What if: Hitler wins the war due to slightly stronger Barbarossa forces

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TheMarcksPlan
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Re: What if: Hitler wins the war due to slightly stronger Barbarossa forces

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 06 Jul 2019 22:27

MarkN wrote:Like so many others, you start with the answer you want and then try to reengineer history into complete fantasy to fit the answer.
No.
You just don't understand the difference between a high-level analysis of what's possible and a detailed path towards the possible.

You, like so many others, decide your stance in an argument and close your mind to - or lack capacity to integrate - contrary arguments.
MarkN wrote:Where is the credible argument to explain it could pan out that way?
Where is your credible argument that (1) the Red Army was capable of stopping determined German mobile penetrations and (2) that Red Army formations were able to, and would have permission, to extricate themselves from envelopment by panzer forces?

The historical record of Red Army and Ostheer performance during panzer Kesselschlachten is all I need.
EVERY time the Germans massed panzer forces of both flanks of a Red Army formation and tried to encircle it, they succeeded - until November.
The reasons they failed in November are easy to explain based on the relative force ratios.

I'll guess that you will hide from addressing this argument as well, however. You'll adopt the the 4yo's strategy of asking why and so far lack the intellectual maturity to address a hypothetical. This is the behavior of the very worst lawyers in court.
The "ignore user" function is essential to AHF/internet sanity and I use it liberally. Feel free to raise another poster's point if I've ignored them.

Richard Anderson
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Re: What if: Hitler wins the war due to slightly stronger Barbarossa forces

Post by Richard Anderson » 07 Jul 2019 02:04

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
06 Jul 2019 05:30
It failed to identify the massive reserve of trained soldiers that could be mobilized within months of war, entering the field as German units reached the end of their supply lines.
What "massive reserve of trained soldiers"? There was none, which was part of Germany's problem. Despite the legends of von Seeckt diddling the Versailles Treaty, 1921-1934 were lost years in terms of reserve training in Germany, the birth year groups 1901-1913 became known as the "Weißen Jahrgänge" and at the end of 1934 and during 1935, 58 special training battalions "Ergänzungs-Bataillone" were organized to begin their training as reservists, a force that was doubled in 1936. The Ergänzungs-Bataillonen formed the 14 4. Welle divisions mobilized in 1939, which interrupted the reserve training function just as it had begun. By 4 February 1941, the number of available trained personnel in the Weißen Jahrgänge were fully expended. The "reserve" as of 1 June 1941 consisted of 80,000 personnel in the divisional FEB and 320,000 trained replacements in the Ersatzheer. Otherwise, the only manpower pool available was Jahrgänge 1922, whose call up had been delayed in order to ease the civilian employment situation. Thus, of 565,060 men registered as fit for service (in what was assessed as an uncommonly large year group), 117,565 already volunteered and were in the Wehrmacht, 72,435 were deferred as critical civilian workers (UK-gestellte), and 375,062 were classed as Reserve I personnel available for service. Of those, 170,125 were already doing RAD service (pre-military work training), so 200,000 were available for call up. Under existing plans, 72.5% would go to the Heer, 22% to the Luftwaffe, 4.1% to the Kriegsmarine, and 1.4% to the SS; manpower was always prioritized to the Heer.

BTW, the expansion of the Panzerwaffe was dependent on the ten training battalions available as of June 1940.
My point was about neither military as a portion of public spending (your first try) nor GDP/NNP (your second try). It's about military spending as portion of GDP, which rose as Germany realized its strategic situation and should have risen earlier given better strategic thinking.
Um, in 1938 Germany allocated 18% of NNP on the military, which amounted to 80% of public spending. That grew to 25% in 1939, 44% in 1940, 58% in 1941, 69% in 1942, and 78% in 1943 (the last year of reliable figures. That is actually not dissimilar from the UK, far exceeds the US mobilization rate, and is only exceeded by the USSR, which went from 20% in 1940 to 75% in 1942. However, the Soviets did not achieve that by "better strategic thinking", they achieved it by ruthless prioritization.
SHUT UP DAD I HATE YOU!!!!!!!!!!
Oh dear, anger issues too.
As already stated, strategic review in 1938 during/after international tension escalations, especially rearmament worldwide. I think this is the point we started on pages ago.
Sorry, 1938, 1939, 1937, its all the same in my mind as far as the fantasy goes. So you imagine the Germans were doing a quadrennial review a la the U.S. DOD? :lol: Sorry, but such unified political-military strategic reviews are a product of the postwar world. It becomes even more problematic a notion when the actual "strategic review" process in place is understood (OKW created 4 February 1938 to remove power from the Ob.d.Heeres) and replaced by Adolf Hitler's strategic review.
You're asking me to repeat the whole argument...
No, I'm asking you to demonstrate that you actually understand the ramifications of the various problems the Nazis encountered. And to demonstrate you've done some real research on the subject other than a superficial skimming of Alan Tooze and Heinz Guderian.
Huh? Use Polish industrial labor earlier and more. I said nothing about Monowitz specifically coming earlier.
No, you stated the German plans for using Auschwitz as a hub for forced labor predated its actual creation by a "few years". I was asking you to clarify that bizarre claim...it is akin to the Dear Leader's declarations regarding the American revolution. Is your teleprompter broke too?

