Could a German invasion of Turkey succeed?

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TheMarcksPlan
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Re: Could a German invasion of Turkey succeed?

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 09 Jan 2021 08:08

TheMarcksPlan wrote:The railroad ends at Miyana (Mianeh), ~200 miles from the Turkey-Iran border by land around Lake Urmia.
In case you're wondering, the rail gap between Mianeh and Tabriz was not bridged during WW2:
In 1939 the railway extended a branch northwest from Tehran toward Tabriz; in 1941 this line had passed Zenjan and was carried on to Mianeh in 1942, a total distance of 272 miles. Some work was done west of Mianeh, but the plans based on the former Shah's insistence upon driving the line from there straight through, rather than around large hill masses, proved too costly and the project withered.
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Re: Could a German invasion of Turkey succeed?

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 09 Jan 2021 08:58

glenn239 wrote:The British couldn't even eject the Germans from some Aegean islands in 1943, and they're going to throw the Germans out of Turkey?
Indeed. The British didn't think it was possible to defend ANYTHING in Turkey during 1942. viewtopic.php?f=11&t=238638&p=2294326&h ... h#p2294326

The obvious hint is Second Alamein: It took months to build a 10-division offensive when Monty's 8th Army was the primary focus of the British Army and Empire. Rommel had 3 German divisions. To imagine it would be possible to defeat a small fraction of German forces - were they committed to Turkey - requires conjuring fleets of shipping and armies that simply did not exist. It's a fundamental misunderstanding of WW2 that - unsurprisingly - the primary sources do not share.

So unless we're talking about some ATL with a '43 PoD or later, there's no prospect of Britain ejecting Germany from Turkey.

Again, this is the kind of thing one won't hear of on AHF, which has devolved into Allied Cold-War views with the sophistication of, say, 1970's historiography. The Good Guys were always going to win; no need to revise worldviews about Good vs. Evil.
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Re: Could a German invasion of Turkey succeed?

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 09 Jan 2021 09:22

TheMarcksPlan wrote:Indeed. The British didn't think it was possible to defend ANYTHING in Turkey during 1942.
Recalling that not all will read a linked post, I'll excerpt an exact quote from Alanbrooke in March 1942:
we cannot at present hope to hold as far north even as the [Turkish]
frontier.’
Source: Britain, Turkey and the Soviet Union, 1940-45 by Tamkin, p.66
https://www.google.com/books/edition/Br ... frontcover

What more does anyone need? The British didn't think they could hold anywhere in Turkey, therefore they wouldn't even have tried. The Americans didn't think they could defend the ME against a large German force (see Hopkins above). To reach the opposite conclusion requires assuming American and British leadership were incompetent.

To repeat: any conception that the W.Allies possessed the land forces and/or shipping to resist the German Army in the MidEast in this period is pure ahistorical fantasy. The typical non-analytical, non-quantitative, faith-based claptrap about Allied resources abounds in this thread - but that's all it is.
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Re: Could a German invasion of Turkey succeed?

Post by Peter89 » 09 Jan 2021 10:44

Just highlighting a few major flaws.

Once again, you think that the Wallies would not change a single bit about their strategy if such thing as the collapse of the Soviet Union was done.

Also, the Soviet collapse can mean a lot of things, including a surviving SU behnd the A-A line (the original plan), German units at Vladivostok, and also a huge number of fleeing Soviet troops which were not stationed in the Western frontier.

If you assume that the Germans could have defeated all the Soviet forces of 1941/1942 on their western front, as well as their units from all other sectors, they would suffer some extra casualties, no? The extra panzer group in AGS would not mean the bloodless defeat of all the Soviet military in Central Asia, Far East, Caucasus, etc.

Also, in order to redirect the extra units to your Barbarossa, as well as reshaping the production, you already sacrificed German contribution to the African Axis effort, the Ju-88 program and so on, effecting a "little" change in the situation in other theatres. For example, the Italians would likely to be ejected from Africa by late 1942, making all the North African logistical effort redirectable to the Middle East, not to mention Torch, which was not quite necessary or sensible in this timeline.

Also, you seem to ignore so many aspects of logistics, that I might call it the very nature of the thing.

