IJN Aircraft losses 7 December 1941

Discussions on all aspects of the Japanese Empire, from the capture of Taiwan until the end of the Second World War.
Rob Stuart
Member
Posts: 1200
Joined: 18 Apr 2009 00:41
Location: Ottawa

Re: IJN Aircraft losses 7 December 1941

Post by Rob Stuart » 21 Sep 2023 00:04

glenn239 wrote:
20 Sep 2023 21:11
Eugen Pinak wrote:
18 Sep 2023 08:07
There was no "theoretically" in Kido Butai attack plans at Midway. EVERY source say "Akagi" was ordered to launch against US carriers only B5Ns and a flight of A6M: from Nagumo's report to Fuchida's part of Midway book. It means either they are lying or Iizuka is lying.
Nagumo Report states,

0530 Message from Comdr. Mobile Force to Mobile Force: "Carrier-based bombers will prepare for second attack. Equip yourselves with 250 kilogram bombs."

That is a direct order made at 0830 to 1st Division carriers Akagi and Kaga to re-arm their Midway D3A1 dive bombers for the second attack. And, from Iizuka and Furuta's accounts, this is exactly what they did when they landed.
.
The "second attack" being referred to here is the second attack on the US carriers, not the second attack of the day.
.

Rob Stuart
Member
Posts: 1200
Joined: 18 Apr 2009 00:41
Location: Ottawa

Re: IJN Aircraft losses 7 December 1941

Post by Rob Stuart » 21 Sep 2023 00:56

glenn239 wrote:
20 Sep 2023 21:11
Eugen Pinak wrote:
18 Sep 2023 08:07
There was no "theoretically" in Kido Butai attack plans at Midway. EVERY source say "Akagi" was ordered to launch against US carriers only B5Ns and a flight of A6M: from Nagumo's report to Fuchida's part of Midway book. It means either they are lying or Iizuka is lying.
Nagumo Report states,

0530 Message from Comdr. Mobile Force to Mobile Force: "Carrier-based bombers will prepare for second attack. Equip yourselves with 250 kilogram bombs."

That is a direct order made at 0830 to 1st Division carriers Akagi and Kaga to re-arm their Midway D3A1 dive bombers for the second attack. And, from Iizuka and Furuta's accounts, this is exactly what they did when they landed.
Elsewhere in the Nagumo Report (bottom of page 7, at https://www.history.navy.mil/research/l ... idway.html) it states that, shortly after 0605:

... every effort was made to expedite completing preparations for the take-off of Organization Number 4. (Akagi: 3 ship-based fighters; 18 ship-based attack planes. Kaga: 3 ship-based fighters; 27 ship-based attack planes. Hiryu: 3 ship-based fighters; 18 ship-based bombers. Soryu: 3 ship-based fighters; 18 ship-based bombers).

The "second attack" referred to in the passage you quote is clearly not the second attack of the day, i.e., the first attack on the enemy carrier task force. It is talking about the planned second attack on the enemy task force, the one which ultimately consisted only of 10 torpedo-armed Kates launched by Hiryu. They were to have been accompanied by Soryu's Kates and CarDiv1's dive bombers. There was never any intention to include CarDiv1 dive bombers in the first attack on the enemy task force. Eugen's comment is entirely correct.
Last edited by Rob Stuart on 21 Sep 2023 00:59, edited 1 time in total.

glenn239
Member
Posts: 5868
Joined: 29 Apr 2005 01:20
Location: Ontario, Canada

Re: IJN Aircraft losses 7 December 1941

Post by glenn239 » 21 Sep 2023 00:59

fontessa wrote:
20 Sep 2023 22:13

Sure? I can't find it in Senshi Soho. And what is your source?
One more question. Why do you think Iizuka was not listed in 戦闘機隊行動調書?

fontessa
I think Iizuka is not listed in the squadron records because these are not accurate due to being reconstructions made in Japan after the ship had been destroyed at Midway.

