Statistics on German PoW hauls in latter October 1941?

[TheMarcksPlan]

I'm flogging the obvious here but in case anyone remains unconvinced about morale's impact on PoW yields...

The U.S. Army's training manuals list "enemy morale" as the first factor in determining prisoner capture rates:



https://www.bits.de/NRANEU/others/amd-u ... 859%29.pdf

[Max Payload]

AGC's level of tactical success in this period was unremarkable. It was advancing but only very slowly. Compared to, e.g., the previously-discussed drive of AGN in summer '41, it moved at a snail's pace yet captured >5x as many Soviets.

Second, AGC's armor support was unremarkable. This is especially true of the non-panzer armies (2nd, 4th, 9th) ...

Given that AGC had unremarkable tactical success and armored support in our period, yet claimed abnormally high tactical PoW's (both absolutely and as a percentage of opposing force), the only remaining explanatory variable with any kind of analytical or data support is Soviet morale.

The Red Army endured a severe morale crisis in October/November 1941 that caused elevated PoW yields and that likely continued until the Moscow Strategic Offensive was underway.

Your arguments regarding low Soviet morale on the Moscow axis after the middle of October stem from your posts #4 (based on the link provided by Art in post #2) and from your postS #8 and #10. These led you to conclude that that the AGC capture rate of 4,500/day compared to the AGN capture rate of <1,000/day was proof of low Soviet morale on the Moscow axis from mid-October. Let me quote a few things from those posts -

“AGN captured only 35,000 PoW through August 6, for example (From Glantz's Leningrad, citing AGN communique on page 27).

During the immediate post-Taifun period, AGC captured ~4,500 PoW/day.”

“The 72k PoW's during two weeks of latter November are twice as many as AGN captured during the first 6 weeks of the war, when its advance was much more rapid than AGC's in late November.”

“Adjusting for Soviet manpower - assuming your 2:1 ratio is correct for now - reduces it to ~3.5x the rate.”

Yet in your recent post (#45) the 3.5x rate was up to >5x. Even the 3.5x was based on Glantz’s figure of 35,000 prisoners taken by AGN in the 45 days from 22/6 to 6/8. If this figure is subject to error, 3.5x may be an over-assessment.
Krivosheev quotes for Northwestern Front in 1941 a total of 182,264 irrecoverable losses of which 142,190 were Missing in action, POWs - 78%.
Krivosheev also quotes 73,924 irrecoverable losses for Northwestern Front in the first 18 days of the war alone. He doesn’t quote how many of these were POWs but assuming the same 78% of such losses to be ‘Missing in action, POWs’, that puts the Front’s MIA losses at 57,660 (equivalent to 3,200/day). Not all of these losses would have been to AGN, the Front’s left wing was initially hit by AGC’s Third Panzer Group, and not all MIAs become POWs but it does create an irreconcilable discrepancy between Glantz’s 35,000 POWs to 8 August and Krivosheev’s implied 57,660 POWs to 9 July.

Returning to the data link provided by Art. Instead of trying to compare the prisoner take of two different army groups, why not compare the performance of an army over two operationally similar time periods. Say from some point in August after the Smolensk pocket had been eliminated to mid-September. Like the period from mid-October onwards, this was also a period of ‘unremarkable tactical success’ when ‘AGC's armor support was unremarkable’ - at least on the central Moscow axis where Fourth and Ninth Armies were engaged in heavy fighting.
Here are the figures:-

For Fourth Army (page 108)
24,372 prisoners over 25 days (22 Aug-16Sep) = 975/day
34,916 prisoners over 26 days (19 Oct-14 Nov) = 1343/day

For Ninth Army (page 119)
51,874 prisoners over 41 days (6Aug-16Sep) = 1265/day
23,027prisoners over 26 days (19 Oct-14 Nov) = 886/day

If prisoner take is a measure of morale, these figures do not indicate any dramatic deterioration in Soviet morale on the Moscow axis after the first phase of Typhoon compared to a month or two earlier before Typhoon began.

