One more panzer group in Barbarossa, plans for a two-year campaign

[ljadw]

The WM had no 97 mobile divisions.
And ,if they had 97 divisions available, these could not march on Moscow because the railway net and road space would not permit it .
Three years later, the Wallies could not advance on a narrow front against Germany,although the railways and roads were much better than in the east .

[ljadw]

The biggest problem was the environment/distance which made it very difficult to use mobile warfare /to supply mobile forces .
And, again, it was NOT about to advance beyond the DD line,it was about to eliminate the USSR west of the DD line .Advancing does not result in the defeat of the enemy, but the defeat of the enemy results in an advance .
If the SU collapsed west of the DD line, it was not needed and impossible to go to the Volga with tanks ,artillery and ammunition .
If the SU did not collapse west of the DD line, she would not collapse east of the DD line, and and advance with tanks,artillery,trucks,ammunition to the Volga was impossible .

Was done actually.

And the result was a failure .

[Aida1]

The biggest problem was the environment/distance which made it very difficult to use mobile warfare /to supply mobile forces .
And, again, it was NOT about to advance beyond the DD line,it was about to eliminate the USSR west of the DD line .Advancing does not result in the defeat of the enemy, but the defeat of the enemy results in an advance .
If the SU collapsed west of the DD line, it was not needed and impossible to go to the Volga with tanks ,artillery and ammunition .
If the SU did not collapse west of the DD line, she would not collapse east of the DD line, and and advance with tanks,artillery,trucks,ammunition to the Volga was impossible .

Was done actually.

And the result was a failure .

There was no failure as you describe it . There was never an impossibility of advancing further east. The only issue was the timeframe given that one wanted to finish the job in 1941.

[ljadw]

The job was not finished before the autumn,as was planned, it was not even finished before the winter, as was planned after the first failure : two times the Germans tried in 1941 and two times they failed .
One wanted to do the job in 1941 because it could not be done in 1942 and because,if it was done in 1942, it would not prevent ,but only delay Germany's collapse .
In 1942 the Yanks would come and destroy the Third Reich . The only possibility to prevent this was to eliminate the USSR in 1941 .

[Aida1]

The job was not finished before the autumn,as was planned, it was not even finished before the winter, as was planned after the first failure : two times the Germans tried in 1941 and two times they failed .
One wanted to do the job in 1941 because it could not be done in 1942 and because,if it was done in 1942, it would not prevent ,but only delay Germany's collapse .
In 1942 the Yanks would come and destroy the Third Reich . The only possibility to prevent this was to eliminate the USSR in 1941 .

But not because of the impossibilities you pretend existed. They did never exist. They reflect your hadden agenda. Different decisions were possible.

[ljadw]

Which different decisions ?

[Aida1]

Which different decisions ?

Do not play silly games. You know very well the different decisions that could have been made during and before Barbarossa. Have been discussed before.

[Terry Duncan]

I am really not in the mood to allow further non-content bickering, so I am locking this thread for now. If any responsible posters wish to make further contributions, please PM me. If bickering spills into another thread people will find they have some spare time to reconsider their ways.

Terry Duncan

[TheMarcksPlan]

Continuing on-topic...

Earlier I began a promised series of posts on the shape of a post-SU German war economy. viewtopic.php?f=11&t=243557&start=405#p2257665

That post estimated the size of Germany's ATL 1944 domestic labor force at +50% versus OTL.

In another post I estimate the size of an SU-inclusive ATL occupied economy at 2.6x the OTL level. viewtopic.php?f=11&t=227341&start=780#p2265181

Finally, another post combines the foregoing and concludes that a doubling of German war production over OTL is a very conservative estimate for any ATL in which Germany defeats the SU by the end of '42. viewtopic.php?f=11&t=227341&p=2266586#p2266585

I'll probably expand on those posts as I come across relevant research.

At the highest-level view, a doubling of German weapons production in this ATL seems entirely reasonable.
Germany would be in control of nearly 500 million people and, contrary to superficial AHF narratives, was actually successful OTL in mobilizing captive populations to its own ends (see second linked post above).
Unlike in OTL, occupation of the SU - and later incorporation of Iberia/Turkey into the Grossraum - removes the natural resources bottlenecks that limited German production.