Source on the order is the Nagumo Report, here, on page 16 at the time 0530. The Tone sighting had just come in of an enemy carrier. The order must pertain to 1st Division because 2nd Divisions carrier bombers were already prepared for the second attack,

https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/Japan/ ... ay/Nagumo/

glenn239
Member
Posts: 5868
Joined: 29 Apr 2005 01:20
Location: Ontario, Canada

Re: IJN Aircraft losses 7 December 1941

Post by glenn239 » 21 Sep 2023 01:18

fontessa wrote:
19 Sep 2023 20:20
About Fuchida’s Book

I would like to make some comments about the book "Midway'' written by Fuchid and Okumiya.
At the time of its publication, this book was considered "True Fact." However, recently it has been evaluated as follows.
The operation leadership was severely criticized for its disastrous defeat at Midway. The intention of the publishing of the book was to relieve criticism of them by emphasizing the narrow loss, saying, “If only we had five more minutes.''
I've got Fuchida's book, and the quote in blue is not accurate. In the preamble Fuchida feels that the Japanese government had lied at the time and presented the battle as a draw. He wanted to bring forth an accurate account of the battle, which the Japanese public was not told was a defeat, and outline the reasons for the defeat. Starting on page 233 he writes a 15 page account of why Japan lost the battle. The Five Minutes is not mentioned once in this autopsy. It bears no weight in the causes of the defeat. Fuchida was a warrior, not a historian by nature. He'd been central to the construction what he well may have thought was the greatest aviation attack force in the history of warfare. It had one purpose, one intention. To find and destroy the US carriers. This did not happen, and he wanted to write a book to explain why. The Five Minutes as an "almost" is a statement of what Fuchida considers a fact of the battle. It is not meant as an apology for Nagumo's and Yamamoto's mistakes, which if you've read Fuchida's book, you would know he holds as the keys to the defeat. Fuchida helped build a magnificent attack force and Nagumo's decisions destroyed it. That is the core message of the book.
Fuchida developed appendicitis and underwent surgery. On June 5th, his stitches were already removed, but he had to stay in his bed in his room. However he crawled onto the bridge. He could see all the deck from there. In other words, the “Five Minutes of Destiny'' story is not just hearsay, but his experience.
Fuchida was never on the bridge. He watched the battle propped up on the flight deck, having come up from the infirmary. He counted nine (not three) dive bombers stacked up over Akagi. The first two missed to starboard, the third he thought was going to hit him directly. The blast blew him across the fight deck and broke both his legs. He would have died on the flight deck in the fires except for a crewman who noticed his plight and pulled him clear of the advancing fires.
In his book, a bomb from a Dauntless exploded during the first Zero's takeoff, and the Zero narrowly escaped a bomb explosion. So how 飛行機隊戦闘行動調書 described the Zero? It is 9直 9th shift on the 2nd CAP page piloted by FPO1 Kimura Koreo 木村惟雄 which took off at 0725 Tokyo Time. He reminisces: “When I saw Kaga and Soryu being bombed and on fire, I immediately boarded the captain's Zero which was preparing to take off.'' In other words, he was not a member of the 2nd Wave Attack. I think this is enough to show that "Five Minutes of Destiny" is not true.

fontessa
I just posted a breakdown of all 18 Akagi fighter pilots to determine which were the three that were intended for the escort. I think that Koreo was earmarked to escort the strike, and I gave the reasons why this is the case. I would add that the Koreo sortie at 1025 is one of the shortest flights of any CAP fighter during the battle. He lands on Hiryu as quickly as Hiryu was able to land aircraft. Anyways, which three pilots of the eighteen in Akagi's roster do you think were held back for this role? Name them please.

