, without air superiority in this moment, to strike US troop freely.Suprise is important too. German 's 1940 Ardennes strike and German suprise attack on USSR in 1941 brought significant strategic and tactial result respectively.

And I know 17.SS and 21. Pz were used in Nordwind, what I say were no need to carry out Nordwind, just used all troop for Ardennes offensive. But full scale of refitting for all Pz/PG divisions at the same time was quite difficult for German. 17.SS and 25.PG only received enough armour until the end of Dec 1944.

And Garrison in Norway, many were static troop without transport and most of infantry divisions were manning coastal forts, somewhat is useless in Ardennsive mobile war. And Hitler already transfered some good divisions to West, 6.SS and 2.Gebirgs divisions and also in March 1945, two veteran 163 and 169. infanterie divisions also sent east.

In my opinion, Hitler mistake was to keep too many troops in Hungary, especially panzer divisions (1. 3. 6. 8. 13. 23. , 3SS and 5SS Pz divisions and 4. SS PG division. He should at least depolyed two third of Pz units to reinforce Poland or East Prussia and completely evacuated Kurland bridgehead to release another 20 divisions for the defence of East Prussia, though Hitler needed to give up his dream of building up another new submarine fleet.

Releasing all Pz/PG divisions ( 21. and 10.SS Pz divisions and 17.SS and 25.PG divisions) and newly created VG divisions (36. 256.257. 559.VolksGrenadier divisions for Nordwind to used in initial attack of Ardennes and also transfer all three armored units (26. Pz and 29 and 90. PG divisions) also used in first attack of Ardennes was better hope for victory.

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Re: Strategic options after Hitler's death

Post by Kelvin » 02 Sep 2017 09:13

jesk wrote:
MarkF617 wrote:Initially there were few divisions in Normandy and a good deception plan kept some in the Pas de Calais but before the breakout most of the western divisions were in Normandy along with others from the Ost front. The panzers were in the line due to lack of infantry and excellent use of the British Armoured divisions by Monty. Every time the Germans tried to mass armour for an attack Monty attacked with his armour forcing the panzers to defend the line. The Allied airforces prevented manouver warfare not to mention lack of transport for many units. The Allies could easily out manouver the Germans by this point.

I may not be as well read as some on this forum, but I have read quite a bit and know that to blame Hitler for everything is very simple and outdated history. If you believe so strongly about this can you give any specific examples of Hitler's errors?

Mark.
Errors of Hitler are described in the memoirs of Warlimont. Read the book in its entirety and you are in the subject.

Hitler in June 1944 was waiting for the Allies to land more. He did not allow prematurely to join the battle of the 15th Army and the tank divisions of the SS.

http://dlx.b-ok.org/genesis/905000/363c ... k.org).pdf

Image

Instead of blaming Hitler, I think we should blame Albert Speer or Guderian who refitted Pz divisions slowly. German Panzer reserves consisted of nine Panzer divisions and one PanzerGrenadier division, but only half were combat ready. 9, 11, 1SS and 2SS were starved of motor vehicles. Tank shipment were not complete. Should Hitler have enough Panzer divisions, It does't matter where is right location of allied landing. On the eve of Normandy landing, Hitler only had five full combat ready Panzer/PG divisoins for mobile war ( 2. Pz, Lehr, 12.SS, 21. Pz divisions and 17.SS PanzerGrenadier divisions) and 9.and 10. SS Pz divisions were on the way from East.

Blame on Hitler was really outdated matter. German generals were no better than Hitler 's judgement. Halder , OKH chief of staff, insisted on concentrate the German main thrust toward Belgium and ban Manstein plan. Bock, as commander of Heeresgruppe Sud, wanted to retreat in face of Soviet summer offensive of 1942, It was Hitler decision to carry out Operation Friedricus to cut off Soviet 6th and 57th Armies in Izyum salient which led to great victory in Kharkov in May 1942.

It was Zeitzler, OKH chief of staff who advocated a strike on Kursk salient, Hitler was not quite agreeable over that project.

