Nazi occupation policies for the USSR

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Postby David Thompson » 22 Oct 2004 02:08

"Extracts From the Diary of General Halder, September 1941 to November 1941", in Trials of War Criminals Before the
Nuernberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10. Vol. 10: United States of America v. Wilhelm von Leeb, et al. (Case 12: 'The High Command Case'). US Government Printing Office, District of Columbia: 1951. pp. 1195-1196.

Partial Translation of Document NOKW-3140, Prosecution Exhibit 1359.

21 September 1941, General Wagner (Generalquartiermeister) [Chief of supply and administration in the High Command of the General Army.]

* * *

d. What to do with inmates of mental institutions in occupied territory.

5 September 1941, General Wagner (Generalquartiermeister).

* * *

h. Mental institutions in Army Group North. Russians regard the feebleminded as sacred beings. Killing them is necessary nevertheless.

2 October 1941, Gen. Wagner:

a. PW matters. Screening out of dangerous elements by Himmler impossible in combat zone, only in the rear. There probably best under responsibility of OKW.

12 November 1941, Minsk: Commander of Security Div, von Bechtolsheim, the railroad district director, and the district police commander pay their respects. Tour around Minsk, almost completely destroyed by shelling; is still holding one-half of its population (still more than 100000). See scenes of PW misery.

14 Bovember 1941, Return trip--Stop at Molodechno. Long talk with commander of local Security Regt. (Semmelmann) and the battalion commander. Molodechno--typhus camp of Russian PW's (20000), all doomed to die.

Several German doctors have been killed by disease. In other camps in the vicinity is no typhus, but many prisoners die dally from starvation. Ghastly picture, but no improvement seems to be possible at the moment.

Stopover at Oszimiana. On neighboring track is a transport of the cavalry division. The men look completely played out.

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Postby David Thompson » 22 Oct 2004 02:15

APPENDIX DOCUMENT

"Extracts From XXVIII Corps Activity report and Correspondence For Period 7-26 December 1941, Pertaining to Liquidation of Insane at Markarevskaja Asylum", in Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10. Vol. 10: United States of America v. Wilhelm von Leeb, et al. (Case 12: 'The High Command Case'). US Government Printing Office, District of Columbia: 1951. pp. 1196-1200.

Partial Translation of Document NOKW-2268, Prosecution Exhibit 678.

Corps Headquarters XXVIII
Army Corps Ic
Activity Report for the period from 29 November 1941 to 9 May 1942. (Enclosures 1-93) (pages 1-58).

On 7-8 December 1941: The Ic of Corps Headquarters and SS Captain Hubig exchanged results and experiences in the anti-partisan warfare.

At the same time the problem of the insane asylum located in the former monastery Markarevskaja-Pustinj was broached. There are about 240 patients, mostly syphilitics and epileptics from Leningrad, in that insane asylum. They are cared for by a nurse and an assistant. The food situation in the asylum is catastrophic. In these circumstances agreement was reached to the effect that the monastery and its inmates might easily constitute an acute danger of epidemics for the troop units stationed around there. 18th Army Command is first to be consulted as to remedial measures to be taken. (Encl. 5.)

Owing to the new border line drawn between the I [Corps] and the XXVIII Army Corps, the monastery Markarevskaja-Pustinj falls within the area of the I Army Corps. In answer to telephone inquiry, Corps Headquarters I Army Corps, states that it concurs with our solution of the problem. (Encl. 5.)

Command Post, 2 December 1941, Security Police and Security Service, Kommando Hubig, Diary No. 32/41. To the Chief of Einsatzgruppe A of the Security Police and the Security Service, Krasnogvardeisk. Subject: Insane asylum in Markarevskaja.

In Markarevskaja 20 kilometers north-northwest of Lyuban, there exists since 1936 a so-called home for invalids situated in the rooms of a former monastery. The inmates were mainly mentally defectives but also epileptics, syphilitics, etc. At present there are still about 230 to 240 persons in the home, all female.

These incurable patients are cared for solely by a female assistant physician and a female supervisor. Some of the patients are confined to bed, others are moving about freely in the environs of the asylum, which is not barred to the outside in any way. The food supplies are nearly exhausted. Medicines are practically nonexistent. The assistant physician stated that she was lacking all control over the patients. Some of them are said to have already left the asylum. The assistant physician sees in this exodus a danger for the civilian population of the surrounding villages as well as for the village of Markarevskaja itself, where there are still about 150 civilians. Apart from the possibility of the population being infected with venereal diseases, etc., there is the danger of starting and spreading epidemics.

The surgeon of the 2d SS Infantry Brigade, SS Major Dr. Blies, considers an immediate intervention on the following grounds necessary: The patients represent a danger not only to the civilian population but, above all, to the German soldiers. Once the last supplies are used up the patients will even break out. With patients of this type it is even possible that they may attack other people. Apart from that they might infect other people with additionally occurring diseases such as typhus, etc. Unless this source of danger was removed, for medical reasons he would have to demand the withdrawal of the SS units allocated for partisan combat in that area.

The conditions found in Markarevskaja and their possible effect were brought forth during a consultation with the competent Ortskommandant in Lyuban, Major Count Westphal. The Ortskommandant does not consider intervention necessary at this point. He held the view that the patients would leave the asylum only slowly. In the adjacent villages there was no more food anyway, so that the patients would either be liquidated by the civilian population or brought back to the asylum.

A checking of the conditions is requested. We suggest consultation with the army and, at the same time, stress the urgency of the matter.

[Signed] Hubig
SS Haupsturmfuehrer.

[Handwritten notes] Submitted to XXVIII Army Corps, Section Ic for information and return. [Signed] Hubig.

Corps Combat Post, 20 December 1941, Corps Headquarters XXVIII Army Corps Section Ic, To 18th Army, Section Ic. Subject: Insane asylum in Markarevskaja.

In Markarevskaja, 20 kilometers north-northwest of Lyub there exists since 1936, a so-called home for invalids situated in the rooms of a former monastery. The inmates under care are mainly mentally defectives, but also epileptics, syphilitics, etc. At present there are still about 230 to 240 persons in the home, all female.

Three incurable patients are cared for solely by a female assistant physician and a female supervisor. Some of the patients are confined to bed, others are moving about freely in the environs of the asylum, which is not barred to the outside in any way. The food supplies are nearly exhausted. Medicines are practically nonexistent. The assistant physician stated that she was lacking all control over the patients. Some of them are said to have already left the asylum. The assistant physician sees in this exodus a danger as for the civilian population of the surrounding villages as well as for the village of Markarevskaja itself, where there are still about 150 civilians. Apart from the possibility of the population being infected with venereal disease etc., there is the danger of starting and spreading epidemic.

The surgeon of the 2d SS Infantry Brigade, SS Major Dr. Blies, considers an immediate intervention on the following grounds necessary--The patients represent a danger not only to the civilian population but, above all, to the German soldiers. Once the last supplies are used up the patients will even break out. With patients of this type it is even possible that they may attack other people. Apart from that they might infect other people with additionally occurring diseases such as typhus, etc.

To allow this definite source of danger to remain immediately behind the advanced lines of the winter positions and in the vicinity of the troop billets appears untenable.

An additional factor is that even according to German conception the inmates of the asylum no longer represent objects with lives worth living.

This problem has already been discussed with the army corps' Ic. The Army Corps fully agrees with the viewpoint of the XXVIII Army Corps.

The Security Service Detachment Hubig, in Tossno, declared itself willing to carry out the requisite measures. They will be carried out with the aid of Russian physicians at its disposal. The Security Service Kommando Hubig only requests the appropriate consenting instruction of SS Brigadier General Stahlecker which corps Headquarters requests you to effect.


For the Corps Headquarters
The Chief of the General Staff
[Illegible signature].

[Handwritten] Copy on 21 December 1941 to the 269, 70, Ic. [Illegible initial].

To 18th Army Ic. The matter has been settled.

On 25-26 December 1941. [Final entries in XXVIIII Corps Activity Report, 29 November 1941-9 May 1942, pertaining to liquidation of insane at Markarevskaja Asylum.]:

The commander in chief assented to the solution of the problem of the asylum in the former monastery Markarevskaja-Pustinj in the manner proposed by section Ic in agreement with Kommando Hubig of the Security Service. The Security Service will receive the appropriate instructions for the implementation directly from Brigadier General Stahlecker with the army. (Encl. 5.)

Corps Headquarters
XXVIII Army Corps, Section Ic, [Handwritten],

Corps Headquarters, XXVIII Army Corps Sect. Ic,
Activity Report 1942.
Enclosure 5.
Corps Combat Post, 3 January 1942.

Reference: Corps Headquarters XXVIII Army Corps Ic, 20 December 1941.
Subject: Insane asylum in Markarevskaja.

The matter has been settled.

For Corps Headquarters,
Chief of the General Staff
[Illegible signature],

To 18th Army Section Ic.