Contrast the high-level demographics with the Anglosphere:
The US plus the UK and its settler dominions had a population of roughly 200 million. While the British Empire included millions more, these populations did not contribute much economic output OTL and there's no reasonable ATL in which either the educational or political obstacles to meaningful industrial production are overcome.

Unlike the populations of occupied Europe, the British (and Free French) Empire's colonial subjects were largely illiterate subsistence farmers. Even could they have been moved to factories or mines in the metropoles, the racism of Anglosphere societies was such that mass migration seems out of the question.

With a ~2.5:1 advantage in industrialized population, it isn't difficult to imagine the German Grossraum economy exceeding the Anglosphere's. To see why that's so, one has to understand the economic "magic" of migration.

Per internal German wartime analysis, foreign workers in Germany were ~70-80% as productive as German workers (it isn't hard to explain the gap, btw, in non-Nazi terms. They were treated like crap, poorly fed, not well-motivated to produce for Germany). Even with this productivity gap, however, a worker moved from a Ukrainian village to a German factory has instantly become roughly twice as productive. [calculation based on 1938 per capita GDP with Germany = $5126 and SU = $2150 at 1990 international USD].

If the entire population of Europe reached 80% of German per-capita GDP, the Grossraum's economy would be substantially larger than the combined Anglosphere economies. Of course that wouldn't happen but illustrates the upside case of these ATL's for post-SU war against the Wallies.

Germany does not need economic parity with the Wallies to win:

First, there is of course the small matter of Japan, a country whose imperial economy exceeded the SU's in size for most of the war. The Wallies may not be able to afford to concentrate against Japan given a stronger Germany perched across the Channel. However, allowing Japan to rack up important conquests in Asia (Kwantung Army is free from '42 in this ATL) - such as interior China and perhaps India - creates a serious geopolitical crisis that can probably only be solved by making peace with Germany.

Second, as the defender along short interior lines, Germany can hold out indefinitely if the economic balance is in the vicinity of even. Unlike the Wallies, it doesn't need to spend a substantial portion of its production on shipping and landing craft (>15% of Wallied production OTL). Neither does it need to spend much on naval forces (~25% of American production OTL).

[Paul Lakowski]

The WM had no 97 mobile divisions.
And ,if they had 97 divisions available, these could not march on Moscow because the railway net and road space would not permit it .
Three years later, the Wallies could not advance on a narrow front against Germany,although the railways and roads were much better than in the east .

no one said they did.

I just followed up on Nigel ASKEY point in Vol-II of his Barbarossa series. Where he points out that the infantry divisions included in Barbarossa Operation had enough motorization to completely motorize 70 of those divisions [ pp167/168 ]. I just ran with that and explored the possibilities.

What happens to the rest of these vehicle free divisions? Well the invasion force still > 750,000 horses and 130,000 associated wagons , karts & gun Limber. Examining the infantry division, the Artillery Regiment had almost no vehicles as do the infantry regiments.

According to Buckner each 1940 infantry Regiment had 73 vehicles and 47 M/C plus 210 wagons [600 horse]. The 1941 CAT 1 infantry Regiment got by with much less ....only 33 truck 15 car & 42 M/C [95t] but 208 wagons! The tactical motorized lift capacity of these units was 100 tons per Regiment requiring only 81 wagons to free up this historical motorization.

A similar pattern exists in the 1940 artillery Regiment that needed 76 cars 80 trucks &57 motorcycle plus 240 wagons and over 2200 horses. Askey shows the 1941 CAT 1 infantry division needed 279 wagons and 30 trucks plus 4 cars [80t] and ~ 32 M/C. The number and type of Artillery used in both divisions is identical.

Further exploration shows Engineer Battalions in 1941 need 43 trucks & 14 cars [120t] plus 37 M/C plus 18 wagons . The 1940 figures where 38 trucks 9 cars and 24 M/C plus 19 wagons.

