Adenauer on the Morgenthau Plan and restitution to Jews

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michael mills
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Adenauer on the Morgenthau Plan and restitution to Jews

Post by michael mills » 16 Aug 2002 07:04

The following quote is from Konrad Adenauer's speech "Hope for Europe", 28 August 1948, as printed in "The Nazi Germany Sourcebook", pp. 394-6 (translation by Sally Winkle, Professor of German Language and Literature, Eastern Washington University).
National Socialism committed terrible crimes, crimes that future historians will still recount with horror, but the Morgenthau Plan, which, thank heavens, was not implemented, but which was prepared and considered in great detail, represents an offense against humanity that is at least a worthy complement to the National Socialist crime. (Enthusiastic shouts: very true!) If it was planned in the enforcement decrees to let 30 or 40 million Germans die (Shouts: shame!) by choking them off economically, then the preparation and consideration of such a plan reveals such depths of cruelty and inhumanity that, by God, no one can speak of a Christian spirit any longer. (Shouts: very true!) This Morgenthau Plan is done for. The time will come when those who wrote it will be ashamed to talk about it. But I have the feeling that certain offshoots of this Morgenthau Plan have taken effect here. It is time to remove them. I am referring above all to this insane policy of dismantling industries. (Shouts: very true!)
It is interesting that Adenauer considered the Morgenthau Plan to be as bad as the National Socialist crimes. He considered it as a plan to starve 30-40 million Germans through the dismantling of industry. Accordingly, it appears that the United States had a starvation plan for Germany as bad as that which Nazi Germany had intended to impose on the Soviet Union.

It should be noted that the Morgenthau Plan was not a plan conceived by the the political mainstream in the United States, but rather of the leftist, heavily Jewish, coterie around Roosevelt which by the end of the war had seized policy-making power for itself from a Roosevelt who was already half-dead. It was not implemented due to opposition from the United States military and the State Department, which were opposed to the Jewish power centred on the Treasury.

The following quote, in which Adenauer justifies the paying of compensation to Israel, is from his address to the CDU Party Committee, Bonn, on 6 Septemebr 1952, as printed in "The Nazi Germany Sourcebook", p. 400 (translation by Sally Winkle).
I hope that the cabinet will not make things difficult for me. If the cabinet did cause problems, it would be a foreign policy disaster of the first order. It would not only be a political disaster, it would strongly impede all our efforts to acquire foreign credit again. Let us be clear that now as before the power of the Jews in the economic sphere is extraordinarily strong[my emphasis], so that this - the term is a bit overstated - this reconciliation with the Jews is an absolute requirement for the Federal Republic from a moral standpoint and a political standpoint as well as an economic standpoint.
I do not think any comment on the above passage is necessary. It reveals exactly why Germany found itself compelled to pay compensation to the Jews.

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Re: Adenauer on the Morgenthau Plan and restitution to Jews

Post by Roberto » 19 Aug 2002 18:39

michael mills wrote:It is interesting that Adenauer considered the Morgenthau Plan to be as bad as the National Socialist crimes. He considered it as a plan to starve 30-40 million Germans through the dismantling of industry.
Interesting indeed, if you consider the actual contents of said plan. Thus it is transcribed on a "Revisionist" site ("Jewish hatred in its purest form"):
TOP SECRET

Program to Prevent Germany from

starting a World War III

1. Demilitarization of Germany.

It should be the aim of the Allied Forces to accomplish the complete demilitarization of Germany in the shortest possible period of time after surrender. This means completely disarm the German Army and people (including the removal or destruction of all war material), the total destruction of the whole German armament industry, and the removal or destruction of other key industries which are basic to military strength.

2. New Boundaries of Germany.

(a) Poland should get that part of East Prussia which doesn't go to the U.S.S.R. and the southern portion of Silesia. (See map in 12 Appendix.)

(b) France should get the Saar and the adjacent territories bounded by the Rhine and the Moselle Rivers.

(c) As indicated in 4 below an International Zone should be created containing the Ruhr and the surrounding industrial areas.