First, the German supply system worked from depots, then the supply went to the "pipeline", meaning higher formations, and then the troops carried supplies, too. By the nature of the German war machine, and the operation you described in the Soviet Union, the German forces had to rest and refit first, build up resources on the frontiers; they did not have the supplies to immediately launch a grand offensive into Turkey and the Middle East. No forward depots were present around the Turkish border.

Second, if the locals (ie.: Turkish) are cooperating, it might ease a bit of the problem: guard duties, sabotage, local foodstuffs, local infrastructure, additional units, etc.: in absence the SU, the Turkish army could be equipped with relatively modern weaponry and increase their industrial output tremendously over time.

Third, again, even though I am not familiar with all the details (it's several lifetimes' study anyway), I know how the German and Wallied logistics worked. They produced matériel and trained soldiers at their home bases, shipped them to air/ports, put them on train and deployed them.
The LL did not mean the Persian Corridor alone. If the Soviets stop fighting (already described how many scenarios could that mean), and the LL does not work anymore, it makes no sense to quote people OTL about how unfeasible was to supply other fronts, on top of their OTL efforts.

What would make sense is a real analysis of the situation.

In your scenario, the Germans just finished a bloody campaign with extraordinary speed, which alone would cause a great drop in combat readiness. The airfields, railroads, bridges, supply depots, hospital capacities, etc. are all in bad condition near the Caucasus. There was also no prospect to take more resources from the locals.

On the Balkans direction, the sabotage is still a problem, the railways had low capacity, and because the Gibraltar was not taken, there was no real prospect to bring in more major ships to haul the cargo or help the invasion.

What we are dealing with is a single railway line with multiple bottlenecks and little ability for alternate routes. I already told you what was he situation of the Black Sea and Agean Sea maritime transport; on top of that, all losses of big merchantmen would be impossible to replace. Once the attack has commenced, and the Bosphorus strait is closed, no extra trasfer between the Black and Agean seas could be done.

The state of the airfields near the invasion zone were not in the best shape either. What we are talking about (improvement of the railway lines, airfields, forward supply depots, etc.) would take months at the very minimum to improve.

Meanwhile, the Wallies competed their preparations in August and December 1942, respectively. Their railway, which connected the Suez with Turkey's network, was improved to a standard gauge railway (20t/axle), with multiple entry points with metre gauge and also in connection with the Baghdad(-Basra) line. These two lines alone - without other entry points to port terminals of the Turkish railway system - would overwhelm the German logistics at least by 2 to 1 (the narrow gauge lines of the ME was designed to haul at least 150 tons per train, about the third of the standard gauge ones, and the Balkan load was 2/3 of the standard gauge load).

Not to mention that the very source you quoted claims 1500 tons / day between August 1942 and December 1942, and rising up from that point to 6,489 tons / day in 1944, with a peak month of 7,520 tons / day in the Persian corridor.

If the Allies upgrade the Basra-Baghadad railway, and the Germans remove the bottleneck from the Balkans railway, the ratio is still the same. 1 line against - at least - 2.

The Allies had a minimum of 1-1.5 years head start in railway development; and the Germans could not easily beat it, especially not with lack of sea control. But actually it was more than 1-1.5 years; both the Iranians and the Turkish invested an immense amount into their railway system. Something that the Bulgarians, Yugoslavians and Hungarians did not. The Germans had to make up that difference, too.

Then we arrive to the Achilles heel of the Germans' problems: the crossing of the sea. Even if they improve all the railways, etc. the next bottleneck is the sea transfer, which again, needs more than just ships and river barges. It doesn't matter how much supplies could be hauled to the Balkan peninsula; it would be a smaller amount that could be hauled over to Turkey. The Black sea ports could only help the effort if and when they are taken. Even then, it is a risky undertaking, for every loss is irreplaceable. What could help here is the redirected shipping from North Africa; but then again, the Wallies can redirect their shipping from North Africa, and I wonder if it is not a net loss in ratio for the Germans.

In order to support such an offensive, the Germans would need to face an aerial battle, too. Something that broke their back in Tunisia and Stalingrad OTL. The well-supplied and trained Wallies face the Germans close to the Turkish airspace; better deployment, superior intelligence, etc. would mean a huge attrition on the Luftwaffe. The oil of the Caucasus or extra production doesn't help in 1942; also, the Germans burned through 40% of their airforce in Tunisia in a very short time. Some months in the summer of 1943 resulted in a 15% loss of their force structure. Such attrition ate up all the increased production they had.

