What if: Hitler wins the war due to slightly stronger Barbarossa forces

[TheMarcksPlan]

You wanted to start building those 20 extra AD with III/IV Stugs in 38, that means paying for it in 38... GDP of 41 is spent on what you produce in 41, and has little to do with what you have in the field to use, that gets there from prior years investment in production.

Willful stupidity.
The majority of additional forces would come from production in the first half of '41 and second half of '40; this production would occur based on investments and past decisions guided by a better strategic concept for the war.

You repeatedly demonstrate willful or organic inability to grapple with the strategic revision proposed, however, so of course everything you say afterwards has zero relevance to the topic at hand.

Oh, sure i figured he was a war gamer

Oh and I figured you assumed something like that, you and Hanny.
That's what causes all the buffoonish self-assurance to misread and make errors while failing to grapple with the central issues.

[pugsville]

Logsitics,

How would MORE troops more motorized and panzer divisions be supplied, When your logistical system breaks down the solution just add more troops does not work.

The ATL specifies better German logistics planning prior to Barbarossa. This was imminently doable had Halder etc. acted competently to plan for better rail connections. The investments in rolling stock and track required would have been a small portion of total expenditure.

This isn't to say that the Ostheer will have "good" logistics. But it doesn't need good logistics, it just needs sufficient lift to supply ~10% greater forces on about 10% greater penetration into the SU.

I haven't gone into great detail yet on the logistics; it's something I plan to address in later posts.

It's not cost without more resources which must come at some cost elsewhere.

Likewise more motorized troops are not without cost.

[Richard Anderson]

That's what causes all the buffoonish self-assurance to misread and make errors while failing to grapple with the central issues.

Uh, dude (or is it bro?), you seem to miss the simple fact that so far your "grappling" with the "central issues" Germany had to deal with consists of your declaration that:

1. German leadership will think about things more. :roll:

Followed by,

2. After thinking hard about things, German leadership will move GDP from one pisspot to another. :roll:

And then, after making these assertions, you aver that you "plan to address [all these central issues] in later posts," before proceeding directly to ad hominem of your critics. All this, to demonstrate how Hitler can win the war, just by "slightly stronger Barbarossa forces".

Pardon me for being more than slightly unimpressed by your genius.

[ljadw]

Besides, there was no need for these divisions, as it was planned to win the war with the existing 150 divisions in a few weeks east of the DD line . After these few weeks, the role of the existing 30 mobile divions would be over . There was never an intention to go with 150 divisions to the Wolga,because the bigger the army, the slower the advance .

Like the other posters here, you have entirely failed to understand the ATL.
The whole point is to change the strategic conception Barbarossa from a quick, easy campaign to a long one of at least two years.

This is like responding to a "What if Hitler had the A-bomb" thread with "Hitler didn't have the A-bomb."

Why do you want to change the strategic conception of Barbarossa from a quick ''easy '' campaign to a long one of at least two years , as 1 Germany had not the means to win a long campaign 2 as winning a long campaign would not help Germany in its war against the Western allies : in 1943 the German cities were every day attacked by the RAF/USAAF.

[TheMarcksPlan]

Germany had not the means to win a long campaign

Obviously I disagree.
If Hitler has 20 more mobile divisions then AGS and AGN encircle and destroy their opponents during the border battles and in subsequent campaigns. AGC doesn't need to divert from its drive on Moscow; Stalin has significantly weaker forces everywhere. '41 campaign ends with Germans in Leningrad, Moscow, VOronezh, and Rostov. Germany conducts a winter offensive towards the Caucasus, maybe reaching Maikop before the spring thaw. In any event, Baku is within reach for the '42 campaign, as are Gorkiy and the whole Volga basin. By summer '43, Stalin has only ~40mil loyal subjects if the USSR hasn't collapsed. Germany can screen the East with a smaller force and with allies while making any assault on Western Europe too costly for the Allies to undertake.

Uh, dude (or is it bro?)

Either is acceptable, as is "My Lord" or even "My Lady."

Pardon me for being more than slightly unimpressed by your genius.

I'm not surprised that in your mind this conversation is about who is smarter. That your motivation here is to show how smart you are and how much you know. I invite you to engage substantively with my proposals.