[Ружичасти Слон]

AGC's level of tactical success in this period was unremarkable. It was advancing but only very slowly. Compared to, e.g., the previously-discussed drive of AGN in summer '41, it moved at a snail's pace yet captured >5x as many Soviets.

Second, AGC's armor support was unremarkable. This is especially true of the non-panzer armies (2nd, 4th, 9th) ...

Given that AGC had unremarkable tactical success and armored support in our period, yet claimed abnormally high tactical PoW's (both absolutely and as a percentage of opposing force), the only remaining explanatory variable with any kind of analytical or data support is Soviet morale.

The Red Army endured a severe morale crisis in October/November 1941 that caused elevated PoW yields and that likely continued until the Moscow Strategic Offensive was underway.

Your arguments regarding low Soviet morale on the Moscow axis after the middle of October stem from your posts #4 (based on the link provided by Art in post #2) and from your postS #8 and #10. These led you to conclude that that the AGC capture rate of 4,500/day compared to the AGN capture rate of <1,000/day was proof of low Soviet morale on the Moscow axis from mid-October. Let me quote a few things from those posts -

Tmp arguments was be circles reasoning. Everything was be deliberate anti-intellectual tosh.

Not one time tmp was give historical datas or evidences for to show anybody was surrender on low moral reason on taifun.

Tmp reasoning was be like this.
1. Many mens was surrender on taifun on reason low morale.
2. It must to be on low morale because was big number surrenders.

Tmp was invent ideas on tactical surrenders and was never explain what he was mean on idea tactical surrenders. Why was tmp invent idea tactical surrenders ? Because many times many mens was surrender on big numbers but was not on reason low morale.

It seems to me mens was can decide on surrender on many many reasons. Sometime it was can be big numbers surrender sometime small numbers surrender. Maybe mens have many reasons on same moment for to surrender. Example. Unit was be surrounded unit not have food not have water not have ammunition. I am sure mens have low morale on that context. But was can be decision on surrender because on low morale or because on starvation or because not have ammunition for to fight ?

[TheMarcksPlan]

For Fourth Army (page 108)
24,372 prisoners over 25 days (22 Aug-16Sep) = 975/day
34,916 prisoners over 26 days (19 Oct-14 Nov) = 1343/day

For Ninth Army (page 119)
51,874 prisoners over 41 days (6Aug-16Sep) = 1265/day
23,027prisoners over 26 days (19 Oct-14 Nov) = 886/day

You're counting PoW's taken in operational encirclements. This is easy to do, as the operational encirclements achieved by AGC between closing the Smolensk pocket and Taifun are less well known - they're smaller but still significant.

9th Army participated, with 3rd PzGr, in an encirclement around Toropets and Velikie Luki between Aug 22 and Sept 16. Here's an excerpt from The Viazma Catastrophe by Lev Lopukhovsky:



As Soviet 22nd Army alone lost >44k, of which most would have been PoW's, most of 9th Army's 52k prisoners probably came from that encirclement battle alone.

4th Army's PoW haul in the post-Taifun period is 38% higher than between Aug 22 and Sep 16, which is consistent with Soviet morale being worse post-Taifun than in August/September. But 4th Army was also involved in mopping up encirclements in Guderian's wake as he began to drive southward during later August. From Glantz's Smolensk book, volume I:



The map is from August 20; as you can see PzGr2 is beginning the southward drive with 4th Army in its wake. These initial battles are not usually considered part of the Battle of Kiev; Art's document labels them "Schlacht von Gomel und Kritschew," dates them from August 6-27, and assigns 78,374 PoW to them. https://wwii.germandocsinrussia.org/ru/ ... ect/zoom/6 In your period of Aug22 - Sep16, some 4th Army units would have continued to accrue prisoners in the wake of Guderian's southwards drive.

