Disaster for the Italian Merchant marine why?

[Andy H]

According to JJ Sadkovich in his book "The Italian Navy in WW2", it was the French collapse in June that triggered Italy's entry before the Italian merchant marine could be brought home. Thus out of some 786ships over 500tons (=3.3million GRT), some 212 (or some 1.2million GRT) was outside the Mediterranean and thus lost. Including 46 tankers.

The ships putside the Med were placed as follows:
33 East Africa, 11 Northern/Eastern Europe, 26 USA, 32 in Spanish possesions plus 3 more in Portugese; 58 in Latin America, 33 in UK & Commonwealth ports, a further 3 in French ports, 4 in Iran and 9 in the Far East.

Some 25 ships tried to make it home, but only 17 got through, to deliver some 88,769tons of cargo.

Though the Italians had access to the 63 German ships caught in the Med, the French merchant marine ships were protected by Germany.

Q1 Why were the French merchant ships protected by Germany and thus not able to help the Italians.

Q2 The Regime gave the Italian merchant fleet 3 days warning. Yet considering the amount of ships outside the Med (1/3rd) why didn't they give more advanced warning, especially for the tankers?

Andy H

[DrG]

The entrance into WW2 was made quickly, without the time to inform the ships outside the Mediterranean. Moreover, in the opinion that war would have ended after a few weeks, those ships were not considered important. Just for comparison, in the same way Germany lost a half of its Merchant Marine in Sept. 1939.
About French ships, I know nothing about "German protection", they were allowed to restart sailing only under approval by Germany and Italy (article XI of the Franco-German Armistice and article XVI of the Franco-Italian Armistice). When, in Nov.1942, south France was occupied, the ships captured were divided between Italy (most) and Germany. Moreover, if French ships sailing with French flag had transported military supplies for the Axis, they would have been attacked by UK.

There is a good article about the Italian Merchant Marine outside the Mediterranean: The Ships Stranded outside the Mediterranean.

[Andy H]

Thank you for the links, very informative.

Do you happen to know if the Spanish merchant marine in anyway helped the Axis in the Med?

Andy H

[DrG]

Do you happen to know if the Spanish merchant marine in anyway helped the Axis in the Med?

I'm sorry, but I don't remember any Spanish involvement.

[gabriel pagliarani]

....Q2 The Regime gave the Italian merchant fleet 3 days warning. Yet considering the amount of ships outside the Med (1/3rd) why didn't they give more advanced warning, especially for the tankers?

Andy H

R2 vs. Q2= NO FUEL!
Regia Marina (Mercantile & Militare both) were embargoed till 1935 by Society of Nations. Only few harbours in few nations (most axis) broke this embargo by vending fuel to fascist merchant vessels (..mostly as black market!) because oil market was an oligopole-trust ( the American definition of trust is not the same of Italian closed-entry oligopole)held by Anglo-Americans. All those lost vessels were waiting for being refuelled from italian tankers. It never occurred, even if there were a lot of empty tankers among them. Interesting to know how many time they were just waiting for refuelling before june 10th 1940. The incredible thing was in oil reserves presents in RSI when falled April 25th 1945: those reserves where about the same in Italy June 10th 1940. What happened really during those years to oil reserves? Another link to the constitution of ENI & AGIP (Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi) just after the war and to the rise & fall (..by killing!) of Enrico Mattei, the man who destroyed the "7 sisters' oil oligopole-trust". What a Nemesis for the "7 sisters"!

[DrG]

The incredible thing was in oil reserves presents in RSI when falled April 25th 1945: those reserves where about the same in Italy June 10th 1940.

I admit I'm quite surprised. What is your source?

[gabriel pagliarani]

The incredible thing was in oil reserves presents in RSI when falled April 25th 1945: those reserves where about the same in Italy June 10th 1940.

I admit I'm quite surprised. What is your source?

RAI3-Last wednesday-h 22:30-"Tutti gli uomini di Mussolini: la dinastia Ciano". Very interesting: the only reasonable meaning of this evidence (..if true) was in the fact that all the oil reserves were spent during a stealth attempted fleet recovery from Nov'39 to Jun'40. The rest of fuel was previously stored directly in the tanks of the vessels. When the Swordfishes of Royal Navy attacked the fleet resting in Taranto harbour italian dreadnoughts were perfectly refuelled.Why else if not? RN had the pefect consciourness about poor oil reserves there were in Italy: there was no oil for a defensive patrol just out of Taranto...or do you prefer to believe to the legend of the surprise after having declarated the war?