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Postby David Thompson » 22 Oct 2004 21:01

APPENDIX DOCUMENT

This document is taken from those collected in Document: 3047-PS; Description: File notes on conference in Fuehrer's train on 12 September 1939; report on execution of Jews in Borrisow; and entries from diary of Admiral Canaris. (USA 80) (Referred to but not offered in evidence.). It can be found in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression vol. V, US Government Printing Office, District of Columbia: 1946, pp. 772-776.

The abbreviation "Komm.", used in the text, means "kommissarische," or "acting" mayor.

[Item 4]

[Report received by General Lahousen in his official capacity as a
German intelligence officer.]

Copy

24 October 1941 Report on the execution of Jews in Borrisow.

From Friday 17 October to Monday 20 October I had official business in Borrisow. Upon arrival there on Friday I was informed by the head of the Russian security police there, Ehof, who had been installed in this post some time ago by the SD, that on the night from Sunday to Monday all Jews of Borrisow were to be shot. To my astounded question, that it would be impossible to dispatch 8000 persons into Eternity in the course of a single night in a fairly orderly manner, he replied that it was not the first time that he did this and he would be able to finish the job with his men; he was no longer a layman at this. On this occasion I also learned, that about 1500 Jews were to be spared temporarily, since they were specialists, such as cobblers, tailors, blacksmiths, locksmiths, in other words artisans who were urgently needed for building up the country. The said Ehof at this time presented me with an invitation, signed by him, to the "Celebration of the German Police" which was to take place in a Borrisow restaurant on Sunday 19 October at two o'clock.

I had known Ehof in my Borrisow days. He was at one time made Komm. [Communist?] mayor of Zembin, a town about 25 kilometers from Borrisow, by some army high command. Before the outbreak of the war he was, as a Volga German, employed as a teacher for the German language in the Russian School in Zembin.

Although the shootings of Jews were to be kept secret, they were already known in the Ghetto early on Saturday. I gave my own boots for repair to a Jewish cobbler who lived on the street leading to the airport. There I learned that a delegation was on its way to the mayor, Dr. Stankewitsch, and the Chief of the Russian Security Police, Ehof, in order to obtain a temporary reprieve of these executions so that they might present a petition to the general. However, the cobbler could not tell me which general was meant.

He only told me that the Jews consider it altogether impossible that Adolf Hitler or the general could have given the order to

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shoot these 6500 Jews. I learned further that the mayor, Dr. Stankewitsch, had promised them to speak to the general about it and that he added that he himself could only say that the conduct of the Jews residing in his official district had been exemplary in every respect. By "conduct" he meant the order in the Ghetto, the performing of the work imposed on the Jews, the raising of 300,000 Rubles in taxes imposed on them a few weeks ago, the turning in of gold, silver, etc., which they fulfilled completely.

On Saturday I visited the already mentioned "Celebration of the German Police", not so much in order to drink beer or liquor there, but because I know beforehand to what an unworthy extent this celebration would develop, in other words, to look the affair over.

Of the so-called prominent citizens there were present : a commissioner of the SD—a squire [Ordensjunker] Burg Vogelsang —with his wife, a lieutenant of the GFP, the mayor, Dr. Stankewitsch, the Chief of the Russian Security Police, Ehof.

In addition there were present the assistant chief of the Russian Security Police, Kowalewski, a large number of Security Policemen and their wives, fiancees, or girl friends, a number of German non-corns, and men, and a lot of people.

There was a lot of talk and still more drinking. I started a conversation with the above mentioned Kowalewski -- an old policeman of the time of the Czars. He is a very sympathetic, quiet, and discreet man of 62, and he informed me among other things that this celebration was to be ended by 9 o'clock because a "welikoje deld", a big affair, was scheduled for tomorrow. K asked me to go home with him after the celebration because he had the urge to speak his mind. After reprimanding a few members of our Wehrmacht for disorderly con-duct and because no one could expect me to witness these disgusting excesses any longer, I left this place at about 5 o'clock in the afternoon and returned about 8 o'clock in order to pick up K and to accompany him to his home. I spent two hours with K in lively conversation, we exchanged reminiscences of Czarist days, of the time of the White Russian battles against Bolshevism, and then we also talked of present conditions. The point of view of K, who is a great admirer of everything German, especially of Adolf Hitler and the German Wehrmacht, coincided wholly with mine ; a man who really has his heart in it.

After leaving K, I returned to my quarters and talked to my Russian landlord until bedtime. Here I learned among other things that a few days previously "Buessing Hall" had burned down and the next night "Opel Hall'', and in addition another

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hall in which the kitchen, etc., of a German Wehrmacht unit was stationed. Of course we also talked of the impending shooting of Jews, for this was also known to the civilian population. My hosts said verbatim, and this was probably the attitude of all non-Jews living in Borrisow on that evening: "Pustj oni pogibaj bajut : oni mnogo plochogo nam nadelali!" In German : "Let them perish ; they did us a lot of harm !"

This is what happened on the following morning : The shootings were begun at 3 am. First the men were brought out. They were driven to the place of execution in Russian cars, escorted by men of the Russian Security police of Borrisow who were detailed for this purpose. Because there were not enough of these men, however, reinforcements were brought from the neighboring Russian Security Police offices, such as Zembin, etc. They were provided with the well-known red and white armband and armed with rifles or automatic pistols. On the Polotzkaja Uliza road leading to the airport I saw these cars, at considerable intervals, loaded with women and children. These cars were guarded by men of the Russian Security Police. On the roof sat among others a Russian policeman with an automatic pistol in readiness. The women and children of all ages in these' cars cried and whimpered and screamed for help as soon as they saw a German Wehrmacht member. In this manner one car followed the other during the whole day in the direction of the place of execution, which was located in the woods near the former staff headquarters of the army group "Center". Besides, since there were apparently not sufficient cars and the time was drawing short, groups of women and children were constantly being herded. down the already mentioned road, partly with iron rods. On the periphery of the Ghetto, that is on this same street, groups of Jewish women and children, even babies in their mother's arms, were standing ready to be picked up. In the distance the noise of rifles could be heard all day, the women and children cried and screamed, cars raced through the streets and the Ghetto and kept bringing new victims—all before the eyes of the civilian population and the German military personnel that happened to come along.

A blockade may have been intended but could not be carried out because the other side of the street as well as the side streets were inhabited by non-Jews. The eyes of the latter expressed either complete apathy or horror, because the scenes which took place in the streets were ghastly ! The non-Jews may have believed on the evening preceding the executions that the Jews deserved their fate, but on the following morning their sentiment

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was: "Who ordered such a thing? How is it possible to kill off 6500 Jews all at once? Now it is the Jews' turn, when will it be ours? What did these poor Jews do? All they did was work ! The really guilty ones are surely in safely!" The executions continued all day Monday ! Late in the evening the shooting could not only be heard from the woods but also spread to the Ghetto and nearly all the streets of the city since, in order to escape their fate, many Jews had broken out of the Ghetto and tried somehow to- save themselves. On that evening and during that night it was not advisable even for a member of the Wehrmacht to venture on the streets, in order to avoid the danger of being killed or at least wounded by the Russian policemen, due to a generally prevalent nervousness. About 10 o'clock in the evening a fire was raging in the city and mild shooting was going on. A few houses were burning in the Ghetto and in the vicinity of the Ghetto—the cause is not known to me.

It must be added that German soldiers were summoned toward evening to blockade the Ghetto and to prevent the Jews escaping. As I learned from a noncommissioned officer, a few Jews were, said to have been caught and turned over to the Russian Security Police for execution. The shooting continued throughout the night. On Tuesday, about 8 o'clock in the morning, I was again a witness of the same occurrences as on the previous day. By no means all the Jews had been shot. Many escorted Russian cars returned from the woods. Piled high on these cars was the clothing of the victims. Thus everybody could see what was going on. The clothing was brought to city warehouses. At many places in the Ghetto and along the street already described groups of Jews cowered, awaiting their executing.

As I heard, some Jews are said to have committed suicide in the nearby Beresina. The most gruesome scenes are said to have taken place in the Ghetto during this operation. According to report all specialists were shot, at least the majority of them. That may be so, for, escorted by two Russian policemen, I entered the homes of a tailor and a cobbler on the main street ; the barbed wire had been torn down and I found the house abandoned. It is hard to describe the appearance of these homes ! In order to obtain details of the executions, I struck up a conversation with these two Russian Security men, and I was told the following:

A few days earlier Russian prisoners of war had dug in the woods some huge mass graves about 100 meters long, 5 meters wide, and 3-meters deep. According to the reports of these eye-witnesses, the executions were performed as follows:

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The first delinquents, about 20 men, were made to jump into the pits after taking off all but their underwear. They were then shot from above ! Of course these dead and half-dead people were lying pell-mell. The next victims had to line them up so as to gain as much space as possible. Then it continued as above. When the bottom row of the mass grave was full, the Jews had to put a layer of sand over the bodies and had to trample upon both sand and bodies. The most horrible scenes are said to have taken place in these two mass graves ! Shortly before my departure for the front I met two German soldiers, a private first class and a corporal, who, for curiosity's sake, had witnessed these executions from very close by. They fully confirmed the information sought by me. They added that the Russian policemen were given a great deal of liquor, otherwise they would hardly have been able to perform their difficult task ! The population of Borrisow is of the opinion that the Russian Security men would enrich themselves with the valuables left behind by the Jews, such as gold, silver, furs, cloth, leather, etc., as they were said to have done during previous executions. These security men, moreover, are said to consist largely of old Communists, but nobody dares to report them because they are feared. The population generally desires the occupation of all important posts by German nationals !