And, yet again, an earlier quadrennial review by the German high command is not going to change Nazi prejudices any quicker...
My dear leader said it and he never lies so it must be true.
Aber natürlich.
Yes they were excess to OTL production plans, which were too low.
Not exactly, production plans, primarily for ammunition, were decreased at the end of the French Campaign, because stocks were considered to have grown too high. The primary consumption of steel was not tanks or ships, it was ammunition. Ammunition was perceived as in excess, so steel could be diverted to export, especially given the acquisition of foreign steel sources. The consequence was felt pretty early in the Russian Campaign and ammunition production - and steel allocations - increased.

The problem is the prewar ammunition stocks were created based upon assumptions from the Great War experience that weren't really subject to improvement via strategic review...it required new data from a new war experience. If you are interested, I can refer you to a nice thesis by a Bundesweht officer on the subject.
Yes the exports helped balance the books but finance didn't constrain German output at any point in the war and should not have been a determinative consideration (unlike pre-war when compulsion was less regular).
Say what? Finance constrained German output throughout the war...its part of the reason the Nazis pulled their social security Ponzi scheme and massive deficit spending to finance the war.
Screws need not be tightened much, if at all, before France falls. Most of the production delta is post-France but enabled by investment decisions pre-France. Only after investments in greater vehicle etc. production come on line are greater labor and materials inputs needed. Plenty of time between France and Barbarossa to produce the additional armaments.
Uh, they can't be tightened at all if there is nothing to leverage the opposite nation with. Most of the "production delta" immediately after the French Campaign was due to the widespread looting of French resource stockpiles and machine tools. Furthermore, "investments in greater vehicle etc. production" require capital investments, primarily in plant buildings, rail and road connections, power, and acquisition and installation of machine tools suitable for the purpose. One reason that BMM and Skoda only built 38(t)-based vehicles was the limitations of the construction halls in terms of space and overhead crane capacity...and the cost (time, finance, labor) to refit them.
Sure, and it was mostly coercion done by foreign governments against their own people as in Vichy's STO. Start pushing those governments earlier, in immediate aftermath of France. Hitler already knows he's gonna invade USSR, needs more men and stuff.
How do you coerce a foreign government when you don't have any coercive means? Coercion worked really well with Spain. :roll: It worked really well with Sweden. :roll: It worked really well with Hungary. :roll: It worked really well with Romania. :roll: It worked really well with Italy. :roll: They were all neutrals or allies. What are they going to "push" them with? Tweets in all CAPS? Withhold exports that are as vital for Germany to export as they are vital for the country to receive? That is wacko-Trump-trade thinking.

Now they could coerce countries very easily after they occupied them. The Poles and French, as well as other later attest to that. They could coerce populations after they captured them, as in British, French, Dutch, and other PW put to work. However, they cannot be coerced if they aren't in German control.

Vichy? The actual arm twisting took a couple of months of negotiations and then it was six months before 240,000 skilled French workers (in addition to the 100,000 French non-coerced workers that went to Germany June 40-June 42) were at work in Germany. The second requisition of 240,000 French took another six weeks to negotiate and further months to round up and send to Germany. And so on. It was not overnight.

