Seelöwe: British Defensive Measures - Naval and Air Ops

[phylo_roadking]

Regarding Crete and AA - the problem was that on several occasions vessels that had been unable to rearm were put to sea again, or turned back towwards the Aegean before they could rearm, because he vessels on station were in a worse position. On I think two occasions, Alexandria was actually unaware of how low ammo stocks were when they were turned around or tasked elsewhere. The AA cruisers were actually doing the job odf several vessels, as they were accompanying and providing cover for destroyers acting as fast freighters trying to land stores in Suda Bay at night.

But actually, I wasn't talking about AA on the German vessels in the sense of large-calibre or pom-pom AA that was what gave the ammo issues at Crete a year later, I was taking about the small-calibre LMGs that each troop-carrying barge/railway ferry/ frieghter with be bristling with. But yes indeed, you've raised an interesting point - how long would RN vessels be able to stay on station when this time they would be under attack by two whole Luftflotte, as opposed to the squadrons operating out of Salonika or Rhodes that Von Richthofen had at his disposal in 1941? Once again, larger RN vessels would be in the position of prviding AA cover for smaller, expending their ammo stocks as fast if not faster than Crete. Then, without protection from air attack they'd have to exit the combat zone, get to port and rearm...ports that would also be under air attack, and you're assuming the U-Boat menace would be totally eradicated....the RN's problem would be they'd be under constant attack approaching the invasion fleet once within range, they'd be attacked from the air while engaging german shipping, then be attacked when leaving the area; events at Dunkirk showed how vulnerable they would be to constant pressure like that.

[JonS]

A good comparison would be British/US artillery OP planes, which AIUI normally used their slow speed maneuver capabilities to escape fighters on the rare occasions when they were bothered by them.

Andreas, Moths don't have a slow speed manouvering capability - just slow speed. British Austers and the various Amercian types all relied on leading edge slats, very light weight large wing surfaces etc to enhance their lift and reduce their stall speed so they could "linger" in station almost but not quite as well as a Storch.

You're wrong, and Andreas is right. Or rather, you are right but in such an irrelevant way that Andreas is right anyway.

The only time the AOPs faced a significant and sustained enemy air treat was in North West Africa. The early model Austers flown there did not have slats, and also had weaker engines than the later types. Comparison between these early AOP a/c and Moths is apt.

[RichTO90]

Regarding Crete and AA - the problem was that on several occasions vessels that had been unable to rearm were put to sea again, or turned back towwards the Aegean before they could rearm, because he vessels on station were in a worse position. On I think two occasions, Alexandria was actually unaware of how low ammo stocks were when they were turned around or tasked elsewhere. The AA cruisers were actually doing the job odf several vessels, as they were accompanying and providing cover for destroyers acting as fast freighters trying to land stores in Suda Bay at night.

Lord, I'm beginning to feel like we're going to have to go over and over this at least a million times whenever a new Tom, Dick, or Harry puts his two cents worth in. Of course we've probably already seen and responded to a couple dollars worth of the same repetition. Isn't there anything new under the sun?

Crete was examined in some detail earlier, including the losses by day and the problems with ammunition supply. One probelm was caused when the hairbrained idea of bombading some of the German airbases was attempted.

What hasn't been touched upon was that Crete occured a full 7 months later, after the Germans had begun to concentrate on antiship training for the Kampf and Stuka Geschwadern (although most of the damage at Crete was from the Stukas). However, the Royal Navy wasn't only hampered by inadequate ammunition, they were hampered by possibly the worst AA director system in servcie in a major navy at that point. BTW, the cruisers were there because RN destroyers had virtually zero AA capability. And yet losses were still insignificant when compared to what would be required to prevent a major RN countermove directed against an invasion force.

But actually, I wasn't talking about AA on the German vessels in the sense of large-calibre or pom-pom AA that was what gave the ammo issues at Crete a year later, I was taking about the small-calibre LMGs that each troop-carrying barge/railway ferry/ frieghter with be bristling with.

You were? Where? And why? Small-caliber machine guns on barges would be about as useful as the nearly nonexistant RAF cannon-armed fighters that were about all that were tasked with the job of attempting to attack them. Zero versus zero is....zero?

And they can bristle all the wish, rifle-caliber AA machineguns are about as useless against aircraft as can be imagined, especially when they are single weapons on unstable mounts without any form of director. The phrase "useless as tits on a bull" comes to mind.

But yes indeed, you've raised an interesting point - how long would RN vessels be able to stay on station when this time they would be under attack by two whole Luftflotte, as opposed to the squadrons operating out of Salonika or Rhodes that Von Richthofen had at his disposal in 1941?

Richtofen had more Stukas operational for Crete than were available by September 1940 to support Seelöwe. For the rest of it, only KG 30 and the nascent KG 40 had any training in antiship operations and level bombers are about as.....what's the phrase?...."useless as tits on a bull" when it comes to attacking mobile naval targets.

Once again, larger RN vessels would be in the position of prviding AA cover for smaller, expending their ammo stocks as fast if not faster than Crete.

Curious, Gypsy Moths can't fly in the dark in response and yet the Luftwaffe evidently can? Carrots? (Yeah, its an old joke, but we've got a new joker in the game. :roll: )

Then, without protection from air attack they'd have to exit the combat zone, get to port and rearm...ports that would also be under air attack,

Er, the RAF? You did read the standing operational orders? That state that the primary task is protection of the fleet? And is the Luftwaffe attacking the ports, the Royal Navy at sea, or escorting the invasion fleet? There is little evidence that by September the Luftwaffe was capable of performing any single one of those tasks, let alone all three - or four if you add in support of the invasion forces.