User avatar
fontessa
Member
Posts: 4506
Joined: 25 Mar 2011 16:29
Location: Yokohama, Japan

Re: IJN Aircraft losses 7 December 1941

Post by fontessa » 21 Sep 2023 06:38

glenn239 wrote:
21 Sep 2023 01:18
fontessa wrote:
19 Sep 2023 20:20
About Fuchida’s Book

I would like to make some comments about the book "Midway'' written by Fuchid and Okumiya.
At the time of its publication, this book was considered "True Fact." However, recently it has been evaluated as follows.
The operation leadership was severely criticized for its disastrous defeat at Midway. The intention of the publishing of the book was to relieve criticism of them by emphasizing the narrow loss, saying, “If only we had five more minutes.''
I've got Fuchida's book, and the quote in blue is not accurate. In the preamble Fuchida feels that the Japanese government had lied at the time and presented the battle as a draw. He wanted to bring forth an accurate account of the battle, which the Japanese public was not told was a defeat, and outline the reasons for the defeat. Starting on page 233 he writes a 15 page account of why Japan lost the battle. The Five Minutes is not mentioned once in this autopsy. It bears no weight in the causes of the defeat. Fuchida was a warrior, not a historian by nature. He'd been central to the construction what he well may have thought was the greatest aviation attack force in the history of warfare. It had one purpose, one intention. To find and destroy the US carriers. This did not happen, and he wanted to write a book to explain why. The Five Minutes as an "almost" is a statement of what Fuchida considers a fact of the battle. It is not meant as an apology for Nagumo's and Yamamoto's mistakes, which if you've read Fuchida's book, you would know he holds as the keys to the defeat. Fuchida helped build a magnificent attack force and Nagumo's decisions destroyed it. That is the core message of the book.
The quote in blue only criticizes about "Five Minutes of Destiny'' story and doesn't say anything else about him. It is not good to pretend that the planes are ready to take off soon when it is still in the hangar.
Regarding the "Five Minutes of Destiny'' story, Kate Division Officer 艦攻分隊長 Chief Goto Jinichi 後藤仁一 said the following.
“Five Minutes'' means that the replacement of Kate's bombs and torpedoes in the hangar will be completed in 5 minutes. After that, the aircraft will be lifted one by one onto the flight deck, placed in the takeoff position, and the engine trial run will be completed. It will be about 30 minutes before the planes can take off. He was watching the large flames erupting from the explosion inside the hangar at the takeoff and landing command post. He said that it was too different from Fuchida's book. I'm currently reading another book that says that the explosion occurred inside the hangar.

fintessa

Eugen Pinak
Member
Posts: 1235
Joined: 16 Jun 2004 16:09
Location: Kyiv, Ukraine

Re: IJN Aircraft losses 7 December 1941

Post by Eugen Pinak » 21 Sep 2023 06:50

fontessa wrote:
18 Sep 2023 12:25
At first I thought that "18-9 1改訂" was ”Revised in September 1944" version. But it seems to be just a calling number of format version.
Agree with you. This format was definitely introduced in early 1942 at least.

Eugen Pinak
Member
Posts: 1235
Joined: 16 Jun 2004 16:09
Location: Kyiv, Ukraine

Re: IJN Aircraft losses 7 December 1941

Post by Eugen Pinak » 21 Sep 2023 07:19

glenn239 wrote:
18 Sep 2023 21:57
fontessa wrote:
18 Sep 2023 21:54

OK. You are free to believe him or not.

fontessa
Not "him", "them". The Iizuka account is functionally identical to Furuta's.
If you'd bothered to read Fuchida's account entirely and not just its parts you like - you'd find out he is directly contradicting IIzuka's claim.
Fuchida was never on the bridge. He watched the battle propped up on the flight deck, having come up from the infirmary.
If you'd bothered to read Fuchida's account entirely and not just its parts you like - you'd find out he was on the air operations bridge.

Nagumo Report states,

0530 Message from Comdr. Mobile Force to Mobile Force: "Carrier-based bombers will prepare for second attack. Equip yourselves with 250 kilogram bombs."

That is a direct order made at 0830 to 1st Division carriers Akagi and Kaga to re-arm their Midway D3A1 dive bombers for the second attack. And, from Iizuka and Furuta's accounts, this is exactly what they did when they landed.
If you'd bothered to read Fuchida's account entirely and not just its parts you like - you'd find out this is order to _2nd_ Carrier Division. Reply to previous Yamaguchi's proposal to attack only with his unescorted D3As armed with land bombs.

See - Fuchida's account can really help if you'll cross-check it and use it as a whole, not just the parts you like.