Signed:
Soennecken
Master sergeant and interpreter for the Russian language with Intelligence Command B

Postscript: There is a rumor in Borrisow that the now vacant houses of the Jews shall be prepared for Jews from Germany, who in turn shall be liquidated in the same manner as were the Jews of Borrisow.

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Postby David Thompson » 29 Oct 2004 06:42

APPENDIX DOCUMENT

Decree Signed by Hitler, Keitel, and Lammers, 17 July 1941, Making 'Police Security' in the Newly Occupied Eastern Territories a Matter for Reich Leader SS Himmler, in Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10. Vol. 13: United States of America v. Ernst von Weizsaecker, et al. (Case 11: 'Ministries Case'). US Government Printing Office, District of Columbia: 1952. pp. 168-169.

Translation of Document NG-1688, Prosecution Exhibit 528.

Fuehrer Decree Regarding Police Security Within the Newly Occupied Eastern Territories, on 17 July 1941.

I: The police security of the newly occupied Eastern Territories is a matter for the Reich Leader SS and Chief of the German Police.

II: After introducing the civilian administration in these territories, the Reich Leader SS is authorized to give directions to the Reich Commissioners within the sphere of his task designated under I. As far as these directions are of a general character or of real political importance, they will have to go through the office of the Reich Minister for the occupied Eastern Territories. However, not if a direct threatening danger is to be averted.

III: In order to carry out this police security, every Reich Commissioner will be assisted by one Higher SS and Police officer, who is directly and personally subordinate to the Reich Commissioner.

To the General Commissioners, Chief and Area Commissioners SS and Police officers will be assigned, who are directly and personally subordinate to them. Fuehrer Headquarters, 17 July 1941.

The Fuehrer
Signed: Adolf Hitler
The Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces
Signed: Keitel
The Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery
Signed: Dr. Lammers. (L.S.).

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Postby David Thompson » 29 Oct 2004 07:42

APPENDIX DOCUMENT

Letter From Himmler to Rosenberg, July 1942, Confirming the Appointment of Berger as Liaison Officer of Himmler With the East Ministry", in Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10. Vol. 13: United States of America v. Ernst von Weizsaecker, et al. (Case 11: 'Ministries Case'). US Government Printing Office, District of Columbia: 1952. pp. 239-240.

Translation of Document No-3631, Prosecution Exhibit 1100.

Fuehrer Headquarters
July 1942 [The original document had no day in the date. The document was found in folder C-111 of the SS files collected in the Berlin Document Center after the war.]

Dear Party Member Rosenberg:

With this letter I wish to confirm our oral discussion of yesterday regarding the appointment of a liaison officer.

After the death of SS Lieutenant General Heydrich, I appoint the Chief of the SS Main Office, SS Major General and Major General of the Wafen SS Berger--with whom you personally, as well as your office, hitherto had good contact--as liaison officer with the Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories.

Current official relations between my Main Offices, especially the Main Office Uniformed Police and the Main Office Security Police and your Ministry are not affected thereby. The chiefs of my Main Offices will, on their own part, inform the liaison officer of all developments.

Consultation and visits of the individual Chiefs of Main Offices, as for example, of the SS General Daluege, of the SS Lieutenant General Wolff, of the SS Lieutenant General Pohl, of the SS Major Generals Streckenbach, Mueller, Greifelt, Juettner, and others will likewise not be affected by the activity of the liaison officer.

Heil Hitler!
Yours,
[Signed] H. Himmler.

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Postby David Thompson » 29 Oct 2004 07:43

Letter From Himmler to Defendant Berger, 28 July 1942, informing Berger that the Occupied Territories will be purged of Jews, and advising Berger of a forthcoming memorandum by Lammers", in Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10. Vol. 13: United States of America v. Ernst von Weizsaecker, et al. (Case 11: 'Ministries Case'). US Government Printing Office, District of Columbia: 1952. pp. 240-241.

Translation of Document No-626 [Photographic reproduction of this document appears in Appendix A, Volume XIV.], Prosecution Exhibit 2378.

The Reich Leader SS,
1279/42.
Reval,
28 July 1942.
Top Secret. 1 Copy.

Dear Berger:

Concerning your file notes:

1. I urgently request that no ordinance regarding the definition of the word "Jew" be issued. We are only tying our own hands by establishing these foolish definitions. The occupied territories will be purged of Jews. The Fuehrer has charged me with the execution of this very difficult order. No one can release me from this responsibility in any case. Hence, I strongly resent all interference. You will receive the memorandum of Lammers in a short time.

2. What is the idea of this marital law? I want it to be submitted to me. I can already say that I am of the opinion that alliances [Verbindungen] of Germans with local women cannot for the present be regulated by law. They should be prohibited by law altogether. Exceptions for Estonia and Latvia would have to be sent to central authorities there and decided individually according to racial considerations. In a year's time the knowledge gained by practical experience can be expressed in legal form.

That is the way to govern and not otherwise.

Heil Hitler!
Yours,
[Initials] H. H. [Heinrich Himmler].

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Postby David Thompson » 29 Oct 2004 07:45

51st Report of Himmler to Hitler, 29 December 1942, concerning 'results in combatting partisans from 1 September 1942 to 1 December 1942,' containing statistics showing the execution of over 300000 people, the capture of weapons and ammunition, villages searched or burned down, German casualties, and related matters, in Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10. Vol. 13: United States of America v. Ernst von Weizsaecker, et al. (Case 11: 'Ministries Case'). US Government Printing Office, District of Columbia: 1952. pp. 269-271.

Partial Translation of Document No-1128, Prosecution Exhibit 2370.

[Another item of Document NO-1128. not reproduced herein, showed that the figures in this report were derived from a report to Himmler from the Higher SS And Police Leader for Southern Russia, the Ukraine, and Northwest Russia.]

Submitted 31 December 1942
[Initial] A.
Headquarters
29 December 1942.

The Reich Leader SS.
Subject: Reports to the Fuehrer concerning the combatting of Guerrillas. 4 fr.

Report No. 51, Southern Russia, Ukraine, Bialystok. Results in combatting Guerrillas from 1 September 1942 to 1 December 1942.


a. Counted dead after engagements (x): August 1942 (227); September 1942 (381); October 1942 (427); November 1942 (302); Total (1337).

b. Prisoners executed immediately: August 1942 (125); September 1942 (282); October 1942 (87); November 1942 (243); Total (737).

c. Prisoners executed after lengthy and thorough interrogation: August 1942 (2100); September 1942 (1400); October 1942 (1596); November 1942 (2731); Total (7828) [sic].

2. Accomplices of guerrilla and guerrilla suspects.

a. Arrested: August 1942 (1343); September 1942 (3078); October 1942 (8337); November 1942
(3795); Total (16553).

b. Executed: August 1942 (1198); September 1942 (3020); October 1942 (6333); November 1942 (3706); Total (14257).

c. Jews executed: August 1942 (31246); September 1942 (165282); October 1942 (95735);
November 1942 (70948); Total (363211).

3. Deserter owing to German propaganda: August 1942 (21); September 1942 (14); October 1942 (42); November 1942 (63); Total (140).

(x) As the Russians remove their dead or rather, bury them immediately, the figures quoted can be regarded as considerably higher, also, according to statements made by the prisoners.

4. Weapons captured or destroyed.

a. Heavy mortars, guns etc.: August 1942 (8); September 1942 (10); October 1942 (21);
November 1942 (16); Total (55).

b. Automatic weapons: August 1942 (33); September 1942 (51); October 1942 (53); November 1942 (37); Total (174).

c. Other small arms: August 1942 (482); September 1942 (654); October 1942 (560); November 1942 (207); Total (1903).

5. Ammunition.

a. Various kinds: August 1942 (52447); September 1942 (531403); October 1942 (551612);
November 1942 (9165); Total (1616647).

b. Hand grenades.: August 1942 (1049); September 1942 (1296); October 1942 (1225);
November 1942 (1181); Total (4751).

c. Mines: August 1942 (20); September 1942 (21); October 1942 (46); November 1942 (216); Total (303).

d. Explosive (kilo): August 1942 (2); September 1942 (235); October 1942 (570); November 1942 (409); Total (1216).

6. Radio sets captured or destroyed: August 1942 (6); September 1942 (2); October 1942 (3); November 1942 (5); Total (16).