Substantive question:
Do you think it historically implausible and economically impossible (1) for Germany to have shifted '38-'41 production and investment from LW/KM to Heer, and (2) for it to have mobilized more resources early in the war?

You seem to answer "yes" to both questions, but haven't said so explicitly. If I'm right in that guess, then what's your argument? In particular, why couldn't Germany have made different cuts to its armaments programs in early 1939, such as avoiding Plan Z in favor of ramping up Heer programs that were cut, most notably a 50% cut to planned tank building? Surely you're aware that the crisis that caused these cuts was financial, such that spending between the services was essentially fungible at that particular point.

Why couldn't Germany have appointed a "Plenpotentiary for Labor" immediately after war began, with broad powers to induct foreign and domestic workers?

I can see several facially valid responses to these questions but all of them arguably are overcome if Hitler has a different strategic conception of the coming war with the USSR. For example: "Greater demands will inspire greater resistance among the French and Polish." Sure, but with a bigger war looming Hitler's probably more willing to make more risks and throw his weight at allies and the conquered.

We can get down to brass tacks of how the greater forces are "paid for." But we'd have to adopt a different tone and be more explicit about our priors.

[Hanny]

Willful stupidity.
The majority of additional forces would come from production in the first half of '41 and second half of '40; this production would occur based on investments and past decisions guided by a better strategic concept for the war.

The stupidity is all yours. This 4 fold production, on a monthly bassis, and in the final 12 months, is based on knowing the outcome and planning for it by use of time travail to change production values.

1936/8 PZR III+Stugs+Pzr IV
98+0+211

1939 PZR II+Pzr IV
157+0+45

1940 PZR III+Pzr IV
1,054+192+268

1941 PZR III+Pzr IV
2,277+540+467

Pre war total
309
1939 total
202
1940 total
1514
1941 Total
3284

Total Pre war to end of 41 is 5309, 48 months gives 110 a month, peaking in 41 at 274.

You otoh, have it peaking at 12000 in 12 month period at a 1000, four times RTL, and 19200 requires an average of 400 a month in 48 months, four times RTL.

You repeatedly demonstrate willful or organic inability to grapple with the strategic revision proposed, however, so of course everything you say afterwards has zero relevance to the topic at hand.

You repeatedly demonstrate willful or organic inability to grapple with reality, so of course everything you say has zero relevance to the real world.

Facts often are very hard on those who proffer fantasy. Germany building 4 times in AFV ( magicly knowing which is the best best gun to deal with aT34 and equipping the ID with integral Battn of it, vastly increasing its MOT Divs, and having a logistics fairy to run it all) from 38 onwards works well in HOI, but would not in real history.

[ljadw]

Germany had not the means to win a long campaign

Obviously I disagree.
If Hitler has 20 more mobile divisions then AGS and AGN encircle and destroy their opponents during the border battles and in subsequent campaigns. AGC doesn't need to divert from its drive on Moscow; Stalin has significantly weaker forces everywhere. '41 campaign ends with Germans in Leningrad, Moscow, VOronezh, and Rostov. Germany conducts a winter offensive towards the Caucasus, maybe reaching Maikop before the spring thaw. In any event, Baku is within reach for the '42 campaign, as are Gorkiy and the whole Volga basin. By summer '43, Stalin has only ~40mil loyal subjects if the USSR hasn't collapsed. Germany can screen the East with a smaller force and with allies while making any assault on Western Europe too costly for the Allies to undertake.

Your desire to make a German victory possible forces you to act as a (bad ) magician .
1 Between June 22 and June 30 1941,the SU mobilised 5 million + men . When these were going to the front, it was over for Germany .
2 A winter offensive in the Caucasus was impossible ( FYI : there are big mountains in the Caucasus )
3 There is no proof that the capture of Gorkiy and Baku would result in the collaps of the SU : the German economic experts warned for this illusion ( source : Germany and WWII )
4 Germany itself could do nothing with the oil of the Caucasus .
It would be better to read something serious instead of trying to change history .
4

[ljadw]

Substantive question:
Do you think it historically implausible and economically impossible (1) for Germany to have shifted '38-'41 production and investment from LW/KM to Heer, and (2) for it to have mobilized more resources early in the war?