Like every argument that seems to come up this all devolves into a hocus-pocus, smoke-and-mirrors routine. The Germans simply did not have the resources to perform all the tasks that were required for a succesful invasion. They might have had the resources to complete any single step, but that would not carry them forward to their goal.

and you're assuming the U-Boat menace would be totally eradicated....

Really? Who's assuming? There is no assumption, look over the evidence presented, like everything else, the U-Bootewaffe was overstretched. There were insufficient fleet boats available for the tasks assigned, sending in the Ducks would have been a measure of desperation (and the operational ones were assigned to Norway anyway), and the Royal Navy simply had too many ASW assets in Home waters (to the detriment of the Atlantic routes at this time). It was already policy for the U-Boote to stay out of the Channel for a very good reason.

the RN's problem would be they'd be under constant attack approaching the invasion fleet once within range, they'd be attacked from the air while engaging german shipping, then be attacked when leaving the area; events at Dunkirk showed how vulnerable they would be to constant pressure like that.

The German plan required the invasion fleet to move during the night and be assembled off the coast in time for the landing a half hour after dawn. There is a thirteen hour window of darkness in the plan. How does the Luftwaffe engage anything in the dark?

And "events at Dunkirk" nonsense, it showed nothing of the sort. Frankly, the only excuse for that statement you can have is that you haven't bothered to read the threads and the evidence presented. If it showed anything - along with Norway - it was just how incapable the German antishipping aircraft were.

[phylo_roadking]

But actually, I wasn't talking about AA on the German vessels in the sense of large-calibre or pom-pom AA that was what gave the ammo issues at Crete a year later, I was taking about the small-calibre LMGs that each troop-carrying barge/railway ferry/ frieghter with be bristling with.


You were? Where? And why? Small-caliber machine guns on barges would be about as useful as the nearly nonexistant RAF cannon-armed fighters that were about all that were tasked with the job of attempting to attack them. Zero versus zero is....zero?

And they can bristle all the wish, rifle-caliber AA machineguns are about as useless against aircraft as can be imagined, especially when they are single weapons on unstable mounts without any form of director. The phrase "useless as tits on a bull" comes to mind.

Why? Because I'M talking about the Tiger Moths of Operation Banquet nothing else at the moment, and if one Lewis gun bullet from a ground LMG is enough to kill the Red Baron in WWII, what price sustained fire from ground troops crammed into barges and only too grateful for something to shoot at...

Once again, larger RN vessels would be in the position of prviding AA cover for smaller, expending their ammo stocks as fast if not faster than Crete.


Curious, Gypsy Moths can't fly in the dark in response and yet the Luftwaffe evidently can? Carrots? (Yeah, its an old joke, but we've got a new joker in the game.

Who mentioned anything about nighttime in the above quote???

Like every argument that seems to come up this all devolves into a hocus-pocus, smoke-and-mirrors routine. The Germans simply did not have the resources to perform all the tasks that were required for a succesful invasion. They might have had the resources to complete any single step, but that would not carry them forward to their goal.

No. Its like the argument of air superiority versus air supremacy. And YOU look at the RAF's list of priorites - the Luftwaffe didn't have to succeed 100% at any one thing - they exactly the same as the RAF only had to disrupt the RAF from fully carrying out any of their responsibilities...to create an exploitable weakness in the defence

Really? Who's assuming? There is no assumption, look over the evidence presented, like everything else, the U-Bootewaffe was overstretched. There were insufficient fleet boats available for the tasks assigned, sending in the Ducks would have been a measure of desperation (and the operational ones were assigned to Norway anyway), and the Royal Navy simply had too many ASW assets in Home waters (to the detriment of the Atlantic routes at this time). It was already policy for the U-Boote to stay out of the Channel for a very good reason

Ah! so if serious planning for Sealion by the KM had gone ahead, they wouldn't have been retasked? Only the RN then is allowed by the thinking of people in this thread to be 100% retasked to invasion defence, and not the KM to invasion support?

The German plan required the invasion fleet to move during the night and be assembled off the coast in time for the landing a half hour after dawn. There is a thirteen hour window of darkness in the plan. How does the Luftwaffe engage anything in the dark?

And "events at Dunkirk" nonsense, it showed nothing of the sort. Frankly, the only excuse for that statement you can have is that you haven't bothered to read the threads and the evidence presented. If it showed anything - along with Norway - it was just how incapable the German antishipping aircraft were.

Actually, I was thinking of the sustained three-four day sea battle events would require, not some magical 13-hour RN crushing everything in their path. Unless Mama didn't teach her son very well about the difference between daylight and nighttime, significant events were going to happen round the clock and the RN wasn't just going to be able to up-sticks and go home before dawn each day....my comments had nothing to do with whether the LW could operate at night or not.

"And "events at Dunkirk" nonsense, it showed nothing of the sort. Frankly, the only excuse for that statement you can have is that you haven't bothered to read the threads and the evidence presented"

So the 52 RN units lost in 8 days at Dunkirk are a figment of my imagination?

[phylo_roadking]

Jon, the similarities in all-up power etc. of early-mark Austers and Moths are indeed notable - but the manouverability is not. The Auster in whatever mark is a far more nimble aircraft than the Tiger Moth. And it's manovuerability that is the topic here.