7. Captured cattle and implements.

a. Cattle, cows and oxen: 3442; pigs: 2869; sheep: 2930; horses: 486; calves: 65.

b. Cereal: 1600 cwt.

c. Linseed: 48 cwt.

d. Implements [equipment]: 1 surgical kit, 2 radio sets, 2 bicycles, 12 fodder machines, 200 farming implements (spades, shovels, saws).

8. Engagements: August 1942 (83); September 1942 (106); October 1942 (108);
November 1942 (150); Total (447).

9. Guerrilla caps destroyed: August 1942 (15); September 1942 (24); October 1942 (143);
November 1942 (103); Total (285).

10. Villages and localities.

a. Searched and combed: August 1942 (223); September 1942 (481); October 1942 (625);
November 1942 (387); Total (1716).

b. Burned down or destroyed: August 1942 (35); September 1942 (12); October 1942 (20);
November 1942 (92); Total (159).

11. Single farms.

a. Searched: August 1942 (1026); September 1942 (1040); October 1942 (1376); November 1942 (386); Total (3828).

b. Burned down: August 1942 (257); September 1942 (621); October 1942 (312); November 1942 (788); Total (1978).

12. Own casualties.

(1) SS Regular and Security Police.

a. Dead: August 1942 (43); September 1942 (16); October 1942 (24); November 1942 (91); Total (174).

b. Wounded: August 1942 (16); September 1942 (5); October 1942 (16); November 1942 (95); Total
(132).

c. Missing: August 1942 (2); September 1942 (3); October 1942 (3); November 1942 (5); Total (13).

(2) Indigenous Security Units [Schutzmannschaft].

a. Dead: August 1942 (67); September 1942 (67); October 1942 (58); November 1942 (93); Total (285).

b. Wounded: August 1942 (34); September 1942 (33); October 1942 (17); November 1942 (43); Total (127).

c. Missing: August 1942 (16); September 1942 (10); October 1942 (39); November 1942 (68); Total (133).

13. Raids: August 1942 (153); September 1942 (171); October 1942 (168); November 1942 (191); Total (683).

14. Destroyed property.

a. Estates belonging to the state and others: August 1942 (18); September 1942 (64); October 1942 (21); November 1942 (10); Total (113).

b. Saw mills and forest service stations: August 1942 (9); September 1942 (7); October 1942 (6); November 1942 (8); Total (30).

c. Industrial plants: August 1942 (6); September 1942 (13); October 1942 (11); November 1942
(5); Total (35).

d . Other property: August 1942 (18); September 1942 (57); October 1942 (15); November 1942
(20); Total (110).

15. Acts of sabotage.

a. Railroads: August 1942 (44); September 1942 (59); October 1942 (86); November 1942 (73);
Total (262).

b. Bridges: August 1942 (15); September 1942 (8); October 1942 (9); November 1942 (22); Total (54).

c. Communication stations: August 1942 (11); September 1942 (13); October 1942 (12);
November 1942 (18); Total (54).

d. Others: August 1942 (8); September 1942 (15); October 1942 (9); November 1942 (8); Total
(40).

[Signed] H. Himmler.

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Postby David Thompson » 29 Oct 2004 07:52

Extract From the SS Guidance Pamphlet For January 1943, issued by the SS Main Office, reproducing an extract From a letter of a deceased SS Lieutenant on the execution of two Russian prisoners of war", in Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10. Vol. 13: United States of America v. Ernst von Weizsaecker, et al. (Case 11: 'Ministries Case'). US Government Printing Office, District of Columbia: 1952. p. 273.

Partial Translation of Document No-4404, Prosecution Exhibit 3504

[The inside of the cover page of this pamphlet states: "Publisher: The Reich Leader SS. 88 Main Office Berlin 35, Luetzowstragse 48/49." The document also shows that defendant Berger, Chief of the SS Main Office, also wrote an article for this issue entitled: "To the 30 January 1943." Defendant Berger testified that "at the end" about 450000 copies monthly of the "SS Guidance Pamphlets" were circulated. See extracts from the testimony of defendant Berger reproduced later in this section.]

SS Guidance Pamphlet [SS Leitheft] 9th Year, No. 1.1.1943

From the letter of an SS Lieutenant who was killed in the Eastern campaign:

9 November 1941,

"Dear Else:

"Together with three other soldiers I received [the] order tonight to shoot two members of the Red Army, so that they cannot be of danger to us anymore. They were ragged and apathetic, just like animals. I give a spade to each of them, and they begin to dig their own grave, and I light a cigarette in order to calm down. There is no sound--Russians have no souls, they are animals, they became animals during the past years. They don't beg for their lives, they don't laugh, they don't cry--three guns are pointed at them. All of a sudden one of them starts to run, but he does not get far, 20 meters and he is dead. The other does not move, he steps into his hole, and then he is dead too. Two minutes later the earth covers everything, and we light another cigarette."

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Postby David Thompson » 29 Oct 2004 08:02

APPENDIX DOCUMENT

Extracts From the SS Pamphlet 'Safeguarding Europe'", in Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10. Vol. 13: United States of America v. Ernst von Weizsaecker, et al. (Case 11: 'Ministries Case'). US Government Printing Office, District of Columbia: 1952. pp. 274-278.

Partial Translation of Document No-2501, Prosecution Exhibit 2353.

Safeguarding Europe, The Reich Leader SS, SS Main Office [The title page states at he bottom: "Edited and published by the Reich Leader SS, SS Main Office."], Table of Contents.

WWII--An Ideological Discussion [weltanschauliche Auseinandersetzung].

[Chapter] I. The East-Germanic Land Taking in Eastern Europe.

II. The Repulsion of Mongolian-Slavonic Nations from the Central European Area.

III. The Foundation of the Russian Empire and Its Consequences for Europe--Turks and Jewry Menace Europe.

IV. The First Signs of a Threat to Europe by the Russian Empire. The First attempts of the Czar to Exercise Influence on the Destiny of Europe.

V. The Development of Parties and Intellectual Influences in the Russian Empire Destroys the last Germanic Influences in the East of Europe and Creates the Basis for the Threat to Europe in the 20th Century.

VI. The Contrasts between the European Powers in the 19th Century Prevent a Clear Attitude Toward the Eastern Problem and Cause a Stronger Influence of the Czar on the Fate of Europe.

VII. The Security of Europe Established by Bismarck.

VIII. The Natural Contrasts between the Nations of Central Europe and the Efforts of Expansion in the East Come Again into Force.

IX. Germany Repulses the Danger Coming from the East during WWI, 1914-1918.

X. Bolshevism Interferes in Domestic Politics of the European States. Concerning Foreign Politics, Stalin Continues the Policies of the Czar.

XI. National Socialist Germany Again Shoulders the Old Historic Task of Safeguarding Europe Against the East.

Proposal for 8 Weeks Training:

First week--Introduction: The WWII--Ideological discussion (p. 7). Chapter I: The East-Germanic taking of land in Eastern Europe (p. 10). Germanic tribes--a living east wall of Europe (p. 10). The first invasions of the Huns threaten Europe (p. 12). The infiltration of Slavs threatens the central 'European area (p. 15).

Second week--Chapter II: The Repulsion of Mongolian-Slavonic nations from the central European area (p. 16). The regaining of the area east of the River Elbe--River Saale--River Drava--line (p. 17). The consolidating Polish State threatens Europe's heart (p. 20). The second Mongolian onslaught threatens Europe. (p. 20).

Chapter III: The foundation of the Russian Empire and its consequences for Europe--Turks and Jewry are menacing Europe (p. 22). The Varangians conquer eastern Europe (p. 22). The expansion of Greek-Orthodox Christianity in eastern Europe separates the Russian Empire from Europe (p. 25). The Mongolian onslaught destroys the Germanic wall between River Dnepr and River Volga (p. 27). The Turkish danger threatens Central Europe from the southeast (p. 28). Jewry gains power in Europe and extends to the East (p. 28).

Third week--Chapter IV: The first signs of a threat to Europe by the Russian Empire. The first attempts of the Czar to exercise influence upon the destiny of Europe (p. 29). Ivan III and Ivan IV look to Europe (p. 29 ) . Peter the Great's policy of power threatens Europe (p. 30).

Chapter V: The development of the parties and intellectual influences in the Russian Empire destroys the last Germanic influences in the east of Europe and creates the basis for the threat to Europe in the 20th century (p. 33). The establishment of the parties leads to the fatal party policy referring to foreign policy and to home policy (p. 33). Russia's political starting position from 1815 is deciding concerning foreign policy and home policy for the further development between
Russia and Europe (p. 35). The Czar's foreign policy means always interference in Europe (p. 35). The Muscovite course attacks the Germanic head of the Russian Empire (p. 36). The Pan-Slavism threatens Europe (p. 38). "Young Russia" proclaims the destruction and salvation of the Russian Empire and of the world (p. 39). The poison of Marxist infiltration (p. 40).