On the first question
1 It was done in September 1940: the army would be increased by 60 divisions
2 It was not needed before September 1940 : before September 1940 there was no intention and no need to attack the SU .
3 It would be suicidal to do it before September 1940
4 It would not help Germany if it decreased the LW and KM production between 1938 and 1941 ,as less aircraft and less UBoats do not mean more tanks . Maybe that is so in a War Game,but not so in reality .
On the second question : Germany mobilised more resources early in the war and it is on YOU to prove that even more resources could be produced .

[TheMarcksPlan]

1 Between June 22 and June 30 1941,the SU mobilised 5 million + men . When these were going to the front, it was over for Germany .

That's not really an argument.
On December 1, 1941 the Red Army fronts had a strength of ~4.3mil with another ~500k in Stavka reserve.
If the Red Army has lost an additional ~2mil men during 1941 (at least two more Kesselschlacht on the borders plus massive Kesselschlacht upon the fall of Leningrad and Moscow) then the most it can put in the field is ~2.8mil men. That's not sufficient to push the Germans back from Moscow/Leningrad over the winter.

There is no proof that the capture of Gorkiy and Baku would result in the collaps of the SU : the German economic experts warned for this illusion ( source : Germany and WWII )

I don't seek nor need to "prove" that the SU collapses. Having lost Baku and the Volga basin (Gorkiy, Kuibyshev, etc.), Stalin has about half the population at the end of ATL '42 as he did OTL. Plus he's lost millions more men than OTL due to encirclement battles. The most RKKA can put in the field then is ~3.5mil men, probably fewer. Capacity to field armies will be limited by loss of Archangel to the Finns.

At that point, Hitler and Stalin/successor could agree a peace. Or Hitler could take the Urals in '43 while simultaneously strengthening Western Europe and/or conquering Middle East (probably Turkey joins Axis).

2 A winter offensive in the Caucasus was impossible ( FYI : there are big mountains in the Caucasus )

That's why I said "towards the Caucasus" not "in the Caucasus". Crossing the Don and taking the entire Kuban region (flat agricultural land) would be a massive blow to SU over the winter. Starting from the Stavropol and Elista in May 1942 instead of from the Donets is a ~400mi advantage ATL over OTL.

[TheMarcksPlan]

It would not help Germany if it decreased the LW and KM production between 1938 and 1941 ,as less aircraft and less UBoats do not mean more tanks

No decrease in U-boats, just never doing the Z plan.
LW production comes out of strategic bombers like Ju-88. Even though it had a tactical role as well, that was more cheaply filled by Ju-87.
Nothing about early war changes except that Hitler has to skip Battle of Britain and the buildup for Sealion, both of which would have been very good things.

[ljadw]

It would not help Germany if it decreased the LW and KM production between 1938 and 1941 ,as less aircraft and less UBoats do not mean more tanks

No decrease in U-boats, just never doing the Z plan.
LW production comes out of strategic bombers like Ju-88. Even though it had a tactical role as well, that was more cheaply filled by Ju-87.
Nothing about early war changes except that Hitler has to skip Battle of Britain and the buildup for Sealion, both of which would have been very good things.

No Bismarck does not mean more tanks .
Why would no Battle of Britain be a very good thing for Germany ?

[ljadw]

1 Between June 22 and June 30 1941,the SU mobilised 5 million + men . When these were going to the front, it was over for Germany .

That's not really an argument.
On December 1, 1941 the Red Army fronts had a strength of ~4.3mil with another ~500k in Stavka reserve.
If the Red Army has lost an additional ~2mil men during 1941 (at least two more Kesselschlacht on the borders plus massive Kesselschlacht upon the fall of Leningrad and Moscow) then the most it can put in the field is ~2.8mil men. That's not sufficient to push the Germans back from Moscow/Leningrad over the winter.

There is no proof that the capture of Gorkiy and Baku would result in the collaps of the SU : the German economic experts warned for this illusion ( source : Germany and WWII )

I don't seek nor need to "prove" that the SU collapses. Having lost Baku and the Volga basin (Gorkiy, Kuibyshev, etc.), Stalin has about half the population at the end of ATL '42 as he did OTL. Plus he's lost millions more men than OTL due to encirclement battles. The most RKKA can put in the field then is ~3.5mil men, probably fewer. Capacity to field armies will be limited by loss of Archangel to the Finns.

