Chapter XII INTELLIGENCE
LAW, ORDER, AND SECURITY
a. During the first year of the occupation, law, order, and security were maintained, in general, satisfactorily, except as respects security of material and information. In regard to material, pilferage attained alarming proportions reaching two million dollars for the month of December 1945. Security of information was often neglected, owing to indifference after the conclusion of hostilities. As the first year of the occupation drew to a close, nothing spectacular had happened to support or confirm the suspicions of those who had feared underground movements or zone--wide resistance to the occupation forces. The breaches of law and order which did occur received perhaps undue emphasis in intelligence reports.
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b. Most effective in the maintenance of law and order was the policy of completely sealing-off Germany from the outside world and, in a somewhat lesser degree, sealing off the United States Zone from the rest of Germany. From the beginning, the U.S. Army maintained a strict border control. Originally designed as a security measure to prevent the movement of members of the German intelligence services, this later proved valuable in controlling the movement of displaced persons, prisoners of war, and refugees.
c. The zone-wide curfew for the civilian population was lifted on 30 March 1946. This action precipitated a controversy, as some major commands and the G-2 Division of Theater Headquarters were in favor of reinstating the curfew. It was finally determined that the curfew could be reinstated by local tactical commanders, after consultation with Military Government, if the security situation warranted such action.
d. Unannounced check and search operations, covering at times areas as large as one of the two Military District, helped to maintain law and order. During an operation all troop in the area were alerted, road blocks were set up, and search parties systematically combed the area for security suspects, firearms, and black-market operators.
e. The rapid redeployment of trained personnel left military police, the Counter Intelligence Corps, the Criminal Investigation Division, and the Judge Advocate's Offices greatly understaffed.
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This problem was in some instances so acute that the security and law enforcing functions of these agencies were seriously impaired.
136. The Counterintelligence Directive for Germany.
a. The basic policies for security were outlined in the counterintelligence directive for Germany, first issued by Headquarters, 12th Army Group, on 10 April 1945, and remained in force on a Theater-wide basis throughout the first year of the occupation. In addition to providing security for American military interests, the basic counterintelligence missions of the United States forces in Germany were the following: to destroy the enemy secret intelligence services and all security or secret police and affiliated para-miIitary organizations; to dissolve the Nazi Party and prevent its rebirth in any form; to aid in the disposal of the German General Staff Corps; and to detain selected enemy scientists and industrial technologists.
b. All personnel of the German intelligence services, including the secret field police and the security service, were to be interned. All security suspects and war criminals were in the automatic arrest category, as were all members of the Gestapo, all higher police officials, Nazi Party officials, high civil servants, the German general staff, and members of the German paramilitary organizations, with the exception of the lowest ranks.
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137. Civilian Internees.
a. About 150,000 persons were arrested during the first year of the occupation, the large majority in the period immediately following V-E Day. The first decrease in the number of civilian internees, was in October 1945. By the end of 1945 there were 128,000 civilian internees in internment camps in the United States Zone. Concentration of such a large number of security suspects, besides creating problems of supply and guarding, offered the danger that new Nazi cliques might be formed behind barbed wires. Many who had not been connected with the Nazi regime had been interned on technical grounds. In view of these considerations, the automatic arrest policy was amended several times during the first year. On 1 July 1946, the total number of civilian internees in United States enclosures had been reduced to about 70,000.
b. Internment camps were administered by the Theater Provost Marshal. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, was charged with providing trained personnel to screen the internees and to determine whether their confinement was in accordance with directives.
c. War Criminals were not segregated from other security suspects. All civilian internees were kept in enclosures, the population of which was constantly changing as new suspects were added and others released or brought to trial. The camp occupants were inconvenienced by serious overcrowding, unsatisfactory sanitary conditions,
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and lack of educational, religious, and recreational facilities. The war criminals, security suspects, automatic arrestees, and other internees received a basic food ration of 1,700 calories per day -- a ration decidedly above that of the German civil population, which was first 1,500 then 1,250 calories per day. Workers in internment camps received an extra allowance of 700 calories per day, while a hospital ration of between 2,300 and 3,000 calories was provided. In the spring of 1946 Theater Headquarters began preparations for transferring civilian internment enclosures to German authorities.
d. On 20 June 1946 the Chief of Staff of Theater Headquarters ordered that the release of civilian internees be expedited. Accordingly, Third U.S. Army established a board of officers familiar with counterintelligence processing. This board went into civilian internment enclosures in the Third Army area and reviewed the oases of all persons who had been arrested and were held solely on grounds of being security threats. In four weeks the board reviewed approximately 1,800 cases, of which more than 1,100 were ordered released.