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Re: Strategic options after Hitler's death

Post by jesk » 02 Sep 2017 13:20

Kelvin wrote:And I know 17.SS and 21. Pz were used in Nordwind, what I say were no need to carry out Nordwind, just used all troop for Ardennes offensive. But full scale of refitting for all Pz/PG divisions at the same time was quite difficult for German. 17.SS and 25.PG only received enough armour until the end of Dec 1944.

And Garrison in Norway, many were static troop without transport and most of infantry divisions were manning coastal forts, somewhat is useless in Ardennsive mobile war.
The war is mobile, but divisions were needed to cover the flanks and fights in the forests of the Ardennes. There was enough infantry with a low amount of transport.
And Hitler already transfered some good divisions to West, 6.SS and 2.Gebirgs divisions and also in March 1945, two veteran 163 and 169. infanterie divisions also sent east.
330 thousand soldiers in Norway remained to the end of the war and this is not correct.
In my opinion, Hitler mistake was to keep too many troops in Hungary, especially panzer divisions (1. 3. 6. 8. 13. 23. , 3SS and 5SS Pz divisions and 4. SS PG division. He should at least depolyed two third of Pz units to reinforce Poland or East Prussia and completely evacuated Kurland bridgehead to release another 20 divisions for the defence of East Prussia, though Hitler needed to give up his dream of building up another new submarine fleet.
I do not know what kind of fleet Hitler dreamed of. On the Western front, Hitler's activity in reducing the number of divisions is better visible against the backdrop of the meager reserves of the Allies. The front of the Russians in terms of strength was three times as high as German, and one can always object, the Russians are parrying the blow of the transfer of their forces.
Releasing all Pz/PG divisions ( 21. and 10.SS Pz divisions and 17.SS and 25.PG divisions) and newly created VG divisions (36. 256.257. 559.VolksGrenadier divisions for Nordwind to used in initial attack of Ardennes and also transfer all three armored units (26. Pz and 29 and 90. PG divisions) also used in first attack of Ardennes was better hope for victory.
Tanks in the Ardennes were enough. They stayed in traffic jams idle without fuel. Infantry is small for taking strong points and fighting in forest areas, where tanks will not pass.

Americans in action during Operation Nordwind.

Image

330 thousand Germans in Norway in inactivity. :(

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Re: Strategic options after Hitler's death

Post by jesk » 02 Sep 2017 13:30

Kelvin wrote:
Instead of blaming Hitler, I think we should blame Albert Speer or Guderian who refitted Pz divisions slowly. German Panzer reserves consisted of nine Panzer divisions and one PanzerGrenadier division, but only half were combat ready. 9, 11, 1SS and 2SS were starved of motor vehicles. Tank shipment were not complete. Should Hitler have enough Panzer divisions, It does't matter where is right location of allied landing. On the eve of Normandy landing, Hitler only had five full combat ready Panzer/PG divisoins for mobile war ( 2. Pz, Lehr, 12.SS, 21. Pz divisions and 17.SS PanzerGrenadier divisions) and 9.and 10. SS Pz divisions were on the way from East.
You attach too much importance to tank divisions. There was still a strong 15 army, which Hitler kept from entering the battle at the stage of accumulation by the Allies of forces on the bridgeheads.

http://www.axishistory.com/axis-nations ... 1-15-armee

Order of battle (15 June 1944)

At the disposal of the 15. Armee
- LXIV. Reserve-Korps
- 1. SS-Panzer-Division “Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler” (refitting)
- 182. Reserve-Division
- 326. Infanterie-Division
- 331. Infanterie-Division (forming)
- 85. Infanterie-Division
- 84. Infanterie-Division
LXXXIX. Armeekorps
- 165. Reserve-Division
- 712. Infanterie-Division
- 48. Infanterie-Division
LXXXII. Armeekorps
- 18. Feld-Division (L)
- 47. Infanterie-Division
- 49. Infanterie-Division
LXVII. Armeekorps
- 344. Infanterie-Division
- 348. Infanterie-Division
LXXXI. Armeekorps
- 245. Infanterie-Division
- 17. Feld-Division (L)
- 711. Infanterie-Division
- 346. Infanterie-Division
- 21. Panzer-Division (part)
Blame on Hitler was really outdated matter. German generals were no better than Hitler 's judgement. Halder , OKH chief of staff, insisted on concentrate the German main thrust toward Belgium and ban Manstein plan. Bock, as commander of Heeresgruppe Sud, wanted to retreat in face of Soviet summer offensive of 1942, It was Hitler decision to carry out Operation Friedricus to cut off Soviet 6th and 57th Armies in Izyum salient which led to great victory in Kharkov in May 1942.