----------------------------------------------------

It's really important to separate what I'm calling "operational" encirclements from tactical surrenders if we want to isolate morale effects. As the TDI document and common sense attest, an enveloped enemy yields far more PoW than a pushed-back or penetrated enemy - holding morale constant.

[TheMarcksPlan]

Krivosheev quotes for Northwestern Front in 1941 a total of 182,264 irrecoverable losses of which 142,190 were Missing in action, POWs - 78%.
Krivosheev also quotes 73,924 irrecoverable losses for Northwestern Front in the first 18 days of the war alone. He doesn’t quote how many of these were POWs but assuming the same 78% of such losses to be ‘Missing in action, POWs’, that puts the Front’s MIA losses at 57,660 (equivalent to 3,200/day). Not all of these losses would have been to AGN, the Front’s left wing was initially hit by AGC’s Third Panzer Group, and not all MIAs become POWs but it does create an irreconcilable discrepancy between Glantz’s 35,000 POWs to 8 August and Krivosheev’s implied 57,660 POWs to 9 July.

Krivosheev's data for this period simply cannot be trusted. Are we really to believe that Northwest Front had only ~40k KIA in all of 1941? (i.e. 182k irrecoverable losses minus 142k MIA) That's gotta be off by at least an order of magnitude.

There are a ton of convincing critiques of Krivosheev's overall figures, which convincingly argue that he undercounted Red Army deaths by >2mil. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_War ... Krivosheev It seems all but certain that such undercounting is biased towards the chaotic first months of the war when records were lost or simply not kept.

Absent your reliance on Krivosheev's 78% PoW figure - which again is based on preposterous KIA's - I don't think there's much to explain here. Army Group North had no incentive to under-report their PoW figures.

[Ружичасти Слон]

For Fourth Army (page 108)
24,372 prisoners over 25 days (22 Aug-16Sep) = 975/day
34,916 prisoners over 26 days (19 Oct-14 Nov) = 1343/day

For Ninth Army (page 119)
51,874 prisoners over 41 days (6Aug-16Sep) = 1265/day
23,027prisoners over 26 days (19 Oct-14 Nov) = 886/day

You're counting PoW's taken in operational encirclements. This is easy to do, as the operational encirclements achieved by AGC between closing the Smolensk pocket and Taifun are less well known - they're smaller but still significant.

9th Army participated, with 3rd PzGr, in an encirclement around Toropets and Velikie Luki between Aug 22 and Sept 16. Here's an excerpt from The Viazma Catastrophe by Lev Lopukhovsky:

As Soviet 22nd Army alone lost >44k, of which most would have been PoW's, most of 9th Army's 52k prisoners probably came from that encirclement battle alone.

Tmp imagination analysis: low morale was make big numbers surrender
Tmp imagination theory: big numbers surrender must to be because on low morale
Tmp historical datas and evidences: ...

When historical datas was not agree on tmp theory can to ignore datas on silence or invent reason for to reject.

I'm flogging the obvious here but in case anyone remains unconvinced about morale's impact on PoW yields...

The U.S. Army's training manuals list "enemy morale" as the first factor in determining prisoner capture rates:



https://www.bits.de/NRANEU/others/amd-u ... 859%29.pdf

Can tmp for to show place on Amerika documents was write datas only apply on tmp invention tactical surrender ?

Can tmp for to show place on Amerika documents was write datas not apply on operational encirclement battle ?

Tmp was not be flogging the obvious tmp was be flogging tmp anti-intellectual imaginations.

On serious discussion (not tmp anti-intellectual imaginations) must to have historical datas and evidences for to explain why mens was surrender. When have historical datas and evidences for to explain reason on surrender on big encirclement was be different to small encirclement or not encirclement then and only then can to reject some datas and suggest theory.

At moment all tmp was write was be tmp theory must to be correct because tmp was write it must to be correct.