BTW, Hitler waffled back and forth on the whole "invade Russia" thing.
You'll note that nowhere in my writing have I said Hitler should have upped investment in panzer divisions specifically pre-war. Rather I've advocated across-the-board higher investment in the Heer, some of which includes higher investment in panzers. I have purposely avoided allowing myself the hindsight bias of panzer focus pre-Poland.
Who said anything about "panzer divisions"? Schnelltruppen, literally "fast troops" included the Panzerwaffe, Infanterie (mot), Panzerjäger, Aufklärung, and Reiterei...all more or less "motorized" as in the 20 extra motorized divisions you are talking about. As of the end of the French Campaign they were 19 divisions of 167 or 11.4%. An "across the board higher investment" to double that under your scheme would mean enlarging the Heer to 334 divisions, which seems extreme. Similarly, if the prewar 15 Schnelldivisionen out of the 112 planned are doubled in an "across the board higher investment" that means an expansion to 224 divisions. Not bloody likely.
Another interesting "what if," however, is what if Guderian had the political position of Goering?
I was waiting for good old Heinz to enter the pantheon. On 1 February 1938, Guderian was promoted from Generalmajor (brigadier general) to Generalleutnant (major general, don't be confused by the usual transliteration, a Generalleutnant was a senior divisional or junior corps commander) as commander of the 2. Panzerdivision. He was appointed commander of XVI. Armeekorps on 4 February and promoted to General der Panzertruppen on 1 November 1938 and was appointed Chef der schnellen Truppen im Oberkommando des Heeres on 20 November 1938.
1938. I didn't specify a month but say September. Adjustments to programs didn't occur only at FY turnover.
No, budgets were readjusted of course by supplementary budgets, but the major funding was planned according to the fiscal year. So then, September 1938 it is.
Ugh. Here's the point:
Curtailing the panzer production program in early 39 set back the clock on the investment path Germany needed to take to ramp up its armored forces.
Ugh back at you. Here's the point: the Panzer production program was not "curtailed" in early 39. Production of the Panzer III was delayed by its problematic development history. Production of the Panzer IV could not be substantially increased until Nibelungenwerke was completed and Vomag converted from producing heavy trucks, since the Krupp-Grusonwerke was maxed out.

However, Nibelungen did not begin work until 10 February 1941 doing assembly work of components manufactured by Steyr, about 21 months after construction was authorized, did not begin actual production of components itself until March-April 1941...and completed its first actual Panzer IV in November 1941. All of one of them and then two more the next month for good measure. In fact, construction of the production halls continued into 1942. Vomag was directed to begin rebuilds of Panzer IV in June 1940 and then expanded its facilities to do full scale production in 1941, although construction of its Panzerhalle was not completed until 1943. It completed its first Panzer IV in August 1941 (two of them).

On 11 July 1938, Inspektorat 6 (In 6) of the Allgemeines Heeresamt awarded extension orders for 759 Panzer III and 223 Panzer IV in addition to the 2,155 Panzer III and 640 Panzer IV already ordered. By 1 April 1940, 414 Panzer III had been delivered and 2,156 remained on order, 10 StuG III had been delivered and 520 remained on order, and 308 Panzer IV had been delivered and 848 remained on order.
I do realize that. Which is why I've said not a word about getting manpower from the KM.
Good, just wanted to be sure.
"Is all this pretentious pseudo intellectual citing of sources REALLY necessary? It gets in the way of a good, spirited debate, destroys the cadence." POD, 6 October 2018

TheMarcksPlan
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Re: What if: Hitler wins the war due to slightly stronger Barbarossa forces

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 07 Jul 2019 02:27

RichardAnderson wrote:What "massive reserve of trained soldiers"?
Yo I was talking about Russian reserves.
RichardAnderson wrote:That grew to 25% in 1939, 44% in 1940, 58% in 1941, 69% in 1942, and 78% in 1943
Exactly. Escalation should have happened earlier.
RichardAnderson wrote:However, the Soviets did not achieve that by "better strategic thinking", they achieved it by ruthless prioritization.
Don't you get sick of hiding behind this lazy sarcasm? What's the argument that Germany shouldn't have escalated its military spending earlier? Do you have one? Or is it just "they didn't, so they wouldn't?"