[RichTO90]

Why? Because I'M talking about the Tiger Moths of Operation Banquet nothing else at the moment, and if one Lewis gun bullet from a ground LMG is enough to kill the Red Baron in WWII, what price sustained fire from ground troops crammed into barges and only too grateful for something to shoot at...

The Red Baron had four Vickers MMG on AA mounts fire at him twice, as well as at least two Lewis guns on simpler post mounts and possibly hundreds of rifles and was hit by a single round although flying just 60 feet off the ground at well under 100 miles per hour. It is also most likely that he was hit by Popkin's Vickers MG section, not Buie or Evan's Lewis guns.

So again, there is considerable difference between a stable ground mount designed to engage aircraft and fired by an experienced gunner (Popkin) and a mass of other rifle-caliber weapons.

Note also that BANQUET was intended as part of a coordinated attack that was to include bombers and fighter escorts, so it wasn't "nothing else" but the Tiger Moths.

Who mentioned anything about nighttime in the above quote???

Sorry, my fault, the context got lost in snipping the quotes. You implied to LWD that the Moths would have to operate in daylight to hit the Germans, but of course that is also true vice versa, the Luftwaffe require daylight to hit the Royal Navy as well.

No. Its like the argument of air superiority versus air supremacy. And YOU look at the RAF's list of priorites - the Luftwaffe didn't have to succeed 100% at any one thing - they exactly the same as the RAF only had to disrupt the RAF from fully carrying out any of their responsibilities...to create an exploitable weakness in the defence

What air superiority versus air supremacy argument?

But although I agree that the Luftwaffe did not have to be 100 percent successful in everything they did, they did at least need to be successful and their task list was certainly no shorter or their resources that much greater than what the RAF had. So why is it that the Luftwaffe is only required to "disrupt" the RAF - i.e., prevent them from being 100 percent successful in everything, while you seem to imply that the RAF versus the Luftwaffe must evidently do just that to acheive their own success? You seem to want to have it both ways?

Ah! so if serious planning for Sealion by the KM had gone ahead, they wouldn't have been retasked? Only the RN then is allowed by the thinking of people in this thread to be 100% retasked to invasion defence, and not the KM to invasion support?

It would help if you read the relevent thread. The numbers of vessels already on patrol, returning from patrol, refitting, and so forth is well known. "100%" retasking to support the invasion would have required U-Boote operations to cease, so the boats could all be prepared, but that of course wasn't going to happen, for many reasons. So "100%" wasn't acheivable, no matter what.

Nor have I ever argued that the Royal Navy could be "100%" retasked, but the imbalance of forces makes that irrelvent in any case, even if "100%" of the KM was tasked and only say "50%" of the RN.

Actually, I was thinking of the sustained three-four day sea battle events would require, not some magical 13-hour RN crushing everything in their path. Unless Mama didn't teach her son very well about the difference between daylight and nighttime, significant events were going to happen round the clock and the RN wasn't just going to be able to up-sticks and go home before dawn each day....my comments had nothing to do with whether the LW could operate at night or not.

Nor did I say anything about a "magical 13-hour RN crushing", but the Seelöwe plan did require that the assault echelon be launched one-half hour after dawn. Which gives a considerable window for reaction by the Royal Navy in which the Luftwaffe cannot intervene. And given that the RN would sortie from numerous ports and in numerous vessels, that the KM would be more or less arrayed over a considerable area, and that the sea is a fairly big place, of course it seems likely that the action would extend into daylight hours and possibly over many days.

But why would the Royal Navy even need to "go home" before dawn so long as they were sustainable in daylight?

So the 52 RN units lost in 8 days at Dunkirk are a figment of my imagination?

Since you can't seem to be bothered with reading the relevent threads I'll repost them here for you.

"Six British DD were sunk off Dunkirk in DYNAMO operations, 4 by bombing, 1 by U-Boote, and 1 by S-Boote. Nineteen more were damaged, I already posted those, virtually all were repairable in less than three weeks and about one-third was damage so minor it did not take the destroyers out of action. So a total of 25 British destroyers were sunk or damaged to one degree or another in DYNAMO.

Three others were bombed and lost in other operations, one in the Scheldt (15 May), one off Nieuport (19 May), and one at Calais (24 May). So in total 25 of the 47 committed to operations off the Low Countries and France from 1 May to 3 June were lost or damaged to some extent."

So six RN destroyers, plus three French destroyers and 20 other RN and French vessels that could be considered "combatants". and all smaller than the DD, were sunk in operations directly related to the Dunkirk evacution. It is also possible to count 41 RN "vessels" lost at Dunkirk, but I'm not sure where 52 comes from?

and

" Back to the subject of German Antiship capabilities, I've completed my review of the losses at Dunkirk. Frankly, it looks like the stories of "200 sunk and as many damaged" at 'Dunkirk' are either just that - stories without any basis in reality - or they reflect all Allied losses in all operations during the period, including Norway. Note in the following the loss and damage accounts took notice of military vessels as small as LCA and civilian vessels as small as 9 GRT fishing boats.

27 May – 3 lost (all to bombing), 1 damaged (to shore guns)
Sunk:
French steamer ADEN (8033grt) was sunk by German bombing at Dunkirk.
French auxiliary minesweeper LA MAJO (47grt) was sunk by German bombing at Dunkirk.
British steamer WORTHTOWN (868grt) was sunk by German bombing at Dunkirk.
Damaged:
British steamer BIARRITZ (2388grt) was damaged by German shore guns near Dunkirk.