To free up all this motorization in each division [222 truck;63 car & 182 M/C] should require 388 more wagons and 86 karts [2 horse] plus 103 mounted horsemen [Officers/Kavalry].

This allows each infantry Regiment plus Artillery Regiment and the Engineer Battalion to become fully horse drawn, and frees up 16650 trucks + 4725 cars + 13,650 M/C [2575 MCS] .These vehicles can transport 103,500 troops and 46314 tons. Enough for maybe 8 divisions troops with 14 divisions of lift. Rather than create "new motorized divisions" ; maybe topping up existing divisions to motorized levels might be better.

MOT DIV LIFT should be ~3286t , while the troop transports allow ~ 13700 troops.

Historical 1941 Motorized divisions had 1264 trucks 780 cars and 281 MCS . Most CAT 1 infantry divisions had 550 trucks 245 cars and 76 MCS . To transform CAT-1 infantry div into MOT DIV levels- they need +714 more trucks + 535 more cars & 167 more MCS. The above vehicles would allow 23 divisions of trucks & ~ 9 divisions of cars plus 15 divisions of motorcycle squad [MCS]. These totals allow 29691+48,212+ 88429 troops =166,332 troops or ~ 12 divisions troops.

23 X 1264 TRUCKS + 450 CARS & 186 MC = 8430 troops 3286 tons failure.
20 X 1264 TRUCKS + 190 troop trucks + 518 CARS & 214 MC = 13880 troops 3286 tons...works OK.

next the whole vehicle inventory....

[ljadw]

I know the works of Nigel Askey ,but what you fail to mention is that it would take a lot of time to transfer all those thousands of trucks and their drivers and technicians : 16650 trucks and 4725 cars would also need a lot of supplies and manpower and if you concentrate them on a smaller number of divisions, the supplies ( thus railways ) would be needed to operate on a smaller front , thus more trains on less railways .
The same for the trucks : trucks need roads to operate and if you concentrate more trucks on less roads , you will have big problems .
More trucks need more roads and more trains . If you use more trucks for Typhoon,you will need more roads and railways/trains in the concerned sector .

[Paul Lakowski]

I know the works of Nigel Askey ,but what you fail to mention is that it would take a lot of time to transfer all those thousands of trucks and their drivers and technicians : 16650 trucks and 4725 cars would also need a lot of supplies and manpower and if you concentrate them on a smaller number of divisions, the supplies ( thus railways ) would be needed to operate on a smaller front , thus more trains on less railways .
The same for the trucks : trucks need roads to operate and if you concentrate more trucks on less roads , you will have big problems .
More trucks need more roads and more trains . If you use more trucks for Typhoon,you will need more roads and railways/trains in the concerned sector .

Since the problem of offensive and defensive warfare was central to Wehrmacht development through the 1930s, the change would have been made by mid 1930s ......especially if the HEER recognized what the LW already understood the moment Hitlers 4YP was announced. That Defence Minister Groner's 1928 plan had been wrecked by Hitler 4YP. This plan still echoed through Groner's CABAL [Blomberg , Fromm, Beck & Schacht etc]. A 3 phase 15 year Wehrmacht expansion to build a mechanized armed forces [70 divisions] based on a TOTAL WAR ECONOMY.

These phases would be 5 years to achieve 'defensive' Wehrmacht based on "LIMITED WAR ECONOMY . Then 5 years to achieve a LIMITED WAR ECONOMY 'Mechanised defensive/mobile -counter offensive' Wehrmacht. The last phase 5 year expansion was to transform this into a German/eastern European based total war Economy based on a mechanized "pre-emptive war" capability. This was to feature a stockpile of two years munitions leading to a TOTAL WAR capability.

Every step along this path Germany undertook HAD TO ASSUME any military action could/would explode into a European wide war [AKA WW-I] . Any larger war HAD to have a 'good chance of success', or the risk was not worth it. Beck later watered this standard down to "A reasonable" chance of success" with the mobilised force of 100 divisions. But by the mid 1930s Schacht was conceding -the eastern European based Economy was taking longer to achieve and Hitler hijack the entire effort. In the late 1930s they had conceded such a war was NOT WINABLE based on Hitler's Wehrmacht..