...which goes back to the question of why participate in ATL discussions at all.
RichardAnderson wrote: a nice thesis by a Bundesweht officer on the subject.
All links appreciated.
RichardAnderson wrote: Finance constrained German output throughout the war...its part of the reason the Nazis pulled their social security Ponzi scheme and massive deficit spending to finance the war.
Name one instance during the war where German production was constrained by finance rather than materials and labor.
RichardAnderson wrote: How do you coerce a foreign government when you don't have any coercive means?
"You're not getting steel if we don't get labor."
RichardAnderson wrote: An "across the board higher investment" to double that under your scheme would mean enlarging the Heer to 334 divisions, which seems extreme. Similarly, if the prewar 15 Schnelldivisionen out of the 112 planned are doubled in an "across the board higher investment" that means an expansion to 224 divisions. Not bloody likely.
Nope, pay attention to your own stipulated conditions. After France - even after Poland - Germany had reason to emphasize its schnelltruppen.
RichardAnderson wrote: the Panzer production program was not "curtailed" in early 39.
Not what Tooze says.
RichardAnderson wrote:However, Nibelungen did not begin work until 10 February 1941 doing assembly work of components manufactured by Steyr, about 21 months after construction was authorized, did not begin actual production of components itself until March-April 1941...and completed its first actual Panzer IV in November 1941. All of one of them and then two more the next month for good measure. In fact, construction of the production halls continued into 1942. Vomag was directed to begin rebuilds of Panzer IV in June 1940 and then expanded its facilities to do full scale production in 1941, although construction of its Panzerhalle was not completed until 1943. It completed its first Panzer IV in August 1941 (two of them).
All of this can and should change with greater prioritization of the Heer pre-war.
The "ignore user" function is essential to AHF/internet sanity and I use it liberally. Feel free to raise another poster's point if I've ignored them.

Richard Anderson
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Re: What if: Hitler wins the war due to slightly stronger Barbarossa forces

Post by Richard Anderson » 07 Jul 2019 06:36

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
07 Jul 2019 02:27
Yo I was talking about Russian reserves.
Yo that makes no sense.
Exactly. Escalation should have happened earlier.
In peacetime? If they start the inflationary spiral early enough, perhaps they can crash the German economy by 1939 instead of 1943 and save everyone quite a bit of trouble.
Don't you get sick of hiding behind this lazy sarcasm? What's the argument that Germany shouldn't have escalated its military spending earlier? Do you have one? Or is it just "they didn't, so they wouldn't?"
No, I rather enjoy it given that you gave it as the lazy answer rather than doing actual research.
...which goes back to the question of why participate in ATL discussions at all.
Because its fun to see the lengths to which posters will take what is basically a giant exercise in confirmation bias.
All links appreciated.
Its not a link, but is a paper thingie. I will happily give you a citation and you can probably track it down through a university.
Name one instance during the war where German production was constrained by finance rather than materials and labor.
Er, 17 September 1941, when the Reichsbank concluded that while the supply of consumer goods had halved, the volume of money in circulation had doubled, threatening an inflationary spiral, which resulted in increased taxes and a program to reduce armament costs. Luftwaffe production was cut back, That maintained the economic balance - barely - until the summer of 1943, when the German war finance structure began to collapse...between September 1943 and August 1944 the Wehrmacht consumed 99.4 billion RM, more than the total national income during the years of the 1930s. Meanwhile, taxes stagnated after 1942, meaning that more and more was financed through the Reichsbank printing more money, leading to the threat of hyperinflation.

Or, to put it another way, German GDP 1941 to 1945 increased 5.72% as the share of military spending increased from 58% to probably well over 80%. US GDP increased 27% in the same period, while the share of military spending increased to 47%.
RichardAnderson wrote: How do you coerce a foreign government when you don't have any coercive means?
"You're not getting steel if we don't get labor."
And "we're not getting steel unless we get coal and iron ore" and "we're not getting synthetic fuel unless we get coal". Coal required massive amounts of labor and steel required foreign exchange to use to buy Swedish ore. Synthetic fuel meant more coal labor and massive investment.
Nope, pay attention to your own stipulated conditions. After France - even after Poland - Germany had reason to emphasize its schnelltruppen.
Would you stop contradicting yourself? You just said you planned for an "across the board" expansion. Now you say the emphasis would be on Schnelltruppen. Which is it?