It was Zeitzler, OKH chief of staff who advocated a strike on Kursk salient, Hitler was not quite agreeable over that project.
Isn't true. Bock did not want to cancel the offensive of May 1942 and Zeitzler insisted on offensive at Kursk. Against was only the Model.

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Re: Strategic options after Hitler's death

Post by jesk » 02 Sep 2017 15:07

arrival time of allied divisions to Normandy

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_A ... y_Campaign

United States
5th Infantry Division 9 July
8th Infantry Division 4 July
28th Infantry Division 22 July
35th Infantry Division 5 July
3rd Armored Division 23 June
4th Armored Division 11 July
6th Armored Division 19 July

Canada
4th Canadian (Armoured) Division 29 July
2nd Canadian Infantry Division 5 July

United Kingdom
Guards Armoured Division 28 June
43rd (Wessex) Infantry Division 24 June
53rd (Welsh) Infantry Division 27 June
59th (Staffordshire) Infantry Division 27 June

France
2e Division Blindée 1 August

Poland
1st Armoured Division 1 August

If the Germans had launched an offensive, for example, on June 22, they would have avoided a battle with 15 allied divisions. Hitler watched the proportion of forces, did not allow the Germans to create advantage. The number of German divisions in Normandy is tied to Hitler by the Allied. As currency exchange rates, peg to the dollar, euro. So Hitler's German divisions in Normandy should not be more enemy.

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Re: Strategic options after Hitler's death

Post by Richard Anderson » 02 Sep 2017 15:19

jesk wrote:Order of battle (15 June 1944)

At the disposal of the 15. Armee
- LXIV. Reserve-Korps
- 1. SS-Panzer-Division “Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler” (refitting)
- 182. Reserve-Division
- 326. Infanterie-Division
- 331. Infanterie-Division (forming)
- 85. Infanterie-Division
- 84. Infanterie-Division
LXXXIX. Armeekorps
- 165. Reserve-Division
- 712. Infanterie-Division
- 48. Infanterie-Division
LXXXII. Armeekorps
- 18. Feld-Division (L)
- 47. Infanterie-Division
- 49. Infanterie-Division
LXVII. Armeekorps
- 344. Infanterie-Division
- 348. Infanterie-Division
LXXXI. Armeekorps
- 245. Infanterie-Division
- 17. Feld-Division (L)
- 711. Infanterie-Division
- 346. Infanterie-Division
- 21. Panzer-Division (part)
I think we've been over this before...in this same thread.