On the other hand, the Wallies had an ever-increasing capacity to supply large formations on the sites which the Germans have to attack, better trained aircrews, local support, better intelligence, etc.
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Re: Could a German invasion of Turkey succeed?

Post by glenn239 » 09 Jan 2021 15:33

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
09 Jan 2021 08:58
So unless we're talking about some ATL with a '43 PoD or later, there's no prospect of Britain ejecting Germany from Turkey.
My opinion is that Germany never had a chance in the USSR and should have never invaded. After Barbarossa/Typhoon, Hitler should have been deposed and talks commenced. Failing this, Blue in 1942 was the pursuit of a broken strategy and should have left no one in doubt by that fall that the war in the East was lost and they needed a diplomatic resolution with Stalin. Instead, Hitler tripled down with Citadel in 1943 and with it, threw away the last chance he had to take the strategic intiative in the war.

The thing about Turkey that is really interesting from a grand strategy position to me is not just its key geographical position, but its political sensitivity WRT the Germans, the Soviets, the British. If Germany does not invade Turkey then Turkey will fall into the Western sphere and that will be that. But, if Germany does invade Turkey, then the fact that German troops are there gives the Soviets the opportunity to invade Turkey. You know, to liberate it and whatnot from the Nazis, to push them out, and it's just an "unfortunate" side effect that Turkey would then be filled with a million Soviet troops. Who would, you must understand, love to leave, but alas cannot because the Red Army is now using Istanbul as a logistics base for the Soviet offensive into the Nazi controlled Balkans. The Soviets would, in a nutshell, be invading Turkey, not Germany. On the British side, Churchill would be going ballistic because he would not trust Stalin to ever leave.

Stalin would not start political talks with Hitler in 1943 because there was nothing to gain from them and a lot to lose. But, if instead of Blue or Citadel, the Germans had invaded Turkey without one word of discussion with Stalin, then Stalin suddenly has a choice. He can invade Turkey himself, and suddenly, the Soviets are doing something that isn't quite the defeat of Germany, and might lead to a clash with the British.

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Re: Could a German invasion of Turkey succeed?

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 10 Jan 2021 02:46

glenn239 wrote:My opinion is that Germany never had a chance in the USSR and should have never invaded.
Well you have a lot of company.
glenn239 wrote:Blue in 1942 was the pursuit of a broken strategy and should have left no one in doubt by that fall that the war in the East was lost and they needed a diplomatic resolution with Stalin.
Agreed.
glenn239 wrote:if instead of Blue or Citadel, the Germans had invaded Turkey without one word of discussion with Stalin
German invasion of Turkey doesn't make sense unless SU is defeated.
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Re: Could a German invasion of Turkey succeed?

Post by Erwinn » 11 Jan 2021 05:47

How about Wallies Supplying an effort in Turkey from Alexandria via sea? Is that possible after the start of 43'?

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Re: Could a German invasion of Turkey succeed?

Post by Peter89 » 11 Jan 2021 16:37

Erwinn wrote:
11 Jan 2021 05:47
How about Wallies Supplying an effort in Turkey from Alexandria via sea? Is that possible after the start of 43'?
Yes, to some extent.

The ports in question - mainly Mersin and Iskenderun (Alexandretta), but also Izmir to some degree, were not the best ports. Mersin's port became part of the State Railways Administration in 1929; Iskenderun on 23 February 1942. The port of Mersin was able to handle 1293 ships in 1942; 1573 in 1938. Most of these ships were not big ones though; the theoretical capacity of the port of Mersin was estimated between 208,000 tons / year to 390,000 tons / year.

Turkey (with 18m of population) was the biggest food producer of the region, a net exporter in key foodstuffs (export during wartime doesn't mean much because Turkey implemented a food rationing to stockpile food) with an ever-increasing output during wartime.