Oh, and how does any of this speed up the design of the Panzer III?
Not what Tooze says.
Tooze also says that the Germans committed nine Panzer divisions to the French Campaign. He was wrong.
All of this can and should change with greater prioritization of the Heer pre-war.
In five years the Heer expanded from ten to 49 standing divisions, with 106 at mobilization. The Luftwaffe expanded from effectively zero to 34 Staffeln as of 1 April 1935 and 272 as of 1 October 1938. So yes, the Luftwaffe expanded more than the Heer. To do so, in three years 1935-1938 the Germans spent 17.2 billon RM, about one-quarter of the total military budget of those three years. The Heer got the lions share of the rest. In 1939, the Heer budget stayed at about 10.449 billion RM, while the Luftwaffe got 7.018 billion, of which it spent 3.942 billion as of 1 September. The KM got a modest increase to 2.744 billion RM. A greater prioritization to the Heer can only mean stripping finding from the Luftwaffe. Does that make the Luftwaffe weaker and less capable in the opening moves of the war? Almost certainly. Does it make the Schnelltruppen more effective? Unlikely, since its primary tank design, the Panzer III, wasn't completed until a few weeks before war broke out.
"Is all this pretentious pseudo intellectual citing of sources REALLY necessary? It gets in the way of a good, spirited debate, destroys the cadence." POD, 6 October 2018

Richard Anderson
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Re: What if: Hitler wins the war due to slightly stronger Barbarossa forces

Post by Richard Anderson » 07 Jul 2019 06:41

MarkN wrote:
06 Jul 2019 09:29
Always better to do the research and analysis first then build you understanding from that.
Research? I don need no stinkin research...
Like so many others, you start with the answer you want and then try to reengineer history into complete fantasy to fit the answer.
To be fair, all "what ifs" are simple exercises in confirmation bias...the proposer decides on a desired end state and then with the benefit of hindsight works backwards from there ensuring that events and decisions fall into place as needed. At their best they aren't as bad as SNL's "what if Napoleon had a B-52 at Waterloo?" At there worst... :lol:
"Is all this pretentious pseudo intellectual citing of sources REALLY necessary? It gets in the way of a good, spirited debate, destroys the cadence." POD, 6 October 2018

MarkN
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Re: What if: Hitler wins the war due to slightly stronger Barbarossa forces

Post by MarkN » 07 Jul 2019 09:19

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
06 Jul 2019 22:27
You just don't understand the difference between a high-level analysis of what's possible and a detailed path towards the possible.
What high-level analysis? What detailed path?

All you have presented is a fantasy of your own imagination and demanded that everybody accept your premise as credible.

You wrote:
TheMarcksPlan wrote:
02 Jul 2019 20:05
There is no "magic bullet" for German victory;....
Very true. There was no magic bullet. Almost 80 years have passed with people far more knowledgeable than you trying to find that magic bullet, and failing.

And yet, despite stating their is no magic bullet, you spend your time telling people you've found the magic bullet: 20 mech divs to win a war of attrition. :lol: :lol: :lol:
TheMarcksPlan wrote:
06 Jul 2019 22:27
Where is your credible argument that (1) the Red Army was capable of stopping determined German mobile penetrations and (2) that Red Army formations were able to, and would have permission, to extricate themselves from envelopment by panzer forces?
Very christianmunchesque.

Fantasy is fantasy. It is not for me to come up with credible arguments to prove your fantasy is fantasy. It is for you to find a way to argue your fantasy has credibility. So far you have failed miserably.
TheMarcksPlan wrote:
06 Jul 2019 22:27
The historical record of Red Army and Ostheer performance during panzer Kesselschlachten is all I need.
Really?
TheMarcksPlan wrote:
06 Jul 2019 22:27
EVERY time the Germans massed panzer forces of both flanks of a Red Army formation and tried to encircle it, they succeeded - until November.
I see you're still struggling with the realities of warfare in the real world. I'm sure it wirks a treat in your game. Do you roll a 6 every time it's your move?

You wrote earlier:
TheMarcksPlan wrote:
10 Jun 2019 13:07
Truth is that the vast bulk of the Red Army survived the border battles. Only one of the fronts suffered encirclements, the largest (Southwest Front) did not. Red Army had ~2.7mil men serving in its active first echelon forces; only ~300k of these fell into German hands at Minsk-Bialystok.
TheMarcksPlan wrote:
06 Jul 2019 22:27
The reasons they failed in November are easy to explain based on the relative force ratios.
The Germans failed because they run out of offensive combat power. They were burned out. Just as the war games lead by Paulus predicted.

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Re: What if: Hitler wins the war due to slightly stronger Barbarossa forces

Post by MarkN » 07 Jul 2019 09:23

Richard Anderson wrote:
07 Jul 2019 06:41
MarkN wrote:
06 Jul 2019 09:29
Always better to do the research and analysis first then build you understanding from that.
Research? I don need no stinkin research...
He's back on the christianmunch posting style theme: demand others do his research for him, others must prove a unicorn doesn't exist, attempt to bully them through insults, threaten not to discuss with them unless they accept/agree with all his fantasies.

