Document related to the Polish POWs in USSR in 1940.

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Oleg Grigoryev
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Document related to the Polish POWs in USSR in 1940.

Post by Oleg Grigoryev » 30 Jul 2003 09:03

I ran across curios document that casts a certain doubt (in my mind at least) that Polish units that were formed in USSR came about as a result of German attack against the later in 1941. I am not going to write anything further, for I want to see the reaction of other members. I don’t really know there to post it – so I’ll do it in war crime section –since it somewhat Katyn related. If moderator moves it – so be it.
Top secret
CC VKP(b) – (Central Committee of All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks - my insert – oleg)
November 2 1940
# 4713/b
Moscow
To Comrade Stalin


Following your orders, given in regards to Polish and Czech POWs, we have done the following:

1. As of now, in the camps under NKVD jurisdiction, there is 18,297 Polish POWs, explicitly: Generals -2, colonels and lieutenant-colonels – 39, majors and captains -222, porudchiks and podporuchiks ( US equivalent of 1st and 2nd lieutenants -oleg ) – 6, NCOs – 4,022, privates – 13,221.

2. Out of 18297 men, 11,988 live on the territories that are now under German occupation.

Number of POWs, that were interned in Latvia and Lithuania , and moved to NKVD camps , is 3,303men.

Most of the remaining POWs, officers excluded, is occupied with building of the highway and the railroad.

In addition, there is 22 former officers of Polis Army that are incarcerated in the NKVD inner prison, arrested for their participation in anti-Soviet organization ,that were active in Western Byelorussia and Ukraine

Junior officers have stated that they are going to act, in accordance with orders, received from any Polish General.

Specifically the positions of the certain individuals should be illuminated:
a) General Yanushaytes stated, that he can take command of Polish units, if such will be organized on the territory of USSR , for the purpose of fighting Germany, regardless the position of Sikorskiy’s “government” . However, to him it seems prudent, to introduce special political program ,that would deal with future of Poland , and at the same time, as he put it, “soften the climate” for the Poles, that now live in Western Ukraine and Byelorussia.

b) General Boruto-Spehovich stated, that he cannot do anything, unless ordered so by Sikorskiy government, which, in his opinion, is a true representative of Polish nation’s interests.

c) General Przhzdeckiy made a statement analogical to that of Boruto-Spehovich.

d) Several colonels and lieutenant-colonels (Berling, Bukoemskiy, Gorchinskiy, Tishinskiy) unconditionally offered their services to the Soviet Union, and that they are very much willing to organize and to lead any military outfit, made out of Polish POWs, whose purpose will be to fight Germans and to reconstitute Polish state as an independent entity. They see future Poland closely allied, in one way or another, with USSR.
In order to determined the moods among the remaining mass of the POWs , we dispatched groups of NKVD operatives that were instructed accordingly.
As a result of conducted work, we came to the conclusion that the main mass of POWs undoubtedly can be used for creation of a military outfit.
In order to achieve that goal it seems reasonable:
Not abandoning the idea of using Generals Yanushaits and Boruto-Spehovich as leader, whose names could attract certain circles of former Polish military personnel, put in charge of the creation, for now of a division, the group of above-mentioned colonels and lieutenant- colonels (corresponding files for them are attached), that make an impression of smart, well military-educated, politically friendly and honest people.
They should be allowed an opportunity to discuss this matter privately with their colleges and friends in the camps, and to select the cadres for a future division.
After the cadre selection is complete, staff and training ground should be organized at one of the Sovhozez in South-West of the USSR. In the close cooperation with specially selected RKKA representative, the plan for the formation of the division should be drawn, as well as the type of the division should be agreed upon (tank, motorized, rifle) and its equipment should get underway.
At the same time NKVD should start recruiting privates, NCOs and junior officers for the division.
As recruitment and filtration progresses, recruits are to be sent to the divisional staff, where they will be trained.
Organization of the division and its training should be subordinated and overseen by RKKA General Staff. Division should include Special NKVD Detachment, that will monitor its personnel.
As for Czech POWs – there are 577 of them in the NKVD camps (501 Czechs and 76 Slovaks), specifically: staff-captains and captains -8, junior officers – 39 NCOs -176, privates – 354.
During the talks with selected 13 officers, it is determined, that all of them see Germany as their blood enemy, and want to fight it in order to reconstitute Czechoslovakian State.
They see themselves as military personnel of the Czech Army, they consider Benesh as their leader, and in case of creation of some kind of Czech military outfits on the USSR territory, they are willing to join them on Beneshe’s order or ,at least, on the order of their commanding officer – colonel Swoboda, who is now aboard. Swoboda is being called upon by us.
Attachments as mentioned above.
People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Union – L.Beria.