138. General Trends in the Security Situation.
During combat it had been impossible to assess accurately the potentialities of German underground movements which were believed to exist. The first two months of occupation, however, proved that no major German opposition was to be encountered. Nazi plans for
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underground activities were not fully formulated at the time of the collapse. The early apprehension of members of the SS, SD, and Gestapo deprived a potential underground resistance of leadership. There were some signs of subversive activities, but they were uncoordinated and showed none of the characteristics of large-scale planning. The legendary Werwolf organization was soon exploded as a myth of Nazi propaganda. A greater nuisance to occupation authorities were the Edelweiss Piraten, who throughout the first year of the occupation figured prominently in field reports of subversive activities. While there was conclusive evidence of Edelweiss Piraten meetings and planning, the long-range aims of the group appeared to vary in different localities. Basically, the Edelweiss Piraten were groups of disgruntled youths who gathered to annoy occupation authorities, to threaten German women who associated with occupation troops, and to deal extensively in the black market. Other groups, similar in character, were the EORGA organization and the Bundschuh and Regenbogen groups.
b. In October 1945, the first signs of unrest were noted in the civilian population. Petty acts of sabotage such as wire cutting were on the increase and the wall-smearing campaign, more or less insignificant in scope, which had so far been directed against German women associating with American troops, now defied the occupation authorities. Furthermore, a slight increase was noted in the
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number of attacks on United States personnel. Generally, the Germans assumed a bolder attitude, which was expressed in a slight but growing disregard for military government legislation. Illegal mail traffic and other petty security violations increased, and revival of anti-Semitic feeling was reported.
c. From December 1945 until the middle of March 1946 there was a general improvement in the security situation, resulting largely, it appears, from the arming of the civilian police in many areas and the increased use of mobile patrols. Strangely enough, the dreaded winter months with their many hardships produced no adverse effects on civil security. The G-2 Division of Theater Headquarters reported also that the large-scale withdrawals of tactical troops under the redeployment plan did not cause the civil population to disregard security controls and that apprehension in this respect had "proven to be unfounded."
d. During the last two weeks of March:, the security situation deteriorated appreciably and remained at a lower level until the beginning of June 1946. The G-2 Division, reversing its previous position, stated that the hasty withdrawal of United States troops contributed "primarily to the boldness of the German people." With the disappearance of the symbol of authority, German self-confidence returned, together with the belief that the United States would soon withdraw from the occupation altogether. During the
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spring of 1945 security violations of all descriptions, from attacks on American personnel to curfew violations, were on the increase. There was some criticism by Germans of Military Government and of occupation policies. The number of civilians apprehended for carrying weapons increased. Although improvements in the situation were noted in the first week of June, the previous high level was not attained during that month.
139. The Theater Protective Security Plan.
a. A zone wide security plan evolved by Theater Headquarters included an estimate of the situation in the United States-occupied areas of Germany and Austria and in adjacent territories, stated the courses of action open to the occupation forces in meeting civil disturbances, and set forth principles to be used as a basis for the security plans of the lower echelons. It was supplemented by a Theater alert plan, containing a checklist of actions to be taken by major commanders in the event of emergencies which were given code word designations. Both the security and the alert plans provided for mutual assistance among major commands and coordination of action by Theater Headquarters.
b. The security plan dealt in great detail with minor uprisings, in the event of which provision was made for vigilant frontier control and for demonstration flights by the Air Force, but reprisal action against German communities was forbidden. A major uprising was deemed less likely and was considered in less detail.