Eugen Pinak
Member
Posts: 1235
Joined: 16 Jun 2004 16:09
Location: Kyiv, Ukraine

Re: IJN Aircraft losses 7 December 1941

Post by Eugen Pinak » 21 Sep 2023 07:23

Rob Stuart wrote:
21 Sep 2023 00:56
The "second attack" referred to in the passage you quote is clearly not the second attack of the day, i.e., the first attack on the enemy carrier task force. It is talking about the planned second attack on the enemy task force, the one which ultimately consisted only of 10 torpedo-armed Kates launched by Hiryu. They were to have been accompanied by Soryu's Kates and CarDiv1's dive bombers. There was never any intention to include CarDiv1 dive bombers in the first attack on the enemy task force. Eugen's comment is entirely correct.
No, this is indeed order to the second attack of the day. But this is order to _2nd_ Carrier Division in reply to previous Yamaguchi's proposal to attack only with his unescorted D3As armed with land bombs.
The funny thing - Fuchida describes this as well as preparation of only torpedo bombers aboard "Akagi" for this attack. But Glenn seems to like Fuchida's account only when it suits his fancy :(

User avatar
fontessa
Member
Posts: 4506
Joined: 25 Mar 2011 16:29
Location: Yokohama, Japan

Re: IJN Aircraft losses 7 December 1941

Post by fontessa » 21 Sep 2023 07:46

glenn239 wrote:
21 Sep 2023 00:59
fontessa wrote:
20 Sep 2023 22:13

Sure? I can't find it in Senshi Soho. And what is your source?
One more question. Why do you think Iizuka was not listed in 飛行機隊行動調書?

fontessa
I think Iizuka is not listed in the squadron records because these are not accurate due to being reconstructions made in Japan after the ship had been destroyed at Midway.
OK. Please tell me why you think Akagi 飛行機隊行動調書 has been reconstructed. Please don't say "Because Iizuka is not listed".

Kaga, who lost her 飛行機隊行動調書 indicated that it is not the original. Why is there no such indication, and Akagi 飛行機隊行動調書 is as detailed as the original?

行動調書.jpg
fontessa
You do not have the required permissions to view the files attached to this post.
Last edited by fontessa on 21 Sep 2023 12:14, edited 1 time in total.

Rob Stuart
Member
Posts: 1200
Joined: 18 Apr 2009 00:41
Location: Ottawa

Re: IJN Aircraft losses 7 December 1941

Post by Rob Stuart » 21 Sep 2023 11:20

Eugen Pinak wrote:
21 Sep 2023 07:23
Rob Stuart wrote:
21 Sep 2023 00:56
The "second attack" referred to in the passage you quote is clearly not the second attack of the day, i.e., the first attack on the enemy carrier task force. It is talking about the planned second attack on the enemy task force, the one which ultimately consisted only of 10 torpedo-armed Kates launched by Hiryu. They were to have been accompanied by Soryu's Kates and CarDiv1's dive bombers. There was never any intention to include CarDiv1 dive bombers in the first attack on the enemy task force. Eugen's comment is entirely correct.
No, this is indeed order to the second attack of the day. But this is order to _2nd_ Carrier Division in reply to previous Yamaguchi's proposal to attack only with his unescorted D3As armed with land bombs.
Here is the full context of the passage I quoted:

At about 0500, Tone's #4 plane reported:

"Sighted what appears to be the enemy composed of 10 (ships), bearing 10 degrees, distance 240 miles from Midway, on course 150 degrees, speed 20 knots (0428)."

Two subsequent reports concerning the weather (0440) and the enemy's course and speed (0455) were received but since we had not been advised of details, the plane was ordered to:

"Advise ship types."

At 0530, Tone's plane reported:

"The enemy is accompanied by what appears to be a carrier in a position to the rear of the others (0520)."

and again at about 0540:

"Sight what appears to be 2 cruisers in position bearing 8 degrees, distance 250 miles from Midway; course, 150 degrees; speed 20 knots (0530)."