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Post by Xserx » 30 Jul 2003 14:52

Hi, Oleg!
If I'm right, you live near Russia :lol: , and you have text this and another documents in Russian. Please, sent me this texts, if you will not complicate, and specify your source. I sent you my e-mail by private message.
Regards.
Xserx/

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Post by Sam H. » 30 Jul 2003 15:04

How did Russia come to have Czech POW's in 1940? Did they serve alongside Poland?

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Post by David Thompson » 30 Jul 2003 16:32

Oleg -- That is a very interesting post.

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Post by Oleg Grigoryev » 30 Jul 2003 19:29

What I personally find interesting here is the short period between this report and “Katyn Order”. Considering that this is already a follow-up, the initial request must have been issued almost immediately after the executions if not during them. And secondly, there is no mentioning of Anders, who eventually became first C-in-C of Polish forces.

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Post by Oleg Grigoryev » 30 Jul 2003 19:50

Sam H. wrote:How did Russia come to have Czech POW's in 1940? Did they serve alongside Poland?
probably interned military personnel form Czech diplomatic mission in USSR

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Post by Sam H. » 30 Jul 2003 20:04

oleg wrote:
Sam H. wrote:How did Russia come to have Czech POW's in 1940? Did they serve alongside Poland?
probably interned military personnel form Czech diplomatic mission in USSR


But over 500?! I would think that was too large for a diplomatic attachment.

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Post by Oleg Grigoryev » 30 Jul 2003 20:15

Sam H. wrote:
oleg wrote:
Sam H. wrote:How did Russia come to have Czech POW's in 1940? Did they serve alongside Poland?
probably interned military personnel form Czech diplomatic mission in USSR


But over 500?! I would think that was too large for a diplomatic attachment.
Czechoslovakia was one of the few states that had rather good relationship with USSR prior to war - USSR actually began mobilization (something it has not done since the Civil War), acting on mutual friendship treaty with Czechoslovakia, and in response to 1938 crisis, and asked Poland for corridors for troops transfer to Czech territory, But England and France prefer to sell Czhchs down the river, Poland refused the corridors (and got chuck Czechoslovakia from Germans as a bonus for good behavior) and USSR was not about to fight half a Europe alone. Still, many Czechs saw USSR as a friendly state, and some military personnel preferred to be interned in the USSR rather than live under Germans.

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Post by Sam H. » 30 Jul 2003 20:16

That sounds like a plausible explanation ... thanks for clarifying it for me.

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Post by PolAntek » 30 Jul 2003 21:53

oleg wrote:Czechoslovakia was one of the few states that had rather good relationship with USSR prior to war - USSR actually began mobilization (something it has not done since the Civil War), acting on mutual friendship treaty with Czechoslovakia, and in response to 1938 crisis, and asked Poland for corridors for troops transfer to Czech territory, But England and France prefer to sell Czhchs down the river, Poland refused the corridors (and got chuck Czechoslovakia from Germans as a bonus for good behavior) and USSR was not about to fight half a Europe alone. Still, many Czechs saw USSR as a friendly state, and some military personnel preferred to be interned in the USSR rather than live under Germans.


Oleg:

1) The relationship between Poles and the Czechs was strained since the Soviet – Polish war of 1920 when the Czechs refused passage over their territory of critical military supplies from France. The Poles were desperate for this material at the time, and remained resentful that the Czech roadblock almost cost them the victory – which one must remember effectively stopped the Bolshevik expansion westward into Europe dead in it’s tracks at the Polish eastern border. No doubt the Soviets remembered this kindly, although ultimately futile, assistance from the Czechs.