At the disposal of the 15. Armee
- LXIV. Reserve-Korps
- 1. SS-Panzer-Division “Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler” (refitting) - The division was initially ordered to Normandy on 8 June, but the order was canceled on 9 June and the division movement did not begin until 17 June.
- 182. Reserve-Division - Was not immediately available for deployment. It was under the administrative control of LXIV Res.-A.K. for training. The division was reorganizing as a field division; a process that was not completed until 27 July when it was assigned to the Feldheer. On 30 July it was assigned to LXXXIX A.K. It was destroyed soon after during the withdrawal to Germany.
- 326. Infanterie-Division - Also was not immediately available. Although designated a static (bodenstandiges) division, it was being reorganized as an improvised mobile division (behilfesmässiges bewegung) using confiscated French vehicles. As of 1 May the division strength was 11,819 (probably including HiWi), but by 20 June it had fallen to 11,533, possibly due to sending drafts of replacements to the forces fighting in Normandy. It appears that it was intended to fill the places of I./Gren.-Regt. 751 and 753 with Ost-Batallionen, but it is unclear which were meant to be used. It was ordered to Normandy in mid July and had crossed the Seine by 22 July.
- 331. Infanterie-Division (forming) - Indeed, so was unavailable for deployment. Remnants of the division arrived in France on 16 March 1944 from the Ostfront to reorganize. As of 1 June the strength was 10,543 and 1,366 HiWi and it appears to have been considered ready for action by the middle of July. It was ordered to Normandy on 28 July and began to arrive in the vicinity of L’Aigle-Gacé on 11 August, attached to LXXXI A.K.
- 85. Infanterie-Division - Was also "forming". The division was raised on 2 February 1944 and although considered ready for action in May, was still organizing on 6 June. By 20 June the division strength was 8,393 (authorized strength 8,126) and 332 HiWi, while a Füsilier Btl. and Feld-Ers.-Btl. had been formed. It was ordered to Normandy on 29 July and elements were west of the Seine in the vicinity of Cleres and extending east of Neufchatel by 4 August. By 10 August the division was in action against First Canadian Army north of Falaise.
- 84. Infanterie-Division - Ditto. The division was raised 2 February 1944 but did not reach full strength until April and on 6 June was still considered to be organizing. By 20 June the division strength was 8,437 (authorized strength was 8,126) and 1,378 HiWi. On 12 June a Füsilier Btl. was formed. The division was ordered to Normandy on 29 July, with the first elements arriving 3 August.
LXXXIX. Armeekorps
- 165. Reserve-Division - Was the famous “Whitebread Division” that garrisoned Walcheren. It was truly a Bodenstandiges as opposed to a Bewegung division in that it had nearly no organic mobility. It was reformed on 17 July as 70. Inf.-Div. (bo). It was under the administrative control of LXIV Res.-A.K. for training.
- 712. Infanterie-Division - One of the original Bodenstandiges divisionen formed for coastal defense...again with nearly zero mobility.
- 48. Infanterie-Division - Formed on 23 November 1943 by the reorganization of the 171. Reserve-Division. Another static unit.
LXXXII. Armeekorps
- 18. Feld-Division (L) - Ditto.
- 47. Infanterie-Division - Another static division formed on 1 February 1944 by the reorganization of the 156. Reserve-Division.
- 49. Infanterie-Division - Although designated a static (bodenstandiges) division, it was being reorganized as an improvised mobile division (behilfesmässiges bewegung) using confiscated French vehicles. As of 1 May the division strength was 11,819 (probably including HiWi), but by 20 June it had fallen to 11,533, possibly due to sending drafts of replacements to the forces fighting in Normandy. It appears that it was intended to fill the places of I./Gren.-Regt. 751 and 753 with Ost-Batallionen, but it is unclear which were meant to be used. It was ordered to Normandy in mid July and had crossed the Seine by 22 July.
LXVII. Armeekorps
- 344. Infanterie-Division - Yet another static division, organized in France on 25 September 1942.
- 348. Infanterie-Division - The division was raised on 2 February 1944 and although considered ready for action in May, was still organizing on 6 June. By 20 June the division strength was 8,393 (authorized strength 8,126) and 332 HiWi, while a Füsilier Btl. and Feld-Ers.-Btl. had been formed. It was ordered to Normandy on 29 July and elements were west of the Seine in the vicinity of Cleres and extending east of Neufchatel by 4 August. By 10 August the division was in action against First Canadian Army north of Falaise.
LXXXI. Armeekorps
- 245. Infanterie-Division - Another static division formed on 8 September 1943.
- 17. Feld-Division (L) - A static division again.
- 711. Infanterie-Division - Another of the original static divisions organized for coast defense. As of 1 May the division strength was 7,242 and an unknown number of HiWi.
- 346. Infanterie-Division - The division had been in Brittany as a bodenstädiges unit until December 1943, when it was decided to increase its mobility, although its designation was unchanged, and it was moved to the vicinity of Le Havre. By 1 May the division strength was 9,534 and an unknown number of HiWi. It was ordered to Normandy on 6 June and was in action by 7 June.
- 21. Panzer-Division (part) - Not part of 15. Armee. The division was part of XXXXVII Pz.K. in Heeresgruppe B Reserve, but was “at the disposal of” A.O.K.7 and was committed on 6 June.
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Re: Strategic options after Hitler's death