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Re: What if: Hitler wins the war due to slightly stronger Barbarossa forces

Post by ljadw » 07 Jul 2019 11:39

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
05 Jul 2019 20:58
ljadw wrote:
05 Jul 2019 06:00
TheMarcksPlan wrote:
04 Jul 2019 15:09


OTOH the Heer was terrible in areas in which the Western Allies excelled, such as logistics and grand strategy.



We (the broad community of non-evil humanity) nearly let Hitler win via Munich, American isolationism, etc.
1 Nonsense

2 Nonsense
As far the Jews of Europe are concerned we did let Hitler win.
He should have been stopped no later than 1939 when there was an opportunity for France/UK/USSR anti-Hitler coalition.
There was no such opportunity, as long as Poland existed .And if Poland did no longer exist, there was also no such reason .
There was no reason for France and Britain to have a coalition with the USSR against Hitler .
There was no reason for the USSR to have a coalition with Britain and FRance against Hitler .
It takes two to tango, in this case 4, there never could be 4,thus no coalition .

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Re: What if: Hitler wins the war due to slightly stronger Barbarossa forces

Post by Hanny » 07 Jul 2019 12:20

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
04 Jul 2019 23:30
Paul Lakowski wrote:
04 Jul 2019 23:11
Germany did not need to build more trucks , they just had to raid the civilian economy for the vehicles. They did this through out the war. As far back as 1936 Bloomberg and Fromm were advising the Wehrmacht, the Nazi would commandeer up to 120,000 trucks if war exploded unexpectedly. By 1937 103,420 trucks [load capacity of 2-7.5 tons] "were classified as completion vehicles for the Wehrmacht". [Trucks of the Wehrmacht .Reinhard Frank, pp 26.]
Raiding the civilian economy undercuts the ability to wage war. Food was a problem throughout the war, limiting coal production especially (coal miners need a lot of food to be productive). Further truck requisitions would disproportionately impact agriculture. You could ask the ag sector to substitute horses for trucks but then you're just shifting a shortage of horses to the army.

Far better for Germany to just build more trucks. Compared to planes and ships, trucks are pretty cheap. And they get cheaper the more of them you build.
Trucks of the Wehrmacht .Reinhard Frank is free online to read, https://mxdoc.com/queue/trucks-of-the-wehrmacht.html mostlya picture book, will suit nazi fan boys, it states the data on truck production was a secret so there is no data and makes a best guess for 37. Trucks were purchased under fixed price contracts and the state did not get them cheaper by ordering more, in fact they wanted them modified and payed more for them not less. USSBS found what frank could not. Civilian economy was raided from 39 onwards, trucks available from production went down by 50% between last year of peace and 41.



http://www.angelfire.com/super/ussbs/motvehrep.html

USSBS Total truck production. Tables 2 and 6.
1934 28452
1935 45213
1936 70040
1937 79160
1938 87661
1939 101745 412271 produced by 1939.
1940 69731
1941 72221
554223 Produced by 1941

USSB numbers of trucks in Germany , military and civilian Table 3
1939 84172 Military
1939 270902 Civilian
355074
Total truck park military and civilian.
355074

http://www.angelfire.com/super/ussbs/motvehrep.html#G2
Split of Military to civilian trucks by year, in 1941 60% to 15% to 25% rest exported.

Difference between produced and present, by 1939 is the number exported,

Number/type of new Divisions https://www.alternatewars.com/BBOW/Stat ... _Count.htm
PZR MOT INF MNT SEC Trucks required
01/09/39 10 5 94 3 0 25500 38800
01/05/40 3 3 48 0 0
01/06/41 18 7 64 3 8
21 15 158 8 8

Trucks required per formation in 39.
PZR 1700
MOT 1700
INF/MNT/SEC 615
Grosstruppen 1939 15000

Trucks in formations in 41.
PZR/MOT 61200
INF/MNT/SEC 107010
Grosstruppen 1941 45000
Non Div 17220
LW 100,000
1941 total required 330430

Above in 41 is Div sized formations and accounts for 2.5 million manpower, 500k is in non divisional sized formations, which at a motorisation level the same as infantry is a further requirement of 17220


1939 Heer Military has a requirement of 79300 and 84172 exist, so the Navy gets nothing, and Air force and non Divisional assets, had 5000, its taken 6 years to produce them, Air force actually had around 50,000 and i wont bother with non Div assets, so in 39 the military is in deficit by 45000 for trucks.