At that point, Hitler and Stalin/successor could agree a peace. Or Hitler could take the Urals in '43 while simultaneously strengthening Western Europe and/or conquering Middle East (probably Turkey joins Axis).

2 A winter offensive in the Caucasus was impossible ( FYI : there are big mountains in the Caucasus )

That's why I said "towards the Caucasus" not "in the Caucasus". Crossing the Don and taking the entire Kuban region (flat agricultural land) would be a massive blow to SU over the winter. Starting from the Stavropol and Elista in May 1942 instead of from the Donets is a ~400mi advantage ATL over OTL.

More mobile divisions does NOT mean additional Kesselschlachten . Additional Kesselschlachten were only possible if there would be additional Soviet forces west of the DD line : in the first month the Soviets lost 600000 POWs; more POWs were only possible if the Soviets committed more men . And there is no proof that with more mobile divisions, the Germans could capture Moscow and Leningrad and that these losses would resul in an additional loss of millions for the SU : the SU did not need millions of men to defend Moscow and Leningrad . It could always decide to give up these cities .
Baku and Gorkiy were not captured in the OTL: YOU must prove that they could be captured in the ATL.

There is no proof that the fall of Archangelsk would influence the outcome of the war . About án offensive towards the Caucasus 'and not the conquest of the Caucasus : why are you talking about the capture of Baku ? The capture of Baku implies the capture of the Caucasus, not an offensive towards the Caucasus .
Last point : a stronger Ostheer does not mean an advance to the Wolga . It prevents such an advance .

[ljadw]

Besides, there was no need for these divisions, as it was planned to win the war with the existing 150 divisions in a few weeks east of the DD line . After these few weeks, the role of the existing 30 mobile divions would be over . There was never an intention to go with 150 divisions to the Wolga,because the bigger the army, the slower the advance .

Like the other posters here, you have entirely failed to understand the ATL.
The whole point is to change the strategic conception Barbarossa from a quick, easy campaign to a long one of at least two years.

This is like responding to a "What if Hitler had the A-bomb" thread with "Hitler didn't have the A-bomb."

Hitler having the A-Bomb is a wast of time, because
a Hitler never could have the A-Bomb
b If he had the A-Bomb, he could not have the results he had without the A-Bomb .
c Hitler could not defeat the US with the A-Bomb
d Hitler could also not defeat France and Britain with the A-Bomb,because the possession of the A-Bomb meant a much smaller Heer, LW and KM ,which means : no successful Fall Gelb .
e US could defeat Germany with the A-Bomb, without D Day .
f US did not need the A-Bomb to defeat Japan .

[ljadw]

At that point, Hitler and Stalin/successor could agree a peace. Or Hitler could take the Urals in '43 while simultaneously strengthening Western Europe and/or conquering Middle East (probably Turkey joins Axis).

Only a fool would conquer the ME (besides : it could not be done ) : there was nothing in the ME that was essential for Germany and Britain .
Western Europe could not be defended, as there was no defense possible against nuclear attacks .
There is no proof that Hitler could take the Urals in 1943 and,if he could, there was no need .

[Hanny]

LW production comes out of strategic bombers like Ju-88. Even though it had a tactical role as well, that was more cheaply filled by Ju-87.
Nothing about early war changes except that Hitler has to skip Battle of Britain and the buildup for Sealion, both of which would have been very good things.

I giggle every time you term it a strategic bomber, from 37 onwards they were only dive bombers, as they failed as med bombers, to provide acurate close air support for the ground troops in Spain.

So now its no JU 88 15k production run at all, you know the basis of LW entire design processs pre war, to replace the outdated JU87 no (2000klm) long range dive bomber assets to support deep Pzr operations who lacked integral art and needed that extra omph, and was why the 88 was changed to a DB, to give the Army what it wanted, close air support for the deep penetration, you now only have for the war 600klm
6k of JU 87s, you just took away the long range capacity of LW close air support role for the Panzerwaffe.

May work in HOI, you now have to build airfields close on the borders of where you want to invade, in reality not so much.