Fourth week--Chapter VI: The contrasts between the European powers in the 19th Century prevent a clear attitude toward the eastern problem and cause a stronger influence of the Czar on the fate of Europe (p. 42). The Czars guide the tensions in home politics consciously concerning foreign politics against Europe (p. 42). England, the opponent of Russia in the l9th Century (p. 44). Germany's central situation compels to a permanent readiness against the East and the West (p. 44). Europe's security apparently recedes to the background (p. 45). Nikolas I threatens Europe by his Balkan politics (p. 46). The Polish Revolution in 1830 shows the possibility of a threat to the German soil (p. 46). The revolt of the Hungarians strengthens the Russian predominance and prevents the hegemony of Prussia (p. 46).

Fifth week--Chapter VII: The security of established Europe by Bismarck (p. 48). Bismarck eliminates the Russian Empire in its capacity as a disturbing factor when establishing the German Reich (p. 48). Bismarck's endeavors for unification (p. 49). The German rear cover enables Asiatic conquests of the Russian Empire (p. 49).

Chapter VIII: The natural contrasts between the nations of the central European area and the efforts of extension of the East again come into force (p. 50). Pan-Slavism for the first time opposes Central Europe in the personality of Gorchakov (p. 50). Russian preparations for war against Central Europe (p. 50). The war on two fronts threatens (p. 52). In 1905 Germany omits to prevent the threatening danger from the East (p. 53). Free Masonry and Jewry cooperate with England in the battle against Germany (p. 54).

Sixth week--Chapter IX: In WWI 1914-1918 Germany repulses the danger which came from the East (p. 55). A view on the military geographical situation of the central European area in the year 1914 shows the danger of the threat (p. 55) . The course of the battles in the east protects Central Europe (p. 58). The WWI shows Czechs and Poles as doubtful elements (p. 58). The peace of Brest-Litovsk does not protect Central Europe from the Slavonic influence; it only withdraws a Slavonic power from the central European area (p. 59). The revolution in Russia destroys Czardom (p. 60). Bolshevism destroys the last Germanic blood-streams in Eastern Europe (p. 62) . The revolution in Russia in 1917 eliminates the Czaristic danger for Central Europe, but brings the Bolshevistic danger much nearer (p. 62). The infamous Treaty of Versailles became the soil for the revival of the German nation (p. 64).

Seventh week--Chapter X: Bolshevism interferes in domestic politics of the European States. Concerning foreign politics Stalin continues the policies of the Czars (p. 64). The Dictate of Versailles (p. 64). Czechs and Poles delegated to Versailles (p. 65). The time of the agreements and contracts creates a permanent threat to Central Europe in the East and West (p. 68). The revolts in Germany show the interference of bolshevism in Europe (p. 69). The alliance between Jewish bolshevism and Jewish plutocracy is starting (p. 70). The German-Russian treaty of Rapallo brought only little freedom of movement back to Germany but gave new influence on European politics to the USSR (p. 71). France's collective treaties include no European task toward the East (p. 72). The foreign-political measures of the Soviet Union in the twenties aimed at the consolidation of the state and at the preparation of the military intervention in Europe (p. 73). The union of plutocracy and bolshevism. England's and France's treason to Europe (p. 74). Germany's re-ascension sprang from the strong reciprocal effects of internal events and foreign-political consequences (p. 74). The pressure of Slavic and Slavic-Mongolian peoples since WWI (p. 75).

Eighth week--Chapter XI: National-Socialist Germany again shoulders the old historic task of safeguarding Europe against the East (p. 76) . England sells Europe again (p. 77). The Fuehrer, conscious of his responsibility, takes the fate of Europe into his hands (p. 78). The Fuehrer attempts a peaceful settlement of the eastern relations with Pilsudski (p. 78). The Fuehrer's policy toward the East was obliged, (1) to expel the internal Bolshevist danger, (2) to solve the western Slav problems, (3) to prevent Bolshevist attempts to influence other states in Europe, (4) to clear up the relationship to the USSR the source of all disturbances (p. 79). The Fuehrer's efforts for peace show again and again--The Fuehrer follows European policy (p. 81). The German responsibility concerning the safeguarding of Europe is justified not only from an ideological but also from a military-geographical point of view (p. 81). The Polish attitude finally brings about the WWII (p. 82). The Soviet Union moves closer to Europe (p. 84). The Soviet demands on Germany mean the overture of the attack on Europe (p. 85).

XI. National Socialist Germany Takes Over Again the Historical Task of Securing Europe Against the East.

The thought of safeguarding German and European territories against the dangers threatening from the East has run like a red thread through the Fuehrer's active policy ever since he took over the government.

Safeguarding of Europe! Europe is safeguarded but limited too, in the North, West, and South by military geographical conditions. From these directions no people was ever able to conquer and keep for long essential parts of the European soil. In the East, however, Europe lacks all natural protection; streams of foreign blood were flowing into the European space from the East through the Caspian plain. Thousands and thousands of Germanic families were annihilated in this eastern area because the motherland was not able or not willing to protect them. From now on Germany will no more abandon the safeguarding of Europe neither racially nor politically, neither in a military nor in an economic sense. The most valuable human races of Europe shall never again be spoiled by alien blood and ideologies of alien races. German energy will take care that all the sword has won will never again be lost in times of peace. For the accomplishment of this task, however, a saying of the Reichsfuehrer SS has to become true.

"It is our task not to Germanize the East in the old meaning that is to bring the German language and German laws to the people living there, but to take care that only people of genuine German, Germanic blood are living in the East."

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Postby David Thompson » 30 Oct 2004 03:54

APPENDIX DOCUMENT

Extracts From a Copy of a Memorandum of Gauleiter Frauenfeld, Commissioner General for the Crimea, 10 February 1944, found in the files of Reich Leader SS Himmler, commenting upon German occupation policies in the Occupied Eastern Territories", in Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10. Vol. 13: United States of America v. Ernst von Weizsaecker, et al. (Case 11: 'Ministries Case'). US Government Printing Office, District of Columbia: 1952. pp. 330-335.

Partial Translation of Document No-5394, Prosecution Exhibit C-272.

Secret.
The Commissioner General for the Crimea
Gauleiter A. E. Frauenfeld
Vienna XIII
10 February 1944;
Weidlichgasse 1, F/Lu.
[Handwritten] V.S. No. 1282/44g,
[Handwritten] Reich Leader SS.
Adjutant's Journal No. 575/g [The two handwritten entries indicate the file registration number of different branches of the central SS offices.]

Please submit 9 March 1944
f., 36/36/44g, RF.

Memorandum on the Problems of Administration of the Occupied Eastern Territories:

The longer large parts of the European Continent are conquered by German troops and are being administrated by German authorities, the more important the question becomes of how to handle this administration and how to treat the population. Especially in times of unavoidable crisis resulting from a long drawn-out war and from the changing fortunes of war, questions concerning the treatment and consequently the morale of the population in the occupied territories may become not only essential but even decisive for the outcome of the war.

The individual components, which together form the relationship of the population of the occupied territory to the German people, can be divided into two groups. One group represents all those elements originating with the population of the occupied territory; the other group is determined by the measures and the conduct of the German occupation and administration authorities.

In the course of the war some parts of Europe were occupied where the population was hostile toward us from the very beginning, as, for example, in Poland, France, Belgium, Holland, Denmark, and Norway. On the other hand, some countries were occupied, or conquered, the population of which greeted the German troops as their liberators and met the German administration absolutely in a positive way. This was especially the case with some peoples of the Balkans and the Baltic countries--especially, however, the Ukrainians.

The numerically second-largest people on the continent (if we do not consider the Russians as part of Europe)--of whose more than 40 millions, three quarters came under German civilian and military administration--received the German soldiers jubilantly as their liberators from the hated yoke of bolshevism, and they met them with the greatest of confidence and sympathy.

On the other side we have that masterpiece of wrong treatment and the most remarkable and astonishing achievement--to have, within the period of 1 year, chased into the woods and swamps, as partisans, a people which was absolutely pro-German and had jubilantly greeted us as their liberator and to have thus influenced the course of events in the East in a decisively negative way.

The reason why things developed in this way is only to a very minor extent due to the fact that the Ukrainian people expected things from its liberator which were not along the lines of our policies and therefore caused disappointment gradually growing into enmity.

The truth is that the incorrect as well as incomprehensible at attitudes of some of the competent authorities or of some individuals have to be blamed for this unfortunate course of affairs.

The principle of ruthless brutality, the treatment of the population of the country according to points of view and methods used in past centuries against colored slave peoples; and the fact, defying any sensible policy, that the contempt for that people was not only expressed in actions against the individuals but was also expressed in words at every possible and impossible occasion and was even printed and propagated by pamphlets--all this bears ample testimony to the complete lack of instinct with regard to the treatment of alien peoples, which, in view of its consequences can only be called pathetic and disastrous.