28 May – 7 lost (1 one to S-Boote, 4 to bombing, 2 to collision), 4 damaged (all to bombs, none put out of service)
Sunk:
British steamer ABUKIR (694grt) departed Ostend at 2300/27th and was sunk at 51 29N, 02 16E by S-34 at 0130.
British personnel ship QUEEN OF THE CHANNEL (1162grt) was sunk by German bombers at 0425 at 51-15N, 2-40E after she had embarked 920 men at Dunkirk. There were no casualties and all personnel were taken off safely.
British drifters BOY ROY (95grt) and PAXTON (92grt) were damaged by German bombing and were run aground and abandoned at Dunkirk.
Drifter OCEAN REWARD (93 grt) sunk in collision off Dover.
French auxiliary minesweeper MARGUERITE ROSE (409grt) was sunk by German bombing at Dunkirk.
British drifter GIRL PAMELA (93grt) was sunk at 2330 in an accidental collision passing the entrance to Dunkirk harbor on her way to the beaches.
Damaged:
Destroyer WINDSOR was near missed by German bombing at South Goodwin Light. The destroyer had one boiler room damaged and there were twenty to thirty casualties. Destroyer WINDSOR returned to Dover with several hundred troops on board. She spent no time out of service.
Destroyers ANTHONY, CODRINGTON, JAVELIN, were damaged by German bombing at Dunkirk. The destroyers spent no time out of action.

29 May – 27 lost (1 to S-Boote, 1 to U-Boote, 20 to bombing, 3 to collision, 1 to mines, 2 to unknown causes) 14 damaged (11 to bombing, 2 to fouling, 1 to collision)
Sunk:
Destroyer WAKEFUL, with 600 troops on board, was torpedoed and sunk at 0136 by S-30 close to North Kwinte Buoy at 51-20N, 2-45E. Destroyer WAKEFUL's twenty five crew and one soldier which survived were picked up by destroyer GRAFTON, minesweeper GOSSAMER, drifters NAUTILUS (64grt) and COMFORT (60grt). While halted at 0420 destroyer GRAFTON was torpedoed and badly damaged by U-62 at 51 22N, 02 45E. She was later scuttled.
Destroyer GRENADE was sunk at 1602 by German bombing along the east mole at Dunkirk.
Auxiliary minesweeper GRACIE FIELDS (393grt) was sunk by German bombing at Dunkirk, three miles west of Middelkerk Buoy.
Auxiliary minesweeper WAVERLEY (537grt) was sunk at 1800 by German bombing at Dunkirk.
Auxiliary antiaircraft ship CRESTED EAGLE (1110grt) was sunk by German bombing at 1850 at Dunkirk.
Minesweeping trawler POLLY JOHNSON (290grt) was badly damaged by German bombing off Dunkirk and later scuttled.
Minesweeping trawler CALVI (363grt) was sunk by German bombing in Dunkirk Harbor.
French steamers MONIQUE SCHIAFFFINO (3236grt) and MARS (721grt) were sunk by German bombing at Dunkirk.
French steamer SAINT OCTAVE (5099grt) was damaged by unknown cause and scuttled at Dunkirk.
French auxiliary minesweeper JOSEPH MARIE (41grt) was sunk by German bombing at Dunkirk.
Belgian tugs VULCAIN (200grt), MAX (177grt) and THAMES (144grt) were sunk by German bombing at Dunkirk.
French steamer DOUAISIEN (2954grt) was bombed and badly damaged by German bombing off Dunkirk and was sunk in further attacks on 1 June.
British steamer CLAN MACALISTER (6787grt) was set on fire by German bombing at Dunkirk, off No. 6 Buoy, Dunkirk East Buoy. The steamer was abandoned.
British steamer MONA'S QUEEN (2756grt) was sunk by a mine off Dunkirk, one half mile east of Dunkirk Pier Head.
British steamer LORINA (1578grt) was sunk by German bombing in Dunkirk Roads.
British steamer FENELLA (2376grt) was sunk by German bombing off Dunkirk.
French steamer MARS (721grt) was sunk by German bombing at Dunkirk.
British drifter NAUTILUS (64grt) was lost at Dunkirk to unknown causes.
British drifters COMFORT (60grt), rammed and sunk by accident off Dover.
British drifter GIRI PAMELA (93grt) sunk in collision off Dunkirk.
British LCA No. 4, 16, and 18 sunk by German bombing.
Damaged:
Destroyer WOLSEY damaged her propellers on debris at Dunkirk.
Destroyer WOLFHOUND damaged her propellers on debris at Dunkirk and required docking.
Sloop BIDEFORD went over to Dunkirk where she was struck by a German bomb on her quarter deck and had forty feet of her stern blown off. She was towed to England and returned to service 15 April 1941.
At 1129 destroyer GALLANT was near missed and damaged by German bombers near Gravelines. She returned to service by 7 June.
Destroyer MISTRAL was bombed and badly damaged along the east mole at Dunkirk.
Destroyer JAGUAR, alongside GRENADE outboard, was badly damaged at 1600 by German bombing. She returned to service by 16 June.
Destroyer INTREPID was badly damaged at 1830 by German bombing off La Panne. She returned to service by 14 June.
Destroyer GREYHOUND was badly damaged at 1628 by a near miss off La Panne. She returned to service 20 June.
Destroyers SALADIN, MALCOLM, WOLFHOUND were all moderately damaged by German bombing at Dunkirk. All three were returned to service after minor repairs at Chatham. Destroyer SALADIN was damaged by a near miss and was under repair for eleven days and was completed on 9 June. Destroyer WOLFHOUND was under repair for this damage and her propeller damage for ten days.
Destroyer VERITY was damaged in a collision with a sunken drifter off Dunkirk. She returned to service on 15 June.
Destroyer ICARUS was damaged by near misses but was not put out of service.
Minesweeper PANGBOURNE was damaged by German bombing at Dunkirk. She was repaired by the end of June.

