First, we have consider the "priority" issue in proper context. It was an attempted means of distributing a pool of resources within armaments production; my argument is that armaments production pool was too small so the OTL distributions within that smaller pool are not binding on my ATL.historygeek2021 wrote: ↑04 May 2021 19:03
In Tanks of Barbarossa by Boris Kavalerchik, page 56, the author states that on August 20, 1940, Hitler issued a special order switching production of Panzer III and Panzer IV tanks to a special priority level of importance. This is consistent with Müller's account in DRZW Volume 4. Nevertheless, Germany failed to produce close to enough Panzer III's and IV's to fully equip the 19 panzer divisions in the OTL OstHeer.
Second, the priority system was bankrupt by mid-'40 and everybody knew it. "Special" priority had no meaning; one needed something like ultra-super-stupendous priority even to get quota allocation (see GSWW v.5/1). I don't recall what specific level tanks had in mid-'40 but I don't think they ever reach "0" priority (a category higher than 1) - ironically exports to Russia did have 0 priority. As GSWW v.4 notes, Jodl/OKW wanted a focus on anti-Britain programs and:
...in hardware-focused literature ("tanks of Barbarossa") it's common to see reference to priority by authors who plainly don't understand the bureaucratic ins/outs of such labels.The consequences of that decision, needless to say, also affected the army’s
main programmes, even though they were included in the top priority class.
Thus, tank production alone was short of over 6,000 skilled workers in January
Third, there was never a plan to produce enough pz3/4's to equip all 20 of the PzDiv's with only medium tanks. IIRC the program shortfalls were on the order of 10% (spent a minute looking, it's somewhere on alternatewars.com). See again my quote from GSWW v.4 on Heer armaments chief checking what could be produced under current programs and then back-filling with booty, in the panzer case including 38(t).
Higher overall armaments resourcing or shrinking LW/KM programs and shifting to Heer (again I don't see the latter being necessary but if so, would be sufficient). Germany should have had ~1mil more foreign workers by Barbarossa; the tank program was missing 6,000. I could get into other aspects but that's more than enough.HistoryGeek2021 wrote: So what exactly do you think needed to happen in the summer of 1940 for Germany to be able to equip 5 new panzer divisions by June 1941? What would the composition of these divisions and the OTL divisions be in terms of Panzer III's, IV's and the older/Czech tanks?
As to the exact division composition, all I'm necessarily arguing for is that 5 more divisions with the usual 70 pz3's, 20 PzIV's plus ~50 light tanks could have been equipped. That's the ATL minimum; the reality probably would have seen many more medium tanks available so probably you scrap the 38(t) TOE divisions and trade those tanks to Romania for more oil.
My way of addressing these questions causes controversy on AHF from people who want something like a detailed production program for ATL outputs. That's not the proper way to do counterfactual analysis, IMO. Rather, we should focus on what's necessary to an argument and not get tied up in more detail than is necessary. As the 38 pages of this ATL attest, there's already too much to discuss without specifying whether MAN or MIAG or Alkett or Krupp-Gruson produce additional tanks. They all had excess plant capacity but lacked labor so whoever does the production, a million more workers should suffice.