3. Partitioning of New Germany.

The remaining portion of Germany should be divided into two autonomous, independent states, (1) a South German state comprising Bavaria, Wuerttemberg, Baden and some smaller areas and (2) a North German state comprising a large part of the old state of Prussia, Saxony, Thuringia and several smaller states.

There shall be a custom union between the new South German state and Austria, which will be restored to her pre-1938 political borders.

4. The Ruhr Area. (The Ruhr, surrounding industrial areas, as shown on e map, including the Rhineland, the Keil Canal, and all German territory north of the Keil Canal.)

Here lies the heart of German industrial power. This area should not only be stripped of all presently existing industries but so weakened and controlled that it can not in the foreseeable future become an industrial area. The following steps will accomplish this:

(a) Within a short period, if possible not longer than 6 months after the cessation of hostilities, all industrial plants and equipment not destroyed by military action shall be completely dismantled and transported to Allied Nations as restitution. All equipment shall be removed from the mines and the mines closed.

(b) The area should be made an international zone to be governed by an international security organization to be established by the United Nations. In governing the area the international organization should be guided by policies designed to further the above stated objective.

5. Restitution and Reparation.

Reparations, in the form of future payments and deliveries, should not be demanded. Restitution and reparation shall be effected b-y the transfer of existing German resources and territories, e.g.,

(a) by restitution of property looted by the Germans in territories occupied by them;

(b) by transfer of German territory and German private rights in industrial property situated in such territory to invaded countries and the international organization under the program of partition;

(c) by the removal and distribution among devastated countries of industrial plants and equipment situated within the International Zone and the North and South German states delimited in the section on partition;

(d) by forced German labor outside Germany; and

(e) by confiscation of all German assets of any character

whatsoever outside of Germany.

6. Education and Propaganda.

(a) All schools and universities will be closed until an Allied Commission of Education has formulated an effective reorganization program. It is contemplated that it may require a considerable period of time before any institutions of higher education are reopened. Meanwhile the education of German students in foreign universities will not be prohibited. Elementary schools will be reopened as quickly as appropriate teachers and textbooks are available.

(b) All German radio stations and newspapers, magazines, weeklies, etc. shall be discontinued until adequate controls are established and an appropriate program formulated.

7. Political Decentralization.

The military administration in Germany in the Initial period should be carried out with a view toward the eventual partitioning of Germany. To facilitate partitioning and to assure its permanence the military authorities should be guided by the following principles:

(a) Dismiss all policy-making officials of the Reich government and deal primarily with local governments.

(b) Encourage the re-establishment of state governments in

each of the states (Lander) corresponding to 18 states into which Germany is presently divided and in addition make the Prussian provinces separate states.

(c) Upon the partitioning of Germany, the various state governments should be encouraged to organize a federal government for each of the newly partitioned areas. Such new governments should be in the form of a confederation of states, with emphasis on states" rights and a large degree of local autonomy.

8. Responsibility of Military for Local German Economy.

The sole purpose of the military in control of the German economy shall be to facilitate military operations and military occupation. The Allied Military Government shall not assume responsibility for such economic problems as price controls, rationing, unemployment, production, reconstruction, distribution, consumption, housing, or transportation, or take any measures designed to maintain or strengthen the German economy, except those which are essential to military operations. The responsibility for sustaining the German economy and people rests with the German people with such facilities as may be available under the circumstances.

9. Controls over Development of German Economy.

During a period of at least twenty years after surrender adequate controls, including controls over foreign trade and tight restrictions on capital imports, shall be maintained by the United Nations designed to prevent in the newly-established states the establishment or expansion of key industries basic to the German military potential and to control other key industries.

10. Agrarian program.

All large estates should be broken up and divided among the peasants and the system of primogeniture and entail should be abolished.

11. Punishment of War Crimes and Treatment of Special Groups.

A program for the punishment of certain war crimes and for the treatment of Nazi organizations and other special groups is contained in section 11.