30 May – 5 lost (1 to mines, 2 to bombing, 2 abandoned), 8 damaged (4 to bombing, 3 to collision, 1 to shore guns)
Sunk:
French destroyer BOURRASQUE, with 880 men on board, struck a mine and then was sunk by German artillery within sight of Ostend.
Armed boarding vessel KING ORRY (1877grt) was damaged by German bombing near misses. The ship cleared the harbor and foundered at 0300 one-half mile north of Dunkirk.
British steamer NORMANNIA (1567grt) was badly damaged by German bombing four miles 271° from the Dunkirk breakwater; was beached and abandoned.
British motor canal boats AMBLEVE and YSER run aground and abandoned at Dunkirk.
Damaged:
French torpedo boat BRANLEBAS was damaged in a collision while embarking troops.
Destroyers ANTHONY and SABRE were damaged at 1800 by German bombing at Dunkirk. ANTHONY required two weeks repair, while SABRE was not put out of service.
Destroyer WOLSEY was in a collision off Dunkirk with British steamer ROEBUCK (776grt).
Minesweeper KELLET was damaged by the near miss of German bombing at Dunkirk. She returned to service 28 June.
Minesweeper SHARPSHOOTER was damaged in a collision with British personnel ship ST HELIER (1952grt) off Dunkirk.
British steamer PRINCESS MAUD (2883grt) was slightly damaged by German guns near Gravelines.
British steamer ST JULIEN (1952grt) was slightly damaged by German bombing midday at Dunkirk.

31 May – 10 lost (7 to bombing, 1 to mine, 2 to unknown causes), 16 damaged (5 to bombing, 1 to S-Boote, 5 to fouling, 4 to collision, 1 to shore guns)
Sunk:
Between 0000 and 0200, French destroyer SIROCCO was torpedoed and badly damaged by S-23 and S-26 near West Hinder, in 51-18N, 2-15E. Attempting to effect emergency repairs, she was sunk by German bombing.
Auxiliary minesweeper DEVONIA (622grt) was beached and abandoned after damage from German bombing near La Panne at Dunkirk.
Antisubmarine trawler ST ACHILLEUS (484grt) was sunk on a mine off Dunkirk.
French steamers AIN EL TURK (2008grt) and COTE D'AZUR (3047grt) and trawlers PUISSANT (200grt), COSTAUD (140grt), ADJADER (414grt) were sunk by German bombing at Dunkirk.
British LCA No. 8 and 15 lost to unknown causes at Dunkirk.
Damaged:
Destroyer BASILISK damaged her propellers on debris in Dunkirk Harbor and was lost before any repairs were made (loss counted on 1 June).
Destroyer VIVACIOUS was damaged by German shore guns off Bray at Dunkirk.
Destroyer EXPRESS was damaged by the near miss of a German air bomb at Dunkirk. She was repaired within a week.
Destroyer IMPULSIVE damaged both propellers on debris at 1554 at Dunkirk. She was repaired by 4 July.
Destroyers ICARUS and SCIMITAR collided at 1147 off Dunkirk. ICARUS was slightly damaged while SCIMITAR was considerably damaged and arrived at Sheerness on 2 June for repairs.
Destroyers ICARUS, KEITH, WINCHELSEA were damaged at Dunkirk by German bombing attack. ICARUS was repaired at Portsmouth completing on 13 June, WINCHELSEA was returned to service after repairs at Dover. Destroyer KEITH was able to continue off Dunkirk and was lost the next day.
Destroyer MALCOLM sustained damage to her bow when she collided with the pier at Dunkirk.
Destroyer WHITEHALL damaged her propellers on debris and had one engine out of service.
Destroyer WORCESTER damaged her propellers when she grounded in Dunkirk Roads.
Destroyer VANQUISHER sustained propeller damage when she struck debris at Dunkirk.
French large destroyer LEOPARD was damaged by German bombing off Dunkirk.
French destroyer CYCLONE was torpedoed and badly damaged when her bow was blown off by S-24 off Dunkirk.
Minesweeper LEDA was slightly damaged in a collision at Dunkirk.