Everything was riding on HITLERS GAMBLES.

In the mid 1930s most divisions did not even exist, so wagon divisions FIRST AND SOME MOBILE DIVISIONS/KORPS was easily doable especially. As I said before there is NO MORE VEHICLES OR WEAPONS , JUST A DIFFERENT ARRANGEMENT OF THE EXISTING FORCES.

[Eugen Pinak]

To free up all this motorization in each division [222 truck;63 car & 182 M/C] should require 388 more wagons and 86 karts [2 horse] plus 103 mounted horsemen [Officers/Kavalry].

First you have to find horses and wagons - and only then you can start to remove motor vehicles from the units. And no - cavalrymen doesn't grow on trees either.

[Paul Lakowski]

To free up all this motorization in each division [222 truck;63 car & 182 M/C] should require 388 more wagons and 86 karts [2 horse] plus 103 mounted horsemen [Officers/Kavalry].

First you have to find horses and wagons - and only then you can start to remove motor vehicles from the units. And no - cavalrymen doesn't grow on trees either.

They had plenty of those, its just a 'shell game' at that level. If you have studied the Wehrmacht you know that few divisions followed actual TOE.

[Tom from Cornwall]

Germany's eastern rail performance improved dramatically over a short period OTL:

During the last month of 1941, 1,330 trains passed the Ostbahn’s eastern
borders into the occupied Soviet Union. During 1942, 38,556 trains moved eastward (3,214.3 per month).

MVAR v.2 at 131.

...this was despite the fact that systemic efforts to fix the system - as opposed to earlier frantic emergency measures during the 41-42 Winter Crisis - came only with the first Ostbau program starting in March 1942. MVAR v.2 at 133. Total spending on railways in the SU throughout the war - including Ostbau and other programs aimed at economic as opposed to military goals - amounted to 1.1bil RM. ibid. at 134. Most railway movement in the occupied SU, however, was within the SU, particularly from the food-surplus areas in the South to the food-deficit areas in the North (interesting fact, btw, which undercuts Tooze and other portrayals of the Hunger Plan as ruthlessly actualized rather than as an amorphous ideological goal held by the more fanatical Nazis). Much economically-induced railroad investment, therefore, was probably spent on north-south lines for which Ostheer had less use.

TMP,

Do you have a source for this claim? I'm not sure that I would describe the "Hunger Plan" as only "an amorphous ideological goal" given the level at which it was generated in May 1941, which included the OKW office of economics in the person of General Georg Thomas and a variety of senior Nazi civil servants. I'm not entirely sure what you mean by "more" fanatical Nazis either. It is clear that agreement over the "Hunger Plan" was widespread throughout the civil-military organisation of the genocidal Nazi state before the invasion of the Soviet Union began.

For details of those aware of and involved with planning the concept of the so-called "Hunger Plan" see the article by Alex J. Kay, 'Germany's Staatssekretire, Mass Starvation and the Meeting of 2 May 1941', Journal of Contemporary History, Vol 41(4), pp. 685-700 which is available on-line.

Kay argues that the plan collapsed only due to the inability of the Germans to control the surviving Ukrainian population but that it was one element in the mind-set that allowed the death by starvation of millions of Russian POWs; and it goes without saying that it was one part of the genocidal rational that moved the surviving Jews of the occupied territories into ghettos where they were systematically undernourished as part of the "extermination through starvation" policy.

Can you explain the logic behind your statement that because most railway movement in the Nazi-occupied area of the Soviet Union was supposedly from south-north (or perhaps north-south) (which I'm sure is something written about the pre-war Soviet Union railway system and food distribution system anyway?) this somehow "undercuts Tooze's" interpretation? Were those trains carrying food around for the occupied population? Or any references that back up your description of the direction that most Nazi trains took in the occupied territories?

Much economically-induced railroad investment, therefore, was probably spent on north-south lines for which Ostheer had less use.

Again, you have absolutely no prove for this rather wooly statement. And I would argue that the Ostheer absolutely needed efficient north-south rail transport anyway in order to efficiently move it's forces and logistics between army groups as required.

Regards

Tom