Production of wheat was 4.26m tons, barley 2.16m tons, maize 0.85m tons, rice 0.09m tons (for a total of 7.36m tons) in 1942, on top of that, Turkey had 9,231 thousand cattle, 848 thousand buffalos, 21,105 thousand sheep, 16,206 thousand goats, 981 thousand horses, 1,621 thousand donkeys and 92 thousand mules in 1943. In terms of both the cereals production and livestock, Turkey had a little more or the same as the whole region (Iran, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, Egypt and Anglo-Sudan) combined. Furthermore, fruits (19.67%), fish (3.10%), leather (5.38%), wool (6.11%), cotton (3.85%) and tobacco (31.91%) were leading Turkish exports during these years, all of them are in demand of the military or military production. Also, Turkey produced 176,000t of cement in 1943 (it was a sharp fall from 287-284,000 t in 1938-1939). For comparison, the Haifa-Beirut railway used 12,103t of cement, but also the steelworks came from South Africa and India, workers from Australia and Africa, and only part of the work had to come from the UK and the US. The two 12 inch pipes led to the terminals in Haifa and Tripoli; the latter having a lackluster capacity, thus coastal shipping shipped the crude from here to there. Also, Abadan was able to produce high octane avgas, refineries were in Bahrein, Saud Arabia and Egypt as well.

It is very superficial to say that an average unit needs X supplies, the route from the USA to the ME is 4x as long as to the UK, so we have to divide the maintenance capacities by 4, and use the theoretical maximums limited in time and scope for the Germans, and then we call something possible.

The maintenance requirements for overseas forces (Appendix A-2) details 20.43kg (45.04lbs) of daily needs. Of which
- 6.22lbs rations
- 2.17 (+19.53)lbs fuels
- 11.9lbs engineer construction material, etc.

I'm just highlighting these to provide a hint why it wasn't needed to import everything from the US. It wasn't OTL, it wouldn't be ATL; it's a typical logical error, nothing more.

Even as early as 1941, from January until July the British were able to ship an average of 1000 men / day to the ME; also 1 million tons of cargo (about 150,000t / month, ~ 5000 t/day), while the Axis was able to unload only 413.386t of cargo between June 1941 and October 1941 (about 52,677t / month, ~ 1800 t/day).

We have seen that the Wallies were able to deliver a gradually increasing amount of cargo to the region; shipping via Mersin could add somewhere between 570-1010t/day, Alexandretta - I'm not sure, but definately lower; not that the port facilities couldn't be improved over time.

But it wasn't that much needed; not in this scenario, not in real history. The competing German logistical network was nowhere near as efficient as the Allies' network, and their losses were either irreplaceable or hardly replaceable.
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Re: Could a German invasion of Turkey succeed?

Post by KDF33 » 12 Jan 2021 03:34

Peter89 wrote:
01 Oct 2020 14:42
Let's not forget that the Wallies:
- operated about 1548 aircrafts in the MTO
- the Axis 1220
- the result is a resounding defeat for the Axis

It wasn't simply about numbers, you see.
Not sure where that data comes from. Just for fighters, the USAAF had an establishment strength of 680 aircraft on 31.12.1942 in the MTO, rising to 1,040 on 30.4.1943.

Meanwhile, and again just for fighters, the RAF had an establishment strength of 512 aircraft in Egypt/Levant/Malta on 25.12.1942, rising to 992 on 7.5.1943, this time including North West Africa.

There were also very significant bomber, transport and miscellaneous aircraft units. I don't really see how the figure of 1,548 aircraft makes sense, unless it refers to a very specific area (say, Morocco-Algeria-Tunisia) early in the campaign, which wouldn't be a valid basis to compare air strength for the overall campaign.

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Re: Could a German invasion of Turkey succeed?

Post by Peter89 » 12 Jan 2021 09:28

KDF33 wrote:
12 Jan 2021 03:34
Peter89 wrote:
01 Oct 2020 14:42
Let's not forget that the Wallies:
- operated about 1548 aircrafts in the MTO
- the Axis 1220
- the result is a resounding defeat for the Axis

It wasn't simply about numbers, you see.
Not sure where that data comes from. Just for fighters, the USAAF had an establishment strength of 680 aircraft on 31.12.1942 in the MTO, rising to 1,040 on 30.4.1943.

Meanwhile, and again just for fighters, the RAF had an establishment strength of 512 aircraft in Egypt/Levant/Malta on 25.12.1942, rising to 992 on 7.5.1943, this time including North West Africa.