1 June – 31 lost (14 to bombing, 2 to shore guns, 2 to S-Boote, 4 to mines, 2 to collision, 5 abandoned, 2 to unknown causes), 17 damaged (14 to bombing, 1 to mines, 2 to collision)
Sunk:
Destroyer KEITH (already damaged the previous day) was damaged by the near miss of an air bomb at Dunkirk. Later, before leaving Dunkirk, she was bombed again by German aircraft at 0915 and sunk
Tugs ST ABBS (550grt), with destroyer KEITH survivors aboard, and ST FAGAN (550grt) were sunk by German bombing at Dunkirk.
Destroyer HAVANT was badly damaged at 0905 in German bombing off Dunkirk and sank under tow five miles from West Buoy.
Destroyer BASILISK was immobilized by near misses from German bombing at 0800, was badly damaged again by German bombing at Dunkirk at 1258 and was later scuttled.
Minesweeper SKIPJACK was sunk by five direct hits from German bombing at Dunkirk.
French destroyer FOUDROYANT was sunk in German air bombing off Dunkirk.
Gunboat MOSQUITO was damaged at 1030 by German bombing off Dunkirk and was scuttled 3 June.
Auxiliary minesweeper BRIGHTON QUEEN was sunk by German shore guns at Dunkirk.
French auxiliary minesweepers DENIS PAPIN (309grt), LA MOUSSAILLON (38grt), VENUS (264grt) were sunk by German bombing at Dunkirk.
British steamer SCOTIA (3454grt) was sunk at 1300 by German bombing off Dunkirk in 51 07N, 02 10E.
Belgian tug ELBE (150grt) was sunk by German bombing at Dunkirk.
Antisubmarine trawlers ARGYLLSHIRE and STELLA DORADO (550grt) were sunk by S-34 near Dunkirk in the North Sea at 0245 and 0430.
Yacht AMULREE (89grt) was sunk at 0200 in a collision with destroyer VIMY in the Dover Strait.
Yacht GRIVE (687grt) was sunk in German bombing at Dunkirk Roads at 2355.
Drifter FAIR BREEZE (92grt) was sunk after a collision with a wreck in Dunkirk harbor.
Drifter LORD CAVAN (96grt) was sunk by German shore guns at Dunkirk.
British sail barges DUCHESS (72grt) and LADY ROSEBERRY (109grt) were lost three miles east of Dunkirk when the tug they were alongside was blown up on a mine.
British sailing barges LARK (67grt) and ROYALTY (101grt) were beached and abandoned at Dunkirk and Malo les Bains, respectively.
British sailing barge DORIS (83grt) was sunk on mines three miles east of Dunkirk.
British sailing barges BARBARA JEAN (144grt) and ETHEL EVERAND (190grt) were blown up and abandoned at Dunkirk. Sailing barge AIDIE was blown up and abandoned between Dunkirk and La Panne.
British fishing vessel RENOWN (9grt) was sunk on a mine near Sandettie Light Vessel.
British motor canal boats ESCAUT and SEMOIS lost to unknown causes (date approximate).
Damaged:
Destroyer VIMY was put out of action due to the collision with AMULREE.
Destroyer IVANHOE was badly damaged at 0805 by German bombing at Dunkirk. She was repaired by 24 August.
Destroyer WHITEHALL was damaged by near misses while scuttling BASILISK. She was repaired by 26 August.
Minesweeper HEBE was damaged by near misses of German bombs at Dunkirk, but was not put out of action.
Minesweeper HALCYON was machine gunned by a German aircraft at Dunkirk, but was not put out of action
Patrol sloop KINGFISHER was damaged by the near miss of German air bombs at Dunkirk.
Destroyer WORCESTER was badly damaged by German bombing at Dunkirk and collided with British steamer MAID OF ORLEANS (2386grt), which was also badly damaged, en route to Dover. WORCESTER was repaired by 11 July.
Destroyer HARVESTER was damaged by near misses of air bombs.
Destroyers VENOMOUS (she also collided with the harbor wall in the process), VIMY, VIVACIOUS and minesweeper SALAMANDER were damaged were damaged by German bombing at Dunkirk. VENOMOUS was repaired by 13 June, VIMY by 7 June, and VIVACIOUS by 11 June after temporary repairs allowed her to participate in the port blocking operations of 2/3 June at Dunkirk.
Destroyer SHIKARI was damaged by German bombing at Dunkirk. She was repaired by 18 June.
MTB.100 was damaged by the near miss of air bombs at Dunkirk.
Hospital ship ST DAVID, at anchor off Dover, was damaged at 0845 by a mine.
British steamer PRAGUE (4,220grt) was damaged at 0927 by German bombing 13 miles 115° from North Foreland.

2 June – 9 lost (1 to bombing, 1 to mine/torpedo, 1 to shore guns, 3 abandoned, 3 to unknown causes), 8 damaged (6 to bombing, 2 to collision)
Blockships EDV. NISSEN (2062grt), WESTCOVE (2735grt), HOLLAND (1251grt) were sunk at 0300/3 June at Dunkirk, but the channel was not completely blocked.
Sunk:
Tug FOSSA (105grt) was stranded and abandoned at Bruyne Sands at Dunkirk.
Belgian fishing vessels ONZE LIEVE VROUW VAN VLAANDEREN (39grt), GETUIGT VOR CHRISTUS (39grt), ANNA LEOPOLD (52grt) were lost at Dunkirk.
Hospital ship PARIS (1790grt), on passage to Dunkirk, was badly damaged at 1915 by German bombing near Dunkirk in 51 11N, 02 07, sinking on 3 June.
British trawler Westella (550 grt) mined or torpedoed off Dunkirk.
Drifter LORD CAVAN (96grt) sunk by shore gunfire off Dunkirk.
British LCM No. 12 and 22 abandoned at Dunkirk.
Damaged:
At 0400, destroyer ICARUS was in a collision with a trawler or a drifter at Dunkirk. The destroyer was damaged, but was not put out of service.
Between X and Y buoy, off Bray, anti-aircraft cruiser CALCUTTA fought off three different air attacks. She was slightly damaged by near misses.
Destroyer MALCOLM at 1651 damaged her bow and propellers in a collision at Dunkirk.
Antisubmarine trawler SPURS (399grt) was badly damaged in German bombing off Dunkirk.
Antisubmarine trawlers AMETHYST and KINGSTON PERIDOT were damaged by German bombing at Dunkirk and put out of action.
British steamer MONA'S ISLE was damaged by the near miss of German bombing at Dunkirk.
Hospital ship WORTHING (2294grt) was damaged by German bombing at 1442 at Dunkirk.