[DrG]

RAI3-Last wednesday-h 22:30-"Tutti gli uomini di Mussolini: la dinastia Ciano". Very interesting: the only reasonable meaning of this evidence (..if true) was in the fact that all the oil reserves were spent during a stealth attempted fleet recovery from Nov'39 to Jun'40. The rest of fuel was previously stored directly in the tanks of the vessels. When the Swordfishes of Royal Navy attacked the fleet resting in Taranto harbour italian dreadnoughts were perfectly refuelled.Why else if not? RN had the pefect consciourness about poor oil reserves there were in Italy: there was no oil for a defensive patrol just out of Taranto...or do you prefer to believe to the legend of the surprise after having declarated the war?

This theory looks a bit strange... Moreover, the embargo because of the war of Ethiopia had ended already in 1936, while the new British-French (the USA never embargoed Italy before WW2) embargo had started in March 1940 (it was done firstly to stop Italian imports of coal from Germany passing through the Netherlands; the problem was solved using railways), but I don't remember that Italian ships were not allowed to refuel. But, if instead Italian ships, at least those in Anglo-French ports, were not allowed to refuel... mhmh, it is interesting, I will have to find more info.
About the matter of the fuel reserves of the RSI, do you mean that they were "tiny as in 1940" or "large as in 1940" (according to common sources Italian reserves of oil were quite large in June 1940). In other words: did they mean that Italy had kept large reserves till the end of the war without using them, or that Italy never had reserves (thus at the end of the war they were next to zero as at the beginning?). Both the options look rather gibberish.

[gabriel pagliarani]

Dear Guido,
USA never had colonial harbours! British Empire embargoed Fascist Italy
and the only known oil sources available in ?30s were under British control. Isn't enough?

....About the matter of the fuel reserves of the RSI, do you mean that they were "tiny as in 1940" or "large as in 1940" (according to common sources Italian reserves of oil were quite large in June 1940). ..

0+0=0;0-0=0;0*0=0;0/0=0 and about 0 were both those stocks.The truth in historical facts is always simple and easy. The hazardous play attempted by Mussolini is too daring & dangerous to be totally understood at very today. He was really 100% sure that Great Britain was close to surrender before the end of June 1940! And some documents in his hands (..we don't know, obviously 8) )reinforced his own aknowledgement/consciourness of Churchill's will. I personally have more than a suspect about the famous bag lost in Dongo municipe at the end of the tragedy.
N.B.
...212 lost and 46 of them tankers...about 22% of lost tonnage is a little less than 1 tanker each 4 or 5 lost ships. The standard average rate was 1 tanker every 10 or 15 vessels. There was no fuel for recovery those tankers, after they have refuelled 4 to 10 other recovered ships. Easy computing, not gibberish history. Really a fine post and a valid topic from Andy!

[Voyager]

Answer to Q1- Germany was courting Vichy France to try to bolster their position in Eastern Europe with respect to the British. If they could get the active cooperation of the French they would be in a better position to pursue their ambitions against the Soviets which was priority number one for Hilter. The French were particuliarly bitter towards Italy because of the not unfounded perception that Italy had piled on, to us football terminology, when the Germans had already beaten them. The Italy merchant marine situation was not critical in 1940-41 and the Germans did not think antagonizing the French was necessary.

Answer to Q2- The descision to enter the war was very hasty due to the unexpected collapse of France. Also, earlier notification would have telegraphed Italy's intentions and given the Allies more time to prepare.
Finally, it was a calculated gamble because Italy entered the war on the assumption that it was just about over and they needed to move before they were left out of the spoils.

[gabriel pagliarani]

.... The Italy merchant marine situation was not critical in 1940-41..

Exactly the contrary of the Andy's statement! If 212 lost vessels in a day only are not as many critical losses for you... Marina Mercantile was not comparable to the American or Jap one not for q.ty nor for tonnage

[Bronsky]

Found this thread thanks to Jon G providing a link to it elsewhere

Q1 Why were the French merchant ships protected by Germany and thus not able to help the Italians.

The French merchant ships were French, they were not German, they were not Italian, therefore the Axis couldn't use them. Germany didn't have to specifically protect them: Vichy France was an independent state, though de facto its independence was limited and after 1942 it was no longer anything but an Axis puppet. The Italians couldn't use French shipping for the same reason that they couldn't use French warships: they weren't theirs to use.