[Ружичасти Слон]

Krivosheev quotes for Northwestern Front in 1941 a total of 182,264 irrecoverable losses of which 142,190 were Missing in action, POWs - 78%.
Krivosheev also quotes 73,924 irrecoverable losses for Northwestern Front in the first 18 days of the war alone. He doesn’t quote how many of these were POWs but assuming the same 78% of such losses to be ‘Missing in action, POWs’, that puts the Front’s MIA losses at 57,660 (equivalent to 3,200/day). Not all of these losses would have been to AGN, the Front’s left wing was initially hit by AGC’s Third Panzer Group, and not all MIAs become POWs but it does create an irreconcilable discrepancy between Glantz’s 35,000 POWs to 8 August and Krivosheev’s implied 57,660 POWs to 9 July.

Krivosheev's data for this period simply cannot be trusted. Are we really to believe that Northwest Front had only ~40k KIA in all of 1941? (i.e. 182k irrecoverable losses minus 142k MIA) That's gotta be off by at least an order of magnitude.

When you not like Krivosheev datas you can to research self and give datas you can to think be correct.

Just for to write are we really to believe and That's gotta be off by at least an order of magnitude when you not like datas because not help tmp imagination you only write anti-intellectual waves on hands tosh.

[TheMarcksPlan]

Tmp was not be flogging the obvious tmp was be flogging tmp anti-intellectual imaginations.

On serious discussion (not tmp anti-intellectual imaginations) must to have historical datas and evidences for to explain why mens was surrender.

At this point I find your screeds kind of endearing but I don't fully understand them. No offense intended, your English is far better than my Russian and I give you credit for participating a non-native forum. Suggestion: try typing your replies in Russian, pasting into Google Translate, and then posting that.

[TheMarcksPlan]

While I think the data continues to support my original assertion of deteriorating morale before Moscow after Taifun, Max Payload's analysis of AGC's August/September PoW hauls shows that this was more a matter of degree than a clean break with the pre-Taifun period.

In other words, RKKA was yielding tactical prisoners at an alarming rate even before Taifun; the situation got even worse after Taifun. This indicates that morale problems started to show by August at the latest.

Just compare AGC's prisoner hauls during the Winter battles: In the first three months of 1942, AGC took "only" 51,518 PoW. https://wwii.germandocsinrussia.org/ru/ ... ect/zoom/6 That's 572/day. What's more, some of these PoW came from encircled units, such as those cut off in counterattacks like Model's 9th Army battles in January.

In May '42, AGC's PoW rate dropped to ~350/day.

--------------------------------------------------

We must also keep in mind not only the absolute number of PoW but also the percentage relative to the forces involved.

After Taifun, AGC faced fewer enemy soldiers than at any time in the war. Lopukhovsky's The Viazma Catastrophe has a long discussion on casualties during Taifun, discusses various analyses, and concludes:

approximately 200,000 men either avoided encirclement entirely, or had managed to make their way back to friendly forces.

See Part 7. I'd provide a page cite but I only have the Kindle edition...

While I don't have figures for AGC's opponents during August-September, Lopukhovsky estimates that they numbered 1.25mil on October 1. Glantz gives a figure of 638,000 for Western Front alone on July 31. See Smolensk, v1 appendix E. A reasonable estimate would give the Red Army close to a million men, on average, facing AGC during August/September.

AGC's 4,500 PoW/day post-Taifun is >1% of the average Red Army strength facing it in the first month or so after the battle.

By contrast, even if we say AGC's PoW/day was 3,000 in August/September (which would include operational encirclements like 22nd Army at Toropets), that's only ~0.3% of its enemies/day or <30% of its post-Taifun, enemy-adjusted capture rate.

So while I appreciate Max Payload's engagement on this issue and our deeper dive into the stats, it still seems clear to me that something anomalous was happening around Moscow post-Taifun.

---------------------------------------------------------------


I wish the 1941 data for AG's N/S were available to me so we could analyze them as well as we can with AGC. Does anyone know which NARA rolls I should seek out?