12. Uniforms and Parades.

(a) No German shall be permitted to wear, after an appropriate period of time following the cessation of hostilities, any military uniform or any uniform of any quasi military organizations.

(b) No military parades shall be permitted anywhere In Germany and all military bands shall be disbanded.

13. Aircraft.

All aircraft (including gliders), whether military or commercial, will be confiscated for later disposition. No German shall be permitted to operate or to help operate any aircraft, including those owned by foreign interests.

14. United States Responsibility

Although the United States would have full military and civilian representation on whatever International commission or commissions may be established for the execution of the whole German program, the primary responsibility for the policing of Germany and for civil administration in Germany should be assumed by the military forces of Germany's continental neighbors. Specifically these should include Russian, French, Polish, Czech, Greek, Yugoslav, Norwegian, Dutch and Belgian soldiers.

Under this program United States troops could be withdrawn within a relatively short time.
Source of quote:

http://www.ety.com/berlin/morgthau.htm

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Post by michael mills » 21 Aug 2002 03:32

The Morgenthau Plan, as drafted, seems innocuous enough; obviously, the bureaucrats in the US Treasury Department, unlike their less inhibited German equivalents, knew that they should not commit their "hidden agenda" to paper.

But both Adenauer and many Allied readers of the Plan knew what it meant in practice; mass starvation.

The relevant parts of the Plan that would have had the effect of mass starvation were:

Paragraph 1: Removal or destruction of key industries necessary for military strength.

Paragraph 4 (a): Dismantling within six months of all surviving industrial plant and equipment in the Ruhr and their transfer out of Germany.

Paragraph 5 (c): Removal from Germany of industrial plants and equipment situated within the International Zone and the North and South German states.

Paragraph 8: No responsibility on the part of the Allied military controlling the German economy to take any measures to maintain or strengthen that economy, except as required for military purposes, leaving the responsibility for sustaining the German people (ie feeding them) to the German people itself with whatever facilities were available (ie not nearly enough to avoid mass starvation).

Paragraph 9: Control over the development of the German economy for at least twenty years "designed to prevent in the newly-established states the establishment or expansion of key industries basic to the German military potential and to control other key industries" (ie. in practical terms to prevent the development of any industry that could sustain the German population).

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Post by Qvist » 21 Aug 2002 10:09

Michael Mills wrote:
I do not think any comment on the above passage is necessary. It reveals exactly why Germany found itself compelled to pay compensation to the Jews.
I cannot help but notice that the quoted passage is hardly a full expression of Adenauer's general views on the subject, but an intervention in cabinet made under quite specific circumstances, obviously with the object of issuing a stern warning to potentially critical members by bringing to their attention a fact that had presumably then not been emphasised in previous discussion.

Also, it is difficult to overlook that Adenauer, in the last sentence, mentions both moral and political considerations before economic ones.

cheers

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Post by Roberto » 21 Aug 2002 15:14

michael mills wrote:The Morgenthau Plan, as drafted, seems innocuous enough; obviously, the bureaucrats in the US Treasury Department, unlike their less inhibited German equivalents, knew that they should not commit their "hidden agenda" to paper.
The underlying assumption is that they had such a "hidden agenda". Evidence?
michael mills wrote:But both Adenauer and many Allied readers of the Plan knew what it meant in practice; mass starvation.
It would be interesting to know how Adenauer arrived at that conclusion and if any "Allied readers of the Plan" ever put concerns in this direction into writing.
michael mills wrote:The relevant parts of the Plan that would have had the effect of mass starvation were:

Paragraph 1: Removal or destruction of key industries necessary for military strength.
Why, would feeding the population require military industry?
michael mills wrote:Paragraph 4 (a): Dismantling within six months of all surviving industrial plant and equipment in the Ruhr and their transfer out of Germany.