1941 141952 more produced, less 15% 120659 sent for export, 60% of that is in the military, 72395 added to the military stock of 84172 in 2 years under the schell program, so has a military stock of 156567 and a military and civilian stock of (355074 + 120659) which is 475733. ( plus the 40% of production to civilian in last 2 years) Military has a requirement of 330430, so is 170000 under requirement to fill TOE, it only filled its requirements by taking from industry ( see link above civilian % dropped and never recovered and was largely replaced by horse drawn see Evanshttps://www.amazon.com/gp/product/B002IPZJ60/re ... bl_vppi_i2) and gaining from taking allied trucks and using them, because it could not build enough of its own, or replace what was lost which was 90k from 39 to 40 at 45k a year and continue its expansion.

Building an extra 34000 trucks fo 20 more PZR/MOT simply reduces the under equipped level, or produces more under equipped formations with reduced combat power.
Last edited by Hanny on 08 Jul 2019 07:16, edited 3 times in total.
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Re: What if: Hitler wins the war due to slightly stronger Barbarossa forces

Post by Hanny » 07 Jul 2019 12:23

This thread is another appalling CM lets pretend the Reich can have anything, be anything,do anything, it wants, and ignore reality.
TheMarcksPlan wrote:
07 Jul 2019 02:27
The historical record of Red Army and Ostheer performance during panzer Kesselschlachten is all I need.
90% of the AFV were lost by years end, so they were a failure, not a success.
TheMarcksPlan wrote:
07 Jul 2019 02:27
EVERY time the Germans massed panzer forces of both flanks of a Red Army formation and tried to encircle it, they succeeded - until November.
The reasons they failed in November are easy to explain based on the relative force ratios.
Correct, by Nov German had the highest relative force ratio ( glantz page 301) it would ever achieve in the east and still lost.June 41 Ger V SU Force ratio 1 to 1.4 in German favour by end of year its reversed to 1.23 to 1 in SU favour and increases against them till end of war.
TheMarcksPlan wrote:
07 Jul 2019 02:27
I'll guess that you will hide from addressing this argument as well, however. You'll adopt the the 4yo's strategy of asking why and so far lack the intellectual maturity to address a hypothetical. This is the behavior of the very worst lawyers in court.
Your entire posting history consists of creating hypotheticals, not what you can prove, which is what lawyers are concerned with in court. Clearly your not a lawyer as hypothetical question to a lay person ina court of law, are not allowed.
To strive, to seek, to find, and not to yield.

Richard Anderson
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Re: What if: Hitler wins the war due to slightly stronger Barbarossa forces

Post by Richard Anderson » 07 Jul 2019 17:35

MarkN wrote:
07 Jul 2019 09:19
What high-level analysis? What detailed path?
Yes, this is where I have a major problem. The argument that I see is actually:

In September 1938, someone (someones?) in the German high command (political? military?) conducts a "high-level analysis" (what is that? how do they do it?) and concludes:

in June 1941 we are going to be at war with the Soviet Union and Britain, after the Munich Conference, which hasn't happened yet, gives us access to Czech industry, then we conquer Poland while making a pact with the USSR, invade Denmark and execute a daring, but successful, sea and air attack conquering Norway, then the Low Countries and France are conquered, then later we conquer Yugoslavia and Greece and enter into alliances with Italy, Hungary, Romania, and Finland (who we cozy up to after our erstwhile Soviet partners invade them).

So to conduct the first stages of these future events in September-October 1939 we require four and a rump fifth Panzer divisions, four leichte divisions, and five to eight motorized infanterie divisions of which they have four, two, and zero respectively. Then, for the events of 1941 we need to increase that from the existing six to fifty-six. All this while we still do not have an acceptable design for their main battle tank, when the motor vehicle industry is struggling to build the over-complex and expensive vehicle designs selected by the Heer, industry is complaining the peacetime military buildup is taking workers away from them, and the financiers are screaming blue murder about the threat of inflation and the lack of foreign capital for purchasing necessary goods.

And because of that we realize the answer is to beach the nice shiny new Kriegsmarine we've built to show off to the world and gain political points and limit the Luftwaffe to its existing 272 Staffeln consisting of rapidly obsolescing aircraft types with inadequate spares and facilities (oh, scratch the daring but successful air and sea attack on Norway). Meanwhile, we'll coerce our neighbors, including those we're about to maybe sit down with at Munich) to send us the millions of industrial laborers to replace the Germans mobilized, by threatening not to send them steel.

