Yes obviously.Max Payload wrote:Inherent force superiority won’t cause more POWs unless that force superiority is put to effective use.
But again that's why TDI tried to disaggregate force superiority from outcomes - i.e. tried to measure PoW effects when superiority was effectively used.
Re post-Taifun, we have a case of extraordinary force superiority (perhaps 5-1 in favor of Germans in mid-October), yet AGC advanced only slowly in this period - mostly due to rasputitsa.
So even on your terms, there appears to be little argument that force superiority was used effectively - i.e. that it translated into battle outcomes correlated with high PoWs.
Soldiers were still returning to Soviet lines from Minsk in August 1941, as the example of General Boldin's group shows. Probably other returnees were less daring/skilled than Boldin and these folks probably would have taken longer to return.I’m not sure of the relevance of Minsk
I still see a huge discrepancy between your figures and those provided by Glantz via Liedtke upthread [different cite than the August AGN communique, btw].Taking the calculation to 8 August requires a further .78x752x8=4,692 POWs giving a total of 61k, not 35k.
I also still see a huge discrepancy between the AGN figures cited by Richard Anderson and your/Krivosheev's figures: Anderson provides for 2,563 daily AGN losses through July 6th, almost all of which would have been bloody casualties (note the absence of PzGr3, which also engaged NWF, specifically its 11th Army). You say 738 daily "sick and wounded" for NWF. Assuming wounded is ~3x KIA then NWF would have had ~1,000 daily bloody casualties.
If that's so, then NWF's bloody casualty exchange ratio with the Ostheer shows it to have been >10x more combat-effective than the rest of the Soviet army (i.e. it was ~2.5x better than Ostheer whereas the Red Army as a whole was ~5x worse). That makes no sense to me; I suspect there's a data issue on your side.
Ironically (given the relative analytical quality of posts) it's [Cyrillic name]'s provision of the Kinzel figures that make the most convincing case for your point and against mine.
Kinzel exposes what is probably a data issue on my side: when I started this thread, I had no feeling for the front-wide rate of Ostheer PoW capture outside of the big kessels - other than Glantz's concededly-problematic citation to the August AGN communique (that now appears to be an undercount). In that context, AGC's post-Taifun PoW rate seemed jarringly abnormal.
Now I see that I have to revise this picture, though I'm more pausing for further analysis than conceding the entire point. Perhaps like AGC waiting out Rasputitsa, my final defeat requires further exploration:
Per Kinzel, AG's N/S captured 5,475 PoW's daily in June/July. That's more than AGC's 4,500 post-Taifun but (1) AGC was smaller than AGN+AGS, (2) AGC faced fewer enemies than AGN+S, (3) AGC advanced at a far slower rate, implying far worse battle outcomes than AGN+S, (4) AGN+S carried out many smaller-scale encirclements in June/July 1941, whereas the fairly-detailed Battle of Moscow sources (Zetterling, Stahel, Lopukhovsky) don't mention any significant encirclements post-Taifun IIRC.
Also (5) I would guess the Ostheer captured thousands of startled, out-of-position Soviets in the first few days of battle.
Given the foregoing factors, my hunch is that AGC's post-Taifun capture rate would remain significantly above normal (for Barbarossa) IF we had sufficient data/time to do a good analysis. I don't have that data/time at the moment but it'll be in the background of further reading. And of course others' thoughts/research on the issue are heartily welcomed/solicited.
The broadest point is that an army doesn't see >1% of its soldiers surrender tactically every day unless it has a very serious morale problem. While initially I hypothesized that these morale problems manifested post-Taifun, it now seems clear that the Red Army was yielding tactical prisoners at an alarming rate long before Taifun, a defeat that may (or may not) have caused a further deterioration of the morale-related tactical surrender problem.
It seems that the Red Army recovered from this trend during Winter, backslid during Blau, and improved even further by the end of the war.