3 June – 1 lost (abandoned), 5 damaged (2 to bombing, 3 to collision)
Sunk:
British LCM No. 17 abandoned at Dunkirk.
Damaged:
Destroyer ESK was damaged by the near miss of a German air bomb at Dunkirk. She was repaired by 11 June.
Destroyer SABRE ran aground leaving Dunkirk and lost her asdic dome.
Minesweeper KELLET ran aground at the western breakwater and was too damaged to embark more than thirty troops.
British steamer ROYAL DIAFFODIL (2060grt) was damaged by German bombing at 0131 off Dunkirk in 51 13N, 02 00E and was further damaged in a collision at 0600 with British steamer BEN MY CHREE, which was also damaged.

4 June – 1 lost (mine), 4 damaged (4 to collision)
Blockship PACIFICO was sunk in place at 0340/4 June and the port of Dunkirk was blocked. En route, blockship GOURKO was sunk in a collision with a French personnel ship off Dunkirk
Sunk:
At 0615, French auxiliary minesweeper EMIL DESCHAMPS (348grt) was sunk on a mine five miles east, northeast of Foreness, three miles 336°from Elbow Buoy in 51-24N, 1-1-29E. She is considered the last vessel lost in DYNAMO.
Damaged
Patrol sloop KINGFISHER was damaged in a collision with a French fishing vessel at 0014/4 June and then with British steamer KING GEORGE V (801grt) at Margate. She was repaired by 8 July.
French trawler MARECHAL FOCH (103grt) was sunk in a collision with minesweeper LEDA off Dunkirk at 0429/4 June. LEDA sustained damage to her stem. LEDA was involved in another collision at 0454 one mile from North Goodwin Buoy with a skoot. She was repaired at Sheerness by 12 June
French motor torpedo boat VTB.25 damaged her propellers rescuing MARECHAL FOCH's survivors and was towed to Dover by destroyer MALCOLM.

Total was 94 lost or sunk and 77 damaged.

Of those lost:
51 were primarily due to bombing/air attack;
11 were abandoned;
9 were to unknown causes
8 were to mines;
7 were to collisions;
4 were to S-Boote;
3 were to shore guns;
1 was to U-Boote; and 1 was to mine or torpedo."

Thanks yet again to the fantastic work done by Don Kindell at http://www.naval-history.net/xDKWW2-3900Intro.htm

[phylo_roadking]

The Red Baron had four Vickers MMG on AA mounts fire at him twice, as well as at least two Lewis guns on simpler post mounts and possibly hundreds of rifles and was hit by a single round although flying just 60 feet off the ground at well under 100 miles per hour. It is also most likely that he was hit by Popkin's Vickers MG section, not Buie or Evan's Lewis guns

The latest I've read on this - a Canadian researcher comes to mind? - attributes this back to the three-man Lewis Gun party with its simple single ground posts. Not Buie or Evans but the as-yet unidentified third man, going by the order that they fired as he flew over them.

Note also that BANQUET was intended as part of a coordinated attack that was to include bombers and fighter escorts, so it wasn't "nothing else" but the Tiger Moths

It would be the Moths that were the lowest and most vulnerable to ground fire. They had absolutely no bombsight nor was it intended to fit one, they were dropping at very low level.

I'm not talking about small arms' fire as in rifles - I'm talking about MG34 etc - of which there would be more than a few in the invasion fleet - and probably several per infantry-carrying vessel. And these were NOT

So again, there is considerable difference between a stable ground mount designed to engage aircraft and fired by an experienced gunner

....inexperienced gunners but guys who had carried and used these weapons in all circumstances in Poland, Holland, Belgium and France.

What air superiority versus air supremacy argument?

...that air supremacy was necessary for an invasion - as opposed to either superiority, or the air superiority battle going on over the invasion rather than before it. Hence the Luftwaffe asking on several occasions for the invasion to be begun while they were engaged over Southern Britain.

[

[RichTO90]

The latest I've read on this - a Canadian researcher comes to mind? - attributes this back to the three-man Lewis Gun party with its simple single ground posts. Not Buie or Evans but the as-yet unidentified third man, going by the order that they fired as he flew over them.

Yep, we could argue who killed him forever. But that in this context is actually irrelevent. What is relevent is that a single round out of hundreds, fired from at least six machineguns and possibly hundreds of rifles on the ground, had any effect whatsoever.

It would be the Moths that were the lowest and most vulnerable to ground fire. They had absolutely no bombsight nor was it intended to fit one, they were dropping at very low level.

Which, to be cruel, makes them something of an excellent diversion.

I'm not talking about small arms' fire as in rifles - I'm talking about MG34 etc - of which there would be more than a few in the invasion fleet - and probably several per infantry-carrying vessel. And these were NOT inexperienced gunners but guys who had carried and used these weapons in all circumstances in Poland, Holland, Belgium and France.