Sure.
"Is all this pretentious pseudo intellectual citing of sources REALLY necessary? It gets in the way of a good, spirited debate, destroys the cadence." POD, 6 October 2018

MarkN
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Re: What if: Hitler wins the war due to slightly stronger Barbarossa forces

Post by MarkN » 07 Jul 2019 20:24

Richard Anderson wrote:
07 Jul 2019 17:35
MarkN wrote:
07 Jul 2019 09:19
What high-level analysis? What detailed path?
Yes, this is where I have a major problem. The argument that I see is actually:

In September 1938, someone (someones?) in the German high command (political? military?) conducts a "high-level analysis" (what is that? how do they do it?) and concludes:

in June 1941 we are going to be at war with the Soviet Union and Britain,....
And nobody had yet invented the special pill to keep the troops fighting on beyond exhaustion and a panzer with the reliability to get to Moscow without a major pause to overhaul and refurbish.

Hanny
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Re: What if: Hitler wins the war due to slightly stronger Barbarossa forces

Post by Hanny » 08 Jul 2019 07:42

Boby wrote:
06 Jul 2019 19:31
I lack sources. I don't know what was Poland POV in August 1939.

What they expected from Berlin? I find it difficult to believe it was just "bluffing".
Polish-British common defense pact was entered to specificly go to war if Germany invaded poland.http://self.gutenberg.org/articles/poli ... fence_pact

Uk also entered into the Anglo Polish agreement http://ibiblio.org/pha/bb/bb-078.html
To strive, to seek, to find, and not to yield.

Paul Lakowski
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Re: What if: Hitler wins the war due to slightly stronger Barbarossa forces

Post by Paul Lakowski » 08 Jul 2019 08:01

Actually it was determined a decade before by Defence minister Groner in TASKS FOR THE WEHRMACHT [TFTW] . He stressed that Germany was sooooo defenseless; that a Polish invasion - liken the war with Russia in 1920 - would force the Reichswehr to surrender after just a couple of weeks fighting. Germany must rearm and Parliament agreed . He planned a three phase 15 year expansion program for the Wehrmacht to become capable of offensive action , including pre-emptive attack or even Preventative war.

Groner also warned that Germanys neighbours would not sit ideally by and just let her rearm. He out lined in TFTW that -no matter what military course taken- it had to have a "reasonable chance to win the wider European war" , that would inevitably break out as a backlash against any German military action. Otherwise it was too risky and Germany had to consider transitory alternatives to a military solution.

Groner's first step was incorporating the various secrete rearmament programs, including the Reichmarine and establishment of "Lufthansa" as de facto air-force. Then he authorised the expansion of the HEER from 7 infantry divisions & 3 cavalry divisions, up to 21 infantry divisions by the early 1930s. With BECK help , this effort was expanded to include a mobilised force of 60-80 divisions by the end of the 1930s. This could achieve a "reasonable chance" of reacting to any Franco -Polish provocation, but offered little chance of driving any foreign invaders out. By the end of that decade a mechanized force was too be establish to drive out any attackers.

After this Groner counselled the complete transformation of Wehrmacht into a mechanized force capable of taking offensive action as either a "pre-emptive" or "preventative war". Further to this goal, was establishment of a plan to achieve total war capability by early 1940s to support a Wehrmacht transformed into a mechanized force. This plan envisaged stockpiling all the munitions needed to conduct one year of continuous warfare against these neighbours. After this, all the resources needed to build the needed munitions for a second year of war was to be established. It was believed that after these two years of warfare, Germany would have established a total war economy.

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Re: What if: Hitler wins the war due to slightly stronger Barbarossa forces

Post by ljadw » 08 Jul 2019 11:21

Hanny wrote:
08 Jul 2019 07:42
Boby wrote:
06 Jul 2019 19:31
I lack sources. I don't know what was Poland POV in August 1939.

What they expected from Berlin? I find it difficult to believe it was just "bluffing".
Polish-British common defense pact was entered to specificly go to war if Germany invaded poland.http://self.gutenberg.org/articles/poli ... fence_pact

Uk also entered into the Anglo Polish agreement http://ibiblio.org/pha/bb/bb-078.html
The word war was not mentioned in the text of the Anglo Polish agreement.
And the agreement had no value at all : no one was taking into account the agreement .

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