Paragraph 5 (c): Removal from Germany of industrial plants and equipment situated within the International Zone and the North and South German states.
Or even heavy industry?
michael mills wrote:Paragraph 8: No responsibility on the part of the Allied military controlling the German economy to take any measures to maintain or strengthen that economy, except as required for military purposes, leaving the responsibility for sustaining the German people (ie feeding them) to the German people itself with whatever facilities were available (ie not nearly enough to avoid mass starvation).
Assuming that the war had left Germany in a state of destruction that, without external help, would have led to mass starvation.

An indication thereof would be mass starvation occurring prior to the implementation of the Marshall Plan.

Where and to what extent can such mass starvation be shown to have occurred?
michael mills wrote:Paragraph 9: Control over the development of the German economy for at least twenty years "designed to prevent in the newly-established states the establishment or expansion of key industries basic to the German military potential and to control other key industries" (ie. in practical terms to prevent the development of any industry that could sustain the German population).
Why preventing the "establishment or expansion of key industries basic to the German military potential" would be synonymous with preventing "the development of any industry that could sustain the German population" is beyond my understanding.

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Post by Dan » 21 Aug 2002 15:30

To answer the question of whether or not the destruction of German war related industry would lead to mass starvation, the answer is yes. Without nitrates agriculture would collapes immediately.

This is to say nothing of the fact that Germany relied and still relies on exporting finished products to earn the money they use to by food.

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Post by Roberto » 21 Aug 2002 15:39

Dan wrote:To answer the question of whether or not the destruction of German war related industry would lead to mass starvation, the answer is yes. Without nitrates agriculture would collapes immediately.
Nitrates?

Didn't German scientists Haber and Bosch develop a procedure for extracting nitrates from the air during World War I?
Dan wrote:This is to say nothing of the fact that Germany relied and still relies on exporting finished products to earn the money they use to by food.
Did Germany ever import food?

As I remember having read in A.J.P. Taylor's illustrated history of the First World War, the famine that occurred in Germany between 1914 and 1918 (killing about 750,000 people) was due not so much to the British naval blockade than to the absence of agricultural labor due to military service and severe mismanagement at government level.

I don't have the book with me right now, but I'll transcribe Taylor's assessment tomorrow.

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Post by Dan » 21 Aug 2002 15:45

Nitrates?

Didn't German scientists Haber and Bosch develop a procedure for extracting nitrates from the air during World War I?
You misunderstand me. You are quite correct that the great German-Jew you mention made Germany self-suffecient in nitrates. The point is that nitrates are important to both fertilizer and explosives, and stoping the industrial production of ammunition would stop the industrial production of fertilizer.

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Post by Roberto » 21 Aug 2002 15:51

Dan wrote:
Nitrates?

Didn't German scientists Haber and Bosch develop a procedure for extracting nitrates from the air during World War I?
You misunderstand me. You are quite correct that the great German-Jew you mention made Germany self-suffecient in nitrates. The point is that nitrates are important to both fertilizer and explosives, and stoping the industrial production of ammunition would stop the industrial production of fertilizer.
Why, can agricultural nitrates only be produced by the armament industry?
The application of 55 per cent more labor to German farms, as proposed here, will not increase this food supply by 55 per cent. But that will not be necessary. An extra 15 per cent would make Germany virtually self-sustaining, even on her high prewar diet. But more probably, Germans will eat a little less for they will have to export food as well as consumer goods in return for such products of heavy industry as they will need, the small amount of foodstuffs that will not grow in Germany and the rather large amount of nitrates and phosphates she will require to keep her soil productive.
wrote Morgenthau on page 62 of Germany is our Problem.

Looks like Germany was not to be kept from importing nitrates for agricultural needs.

The text of Germany is our Problem can be downloaded from the site under

http://www.ety.com/berlin/morgthau.htm

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Post by Scott Smith » 21 Aug 2002 17:49

Roberto wrote:
Dan wrote:
Roberto wrote:Nitrates?