Post by Richard Anderson » 02 Sep 2017 15:23

jesk wrote:If the Germans had launched an offensive, for example, on June 22, they would have avoided a battle with 15 allied divisions. Hitler watched the proportion of forces, did not allow the Germans to create advantage. The number of German divisions in Normandy is tied to Hitler by the Allied. As currency exchange rates, peg to the dollar, euro. So Hitler's German divisions in Normandy should not be more enemy.
You might want to actually read a few books on what happened in Normandy, before you continue. The Germans attempted to launch a number of offensives...they did not fair too well. To conduct such an offensive, first you need to assemble a force capable of offensive operations. Then it needs to have superior combat power to the forces it opposes...or have complete surprise or some other combat multiplier working for it.
"Is all this pretentious pseudo intellectual citing of sources REALLY necessary? It gets in the way of a good, spirited debate, destroys the cadence." POD, 6 October 2018

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Re: Strategic options after Hitler's death

Post by jesk » 02 Sep 2017 15:37

Richard Anderson wrote:- 326. Infanterie-Division - Also was not immediately available. It appears that it was intended to fill the places of I./Gren.-Regt. 751 and 753 with Ost-Batallionen, but it is unclear which were meant to be used. It was ordered to Normandy in mid July and had crossed the Seine by 22 July.
- 331. Infanterie-Division (forming) - Indeed, so was unavailable for deployment.As of 1 June the strength was 10,543 and 1,366 HiWi and it appears to have been considered ready for action by the middle of July. It was ordered to Normandy on 28 July and began to arrive in the vicinity of L’Aigle-Gacé on 11 August, attached to LXXXI A.K.
- 85. Infanterie-Division - Was also "forming". The division was raised on 2 February 1944 and although considered ready for action in May, was still organizing on 6 June. By 20 June the division strength was 8,393 (authorized strength 8,126) and 332 HiWi, while a Füsilier Btl. and Feld-Ers.-Btl. had been formed. It was ordered to Normandy on 29 July and elements were west of the Seine in the vicinity of Cleres and extending east of Neufchatel by 4 August. By 10 August the division was in action against First Canadian Army north of Falaise.
- 84. Infanterie-Division - Ditto. The division was ordered to Normandy on 29 July, with the first elements arriving 3 August.
LXXXIX. Armeekorps
- 712. Infanterie-Division - One of the original Bodenstandiges divisionen formed for coastal defense...again with nearly zero mobility.
- 48. Infanterie-Division - Formed on 23 November 1943 by the reorganization of the 171. Reserve-Division. Another static unit.
LXXXII. Armeekorps
- 18. Feld-Division (L) - Ditto.
- 47. Infanterie-Division - Another static division formed on 1 February 1944 by the reorganization of the 156. Reserve-Division.
- 49. Infanterie-Division - Although designated a static (bodenstandiges) division, it was being reorganized as an improvised mobile division (behilfesmässiges bewegung) using confiscated French vehicles. As of 1 May the division strength was 11,819 (probably including HiWi), but by 20 June it had fallen to 11,533, possibly due to sending drafts of replacements to the forces fighting in Normandy. It appears that it was intended to fill the places of I./Gren.-Regt. 751 and 753 with Ost-Batallionen, but it is unclear which were meant to be used. It was ordered to Normandy in mid July and had crossed the Seine by 22 July.
In the text, the lack of orders for nomination to the front, is replaced by speculation about unpreparedness and static. Soldiers have legs. In combat, they are mobile, running and shooting. As in the photo.

Image

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Re: Strategic options after Hitler's death

Post by Richard Anderson » 02 Sep 2017 15:41

jesk wrote:Hitler in June 1944 was waiting for the Allies to land more. He did not allow prematurely to join the battle of the 15th Army and the tank divisions of the SS.
15. Armee we've already covered, but the "tank divisions of the SS", the 1st, 2nd, 9th, and 10th SS? Really?