There were also very significant bomber, transport and miscellaneous aircraft units. I don't really see how the figure of 1,548 aircraft makes sense, unless it refers to a very specific area (say, Morocco-Algeria-Tunisia) early in the campaign, which wouldn't be a valid basis to compare air strength for the overall campaign.
They came from a study called The Mediterran crucible, 1942-1943 Did Technology or tenets achieve air superiority by Francois H. Roy, which I originally quoted for the superior intelligence the Allies had in the MTO. The Axis aircraft number comes from Playfair IV., and seems to check out. The overall conclusion of the study is that if you have a battle between approximately same forces, the one with better intelligence will come out as victorious. Williamson says the same thing about deployment, and countless others about training.

I checked back, and I think I made a mistake when I quoted; these numbers were rather planned numbers from the Wallies' side and for Torch only. Meaning the necessary commitments from the 12th Air Force (1,094) and the Eastern Air Command (454).

Later in the study, he claims that at the Torch, 1,086 Axis aircraft was there against 1,172 for the Allies; but then the citation leads to various sources. He also claims that there was 1500-1600 Axis aircraft and nearly 5000 for the Allies when Husky began.

Do you have an overall aircraft strength for the Wallies in MTO, just before Torch? Maybe with aircraft type breakdowns? I'd be very much interested now :)
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Re: Could a German invasion of Turkey succeed?

Post by KDF33 » 12 Jan 2021 11:01

Peter89 wrote:
12 Jan 2021 09:28
Do you have an overall aircraft strength for the Wallies in MTO, just before Torch? Maybe with aircraft type breakdowns? I'd be very much interested now :)
Sure.

USAAF, 30.6.1943 (whole MTO):
  • Heavy Bombers: 461, of which combat units have an establishment strength of 384
  • Medium/Light Bombers: 881, of which combat units have an establishment strength of 512
  • Fighters: 2,048, of which combat units have an establishment strength of 1,120
Difference between establishment and total strength is accounted by reserves, aircraft in depots damaged or under repair, as well as recently arrived aircraft not yet distributed to units.


RAF, 7.5.1943 (Malta, North West Africa and Egypt/Levant):
  • Heavy Bombers: 45, of which combat units have an establishment strength of 32
  • Medium/Light Bombers: 682, of which combat units have an establishment strength of 248
  • Torpedo Bombers: 145, of which combat units have an establishment strength of 80
  • Fighters: 2,802, of which combat units have an establishment strength of 992
As can be seen, most of the bomber strength is provided by the USAAF.


Now for the Germans on 17.5.1943, with figures representing actual strength within combat units (ie., to be compared with establishment strength):
  • Medium/Light Bombers: 385
  • Fighters: 469
The Italians had 545 medium/light bombers and 983 fighters at the time of El Alamein/Torch, somewhat less around the time of Husky.


Overall balance is 3,368 Allied combat aircraft against 1,000+ Italian and 854 German combat aircraft, almost a 2-to-1 superiority.


Edit: You said Torch, my bad. I don't have such a breakdown for now, save for the Italians, but then the landing forces didn't go in action against the Axis, but rather the French. Still, I'll dig and might be able to find it and if so post it here.

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Re: Could a German invasion of Turkey succeed?

Post by KDF33 » 12 Jan 2021 11:26

Peter89 wrote:
12 Jan 2021 09:28
Do you have an overall aircraft strength for the Wallies in MTO, just before Torch? Maybe with aircraft type breakdowns? I'd be very much interested now :)
RAF on 4.9.1942, Egypt, Malta and Levant (establishment/total on hand):

Heavy Bombers: 32 / 52
Medium/Light Bombers: 272 / 629
Torpedo Bombers: 96 / 143
Fighters: 608 / 1,343

Comments: Torch added about 50% more British fighters, but no additional bomber strength. RAF bomber strength in-theater was and remained low. What greatly increased Allied strength was the arrival of the Americans.

Overall, between Fall 1942 and Spring 1943, overall Allied air strength increased by 334%, and with heavier types added. Axis strength must have stayed roughly constant, with the fall in Italian strength offset by the arrival of additional German units.

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Re: Could a German invasion of Turkey succeed?

