Agreed, but it still may not be relevant in this case?daveshoup2MD wrote: ↑17 Feb 2022 20:43Think the issue would be if the "mixed" organization, by removing one of these seven division's three infantry brigades (from their 1941-42 organizations, prior to the "mixed" organization) had any impact (positive or negative) in terms of their performance when they went into action in 1943-44. One potential positive: did they do better, worse, or about the same in terms of combined arms than the "standard" divisions, because of the experience with the armor cross-attachment? A potential negative: did the churn overall, and the need to create and then attach a third divisional infantry brigade in 1943 make a difference in their performance compared to the divisions that did not have to deal with that? Or delay their deployment on active service?
For example, the 1st Division "lost" 1 Infantry (Guards) Brigade on 1 June 1941. It "gained" 34 Army Tank Brigade 8 June 1942. In between, it also "gained" 210 Infantry Brigade 25 November 1941-12 January 1942 and 38 (Irish) Infantry Brigade 13 January-7 June 1942. Afterwards it also had a succession of ins and outs of third infantry brigades, 24 Infantry (Guards) Brigade 6 December 1942-17 May 1943, 128 Infantry Brigade 9-15 May 1943, 1 Infantry (Guards) Brigade 17 May-29 June 1943, 24 Infantry (Guards) Brigade 30 June 1943-7 March 1944, 18 Infantry Brigade 8 March-16 August 1944, and 66 Infantry Brigade 19 August 1944-31 August 1945.
The problem was not a "churn" caused by withdrawing an infantry brigade, substituting an armoured/tank brigade, and then returning an infantry brigade. British divisions of all types tended to churn because of a lack of infantry forces in the British Army, complicated by the British Regimental System. Most of these infantry brigades were not created in 1943 to replace the tanks in the mixed division, most already existed, but had been shuffled off to other divisions, task forces, garrisons, and so on until hoovered up again as the British tried to make up infantry losses in units in combat. It is also the reason for the Lower Establishment divisions; they were stripped of personnel as replacement drafts and then acted as draft finding and training units.