The PoW returns for 2nd Army, which was largely driving towards Kursk rather than Moscow, are significantly lower than for the other AGC units. This suggests that the morale crisis might not have been generalized across the front, but limited to the Moscow area. As well-documented in many books, including The Viazma Catastrophe, a civilian panic subsumed Moscow after Taifun. It may be that this civilian panic spread undermined troop morale around Moscow but not across the front.

[Ружичасти Слон]

Tmp was not be flogging the obvious tmp was be flogging tmp anti-intellectual imaginations.

On serious discussion (not tmp anti-intellectual imaginations) must to have historical datas and evidences for to explain why mens was surrender.

At this point I find your screeds kind of endearing but I don't fully understand them. No offense intended, your English is far better than my Russian and I give you credit for participating a non-native forum. Suggestion: try typing your replies in Russian, pasting into Google Translate, and then posting that.

Hahaha! Mr tmp was try to be Mr passive-aggressive but was make same errors on analysis like always.

My english is most better on my russian.

I am not Russian. I not speak russian. I can to read some russian after I was decide to read russian historical datas and evidences for to understand historys.

If you want for to enjoy my comments more i can to use google for to translate on russian then on english. Hahaha!

But it seems to me you understand very good my english but not like what i was write because they not help tmp imagination storys and tmp anti-interlectual tosh.

[Ружичасти Слон]

While I think the data continues to support my original assertion of deteriorating morale before Moscow after Taifun, Max Payload's analysis of AGC's August/September PoW hauls shows that this was more a matter of degree than a clean break with the pre-Taifun period.

In other words, RKKA was yielding tactical prisoners at an alarming rate even before Taifun; the situation got even worse after Taifun. This indicates that morale problems started to show by August at the latest.

Just compare AGC's prisoner hauls during the Winter battles: In the first three months of 1942, AGC took "only" 51,518 PoW. https://wwii.germandocsinrussia.org/ru/ ... ect/zoom/6 That's 572/day. What's more, some of these PoW came from encircled units, such as those cut off in counterattacks like Model's 9th Army battles in January.

In May '42, AGC's PoW rate dropped to ~350/day.

--------------------------------------------------

We must also keep in mind not only the absolute number of PoW but also the percentage relative to the forces involved.

After Taifun, AGC faced fewer enemy soldiers than at any time in the war. Lopukhovsky's The Viazma Catastrophe has a long discussion on casualties during Taifun, discusses various analyses, and concludes:

approximately 200,000 men either avoided encirclement entirely, or had managed to make their way back to friendly forces.

See Part 7. I'd provide a page cite but I only have the Kindle edition...

While I don't have figures for AGC's opponents during August-September, Lopukhovsky estimates that they numbered 1.25mil on October 1. Glantz gives a figure of 638,000 for Western Front alone on July 31. See Smolensk, v1 appendix E. A reasonable estimate would give the Red Army close to a million men, on average, facing AGC during August/September.

AGC's 4,500 PoW/day post-Taifun is >1% of the average Red Army strength facing it in the first month or so after the battle.

By contrast, even if we say AGC's PoW/day was 3,000 in August/September (which would include operational encirclements like 22nd Army at Toropets), that's only ~0.3% of its enemies/day or <30% of its post-Taifun, enemy-adjusted capture rate.

So while I appreciate Max Payload's engagement on this issue and our deeper dive into the stats, it still seems clear to me that something anomalous was happening around Moscow post-Taifun.

---------------------------------------------------------------


I wish the 1941 data for AG's N/S were available to me so we could analyze them as well as we can with AGC. Does anyone know which NARA rolls I should seek out?

The PoW returns for 2nd Army, which was largely driving towards Kursk rather than Moscow, are significantly lower than for the other AGC units. This suggests that the morale crisis might not have been generalized across the front, but limited to the Moscow area. As well-documented in many books, including The Viazma Catastrophe, a civilian panic subsumed Moscow after Taifun. It may be that this civilian panic spread undermined troop morale around Moscow but not across the front.