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140. Security Aspects of the Displaced Persons Problem.
a. Displaced persons were responsible for some crimes of violence, for looting, pilferage, and a large amount of black-market activity. Establishment of camps, shake-down inspections, and stepping up of patrol activities contributed to control.
b. From the outset the military authorities were responsible for the enforcement of law and order with respect to displaced persons. The agreement with the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration of 18 February 1946 provided, however, that the military authorities would consult with camp directors, particularly when the displaced persons in the latters' care might be subjected to search, arrest, and detention. Search operations had to be approved by Military Government. The displaced persons were well aware of the stringent regulations covering the entry into and search of their camps and believed that they were relatively immune from action by law-enforcement agencies. Check and search operations were conducted, however, from time to time in displaced persons centers, and usually yielded large numbers of lethal weapons and black-market supplies.
c. Prior to 30 March 1946, German police were permitted to conduct searches in displaced persons assembly centers, provided concurrence had been obtained from Military Government. But this caused friction, culminating in the Stuttgart riot of 29 March 1946, when displaced persons moved against German police conducting a search
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operation. Shots were fired from both sides and one Jewish displaced person was killed. Order was not restored until an armored car and several jeep loads of District Constabulary arrived. The immediate result was that the Theater Commander prohibited the use of German police in searches and seizures in camps housing persecutees. Six weeks later, on 16 May 1946, Theater Headquarters promulgated Standing Operating Procedure No. 81 on check and search operations in United Nations displaced persons centers, which was intended to establish uniform procedures throughout the United States occupied area of Germany. To prevent recurrence of incidents like the one in Stuttgart, authority to approve check and search operations in Jewish displaced persons centers was limited to the commanding generals of the Third U.S. Army and the Berlin District. Germans were not permitted to participate in such operations in Soviet-administered or Jewish centers, except when required to identify persons or material evidence. In this event their number was to be limited to one or two essential individuals. German police could participate in search operations in other than Soviet-administered or Jewish centers, provided that they did not exceed the number of United States troops engaged in the operation and that they remained under the direct supervision of United States personnel. Troops taking part in such an operation were to be commanded by an officer of at least the rank of captain and were to be carefully briefed as to their objectives, powers, and conduct.
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d. Contributing to the security aspects of the displaced-persons problem was the fact that Allied and neutral nationals were assigned as static guards in depots and large military communities, and on prisoner-of-war details where United States manpower was insufficient. The men used for these purposes were almost entirely displaced persons, mainly from the Eastern European countries. Because of the large number of Poles employed, these organizations were often termed "Polish Guard Companies." This was a misnomer, as the companies were not composed entirely of Poles. During the last week of January 1946, the number of Poles used for guard duties was 23,340, but the total of foreign nationals so employed was 31,836. By 30 June 1946, the Theater total of foreign civilian guards had risen to 41,500 persons, organized into 199 units.
e. The widespread use of these foreign guards was not without perplexing ramifications. The Secretary of State questioned the wisdom of using Polish personnel inasmuch as political repercussions might result from it. Theater Headquarters had to assure the War Department that steps were being taken to effect the repatriation of these displaced persons, but recommended that, since they were available, foreign nationals be retained in service on guard detail until the prisoner-of-war labor companies were disbanded. A more immediate and no less disturbing problem was the conduct of these civilian guards. Frequent reports of crimes perpetrated by uniformed displaced persons, ranging from capital crimes to minor offenses,
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presented a problem with which the German police could not cope and which military police found difficult. Culprits were often mistaken for United States personnel and the American soldier was discredited in the eyes of the civil population. Theater Headquarters ordered in December 1945 that all uniforms in possession of non-Americans be dyed blue or brawn, but it was not until April that this order was complied with.