2) The re-possession of the Cieszyn (Teschin) area was done independently of any German involvement – i.e. NOT a German “bonus for good behavior” . The Poles were simply being opportunistic in reclaiming this contested parcel of land, and acted on their own accord. While understandable to a degree when one considers the historical background of this area, this move was nonetheless a poor diplomatic move as it created the impression that the Poles were in collusion with the Germans. Such was not the case.

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Post by Oleg Grigoryev » 30 Jul 2003 22:14

PolAntek wrote:
oleg wrote:Czechoslovakia was one of the few states that had rather good relationship with USSR prior to war - USSR actually began mobilization (something it has not done since the Civil War), acting on mutual friendship treaty with Czechoslovakia, and in response to 1938 crisis, and asked Poland for corridors for troops transfer to Czech territory, But England and France prefer to sell Czhchs down the river, Poland refused the corridors (and got chuck Czechoslovakia from Germans as a bonus for good behavior) and USSR was not about to fight half a Europe alone. Still, many Czechs saw USSR as a friendly state, and some military personnel preferred to be interned in the USSR rather than live under Germans.


Oleg:

1) The relationship between Poles and the Czechs was strained since the Soviet – Polish war of 1920 when the Czechs refused passage over their territory of critical military supplies from France. The Poles were desperate for this material at the time, and remained resentful that the Czech roadblock almost cost them the victory – which one must remember effectively stopped the Bolshevik expansion westward into Europe dead in it’s tracks at the Polish eastern border. No doubt the Soviets remembered this kindly, although ultimately futile, assistance from the Czechs.

2) The re-possession of the Cieszyn (Teschin) area was done independently of any German involvement – i.e. NOT a German “bonus for good behavior” . The Poles were simply being opportunistic in reclaiming this contested parcel of land, and acted on their own accord. While understandable to a degree when one considers the historical background of this area, this move was nonetheless a poor diplomatic move as it created the impression that the Poles were in collusion with the Germans. Such was not the case.
1. "bolshevik expansion" came about as result of Polish aggression
2. Fall Gruen - German plan for Czechoslovakia specifically counts on Polish intervention – Poland would have hard time occupying Tshehin district if Germans decided that they don’t want it – don’t’ you think?

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Post by Oleg Grigoryev » 30 Jul 2003 22:33

I did some reading and found out that during the conference with Chamberlain, on September the 22nd, Hitler specifically requested that territorial demands of Germany, Poland and Hungary are to be satisfied. Hitler intervening on behalf of Poland… 1938 was a “funny” year indeed.

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Post by PolAntek » 31 Jul 2003 01:16

oleg wrote:[1. "bolshevik expansion" came about as result of Polish aggression
2. Fall Gruen - German plan for Czechoslovakia specifically counts on Polish intervention – Poland would have hard time occupying Tshehin district if Germans decided that they don’t want it – don’t’ you think?

I did some reading and found out that during the conference with Chamberlain, on September the 22nd, Hitler specifically requested that territorial demands of Germany, Poland and Hungary are to be satisfied. Hitler intervening on behalf of Poland… 1938 was a “funny” year indeed


1) The Poles were left to establish their own eastern borders after Versailles – and how were they to do this other than militarily? Secondly, are you denying that the Soviets did not intend on spreading their ideology into Europe via “aggression” – first by overthrowing the fledgling Polish democracy and then onto Germany?
2) Once again - the Poles were being opportunists and took advantage of the situation at the time. I do not agree that the German's placed a heavy emphasis on the Polish maneuver in their decision to move into Czechoslovakia.
3) Lastly - Hitler - ever the brilliant manipulator - cleverly used the Polish move on Cieszyn to his advantage. As mentioned earlier - in my opinion the Poles used very poor judgemnet to take Cieszyn back. They would have been much better off forgetting the grudge and attempting to align themselves with the Czechs and their modernized military which was reasonably strong at the time. This would have changed the entire chemistry of the region just before the start of the war.

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Post by Oleg Grigoryev » 31 Jul 2003 01:36

PolAntek wrote:
oleg wrote:[1. "bolshevik expansion" came about as result of Polish aggression
2. Fall Gruen - German plan for Czechoslovakia specifically counts on Polish intervention – Poland would have hard time occupying Tshehin district if Germans decided that they don’t want it – don’t’ you think?