Thus, it was definitely established that enemy carriers were operating in the vicinity. The following dispatch was, therefore, sent to CinC Combined Fleet:

"(Info: CinC 2nd Fleet) At 0500, the enemy composed of 1 carrier, 5 cruisers, and 5 destroyers, was sighted in position bearing 10 degrees, distance 240 miles from Midway. We are heading for it."

Under orders issued at 0415, the ship-based attack planes were already being re-equipped with #80 land bombs which made immediate take-offs of the ship-based attack planes in Organization Number 4, impossible. It was therefore decided that we would await the return of the Midway attack unit and then carry out a grand scale air attack. The Fleet was advised as follows:

"After taking on the returning planes, we shall proceed north to contact and destroy the enemy task force."

This was sent at 0605.


In reply to this CarDiv 1 advised that its ship-based attack planes (torpedo equipped) would be ready for the take-off at 0730 and CarDiv 2 that its ship-based attack planes (to be equipped with torpedoes upon their return from the first attack), would be ready for the take-off by from 0730 to 0800. Subsequent to this, every effort was made to expedite completing preparations for the take-off of Organization Number 4. (Akagi: 3 ship-based fighters; 18 ship-based attack planes. Kaga: 3 ship-based fighters; 27 ship-based attack planes. Hiryu: 3 ship-based fighters; 18 ship-based bombers. Soryu: 3 ship-based fighters; 18 ship-based bombers).



I would suggest that the portion of the text I've highlighted in red is Nagumo's reply to Yamaguchi.

The bit I've coloured green clearly refers to the second attack of the day, aka the first attack on the US task force, and no CarDiv1 dive bombers are to be included in it. This being the case, then Nagumo's 0530 order for the dive bombers to be re-armed with 250 kg bombs "for second attack" cannot mean the second attack of the day, as far as CarDiv1's dive bombers were concerned, since they were not participating in the second attack of the day. It must therefore refer to the second attack on the enemy ships.

Eugen Pinak
Member
Posts: 1235
Joined: 16 Jun 2004 16:09
Location: Kyiv, Ukraine

Re: IJN Aircraft losses 7 December 1941

Post by Eugen Pinak » 21 Sep 2023 18:29

Rob Stuart wrote:
21 Sep 2023 11:20
I would suggest that the portion of the text I've highlighted in red is Nagumo's reply to Yamaguchi.

The bit I've coloured green clearly refers to the second attack of the day, aka the first attack on the US task force, and no CarDiv1 dive bombers are to be included in it. This being the case, then Nagumo's 0530 order for the dive bombers to be re-armed with 250 kg bombs "for second attack" cannot mean the second attack of the day, as far as CarDiv1's dive bombers were concerned, since they were not participating in the second attack of the day. It must therefore refer to the second attack on the enemy ships.
There is a problem with your theory. There was no need to order CarDiv 1 dive bombers to rearm with ordinary bombs. Just like there was no need to order to arm
CarDiv 2 torpedo bombers with torpedoes. Strike against ships meant all this armament by default. At 05:30 there was exactly one bunch of dive bombers in need or rearming - those of CarDiv 2, carrying land bombs for the second strike against Midway. Exactly those planes Yamaguchi wanted to send against US CV _without_ rearming.
So here I think Fuchida story is confirmed with Nagumo report.

Eugen Pinak
Member
Posts: 1235
Joined: 16 Jun 2004 16:09
Location: Kyiv, Ukraine

Re: IJN Aircraft losses 7 December 1941

Post by Eugen Pinak » 21 Sep 2023 18:31

fontessa wrote:
21 Sep 2023 07:46
Kaga, who lost her 飛行機隊行動調書 indicated that it is not the original. Why is there no such indication, and Akagi 飛行機隊行動調書 is as detailed as the original?
Fontessa - thank you for the find. I've missed this important part.