At this point I must state with the greatest of emphasis that the situation is by no means such as the Reich Commissioner for the Ukraine [Koch] constantly pictures it in his reports to the highest authorities--namely that there are now two camps; on the one side those people who first of all want to safeguard Germany's interests in the East; and on the other side the day dreamers and weaklings who, in an almost traitorous way, would be ready to neglect, indeed even to sacrifice, German interests in favor of their "Eastern complex," their "Russian soul," out of their sympathy for the foreign peoples.

On account of this complete distortion of the actual facts an entirely wrong impression of the actual situation was created. The facts were rather the following:

On the one side there were persons who could shape their policies only in accordance with their character, their disposition, and their education, namely, "politics with the sledge hammer."

On the other side there were those persons--in many cases border Germans [Grenzdeutsche] or Germans from abroad--who on the basis of their theoretical knowledge and their practical experience were of the opinion that a policy of brutality and force could not work in the long run, but that the administration of occupied territories would have to be handled on a higher level and one would have to use the (to be sure) more complicated and difficult method of guiding the peoples which, however, promises success.

One cannot repudiate sharply and emphatically enough the arguments that sentimentalities or perhaps special sympathies for the eastern people are involved which are opposed to the interests of the German people; such suspicions, raised again and again, are aimed at discrediting all evidence coming from this side. It is rather appalling to notice how little some people know about history and what we could have learned from it in order to avoid mistakes and act in the right way. In the long run a policy trying to reach its goals in the cold way always proved to be the better and more successful one. This kind of policy will have much more serious and disadvantageous effects on a subjugated people than the "head through the wall policy of the bulls and boars." Anybody who knows history will be able to name a hundred examples to prove that pressure will produce counter-pressure, and that in many a case a people was not smashed on the anvil but was made as hard as steel and thus bring about the desired result quickly and reliably while flexible tactics with regard to the treatment always prove to have a dividing and disintegrating effect.

Apart from these fundamental deliberations it was also stupid that these champions of a thick-headed policy of force did not only apply this force, but talked about it constantly and always in the wrong moment; and that in threatening and ridiculing the native population they went much farther than they could actually afford to, since, on account of the insufficient means of power at their disposal, they could not back up their words by action. Although one might argue as to whether one should do such things, however, there should be no doubt that in any case one keeps silent about it instead of talking constantly about it.

It takes a naivete which borders on stupidity for anybody to believe that in the 20th century a people, which, to be sure had a pathetically sad history, but nevertheless does have some historical past and which--though of different character than the German people--certainly has some racial and character qualities, will accept constant abuses and contempt and, at the same time, will gladly and perhaps voluntarily place its working capacity and its strength at the disposal of its master.

If, on top of all this, the policies of the British in the colonies of the Empire are quoted as an explanation and excuse for such senseless conduct, and if the point of view of the German master race is set against the slave character of Slavic mixed peoples, and if this difference is emphasized loudly and with a lot of ado, one must state that even a policy of catastrophes planned and financed by our opponents could hardly have such disastrous effects as the measures resulting from such nonsense.

All people, but especially naive and rather simple primitive peoples who have, despite a quarter of a century of Bolshevist subjugation, preserved extraordinary sound moral strength (a fact which is worth thinking about), possess like a child that strong ability of differentiating between harsh and unjust treatment, between punishment and arbitrary acts.

In this connection I want to emphasize that even among the champions for a "sensible" eastern policy there is nobody who would hesitate to approve even of the most serious and ruthless actions if they were required in the interest of the German people. It seems justifiable and
can be justified, even in the fact of history, in the case of dire necessity to let thousands and hundreds of thousands of foreigners die if this is necessary for the future and the victory of the German people. Such action would also withstand the judgment of world history. Killing a single person, however, without such higher necessity demanding it, is murder. An action like that has always been condemned by history and its perpetrators were punished by history with the worst of punishments, failure!

The tactics of brutality born of stupidity and inclination are usually supplemented by a complete misunderstanding of political and ideological concepts. It can only be considered as the height of miscomprehension if people believe that they must, already during the war, advocate those basic points of view which are to guide our policies in the East in the postwar area, and fail to take into consideration their psychological effects. Such rigid, dogmatic attitude proves the lack of ability of such people to guide alien peoples; such tasks demand merciless severity in the last and most important questions, but also a rather far extending elasticity and flexibility as well as adaptability in questions of tactics, which do not necessarily have to influence the strategies of our eastern policies in any way. Only one principle must be observed during a war which is waged at the cost of such high sacrifices and is fought for the highest ideal.

What actions are in order to contribute to the victorious conclusion of the war: Applying principles of bourgeois morality to the problems of world history shows that the persons displaying brutality and a master race attitude are inwardly just little philistines [Spiessbuerger] without any greatness; also if they declare that at this early date basic questions must be treated in agreement with our future intentions with regard to the treatment and administration of the eastern peoples, since, we cannot, in a few years assume a different attitude.

Just the opposite is true. If I have the choice of acting in accordance with my policies, but might thus cause embitterment and hostility among the subjugated peoples, or if I can act in a way that will have a favorable propagandistic effect, though it may not be completely in the line of our future policies, there should not be the slightest doubts that it is correct to choose the action which is not quite in keeping with the political line, but will be favorable for the course of the war.

After the German people have won the war, there will be nobody to hinder it in changing its individual measures as well as its entire policies in any way it pleases. World history and German history contain numerous examples for cases in which, afterward, a form based on national or international law was found, or when it could be proved that one partner to the treaty had violated its provisions, whereupon it was possible to cancel former promises or agreements or to change them according to the new situation.

It was doubtlessly right, during the first months of the Eastern Campaign, when everybody was under the illusion that a fifth Blitzkrieg would follow the first four, to advocate the principle of brutality and ruthlessness, since it is doubtlessly apt to produce a maximum of effect within the shortest possible time. When we found out that events in the East became an uninterrupted chain of surprises, it would have been necessary to show our elasticity and to be brave enough to change basically our method of administrating the country just as the battle tactics and the military situation was basically changed. When it became evident that these persons, to whom the policies of ruthlessness and forceful exploitation had been entrusted in case the Blitzkrieg was successful, did not possess the adaptability and flexibility to adapt themselves to the changed situation, one would also have had to bring about the necessary change of policies by means of changing the personnel. Even if in the occupied eastern territories, especially, however, in the Ukraine, the method of ruthlessness was right on principle it would not only have been wrong from the propagandistic point of view thus endangering the course of the war, but also from the tactical point of view, since the civilian administration never has enough executive power in order to maintain such policies with the necessary perseverance and severity.

[Here follows nearly 30 pages of supplementary material, most of which the author specifies as "concrete examples" of his general criticism. This material has been omitted since most of it is similar in nature to materials reproduced herein in documents bearing an earlier date.]

No attempt is intended here to shift all obvious shortcomings and resulting difficulties to the different agencies or individuals mentioned here. It should only be shown how a task by itself difficult, but a beautiful and solvable task, can be made insolvable within the shortest time due to the lack of know how, but also due to the lack of seriousness and the conceited indolence of certain people who seriously hampered the problem of conducting our war.

If in the further course of the war, and after the victorious ending of the war, we will get these territories back, a basic change in the judgment of the population and their treatment must take place, also a fundamental change in the set up of the organization of the civilian administration and of the field of economy lest the most serious difficulties arise for Germany.

Signed: Frauenfeld (Gauleiter A. E. Frauenfeld).

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Postby waffen » 31 Oct 2004 01:54

:D congratulations david excellent work and a great read of factual historical documents. hope you can continue posting the original version of the reichs laws and propaganda. much better than reading some authors edited opinions of 1933 -45. 8)

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Postby David Thompson » 31 Oct 2004 02:12

Thanks, Waffen. I'll keep posting them as I find them.

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Postby David Thompson » 31 Oct 2004 23:45

APPENDIX DOCUMENT

Goering Decree, 27 July 1941, concerning German economic policy in the Occupied Eastern Territories, its relation to war economy, creation of the monopoly companies and Trustee Administration, and related matters", in Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10. Vol. 13: United States of America v. Ernst von Weizsaecker, et al. (Case 11: 'Ministries Case'). US Government Printing Office, District of Columbia: 1952. pp. 848-851.

Translation of Document NI-3777, Prosecution Exhibit 1976.

[This decree was taken from the so-called "Green Folder" of directives on the administration of economy in German occupied territories. See Document EC-347. Prosecution Exhibit 1068, reproduced later in this section.]

The Reich Marshal of the Greater German Reich
Plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan
VP 12 028
Berlin
27 July 1941.

By virtue of the Fuehrer's decree concerning the economy in the newly occupied Eastern Territories dated 20 June 1941 of this year, I hereby decree:

1. The aim of the economic leadership [Wirtschaftsfuehrung] in the occupied Russian territories is not an early restoration of the entire economy--the vastness of the Russian territory and the scarcity of suitable skilled labor rather make it imperative to create centers of gravity within those economic branches which are decisive for the German war economy. Such centers of gravity are grain, oil, seeds, petroleum, and light metals. To these must be added industries which, like the manufacture of agricultural machinery and means of transportation, form the prerequisites for the successful execution of the main tasks. The exploitation of all other branches of economy can be considered or the time being, only if the main tasks do not suffer therefrom. It must give way until the German interests in the abovementioned sectors, which are decisive for the outcome of the war, are fully safeguarded. In accordance with this guiding principle, the maintenance or reinauguration of economy will vary in scope in the different areas.