Yes yes yes! Much words and much numbers.

But have you historical datas or evidences why mens was surrender ?

Datas on numbers on surrender is not data on why mens surrender.

Datas on where on surrender is not data on why mens surrender.

Datas on who was capture is not data on why mens surrender.

Datas on absolutes and percentage not data on why mens surrender.

Big numbers surrender = low morale surrenders is only tmp imagination story until tmp give historical datas and evidences why mens surrender.

[Max Payload]

Krivosheev's data for this period simply cannot be trusted. Are we really to believe that Northwest Front had only ~40k KIA in all of 1941? (i.e. 182k irrecoverable losses minus 142k MIA) That's gotta be off by at least an order of magnitude.

Unless you are questioning Krivosheev’s figure of 73,924 irrecoverable losses for Northwestern Front in the first 18 days of the war, the Front must have lost more personnel to German POW camps by 9 July than the 35,000 stated by Glantz to 8 August.

You're counting PoW's taken in operational encirclements. This is easy to do, as the operational encirclements achieved by AGC between closing the Smolensk pocket and Taifun are less well known - they're smaller but still significant.

9th Army participated, with 3rd PzGr, in an encirclement around Toropets and Velikie Luki between Aug 22 and Sept 16. ...

4th Army's PoW haul in the post-Taifun period is 38% higher than between Aug 22 and Sep 16, which is consistent with Soviet morale being worse post-Taifun than in August/September. But 4th Army was also involved in mopping up encirclements in Guderian's wake as he began to drive southward during later August. ...

The map is from August 20; as you can see PzGr2 is beginning the southward drive with 4th Army in its wake. These initial battles are not usually considered part of the Battle of Kiev; Art's document labels them "Schlacht von Gomel und Kritschew," dates them from August 6-27, and assigns 78,374 PoW to them. ... In your period of Aug22 - Sep16, some 4th Army units would have continued to accrue prisoners in the wake of Guderian's southwards drive.

The battle for Gomel was entirely a Second Army affair. The battle for Krichev was fought by Second Panzer Group. The 78k POWs had nothing whatsoever to do with Fourth Army. Any mopping up and subsequent accrual of prisoners resulting from Guderian’s drive to the south would have been undertaken by 46 Pz Corps after it had been transferred back to Second Panzer Group from Fourth Army to protect Guderian’s flank and rear in the Pochep area. Fourth Army during this time was preoccupied with the fighting on the Elnia - Roslavl axis, extending its frontline south only as far as northwest of Bryansk.

I take your point with regard to the Toropets encirclement, though this was largely down to the Panzer (motorised) corps of Third Panzer Group, in particular 19 and 20 PDs. However, since at that time Third Panzer Group was subordinated to Ninth Army, it is not clear (to me at least) whether the 52k POWs quoted for Ninth Army includes any, some or all of the prisoners associated with the Toropets encirclement.

[TheMarcksPlan]

Unless you are questioning Krivosheev’s figure of 73,924 irrecoverable losses for Northwestern Front in the first 18 days of the war, the Front must have lost more personnel to German POW camps by 9 July than the 35,000 stated by Glantz to 8 August

That's not the issue. Here's how I understand your argument:

1. Per Krivosheev, 78% of NW front irrecoverable losses in 1941 were PoW.

2. Therefore 78% of NW's initial 18-day losses of 74k were PoW.

If 1 isn't true then 2 doesn't follow. [Setting aside for now whether 2 follows from 1 even if 1 were true]

1 isn't true because Krivosheev’s figure for KIA is absurdly low and therefore the proportion of PoW/MIA among irrecoverable losses is too high.

If NW front had only ~40k KIA in 1941 then it killed more Germans than it suffered killed. Hopefully it's clear that's preposterous. this would require NW front having ~5x the combat effectiveness of other fronts. Among other things NW front sent thousands of untrained, under-equipped opolchenie into battle who were massacred for little effect.