Post by Peter89 » 12 Jan 2021 12:32

KDF33 wrote:
12 Jan 2021 11:26
Peter89 wrote:
12 Jan 2021 09:28
Do you have an overall aircraft strength for the Wallies in MTO, just before Torch? Maybe with aircraft type breakdowns? I'd be very much interested now :)
RAF on 4.9.1942, Egypt, Malta and Levant (establishment/total on hand):

Heavy Bombers: 32 / 52
Medium/Light Bombers: 272 / 629
Torpedo Bombers: 96 / 143
Fighters: 608 / 1,343

Comments: Torch added about 50% more British fighters, but no additional bomber strength. RAF bomber strength in-theater was and remained low. What greatly increased Allied strength was the arrival of the Americans.

Overall, between Fall 1942 and Spring 1943, overall Allied air strength increased by 334%, and with heavier types added. Axis strength must have stayed roughly constant, with the fall in Italian strength offset by the arrival of additional German units.
Good to know :)

Thank you very much!
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Re: Could a German invasion of Turkey succeed?

Post by Avalancheon » 16 Jan 2021 23:28

Peter89 wrote:
23 Dec 2020 20:16
Avalancheon wrote:
23 Dec 2020 13:19
Peter89s claims about the supply requirements of a German division seem to check out. According to this site: http://www.mnstarfire.com/ww2/history/l ... ision.html

''A typical full strength infantry division would consist of roughly 17,000 men. Prior to 1944 a German infantry division would include over 5,000 horses and almost 950 motor vehicles. A division of this size would need 53 tons of hay and oats, 54 tons of food, 20 tons of petrol, one ton of lubricants, ten tons of ordinance and another 12 tons of miscellaneous supplies plus ammunition and baggage (approx 150 tons total per day).''

''A Panzer or Armored Division would be roughly 14,000 men. Usually there would be over 3,000 vehicles... The supply requirement for an average of motorized, mechanized and panzer divisions has been stated as approximately 300 tons per day.''
IIIRC my numbers came from here: https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/Germany/HB/HB-6.html
Okay, no problems here.
Peter89 wrote:
23 Dec 2020 20:16
Avalancheon wrote:
23 Dec 2020 13:19
However, this figure does not include ammunition consumption. For some idea of what their ammo needs are, we can look to the Eastern front. In August of 1941, Franz Halder noted that the Ostheer had expended 340 trainloads of ammunition during a 15 day period. This means they were consuming an average of 8220 tons ammunition per day on the Eastern front. Spread out across 150 divisions, that works out to about 55 tons per division, per day.

So when adding in ammunition requirements on top of their regular needs, the infantry divisions would each need 205 tons of supplys a day, and the panzer divisions would need 355 tons a day.

Thus, a force of 10 infantry and 10 panzer divisions would need 5600 tons of supplys a day.
Please check again on the ammunition consumption.

(3) Ammunition supply trains (Munitionszüge), with an average of 30 cars per train, are of three types:
(a) Unit-loaded trains, loaded according to the proportion of different types of ammunition needed by a particular division.
(b) Caliber unit trains, in which each car is loaded with approximately 15 metric tons (161/2 short tons) of ammunition of a specific caliber.
(c) Single caliber unit trains, in which all cars are loaded with ammunition of the same caliber.
Alright, so an ammunition train of 30 cars, at 15 tons each, can carry 450 tons of ammunition.

340 trainloads of ammunition over a 15 day period comes out to about 10,200 tons per day. Not 8220 tons per day. Ammunition consumption is 24% greater than what I stated [].


[] FYI, I got these figures from the CIA document, The Eastern Front at the Turning Point. https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for- ... i4a07p.pdf