2. In order to avoid, as far as possible, breaks in production and interruptions in the delivery of agricultural products, the present economic Kolkhoz [collective farm] system--although in the modified form of the "Gemeindehof" [community farm] and sovkhoz [state farm]--will, at present, have to be maintained. It is essential that as many German managers as possible be committed in the field of agriculture in the occupied territories, especially in the surplus areas, and that they endeavor to bring about a maximum production of the enterprises under their control and see to it that the products are sent to points where they are most needed in the interests of the German war economy. In order to insure the centrally organized collection of agricultural products in the Occupied Eastern Territories and their commitment in accordance with the given interests of the German food situation, I agree to the creation of the "Central Trading Company East for Agricultural Distribution and Supply" [Zentrale Handelsgesellschaft Ost fuer landwirtschaftlichen Absatz und Bedarf m.b.H] which shall have exclusive trading rights (a monopoly company) and shall, apart from its task of seizure and distribution, also undertake the task of supplying the agricultural economy of the Occupied Eastern Territories with production and consumer goods as long as it is not yet possible to permit the participation of independent trading enterprises without endangering the delivery of food supplies.

3. The Russian oil production must remain in German hands because of its supreme importance for the German Army and economy. For this reason I have ordered the Continental Oil Company [Kontinentale Oel, AG] to take over all oil fields which fall into German hands. I reserve the right to order that other type of raw materials the permanent transfer of which into German hands is in the interest of the over-all German economy, be also transferred immediately to the ownership of those particular concerns which are to manage them on a permanent basis.

Furthermore, in reply to the suggestion of the Reich Minister of Economics I agree that the following monopoly companies [The designation has been changed to "Ostgesellschaften."] be created in accordance with the submitted company charters and commissioned by executive authorities:

a. The Mining and Steel Company East, with the task of managing, in the interest of the German war economy, the Russian coal and iron industry as well as the mining of iron ore.

b. The Textile Fiber Company East with the task of managing the Russian textile industry in the interest of the German war economy.

Once a month the monopoly companies shall submit to the Economic Operations Staff a report on their activities.

Apart from the above-enumerated companies, further monopoly companies shall be created only to the extent to which it is necessary for the central steering in the interest of the German war economy. I therefore reserve to myself the right to authorize in each individual case the creation of possible subsidiaries, as well as of further monopoly companies. In any such case, the charters shall be submitted to me for approval through the Economic Executive Staff East [Wirtschaftsfuehrungsstab Ost] [Defendant Koerner was the Deputy Chief of the Economic Executive Staff East. The functions of this agency are taken up in documents reproduced later in this section and in the extracts from the testimony of defendant Koerner reproduced later in this section.] Since monopoly companies are only a transitory solution, they shall furthermore be uniformly created only for a limited period of time. I also reserve to myself the right to decide on a prolongation of the duration of the charters, if any be necessary.

5. For the rest, it will be sufficient for the purpose of safeguarding German interests during the transition period, if especially important branches of industry and commerce are administered by German firms as individual trustees. In such cases, it will often be advisable as, for example, in the case of the chemical industry, that, for the assistance of the trustee in the administration of enterprises, companies be created in Germany by individual enterprises or by German economic associations. [Concerning special companies formed in the chemical field, see the materials on the I.G. Farben case, volumes VII and VIII. this series.]

On the other hand, it will have to be borne in mind that the trustee administration, which is interconnected with strong State supervision, does not represent the final solution. It must be endeavored, at an earliest possible date, to lease the enterprises to German and--if the executive authorities approve--to local entrepreneurs. In principle this also applies to the economic branches which are centrally administered by the monopoly companies, provided that I make no provision for special exceptions.

6. Basically, the principle of business expediency must be determinative in the selection of methods to be employed in the administration of economic branches which are essential for the war, that is, the question how a maximum performance can be achieved.

In the long run the highest economic performance cannot be expected from Bolshevik collective economy, but only on the proven basis of private economy directed by the State. The system of collective economy shall, therefore, be continued only as long as it is absolutely essential to avoid disruption in the supply of the German Army and economy from the Russian territory, which might result from a sudden change in the forms of economy.

7. Finally, every measure must be tested in the light of the principle that those branches of economy which are decisive for the outcome of the war shall have priority. I expect all economic agencies in the Occupied Eastern Territories to observe this principle under all circumstances.

Signed: Goering.

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Postby David Thompson » 31 Oct 2004 23:52

APPENDIX DOCUMENT

Extracts from a Handbook (Brown Folder) of the East Ministry, April 1942, concerning 'Directives for the Economic Administration' of Occupied Russia", in Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10. Vol. 13: United States of America v. Ernst von Weizsaecker, et al. (Case 11: 'Ministries Case'). US Government Printing Office, District of Columbia: 1952. pp. 851-854.

Partial Translation of Document NI-10119, Prosecution Exhibit 1055.

[Handwritten] VII A 36.V.7
Restricted.
The Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories
III Wi. 2461/42.

The Civil Administration in the Occupied Eastern Territories (Brown Folder):

Part A--Directives for the Economic Administration [This handbook is 77 pages long, the first 39 pages being devoted to exposition and the balance containing 14 appendixes, each appendix being an order or a regulation.]

Berlin, April 1942.

I. General Directives.

II. Organization:

1. Central agencies: By the Fuehrer's decree of 17 July 1941 concerning the administration of the newly occupied Eastern Territories [This decree, Document NG-1280, Prosecution Exhibit 529, is reproduced in section VI H, Volume XII, this series.] (see appendix), it was decided that the whole administration, and accordingly the administrative agencies with the Reich Commissioners on the top, will be subordinated to the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories and that those agencies will receive their directives exclusively from him (secs. 2 and 7)

A very important exception of those decisions is admitted in the sphere of the economy. By the Fuehrer's decree of 29 June 1941 [This decree, Document EC-207, Prosecution exhibit 1057, is reproduced earlier in this section.] the Reich Marshal Hermann Goering is allowed, in the sphere of competence as the Plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan, to take all measures necessary for the utmost exploitation of the stocks and economic resources found, and the reconstruction of the economy for the German war effort.

The relationship of the Plenipotentiary of the Four Year Plan and the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories has been coordinated for practical purposes as follows (compare competent decree by the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories, for the Reich Commissioners of 26 February 1942--III 1180/41):

a. Both offices keep in constant contact, inform each other currently, and coordinate all decisions.

b. Decrees about economic matters may be issued by the Reich Commissioners for their territory, within the scope of the decree by the Reich Minister for Occupied Eastern Territories, of 26 February 1942, and appended decrees thereof. Decrees by the Reich, valid in the newly occupied Eastern Territories, will only be published in the official gazette of the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories.

c. Without prejudice as to the direct jurisdiction of the Plenipotentiary of the Four Year Plan, assignment for the Reich Commissioners will be made by the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories.

d. All reports by the Reich Commissioners will be submitted to the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories unless direct reports are expressly requested by the Plenipotentiary of the Four Year Plan. In that case, a copy of the report is to be submitted to the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories simultaneously. General situation reports have to be submitted to both agencies simultaneously.

Apart from the jurisdiction [Weisungsrecht] of the Plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan, and the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories, other Supreme Reich Agencies do not have jurisdiction over the Reich Commissioners in economic matters.

The Reich Marshal formed the Economic [Executive] Staff East [Wirtschaftsfuehrungsstab Ost] [The original English translation for this term at this particular point in this document was "Economic Staff East," which was either a typographical error or an erroneous and misleading translation, since "Economic Staff East" was the usual and the literal translation of "Wirtschaftsstab Ost," a related agency. The superior agency, the "Wirtschaftsfuehrungsstab Ost," was usually translated as "Economic Executive Staff East" and this translation was adopted by the Tribunal in its judgment. During the examination of defendant Koerner, an extensive discussion took place between counsel and the Tribunal which produced no agreement on the question. Dr. Koch suggested the following: "For the superior agency, the 'Wirtschaftsfuehrungsstab Ost,' 'Economic Operational Staff East,' and for the subordinate staff, which had the executive function, I suggest 'Economic Executive Staff East'...Policy was laid down in advance by Goering in Berlin. For basic questions, the staff I have now christened the 'Economic Operational Staff' was competent, but it had little work and soon faded out altogether. The work throughout all these years--masses of decrees and practical measures--was carried out by the staff which I have called 'Economic Executive Staff East'" (Tr. pp. 14386-7).]--directed by State Secretary Koerner as his deputy--in which all departments concerned are centralized and are given the possibility to state their points of view and to influence all the decisions concerning the Eastern Territories.