[TheMarcksPlan]

The battle for Gomel was entirely a Second Army affair.

Yeah point granted - AGC prisoner tallies say the same.

Still it's only five days of the covered period and not central to my point as 4th Army captured more men, out.of fewer enemies, during post-Taifun than pre-Taifun.

Re 9th Army and 3 PzGr the former must have received credit for the latter's haul during its subordination - otherwise the tally would have transferred to 2nd/4th armies which wouldn't make much sense.

-----------------

There are surely some data issues caused by delays in reporting and time-overlaps for unit/army subordination. Which is why it's IMO essential to look at the broad picture and not get too tied up in granular analysis.

To repeat, AGC tactically captured >1% of its enemies post Taifun and < 0.3% pre-Taifun. What's your argument that there's no significance to that discrepancy, or that it traces to something other than morale? [Aside from the Krivosheev reasoning chain and excluding the Toropets PoWs from tactical credit]

[Max Payload]

We must also keep in mind not only the absolute number of PoW but also the percentage relative to the forces involved.

After Taifun, AGC faced fewer enemy soldiers than at any time in the war. Lopukhovsky's The Viazma Catastrophe has a long discussion on casualties during Taifun, discusses various analyses, and concludes:

approximately 200,000 men either avoided encirclement entirely, or had managed to make their way back to friendly forces.

See Part 7. I'd provide a page cite but I only have the Kindle edition...

While I don't have figures for AGC's opponents during August-September, Lopukhovsky estimates that they numbered 1.25mil on October 1. Glantz gives a figure of 638,000 for Western Front alone on July 31. See Smolensk, v1 appendix E. A reasonable estimate would give the Red Army close to a million men, on average, facing AGC during August/September.

That is true, but there are two counter arguments to explain a higher Fourth Army prisoner count post Viazma compared to Aug/Sep despite there being fewer Red Army personnel available for capture.
Firstly -
If there is a change in force ratio to the advantage of Fourth Army it might be expected that Red Army losses would increase proportionally. (Fourth Army had Fourth Panzer Group subordinated to it in Oct/Nov increasing its force ratio advantage still further). Whether that proportional increase in Red Army losses would be greater or less than total numerical losses at an earlier stage would depend on a range of circumstances.
Secondly -
You quoted Lopukhovsky, let me expand on the quote (p389)
“Thus approximately 200,000 men either avoided encirclement entirely, or had managed to make their way back to friendly forces. However, separate groups of military personnel continued to trickle back into friendly lines in November and even later.”
How many of those attempting to ‘make their way back to friendly forces’ in late October and early November were captured by Fourth Army, thereby inflating its prisoner haul above that of prisoners taken on the frontline?

Re 9th Army and 3 PzGr the former must have received credit for the latter's haul during its subordination ...

You may be correct, but on p127 of Art’s link the prisoner numbers of Third Panzer Group (to 27 Sep) are reported separately. As I wrote previously, “it is not clear (to me at least) whether the 52k POWs quoted for Ninth Army includes any, some or all of the prisoners associated with the Toropets encirclement.”

Unless you are questioning Krivosheev’s figure of 73,924 irrecoverable losses for Northwestern Front in the first 18 days of the war, the Front must have lost more personnel to German POW camps by 9 July than the 35,000 stated by Glantz to 8 August

Krivosheev’s figure for KIA is absurdly low and therefore the proportion of PoW/MIA among irrecoverable losses is too high.

The question is, do you accept Krivosheev’s figure for NWF irrecoverable losses over the first 18 days of the war? If so, pick your own KIA figure -
20,000?
25,000?
30,000?
35,000?
Subtract that from the Front’s irrecoverable losses and you are still left with more MIAs to 9 July than the 35,000 POWs you quoted to 8 August.

It seems to me that there is insufficient hard data to justify your assertion that Red Army morale declined markedly after mid-October. There was never even any true consistency on the post-Viazma Moscow axis on any particular day, some units fighting heroically, others performing abysmally.