- 1. SS-Panzer-Division “Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler” (refitting). The division was initially ordered to Normandy on 8 June, but the order was canceled on 9 June and the division movement did not begin until 17 June.
- 2. SS-Panzer-Division "Das Reich" was also refitting and was in Southern France. It's piecemeal movements north and the reasons for it are extremely well documented.
- 9. and 10. SS-Panzer-Division, i.e., II-SS-Panzerkorps, was in the EAST and were ordered west on 11 June...six days before the Margival meeting. It began arriving on 21 June and was not ready for operations until c. 26 June. The only way they can maturely or prematurely join the battle prior to 17 June is if ASB provide the Germans with matter transporters.
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Re: Strategic options after Hitler's death

Post by Richard Anderson » 02 Sep 2017 15:44

jesk wrote:In the text, the lack of orders for nomination to the front, is replaced by speculation about unpreparedness and static. Soldiers have legs. In combat, they are mobile, running and shooting. As in the photo.
No, not speculation, analysis based on reading the documentation. So just how long do you think it would take the rather unsteady legs of the Whitebread Division to get from Walcheren to Normandy? Have you prepared a movement analysis for getting those units to Normandy?
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Re: Strategic options after Hitler's death

Post by jesk » 02 Sep 2017 15:49

Richard Anderson wrote:
jesk wrote:If the Germans had launched an offensive, for example, on June 22, they would have avoided a battle with 15 allied divisions. Hitler watched the proportion of forces, did not allow the Germans to create advantage. The number of German divisions in Normandy is tied to Hitler by the Allied. As currency exchange rates, peg to the dollar, euro. So Hitler's German divisions in Normandy should not be more enemy.
You might want to actually read a few books on what happened in Normandy, before you continue. The Germans attempted to launch a number of offensives...they did not fair too well. To conduct such an offensive, first you need to assemble a force capable of offensive operations. Then it needs to have superior combat power to the forces it opposes...or have complete surprise or some other combat multiplier working for it.
You did not read, but advise. And it's funny.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_L%C3%BCttich

Operation Lüttich was a codename given to a German counter-attack during the Battle of Normandy, which took place around the American positions near Mortain from 7 August to 13 August 1944. (Lüttich is the German name for the city of Liège in Belgium, where the Germans had won a victory in the early days of August 1914 during World War I.) The offensive is also referred to in American and British histories of the Battle of Normandy as the Mortain counter-offensive.
The assault was ordered by Adolf Hitler, to eliminate the gains made by the First United States Army during Operation Cobra and the subsequent weeks, and by reaching the coast in the region of Avranches at the base of the Cotentin peninsula, cut off the units of the Third United States Army which had advanced into Brittany.
The main German striking force was the XLVII Panzer Corps, with one and a half SS Panzer Divisions and two Heer Panzer Divisions. Although they made initial gains against the defending U.S. VII Corps, they were soon halted and Allied aircraft inflicted severe losses on the attacking troops, eventually destroying nearly half of the German tanks involved in the attack.[1] Although fighting continued around Mortain for six days, the American forces had regained the initiative within a day of the opening of the German attack.
As the German commanders on the spot had warned Hitler in vain, there was little chance of the attack succeeding, and the concentration of their armoured reserves at the western end of the front in Normandy soon led to disaster, as they were outflanked to their south and the front to their east collapsed, resulting in many of the German troops in Normandy being trapped in the Falaise Pocket.

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Re: Strategic options after Hitler's death

Post by jesk » 02 Sep 2017 15:54

Richard Anderson wrote: No, not speculation, analysis based on reading the documentation. So just how long do you think it would take the rather unsteady legs of the Whitebread Division to get from Walcheren to Normandy? Have you prepared a movement analysis for getting those units to Normandy?
Speculation. Some divisions were closer Holland.

jesk
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Re: Strategic options after Hitler's death

Post by jesk » 02 Sep 2017 16:25

Arrangement of forces before the invasion. How many divisions 15 armies next to Normandy. And why did you for that Whitebread Division near Utrecht remember.

http://wwii-photos-maps.com/lagewest/19 ... -1944.html

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