Didn't German scientists Haber and Bosch develop a procedure for extracting nitrates from the air during World War I?
You misunderstand me. You are quite correct that the great German-Jew you mention made Germany self-suffecient in nitrates. The point is that nitrates are important to both fertilizer and explosives, and stoping the industrial production of ammunition would stop the industrial production of fertilizer.
Why, can agricultural nitrates only be produced by the armament industry?
Both are explosives. Ammonal is ammonium nitrate fertilizer and diesel oil.
Roberto wrote:Looks like Germany was not to be kept from importing nitrates for agricultural needs.
Where do you initially get the surpluses or foreign exchange to buy chemicals and machinery, and to pay labor for reclaimation, drainage, canals, and all internal improvements?

If by loans, where do you get the surplus to pay the interest to service the debt?
Roberto wrote:As I remember having read in A.J.P. Taylor's illustrated history of the First World War, the famine that occurred in Germany between 1914 and 1918 (killing about 750,000 people) was due not so much to the British naval blockade than to the absence of agricultural labor due to military service and severe mismanagement at government level.
The blockade was maintained until the Versailles treaty was signed on June 28, 1919. The war was over on November 11, 1918. Most of the starvation occured during this time, IIRC, particularly of children.
:)
Last edited by Scott Smith on 22 Aug 2002 14:12, edited 1 time in total.

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Post by Roberto » 21 Aug 2002 22:07

Roberto wrote:Why, can agricultural nitrates only be produced by the armament industry?
Scott Smith wrote:Both are explosives. Ammonal is ammonium nitrate fertilizer and diesel oil.
Question not answered and still standing. Do you need a munitions factory to produce agricultural nitrates?
Roberto wrote:Looks like Germany was not to be kept from importing nitrates for agricultural needs.
Scott Smith wrote:Where do you initially get the surpluses or foreign exchange to buy chemicals and machinery, and to pay labor for reclaimation, drainage, canals, and allinternal improvements?
If by loans, where do you get the surplus to pay the interest to service the debt?
I suggest that Smith download and read Morgenthau's book, which I would expect to contain answers to such questions.

Smith is also welcome to demonstrate that the author of Germany is our problem didn't take a number of key factors into consideration, or even that the good man was daydreaming like so many other policymakers.
Roberto wrote:As I remember having read in A.J.P. Taylor's illustrated history of the First World War, the famine that occurred in Germany between 1914 and 1918 (killing about 750,000 people) was due not so much to the British naval blockade than to the absence of agricultural labor due to military service and severe mismanagement at government level.
Smith wrote:The blockade was maintained until the Versailles treaty was signed on June 28, 1919. The war was over on November 11, 1918. Most of the starvation occured during this time, IIRC, particularly of children. :)
Well, I wouldn't expect the effects of agricultural mismanagement that Taylor considered the primary cause of the famine to cease overnight.

Anyway, let's see some evidence to the contention that most of the starvation occurred after the war.

From what I remember, the worst period was the 1916/17 "Kohlrübenwinter".

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Post by Scott Smith » 21 Aug 2002 22:30