* * *

Appendix 6:

Headquarters
28 October 1941
The Reich Marshal of the Greater German Reich
The Plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan
V.P. 17621.

Decree concerning the Seizure and Utilization of Industrial Raw Materials and Other Materials Important for the War Effort in the Newly Occupied Eastern Territories, 28 October 1941.

To clarify questions which arose about reconnaissance, seizure, safeguarding, and confiscation, as well as removal and utilization of raw materials and materials essential for the war effort of the industrial economy in newly occupied Eastern Territory, the following directives and regulations are again summarized here:

I. Basic principles as contained in the directive concerning the economic leadership in the newly occupied Eastern Territories (Green Folder, Part I) are also decisive here. Therefore, raw materials and the newly acquired industrial raw materials found in occupied territories must, after satisfying the need of combat troops, the replacement organizations, and security units, be used first of all to satisfy the needs of the war economy of the Reich, while remaining parts will be distributed in the Occupied astern Territories according to requisitions which will be done by the Reich, in view of war economical needs.

II. On particular points the following applies:

1. Usage of the stocks of industrial raw materials and materials essential for war effort.

a. Reconnaissance, seizure, safeguarding, and confiscation, as well as execution of the removal of raw material stocks and materials important for the conduct of the war, follows according to the directives of the Plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan--Economic Executive Staff East.

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Postby David Thompson » 01 Nov 2004 00:01

Report from General Thomas' Liaison Staff with Goering, 25 November 1941, quoting a memorandum on 'General Principles for the Economic Policy in the Newly Occupied Eastern Territories' arising out of Goering's 'East Conference' of 8 November 1941", in Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10. Vol. 13: United States of America v. Ernst von Weizsaecker, et al. (Case 11: 'Ministries Case'). US Government Printing Office, District of Columbia: 1952. pp. 854-856. (emphases in original)

Partial Translation of Document EC-3, Prosecution Exhibit 1061.

Liaison Staff of the High Command of the Armed Forces Economic Armament Office, with the Reich Marshal
Local headquarters
25 November 1941
No. 260/41 g.

Reference: Order of the Chief, Economic Armament Office in the High Command of the Armed Forces of 29 July 1941.

Concerning: War Economic Notes ending 30 November 1941.

To the Chief of the Economic Armament Office [W. Rue Amt], [The full title of this office is "Military Economics and Armament Office" (Wehrwirtschafts -und Ruestungsamt); this office is frequently referred to in original documents as "Wi Rue Amt," and in this case the translation "Economic Armament Office" is frequently used.], Lieutenant General Thomas, Berlin.

The viewpoints occasionally mentioned during the reporting period are comprised in the notes of the conference on 8 November 1941. Compare Reich Marshal of Greater Germany report for the Four Year Plan, No. 19 203/6 g. of 20 November 1941. [A translation of this report was introduced in evidence as Document NI-440, Prosecution Exhibit 10062, reproduced in part immediately below.] The Reich Marshal has not been in the Headquarters East since that time so that no reports have been given.

To maintain the completeness of the presentation of the existing reports, the "General Principles for the Economic Policy in the Newly Occupied Eastern Territories" based on the ''East Meeting" in Berlin on 8 November 1941 are quoted below:

"I. For the duration of the war the requirements of the war economy will be the all-dominant factor of any economic measures in the newly occupied Eastern Territories.

"II. Seen from a long range point of view the newly occupied Eastern areas will be exploited economically from the point of view of colonial administration [kolonialen Gesichtspunkten] and by colonial methods.

"Exceptions will be made only for those parts of the Ostland which are to be Germanized by order of the Fuehrer, but even they are subject to the principle expressed in paragraph I.

"III. The main emphasis of all economic work rests with the production of food and raw materials.

"The highest possible production surplus for the supply of the Reich and of other European countries is to be attained by cheap production based on the maintenance of the low living standard of the native population. Besides covering thereby the European needs for food supplies and raw materials as far as possible, this measure is intended to create a source of income for the Reich which will make it possible to liquidate in a few decades, with utmost consideration for the German taxpayer, an essential part of the debts incurred in the financing of the war.

"IV. Manufacturing in the Occupied Eastern Territories will be considered only if absolutely necessary:

(a) to decrease the volume of transportation (i.e., manufacturing processes up to steel or aluminum blocks),

(b) to take care of urgent repair needs inside the country,

(c) to take advantage of all facilities in the armament sector during war time.

"It remains to be decided to what extent a resumption of the production of trucks and tractors can be considered during the war (in view of the overburdened European industrial capacity).

"V. The development of a considerable consumer goods and finished products industry in the Occupied Eastern Territories is not permitted. It is rather the task of European, and especially, German, industry to process the raw materials and semi-finished products produced in the occupied Eastern areas and to take care of the most urgent requirements for industrial consumer goods, and production means of these Eastern areas which are to be exploited like a colony [kolonialwirtschaftlich auszunuetzen]. The larger the number of products of daily needs we send to Russia, the greater will be the quantity of raw materials we can extract, the greater will the difference in value become, and the earlier will our war debts be liquidated.

"VI. To supply the population with high-valued consumer goods is out of the question. On the contrary, all tendencies to raise the general standard of living are to be suppressed right from the start with the most drastic measures. The question as to which kinds and quantities of consumer goods and production means are to be delivered to the newly Occupied Eastern areas is to be settled in conjunction with the Economic Office of the Reich Commissioners.

"The Ostland, too, may, at the beginning, be furnished only very limited quantities of consumer goods. The long range order for the Germanization of the Ostland must not be allowed to lead to a general rise of the living standards of all the nationalities living there. Only the Germans living there, or to be settled there, and the elements to be Germanized may receive preferential treatment.

"VII. The Russian price and wage scales are to be kept as low as possible. Any interference with the price and wage policy which is to be established exclusively to benefit the interests of the Reich is to be punished mercilessly. The Ostland, too, is subject to the principle that surpluses, specifically the agricultural ones, have to reach the Reich at the lowest possible prices."

Signed: Nagel.




Liaison of the OKW/WiRueAmt with the Reich Marshall

C. P., 18 September 1941 31/41

TOP SECRET

Re: Economic Notes for the Reporting Period of 15 August -16 September 1941.

In that period discussions pertaining to war and general economy took place only on the 15th and 16th of September. Nothing of basically new importance came out of the discussions so that no notes could be taken about it.

* * * * *

The following persons participated in the conference of 16 September which had been preceded by a short meeting on the 15th of September:

The Reich Marshall. Secretary of State Backe (4-Year Plan). General of the Luftwaffe Gosrau (Administrative Office, b d L). Lt. General von Seidel (Quartermaster General Ob d L). Lt. General Osterkamp (Army Administrative Office). Lt. General Wendersleben (Army Administrative Office). Colonel Baentsch (Quartermaster General, OKH). Ministerialdirektor Riecke (Economic Staff East, 4-Year Plan and Reich Minister, East). Major General Nagl (Liaison Office, OKW/WiRueAmt). Ministerialrat Dr. Goernnert (Reich Marshall). Captain on the General Staff of the Luftwaffe von Brauchitsch (Reich Marshall).

At this conference which was concerned with the better exploitation of the occupied territories for the German food economy, the Reich Marshall called attention to the following:

It seems that the Wehrmacht demands too much, especially preserved food from home. With the exception of tobacco goods, chocolate, dried vegetables, etc., all food supplies for the troops, used or utilized in the Eastern territories, have to be furnished by the occupied territories themselves. If that cannot be accomplished, perhaps on account of insufficient organization or out of sympathy for the native population, or because of transport difficulties or indolence, or because the use of preserved foods is simpler, then those reasons must be done away with. On no account do I permit an increased supply from the Reich, which -- especially with regard to meat supply -- would lead to a decrease of rations for the German civilian population. On no account do I give my permission for that.

The morale at home would suffer from that or become shaky. The home front has to take enough already (bombings, mounting losses, slow successes in the East, and in addition, the fact that this war is a second one within a generation). This would furnish an excellent weapon for enemy propaganda. It already employs these days the method of instructing the populations of the occupied countries to cry for food time and time again, to hide stores, to keep from delivering food supplies, etc., so that every place -- and not the least at home -- food difficulties and bad feelings associated with the sinking of morale, arise.

It is clear that a graduated scale of food allocations is needed.

First in line are the combat troops, then the remainder of troops in enemy territory, and then those troops stationed at home. The rates are adjusted accordingly. The supply of the German non-military population follows and only then comes the population of the occupied territories.

In the occupied territories on principle only those people are to be supplied with an adequate amount of food who work for us. Even if one wanted to feed all the other inhabitants, one could not do it in the newly-occupied Eastern areas. It is, therefore, wrong to funnel off food supplies for this purpose, if it is done at the expense of the army and necessitates increased supplies from home.

(signed) Nagel
(Reich Marshal)

Last edited by David Thompson on 03 Feb 2005 22:56, edited 3 times in total.


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