Peter89 wrote:
23 Dec 2020 20:16
Also, the Bulgarian railway, the only way where you could transport stuff was good for 2/3 cargo only.
And why is that? Explain, please.
Peter89 wrote:
23 Dec 2020 20:16
Avalancheon wrote:
23 Dec 2020 13:19
Peter89s estimate on the capacity of a single track railway are unrealistically low. He says 10 train (pairs) per day, but in fact it was 12. More importantly, it was possible to greatly improve the capacity of a single track line, to the point where they could handle 72 train (pairs) per day. (Thats an increase of 6 times) This is explained in the article, The Influence of Railways on Military Operations in the Russo-German War 1941–1945, by H.G.W. Davie.
36 trains per day in this direction is an illusion. The Germans might rebuild the whole railway on the Balkans, making it double track and everything, but it's not gonna happen soon, and by this standard, they could have built a railway anywhere, anytime.
No, it is not an illusion. Again, as the article in question points out, a single track railway can theoretically get up to a maximum of 72 train pairs per day. To get 36 train pairs per day should be feasible. Is there anything you can explicitly point to that would make this impractical?
Peter89 wrote:
23 Dec 2020 20:16
You see, "one train" can be translated into many, very different types of supply and troops, my numbers are representing a theoretical maximum, without the "Balkan load" limit.
Whats that supposed to mean?
Peter89 wrote:
23 Dec 2020 20:16
Obviously, the economic exploitation of the Balkans cannot stop forever, and the Bulgarian domestic economy can't be stopped forever.

If you plan a short-term offensive, then you might build up and load forward supply depots, but to operate 5+5 divisions fighting heavily on the offense using this railway line is a daydreaming.
You claim, but you do not so demonstrate.
Peter89 wrote:
23 Dec 2020 20:16
I quoted exactly S.H. Beaver that he estimated 12-20 trains per day for a single standard gauge track railway; I used 10 trains per day as a very optimistic number, because in order to achieve that, a lot of things must happen right, which they usually didn't.
Is that so? I didn't see you quoting him anywhere. Give me that citation from Beaver, and we'll see whether it has any merit.

10 trains per day is far below the theoretical maximum capacity of a single track line. 12 trains per day is usually the lower limit, and 72 trains per day is the upper limit.
Peter89 wrote:
23 Dec 2020 20:16
I don't really understand you; you say that my numbers are "unrealistically low", because I used 10 trains per day and you used 12.
Did you check the numbers of the Bulgarian domestic economy? Their typical cargo and train types? Did you substracted it from the 12?
Again, I have no idea what you are referring to. You didn't mention any of this in the quote I was responding to here viewtopic.php?p=2292406#p2292406

Carl Schwamberger
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Re: Could a German invasion of Turkey succeed?

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 17 Jan 2021 00:29

↑23 Dec 2020 13:16

Peter89s claims about the supply requirements of a German division seem to check out. According to this site: http://www.mnstarfire.com/ww2/history/l ... ision.html

''A typical full strength infantry division would consist of roughly 17,000 men. Prior to 1944 a German infantry division would include over 5,000 horses and almost 950 motor vehicles. A division of this size would need 53 tons of hay and oats, 54 tons of food, 20 tons of petrol, one ton of lubricants, ten tons of ordinance and another 12 tons of miscellaneous supplies plus ammunition and baggage (approx 150 tons total per day).''

''A Panzer or Armored Division would be roughly 14,000 men. Usually there would be over 3,000 vehicles... The supply requirement for an average of motorized, mechanized and panzer divisions has been stated as approximately 300 tons per day.''
IIIRC my numbers came from here: https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/Germany/HB/HB-6.html
I may have missed something reading this & glancing at the sources. It appears to address the requirements of the 'division' only & not the corps or army combat & support units. Neither does it appear to allow for supplying the air force units that are rebased forward.

For operations in NW Europe the US and British calculated in terms of total army requirements, including forward based tactical air force. This was in some contexts expressed as the 'Division Slice'. That is the gross force divided by the number of division HQ. For planning purposes for Op OVERLORD a division slice was about 44,000 men. The allowance per DS in the planning was initially 900 tons per day per slice. Or using short tons 41 lbs per man per day, or 18.6 kg. What the German division slice might be for this hypothetical Turkish invasion might be I cant say, but heres some possible requirements

Doubling men to achieve division slice
Armored Div.....14,000 men x2 = 28,000 men = 600 tons daily

Inf Div............17,000 men x2 = 34,000 men = 300 tons daily.

2.5 x division strength to achieve division slice
Armored Div.....14,000 men x2.5 = 35,000 men = 750 tons daily

Inf Div............17,000 men x2.5 = 35,000 men = 450 tons daily

Using the smaller values a force of four armored & six infantry divisions, plus air units and LoC units, would need a average of 4200 tons daily or 250,000 tons for a sixty day campaign. Assuming no extra requirements for artillery ammunition, fuel, or material for the LoC units to rebuild infrastructure, or adding new infrastructure.

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