I did some reading and found out that during the conference with Chamberlain, on September the 22nd, Hitler specifically requested that territorial demands of Germany, Poland and Hungary are to be satisfied. Hitler intervening on behalf of Poland… 1938 was a “funny” year indeed


1) The Poles were left to establish their own eastern borders after Versailles – and how were they to do this other than militarily? Secondly, are you denying that the Soviets did not intend on spreading their ideology into Europe via “aggression” – first by overthrowing the fledgling Polish democracy and then onto Germany?
2) Once again - the Poles were being opportunists and took advantage of the situation at the time. I do not agree that the German's placed a heavy emphasis on the Polish maneuver in their decision to move into Czechoslovakia.
3) Lastly - Hitler - ever the brilliant manipulator - cleverly used the Polish move on Cieszyn to his advantage. As mentioned earlier - in my opinion the Poles used very poor judgemnet to take Cieszyn back. They would have been much better off forgetting the grudge and attempting to align themselves with the Czechs and their modernized military which was reasonably strong at the time. This would have changed the entire chemistry of the region just before the start of the war.


1st. what kind of a lame excuse is that? besides ever herad of the Kurzon line?
2nd I went through Diirectievs of Soviet Miliatry comamnd for that cmapgin - there is nothing of that sort. Considreing that "whites" were not defeted yet that is rather amusing.
3rd as for Poles being opportnistic - is that supposed to be some kind of excuse?

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Post by PolAntek » 31 Jul 2003 05:07

oleg wrote:1st. what kind of a lame excuse is that? besides ever herad of the Kurzon line?
2nd I went through Diirectievs of Soviet Miliatry comamnd for that cmapgin - there is nothing of that sort. Considreing that "whites" were not defeted yet that is rather amusing.
3rd as for Poles being opportnistic - is that supposed to be some kind of excuse?


Time to take off the red sunglasses my friend.

Re the Curzon line - I understand it to be Poland's minimum frontier line as proposed by the Allied Supreme Council on 8 December 1919 – although it is important to note that it was recognized as being preliminary and negotiable. Moreover, the Allies also anticipated awarding additional eastern territory containing large Polish populations to Poland. On the advance of the Red Army in 1920, contrary to what is sometimes stated, The Polish Grabski government, with considerable reluctance, had indeed agreed to the line after prodding by the Allies in order end the conflict in the region. Admittedly, the Red Army had the Poles against the ropes at this time. As mentioned previously, the refusal the Czechs to permit French armament tranport over Czech territory was one factor hindering the Poles.

The Allies then approached the Soviet Politburo with the proposed armistice and the Curzon line boundary. At this time Tukhachevsky was rapidly advancing westward as the Soviets were geared to “probe Europe with the bayonet of the Red Army”. Lenin was not interested in any armistice. He telegraphed Stalin his opinion of the Curzon proposal with the comment “I personally think it is a complete swindle…they want to snatch victory from our hands”. Stalin was in agreement and it was agreed to march on Warsaw, remove the “White” Polish government and spread ‘The Revolution’ to Poland and beyond. Of course, on the advance of the Red Army into the outskirts of Warsaw the Poles made a remarkable stand against all odds and defeated the Soviets – the “Miracle on the Vistula”.

To clarify my earlier point re. the opportunism of the Poles re the Cieszyn (Teschen) affair, essentially they were taking advantage of the Sudeten Crisis of 1938. The Polish government issued an ultimatum to the Czechoslovak government demanding the return of the 600 sq. km. Teschen area containing 100000 Poles. As mentioned, this region had been in dispute between the two countries since the Czechoslovaks seized the region during the Russo-Polish War of 1920.

Oleg, it’s been just over a decade since the communists were toppled in your country (assuming that you are from one of the former Soviet bloc countries). It may be possible that you are obtaining your history from some of the corrupt sources that were used in the Soviet education system to educate the masses with the twisted Soviet version of events.
Last edited by PolAntek on 31 Jul 2003 15:16, edited 1 time in total.

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