Roberto wrote:
Scott Smith wrote:
Roberto wrote:Why, can agricultural nitrates only be produced by the armament industry?
Both are explosives. Ammonal is ammonium nitrate fertilizer and diesel oil.
Question not answered and still standing. Do you need a munitions factory to produce agricultural nitrates?
It's the same stuff, Roberto. The basis of fertilizer and explosives is ammonia, NH4, either synthetic or from nitrates. Black powder is charcoal, sulfur and saltpeter (potassium nitrate). Furthermore, amino acids form the basis of protein.
I suggest that Smith download and read Morgenthau's book, which I would expect to contain answers to such questions.
Yes, I'm well aware what Morgenthau's motives were. But that's not a bad idea, Roberto.
Smith is also welcome to demonstrate that the author of Germany is our problem didn't take a number of key factors into consideration, or even that the good man was daydreaming like so many other policymakers.
Morgenthau's plan would have led to a Bolshevist Europe which is why it was soon dropped. Bolshevism, Zionism, International-Finance Capitalism, whatevah. :wink:
Roberto wrote:
Smith wrote:
Roberto wrote:As I remember having read in A.J.P. Taylor's illustrated history of the First World War, the famine that occurred in Germany between 1914 and 1918 (killing about 750,000 people) was due not so much to the British naval blockade than to the absence of agricultural labor due to military service and severe mismanagement at government level.
The blockade was maintained until the Versailles treaty was signed on June 28, 1919. The war was over on November 11, 1918. Most of the starvation occured during this time, IIRC, particularly of children. :)
Well, I wouldn't expect the effects of agricultural mismanagement that Taylor considered the primary cause of the famine to cease overnight.
Nonsense. Ludendorff's War Socialism was tightly rationing to limit shortages, but the government effectively broke down when the war was lost.
Anyway, let's see some evidence to the contention that most of the starvation occurred after the war.
Let's see some evidence that it did occur mostly during the war, since this was your claim. Show me statistics of starvation. :idea:
From what I remember, the worst period was the 1916/17 "Kohlrübenwinter".
You were there? You have the date right, but that wasn't the famine. Germany was still able to fight the war and was not in chaos. Plus, Germany increasingly gained territories to requisition from, until the Armistice.
:)
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Post by Roberto » 21 Aug 2002 22:59

Roberto wrote:
Scott Smith wrote:
Roberto wrote:Why, can agricultural nitrates only be produced by the armament industry?
Both are explosives. Ammonal is ammonium nitrate fertilizer and diesel oil.
Question not answered and still standing. Do you need a munitions factory to produce agricultural nitrates?
Scott Smith wrote:It's the same stuff, Roberto. The basis of fertilizer and explosives is ammonia, NH4, either synthetic or from nitrates. Black powder is charcoal, sulfur and saltpeter (potassium nitrate). Furthermore, amino acids form the basis of protein.
Does that mean it takes a munitions factory to produce agricultural nitrates, yes or no?
Roberto wrote: I suggest that Smith download and read Morgenthau's book, which I would expect to contain answers to such questions.

Smith wrote: Yes, I'm well aware what Morgenthau's motives were. But that's not a bad idea, Roberto.
Go ahead.

I'm not saying the guy was a genius or even proposed a reasonable policy.

I only have a problem with the "Jewish hatred in its purest form" - crap, after what I've read from him.

I also have a problem with the contention that the plan would have brought about mass starvation and the planner intended this or at least knew it would be an inevitable consequence of the plan's enforcement.
Roberto wrote: Smith is also welcome to demonstrate that the author of Germany is our problem didn't take a number of key factors into consideration, or even that the good man was daydreaming like so many other policymakers.
Smith wrote: Morgenthau's plan would have led to a Bolshevist Europe which is why it was soon dropped. Bolshevism, Zionism, International-Finance Capitalism, whatevah. :wink:
Well, a de-militarized and de-industrialized Germany would certainly have been more in the interest of the Soviet Union than of the Western Allies.
Roberto wrote:Well, I wouldn't expect the effects of agricultural mismanagement that Taylor considered the primary cause of the famine to cease overnight.
Smith wrote:Nonsense. Ludendorff's War Socialism was tightly ratiuoning but the government broke down when the war was lost.
Starvation there was long before that, wasn't there?

750,000 famine dead between 1914 and 1918, according to the German Historical Museum:

http://german.historical.museum/lemo/ht ... index.html
Roberto wrote:Anyway, let's see some evidence to the contention that most of the starvation occurred after the war.
Smith wrote:Let's see some evidence that it did occur mostly during the war, since this was your claim. Show me statistics of starvation. :idea:
You made the assertion, pal, so it's up to you to substantiate it. The ball is in your court.
Roberto wrote:From what I remember, the worst period was the 1916/17 "Kohlrübenwinter".
Smith wrote:You were there? You have the date right, but that wasn't the famine. Germany was still able to fight the war and was not in chaos. Plus, Germany increasingly gained territories to requisition from, until the Armistice. :)
Well, for some reason the German Historical Museum, see above link, speaks of 750,000 famine dead between 1914 and 1918, highlights the "Kohlrübenwinter" and doesn't mention famine during the 1918-1919 period following the armistice.