Nor was I "talking about small arms" fire as in rifles, I was referring to rifle-caliber machineguns, which is quite a different thing. You have a touching faith in rifle-caliber weapons as a means of bringing down aircraft. And I suppose like most things based on faith over evidence it is worthless attempting to argue anything different with you? :roll:

...that air supremacy was necessary for an invasion - as opposed to either superiority, or the air superiority battle going on over the invasion rather than before it. Hence the Luftwaffe asking on several occasions for the invasion to be begun while they were engaged over Southern Britain.[

Er, where did I make that argument anywhere in my posts that you refer to? :roll:

Of course I'm not sure where you get the idea that the Luftwaffe ever acheived air superiority at any time, at best they were able to contest air superiority throughout, which is rather a different kettle of fish?

[phylo_roadking]

I didn't say YOU said it, i believe. Nor do I believe they achieved air superiority, though for a three-day period were VERY close to it over Kent, forcing very serious consideration of withdrawal north of the Thames (supremacy would of course be the RAF unable to come South to operate again at all...); what I meant was there was a blind spot in German thinking at the very top that supremacy was necessary, whereas all that would be needed was that it be contested - it doesn't matter if the RAF are beaten before an invasion - it matters that they at the very least be kept busy...

[phylo_roadking]

WW, its very hard to find details, mostly squashed in here and there. Unless anyone has something specifically relating to them?...

I first came across "Tiger Moths being converted as bombers in airfields in Norfolk" about three years ago, and for a long time thats all I had. Then chasing down the anti-invasion use of gas by the British gave me a site - I think in the BBC WW2 personal history collection - by a civilian maintenance engineer at an RAF station. The civilian workers were asked and volunteered to work at ALGS - Advanced Landing Grounds - for the Banquet aircraft just behind the front lines, and they were issued military field kit - including military issue respirators, gas capes etc. - which they kept at home. In the event of an authenticated Cromwell warning they would be collected with their kit in a suitcase by local constabularies and RAF Police and taken to their ALGs.

The planes were to be flown by RAF trainee pilots in whatever stage of training - they just weren't made aware of it! The procedure in the event of CROMWELL was very similar for the vast majority of them - they would be rounded up from homes/barracks/pubs/clubs/cinemas by the police and taken to their airfields in whatever state of undress or inebriation, where they would be be briefed and given orders.

It wasn't just Tiger Moths as far as I can make out; though it was several trainer squadrons of these that were equiped and trained with ahead of schedule. DeHavilland's carried out the work on the Moths, and produeced prefabricated conversion kits for issuing to airfields to fit to any airworthy trainer. Also, Major Hereward DeHavilland was involved in training the few trainee pilots who knew about Banquet ahead of schedule in lowflying techniques and skills.

The Banquet round-up procedures were actually carried once, during the protracted invasion scare of September 8th-9th, 1940.

[phylo_roadking]

The Moths were converted ahead of schedule because DeHavilland's needed to develop the fitment kits. I'm sure there were more and bettter trainers that would come into use for Banquet - the RAF had a variety of nice monoplane ab initio trainers as well - but these were fully employed following the Fall of France as the RAF despertately tried to replace the pilots lost there and convert foreign pilots to the RAF controls set. Thus they couldn't be released for conversion, their training duties were more immediately important - hence the prefabricated kits. Banquet was after all a panic measure - and couldn't be allowed to detract from the Air Training Schools' day-to-day work.

[Walter_Warlimont]

How Many Tiger Moths were there exactly that were to be used in this converted role?????

[phylo_roadking]

WW, I've seen a figure of 350 - but I'm not sure if this was actual conversions...or numbers of conversion kits produced. Though that article re-found by Andreas says 1500 kits were produced. Rota'ing 350 out of service for conversion would have made a big dent in the RAF's training capacity, at a time that they were busy impressing all the aircraft they could into service. As of September 1939 they only had 500 Tiger Moths of their own! Pulling that many away from the Air Training Schools couldn't have been kept secret.

However - I've also seen mention of Tiger Moths being converted to spray a particularly lethal insecticide of the period, but have absolutely no numbers on that - or if this conversion was counted into the Banquet role. This could be what's led to the idea that the Banquet converted aircraft would drop gas?

I know this is a long shot, but is there anyone on here who a a pilot-trainee in the summer of 1940 - or knows anyone who was? Given the 350 figure, its possible aircraft were converted then returned to their training schools - so trainees may have done their initial hours on Moths with bomb racks...?

[phylo_roadking]

Just found the insecticide mentioned....

"Paris Green a lethal mixture of arsenic trioxide and copper acetate."

[RichTO90]

Now that was a very interesting read. However, I think I am going to stick w/Phylo here on the ability of the Tiger Moth to be that much help during an invasion.

Um, I'm not sure that anyone has said much about how much help they would be in repelling an invasion? But I do think that BANQUET is rather a good indicator of just how serious the British were about repelling an invasion? Which goes back to an old implication - by leandros IIRC - on one of these threads that the British supposedly had no plans for repelling the invasion?

I too would argue that it would be quite easy to bring down such a plane that already moves at a slow speed, which would no doubt travel at an even slower speed with 8/20 pound bombs strapped to it's underwings + the addition of at least one passenger (The Pilot).

Lordy, the triumph of opinion over evidence? :roll: Let's repeat, Richtofen flew at low speed and minimal altitude, for some minutes in a plane more fragile than a Moth, and was fired upon twice by four AA MG (Popkin reported that he alone fired twice, each time for 30-45 seconds), at least two LMG (Buie at least fired a full pan at him), and the rifles of Wood's platoon - oh, and of course Brown's fire - and yet only 1 round had an effect?

BTW, the "pilot" is not an "additional" passenger in an aircraft, I rather think he might be considered the primary passenger.