I suppose that you could rephrase the question to "why didn't Germany accede to Italy's demands for a much harder armistice?". Leaving aside the fact that the great majority of the Germans were contemptuous of Italy's trying to claim victory and grab most of the spoils with only a bloody nose in the Alps to show for its achievements, it was not certain that the French could make the armistice stick. At the time - 25 June - practically all the French warships and merchant shipping were overseas, out of Axis reach. The only way for the Axis to prevent these ships from joining the Allied cause was to have French authorities order them not to.
French authorities might not sign an armistice in the first place if conditions were too high - and the comment about the French hating the idea of surrendering to the "lowly" Italians is spot on - and French colonies might decide to disregard the armistice anyway if the conditions were deemed too "dishonorable". Some did, and the most important ones (French North Africa) were on the fence for a while. The commander in Lebanon-Syria had made it clear that he would follow the lead of his superior in French North Africa, so if the latter had deceded to secede and become the leader of Free France (De Gaulle had written to him, saying that he was ready to serve under his orders), then probably all of France's colonies - and shipping - would have followed suit.
The Axis didn't know all the details, but they did know that they shouldn't push the colonies into secession. Hitler wanted an end to the fighting now, even if it meant telling Mussolini to wait.

Prior to November 1942, the Axis used French shipping on charter, on different occasions. Some of the trade between French North Africa and the Axis was conducted on French bottoms, and the French also transported some fuel to Tunisia for the benefit of the Axis, later to be railed and trucked to Tripoli.

After November 1942, what remained of the French merchant fleet became a "voluntary contribution to the common defense of Europe" i.e. was seized by the Axis. Most of it was sunk by the Allies.

Q2 The Regime gave the Italian merchant fleet 3 days warning. Yet considering the amount of ships outside the Med (1/3rd) why didn't they give more advanced warning, especially for the tankers?

The more warning you give to your own ships, the more you give to the enemy. Italian planning for war was rushed because Mussolini absolutely wanted in and the French collapsed more quickly than he had anticipated so he had to hurry.

It wouldn't have made much of a difference anyway, as the Allies had long known that Italy was on the warpath and taken deliberate steps to prevent Italian ships from getting out of reach. For Italy to have saved a significant portion of her shipping would have required really advance warning i.e. several weeks, and this would have carried an economic penalty (disruption of imports).

[TRose]

Would not the Germans and Japanese though have been able to make use of some of the Ships? The 11 in Northern Europe might have been no use in the Med but could have still served useful work in the Baltic .Same with the ships in the far east. And would not have been hard for those in Latin America to run to Japan.

[Jon G.]

There were some Italian captures of merchant ships, but not enough to compensate for the loss of ships stranded outside the Mediterranean at the outbreak of war. Captures were mostly Greek and Yugoslav, and a few French ships were also transferred to Italy as part of the meager bounty of the French armistice. This sub-page of the site linked to by DrG, above, gives more details.

On one interesting occasion a captured ship was stranded outside the Mediterranean, too. The Yugoslav ship Tomislav became Italian by Japanese law, cf. the link above, and subsequently pressed into service as the Venezia Giulia

[Bronsky]

a few French ships were also transferred to Italy as part of the meager bounty of the French armistice.

The Italians got their impounded ships back as well as the impounded cargoes - at least those held by the French - plus a handful of ships as a compensation for ships sunk by the French in the few days of Franco-Italian belligerency. By definition, this couldn't begin to make up for the losses suffered at the declaration of war.

On one interesting occasion a captured ship was stranded outside the Mediterranean, too. The Yugoslav ship Tomislav became Italian by Japanese law, cf. the link above, and subsequently pressed into service as the Venezia Giulia

On October 31st, the Yugoslav vessel TOMISLAV, which has been at Shanghai since April, was boarded and seized by a company of Italian Marines. The master and crew members were threatened with pistols and forced to abandon the ship and their personal effects. This is the second incident involving the vessel, the first occurring last April when the Italians seized the ship, claiming it had been purchased by Lloyd Triestino. This attempt failed, however, when the Japanese intervened. Since the second seizure, the Italians have been busy removing the last vestiges of Yugoslav ownership and the funnell is being repainted with the colors of Lloyd Triestino. In connection with the reported purchase of the vessel by Italian interests, a Japanese naval spokesman stated that under the Chinese Maritime code, the transfer of the vessel would not be valid unless it was duly registered with the Chinese Government.

This if from the fortnightly summary of U.S. Naval intelligence I don't know what the subsequent record of the ship was.

Coordination between the Italians and the Japanese doesn't seem to have been all that good. The liner Conte Verde was marrooned in Shanghai in June 1940 and doesn't seem to have contributed to the Japanese war effort, it was scuttled when Italy surrendered.