But I'm sure that Smith, the great historian, knows more than the German Historical Museum and can demonstrate it.
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Post by Scott Smith » 21 Aug 2002 23:22

Roberto wrote:Does that mean it takes a munitions factory to produce agricultural nitrates, yes or no?
Yes, it's the same stuff.
I also have a problem with the contention that the plan would have brought about mass starvation and the planner intended this or at least knew it would be an inevitable consequence of the plan's enforcement.
A viable objection to be explored by historians. Hard to say exactly what the consequences would have been if fully implemented, but certainly Stalinism was likely.
Well, a de-militarized and de-industrialized Germany would certainly have been more in the interest of the Soviet Union than of the Western Allies.
Only until Stalin had become Europe's Red Tsar; then it would be a crash program of military industrialization, as in the Rodina.
Well, I wouldn't expect the effects of agricultural mismanagement that Taylor considered the primary cause of the famine to cease overnight.

750,000 famine dead between 1914 and 1918, according to the German Historical Museum:

http://german.historical.museum/lemo/ht ... index.html

Anyway, let's see some evidence to the contention that most of the starvation occurred after the war.
So the German museum stops counting after the Armistice? That's a good one. :roll:
You made the assertion, pal, so it's up to you to substantiate it. The ball is in your court.
I don't know the figures. I merely suggested that you did not account for the period between the Armistice and Versailles. The ball is in your court, my friend, if you claim that starvation from the British blockade wasn't severe AFTER the war and BEFORE the Versailles Diktat, after which the blockade was lifted. There were no more requisitions from occupied territories after the Armistice and the government was in shreds.
Well, for some reason the German Historical Museum, see above link, speaks of 750,000 famine dead between 1914 and 1918, highlights the "Kohlrübenwinter" and doesn't mention famine during the 1918-1919 period following the armistice.
Well, that's not a surprise, is it? We are talking about a country increasingly wont to argue that Germany's Evil leaders started WWI so that the Jews could be killed in WWII. :roll: Of course, Hitler had no real issues; he was just Evil. Yes, the Germans have to be kept away from Genocide as a drunk has to be kept away from booze. :lol:
But I'm sure that Smith, the great historian, knows more than the German Historical Museum and can demonstrate it.
I'm curious, but I have other things to do. AFAIC, keeping the hunger-blockade going AFTER the Armistice was an incomparable warcrime that helped radicalize the Germans for further violence. I don't care if you agree or not. I don't see Germans as innate wild-eyed goosesteppers the way Americans see Muslims as terrorists today.
:)
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Post by walterkaschner » 21 Aug 2002 23:24

Excuse me, but I'm too dense to see what all the fuss is about.

Michael Mills wrote:
It is interesting that Adenauer considered the Morgenthau Plan to be as bad as the National Socialist crimes. He considered it as a plan to starve 30-40 million Germans through the dismantling of industry. Accordingly, it appears that the United States had a starvation plan for Germany as bad as that which Nazi Germany had intended to impose on the Soviet Union.
In the first place, whatever Adenauer might have thought the effect of the Morgenthau Plan might be ( and viewed in light of the obvious political character of his speech quoted by Mr. Mills one may, I think, legitimately question whether it reflected Adenauer's considered judgement of the matter) I know of no evidence that its purpose was to starve 30-40 million Germans, or indeed that that would have been the effect had it been put into practice.

In the second place, Mr. Mills' notion that "the United States had a starvation plan for Germany" suggests that the Morganthau Plan had been in some way officially adopted by the United States Government. It had not and was not. Unlike Adolph Hitler's, Franklin Roosevelt's ipse dixit was not sufficient to transform a whim into official policy of the state, as Roosevelt himself quickly acknowledged when faced with the public uproar after news of the Morganthau Plan was leaked to the press.

