Here are some fragments from the memories of gen. Radu Rosetti (during WWI he was a major and then a lt. colonel; he resigned from the Romanian army in 1918 and traveled to France where he joined the French army and was assigned to gen. Berthelot's Danube Army).
It seems there were six, not four divisions. It also gives an insight on some of the reasons the intervention failed.
Source: Marturisiri (1914-19)
17 February 1919
General Berthelot, upon his return from Odessa, told me that the Russians are even less interested than he imagined. "They won't fight". Denikin abuses of his power. Many Russians, of all political colors, told him that they would fight the Bolsheviks, but not under Russian command. They prefer an Entente command.
27 February 1919
Captain Berthelot has returned from another visit at the Kransov and Denikin armies. He says the situation in Russia is slowly becoming dangerous. The Bolsheviks fight, while Denikin doesn't. His staff continues to draw up plans to conquer Russia. Krasnov fled together with his family. Tsaritsin [Volgograd] is threatened. From what he says the situation of the French troops in Russia isn't one to be envied either.
12 March 1919
The Franco-Greek detachment at Kherson had to abandon it , after it lost 40% of its men in a terrible fight. The lack of unity in planning the Entente actions in Russia is concerning.
14 March 1919
In the report on his second mission in Russia, captain Marcel Berthelot concludes that the only strong party in Russia and the only one that can speak in its name are the Bolsheviks.
16 March 1919
Lt. colonel Germain returned from Odessa. He said: 1). At Kherson the civilians attacked the allied troops from behind with grenades 2). at Odessa martial law has been instituted 3). his opinion is that the allied troops should evacuate Russia and retreat on the right bank of the Dniester River and help us defend Bessarabia. After what Caput told me yesterday, this is necessary as the French troops aren't content. This is because the French government doesn't have a clear policy on the subject and doesn't know that its soldiers don't want to be sacrificed for nothing.
24 March 1919
General Berthelot retuned from Odessa. He thinks that Odessa should be abandoned, because there are 1,000,000 mouths to be fed instead of allied troops. And they would probably shoot on our troops if the opportunity should arise. According to him, they should be immediately retreated and assigned t odefend the Lower Dniester, while the Romanians defend the Upper Dniester.
26 March 1919
General d'Anselme (CO of the French forces in Russia) requested that our troops occupy Ribnita to ease up the situation of the Ukrainians. Berthelot disagrees and ordered all the bridges over the Dniester to be destroyed, except the railroad ones, which are only to be prepared for destruction.
2 April 1919
Lunch at Vintila Bratianu. After, Berthelot told Prezan [general Prezan was the Chief of the Romanian General Staff] in my presence: "It is absurd to remain at Odessa, because we only have food left there for 8 days. We must think about living the city and I will order general d'Anselme to make the necessary preparations. I would like to see you in the afternoon to discuss sectors which will be manned by French, greek and Romanian troops [on the Dniester River]. Polish Division I think should be deployed on the Romanian left, in Polish territory. All the civilians that want to flee from the right bank of the Dniester should be directed to the Chiulia-Ismail area (I'll set up food store houses there) from where they will be taken by ship to Crimea. I will order general d'Anselme to evacuate all railroad material to Bessarabia.
4 April 1919
The evacuation of Odessa and the retreat to the right bank of the Dniester has begun.
Discussion with Ion Antonescu on the military situation. He says that Prezan wants to deploy the forces in the following maner. In Bessarabia: in the first line from right to left: 10th Infantry Division (Dubasari), 4th Infantry Division, 9th Infantry Division and the 2nd Cavalry Division with some infantry. In Bukovina: the 8th Infantry Division. In the second line: 1st Vanatori [Chasseurs] Division in the Dorohoi-Boitosani area, 6th Infantry Division in the Iasi-Sculeni area, 5th Infantry Division in the Husi-Leova area. In the third line: the 7th Infantry Division in the Roman-Pascani area. General Berthelot had told me that he wanted the six French and Greek divisions deployed in the following manner: four in the first line from Dubasari down to the mouth of the Dniester, one in the Chisinau-Husi area and one at Roman.
4 April 1919
The news from Odessa is unsettling. It seems we won't be able to evacuate all the railroad material we need.
11 April 1919
Ion Antonescu in a conversation with me says that it would be better if the French and Greek troops in Bessarabia be taken to Galitia to fill up the gap between us and the Poles and to get them out of the country, as they are a bad example of discipline and lack of combat spirit for our own troops. I replied that the Allies will never go that far away from their supply base (the Black Sea). Plus Romania will have to put at their disposal the Galati-Cernauti railroad. Then Antonescu said, that he would then prefer to have no Allied troops at all or at least to have colonials, who are more disciplined.
General Patey returned in the evening from Cetatea Alba. He said that the French and Greek troops "sont a\en pagaie" [they are in disarray] and he needs time to discipline them ("les mettre en mains"). He praised the attitude of our [Romanian] troops, frontier-guards and authorities. He and general d'Anselme request that the Romanian troops be kept in the area as they alone can maintain order.
14 April 1919
Following general Berthelot's intervention, the Romanian General Staff took all necessary measures to insure the transportation of the disarmed Ukrainians from Tighina to Hotin, where they will cross the Dniester River.
17 April 1919
I talked with Landrot, Berthelot and Petin about the morale state of the French troops in Bessarabia.
The first one said that is true that the troops won't fight, that the men were ready t osacrifice their lives once, but won't anymore for a cause that is not theirs. He thinks that once they crossed the Dniester they will stay on the defensive. An officer was sent to evaluate the situation\, because general d'Anselme hasn't reported anything yet. The Greek morale status is unknown.
Berthelot said that indeed the soldiers and especially the officers don't want to fight anymore. The 58th Regiment, which had been penetrated by Bolshevik propaganda, will be sent to southern Morocco as punishment. He requested from Paris more equipment in order to mobilize all the Romanian forces and man the Dniester front. He also asked for the repatriation of te hFrench forces as soon as possible.
Petin said it is humiliating for them to confess, but so it is. Their troops won't fight. What would our soldier be thinking after seeing two allied armies Bolshevized? In Tighina there were a French unit and a battalion of the 39th Infantry Regiment. The French were having a very good meal, as opposed to the modest rations our troops were receiving. A gentleman asked a sergeant what he thought about this. He replied:"Probably we will have to disarm them too", hinting to the fact that the Russians also had good meals, but eventually had to be disarmed. Ironically the French unit was disarmed by that battalion several days later.
23 April 1919
Franchet d'Esperey, as usual, is blaming his subordinates and now wants to dismiss d'Anselme for what happened at Odessa.
28 April 1919
General Patey, freshly returned from Bessarabia, said that general d'Anselme does not deserve to be relieved of command and that now the French troops are again under the control of their officers.
by Radu R. Rosetti, Modelism, Bucharest 1997
To be continued.