glenn239
Member
Posts: 5868
Joined: 29 Apr 2005 01:20
Location: Ontario, Canada

Re: IJN Aircraft losses 7 December 1941

Post by glenn239 » 22 Sep 2023 00:25

Rob Stuart wrote:
21 Sep 2023 00:56
The "second attack" referred to in the passage you quote is clearly not the second attack of the day, i.e., the first attack on the enemy carrier task force. It is talking about the planned second attack on the enemy task force, the one which ultimately consisted only of 10 torpedo-armed Kates launched by Hiryu. They were to have been accompanied by Soryu's Kates and CarDiv1's dive bombers. There was never any intention to include CarDiv1 dive bombers in the first attack on the enemy task force. Eugen's comment is entirely correct.
I have no idea whether 'second attack' refers to the second attack (ie, 1030) or the second attack on the carriers, (which should be called the 'third attack' to avoid confusion). The point is that the order at 0830 caused the 1st Division's D3A1 units of both Kaga and Akagi to rearm immediately. So, when fontessa says that Iizuka must be inventing matters to say that his dive bomber was rearmed on landing, no, this is not the case. Both Iizuka and Furuta said this happened, and I notice no one is going out of their way to say that Furuta is a liar or wasn't aboard Akagi at Midway.

On Kaga, there was no possibility that rearmed dive bombers could have been included in the 1030 attack because Kaga's torpedo bomber wing was 26 strong. On Akagi, it was a different story. Akagi's torpedo squadron was just 17 planes, not 27, and her dive bomber squadron had as little as 13 planes operational after the Midway attack, totalling just 30.

glenn239
Member
Posts: 5868
Joined: 29 Apr 2005 01:20
Location: Ontario, Canada

Re: IJN Aircraft losses 7 December 1941

Post by glenn239 » 22 Sep 2023 00:45

fontessa wrote:
21 Sep 2023 06:38

The quote in blue only criticizes about "Five Minutes of Destiny'' story and doesn't say anything else about him. It is not good to pretend that the planes are ready to take off soon when it is still in the hangar.
Your quote in blue is factually incorrect. Fuchida's 15 page summary of why the Japanese lost the battle does not mention the Five Minutes at all. Before the narrative reaches this point in the battle, the Five Minutes is never mentioned. After the narrative passes on, it never mentions it again. It is only there because Fuchida witnessed it as an event in the battle. It is given no importance in the summary of the reasons of defeat, and if you read the book, you certainly know that Fuchida pulled no punches with Yamato or Nagumo because of an "almost".

Also, the recent survey of the wreck found no evidence of aircraft in Akagi's hangers. One poster suggested that they could have been completely destroyed, but I think this is not possible because the walls of the hangers are still there.
“Five Minutes'' means that the replacement of Kate's bombs and torpedoes in the hangar will be completed in 5 minutes. After that, the aircraft will be lifted one by one onto the flight deck, placed in the takeoff position, and the engine trial run will be completed. It will be about 30 minutes before the planes can take off. He was watching the large flames erupting from the explosion inside the hangar at the takeoff and landing command post. He said that it was too different from Fuchida's book. I'm currently reading another book that says that the explosion occurred inside the hangar.
If Akagi's Kates were in the hanger then, they are there now and not in the debris field. So we will see. Both Furuta and Iizuka stated that their aircraft were on the flight deck when Akagi was bombed, not in the hanger.

glenn239
Member
Posts: 5868
Joined: 29 Apr 2005 01:20
Location: Ontario, Canada

Re: IJN Aircraft losses 7 December 1941

Post by glenn239 » 22 Sep 2023 00:59

Eugen Pinak wrote:
21 Sep 2023 07:19
If you'd bothered to read Fuchida's account entirely and not just its parts you like - you'd find out he is directly contradicting IIzuka's claim.
I said Furuta, not Fuchida.
If you'd bothered to read Fuchida's account entirely and not just its parts you like - you'd find out he was on the air operations bridge.
No, he wasn't. He was on the flight deck. "I did not have the power to stop this action. I was lying on the deck in a hospital gown". When the attack happened, "The bomb hit the center of the flight deck...close to where I was. I was lifted by the explosion and thrown against the flight deck at the front of the bridge

If you'd bothered to read Fuchida's account entirely and not just its parts you like - you'd find out this is order to _2nd_ Carrier Division. Reply to previous Yamaguchi's proposal to attack only with his unescorted D3As armed with land bombs.
It is an order to all carrier based bombers to prepare for the second attack.

Return to “Japan at War 1895-1945”