In the third place, Roosevelt promptly abandoned support of the Morgenthau Plan when faced with its potentially severe political repercussions, and it was never placed in effect. IMHO a convincing demonstration of one of the more compelling arguments in favor of a form of government which is ultimately answerable to the will of the public.

So what do we really have here? A political speech by Konrad Adenauer criticizing a proposal by the US Secretary of Treasury, which was in fact never adopted as official US policy and never placed in effect. And an argument he made four years later to his political council urging support for compensation for Israel, on the grounds, among others, that Jews have great power in the economic sphere (which is certainly a truism.) IMHO involving nothing more than the veritable tempest in a teapot.

Apparently, however, Mr. Mills sees a significant link between the Adenauer speech which he quotes and Germany's decision to make restitution for the evils which the Third Reich heaped upon the Jews. As best I can make it out (and if I'm wrong I'm sure Mr. Mills will not hesitate to correct me) the link seems to consist in Adenauer's concept of the tremendous power which the Jewish community exerts in the US which, if it could result in the Morgenthau Plan, could also result in a denial of Germany's much need financial credits if not assuaged by financial compensation to Israel.

If that is indeed the link, it strikes me as tenous indeed. A statement made in a political speech in 1948 and another to his Party Committee four years later in 1952. Both statements taken out of the context in which they were made. And of course we shall never know precisely what was in Adenauer's mind, but as Qvist has already perceptively pointed out, in the latter statement Adenauer clearly placed the moral and political factors before the economic.

Finally, from Mr. Mills' post here and elsewhere on this forum, I have the impression (and again if I'm wrong I would welcome a correction) that he attributes the brutalities of the Third Reich against the Jews to a pervasive, and, in his view, well founded fear of an internationally solidified and powerful Jewish cabal united toward the utilization of whatever means available to quell opposition to the Zionist cause and to punish Germany and all Germans. In his above post he states:
It should be noted that the Morgenthau Plan was not a plan conceived by the the political mainstream in the United States, but rather of the leftist, heavily Jewish, coterie around Roosevelt which by the end of the war had seized policy-making power for itself from a Roosevelt who was already half-dead. It was not implemented due to opposition from the United States military and the State Department, which were opposed to the Jewish power centred on the Treasury.
Now there is no question but that Henry Morgenthau, the then Secretary of Treasury, was a Jew, nor that Harry Dexter White, his Assistant Secretary and probably the author of the details of the Morgenthau Plan, was Jewish. Nor is there any question that there were several others of Jewish faith in the Treasury Department at the time, although I do know to what degree they did, in fact, support the Morgenthau Plan. But the implication that the Plan reflected the general opinion of "leftist" Jews in the Roosevelt administration is simply false. As only one example, Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter, who was a Roosevelt appointee to the then so-called "Jewish seat" on the US Supreme Court and extremely close to the President himself, was vocally opposed to the Morgenthau Plan; as, I believe, were other prominent American Jews who supported the President.

Moreover, the opposition of the War Department and Department of State was not toward "the Jewish power centred on [sic] the Treasury", but rather toward the very nature of the Plan itself, to which they objected on moral, strategic and pragmatic grounds. Henry Stimpson, the Secretary of War, was indeed upset at the Treasury Department's efforts to take a leading role in deciding the fate of post-war Germany, which he felt was more properly the domain of the Departments of State and of War, and he recognized with some understanding that Morgenthau's harsh position may have been in response to Germany's treatment of the Jews, but from what I have read his opposition to the Morgenthau Plan itself was based on the belief that it was morally wrong to burden the entire German people with the crimes of Nazism and that the practical result would inevitably lead to aggressive revanchisme in the future. I have seen nothing to indicate that either Stimpson or Cordell Hull, the Secretary of State, were opposed to the Plan because it reflected "Jewish power". That may of course be because I am not an expert in this field, and certainly if any such evidence exists I would be pleased to know of it.

I'm sorry that I have no sources to cite for the above other than my memory of various readings over the years, which admittedly is becoming more feeble as the years progress.

Regards, Kaschner

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