141. War Criminals.
a. The first comprehensive directive on bringing war criminals to justice was the Joint Chiefs of Staff Directive 1023/10 of 8 July 1945. By its terms, responsibility was imposed upon the Theater Commander to bring about punishment for the following crimes:
(1) Atrocities and offenses against persons or property constituting violations of international law, including the laws, rules, and customs of land and naval warfare;
(2) Initiation of invasion of other countries and of wars of aggression in violation of international treaties;
(3) Other atrocities and offenses, including atrocities and persecutions on racial, religious, and political grounds, committed since 30 January 1933.
b. The term "criminal" was defined as including all persons, "without regard to their nationality or capacity in which they acted," who had committed any of the crimes defined above. It included also
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all persons who had been accessories to these crimes, who took a consenting part therein, who were connected with plans or enterprises involving their commission, or who were members of groups or organizations connected with the commission of such crimes. With reference to crimes against peace, invasion of other countries, and wars of aggression, the term "criminal" included persons who held high political or military positions in Germany or one of its allies or cobelligerents.
c. The Theater Commander was directed also to cause the arrest of all persons whom he suspected of having committed other atrocities and offenses, including persecutions on racial, religious, or political grounds, and of all persons whom the Control Council, or any one of the United Nations or Italy, charged as criminals.
d. As a result of Joint Chiefs of Staff Directive 1067/10, the Theater Commander not only was charged with the punishment of crimes committed against the laws and customs of war in connection with military operations or occupation, but also was directed to punish all crimes, except common law crimes, committed in Germany and territories conquered or annexed by Germany since 1933.
e. By Theater directive of 14 December 1945, the 970th Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment was responsible for the apprehension of suspected war criminals and witnesses. The Counter Intelligence Corps was not to initiate investigations or uncover war criminals, but merely to apprehend those persons designated by the
Theater Judge Advocate, intern them, and render an immediate report of arrest. Issue to counterintelligence agents of such items as food, gasoline, cigarettes, lipsticks, and similar supplies could be requested through channels when required to facilitate the apprehension of war criminals.
142. Military Justice.
a. The statistics of general court-martial cases from July 1942 to February 1946 revealed that the number of purely military offenses constituted 58.1 percent of all cases tried. The number of accused tried for murder and sex crimes was 10.17 percent of the total, and the rest were miscellaneous offenses, of which black-market deals accounted for the largest number. V-E Day brought a sharp drop in rape cases. The number of purely military offenses began to decline in a somewhat less marked manner in June 1945. There was, however, a corresponding rise in the number of noncapital common-law crimes.
b. Approximately 10 percent of all troops in the European Theater were Negroes. The amount of violent crimes, murder, and rape committed by this minority was far out of proportion to its numbers. An analysis of the death sentences executed in the European Theater through 31 October 1945 showed that, of 70 soldiers executed, 55 were Negroes, all of whom died for murder or rape, or both. The one soldier executed for desertion was white. During the same period of time a total of 260 white soldiers and 253 Negroes had been condemned
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to death, the sentences in the cases of 245 whites and 198 Negroes having been commuted. The largest number of Negro offenders had committed violent crime, while with white troops desertion, misbehavior before the enemy, and sentinel offenses were more prevalent.
c. The decline in serious offenses after V-E Day was not in proportion to the decline of troop strength in the Theater and the volume of court-martial cases did not fall as anticipated. In view of the fact that personnel in the Office of the Theater Judge Advocate had been diminished by redeployment, the processing of general court-martial cases through that office was considerably slowed down. Excessive delays often occurred between initial confinement and trial of military personnel. The shortage of trained officer lawyers in the European Theater was the most pressing single problem encountered in the administration of military justice.
d. At the end of the first year of the occupation, the total general prisoner population of the European Theater was concentrated in the Wuerzburg Rehabilitation Center, Wuerzburg. On 30 June 1946 a total of 1,175 military personnel were in confinement.
143. Censorship Policy.
Press censorship policy was formulated by the Press Censor-ship Branch of the Public Relations Division of Theater Headquarters and executed by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, through the Censorship Branch. Operational censorship units in the theater were supervised by the Public Relations Division. From V-E Day until V-J Day, the main mission of military and press censorship was to safeguard information on troop movements from Europe to the Pacific.
144. Military Censorship of Private and Press Communications.
A week after V-E Day, Theater Headquarters notified all major commands of eased censorship restrictions. Locations and identities of units and descriptions of combat experiences could then be passed. Unit censorship for units not alerted for the Pacific was discontinued on 15 May. Base censors still made spot checks to determine whether personal communications contained vital information on the war against Japan or on the European occupation. Material that had been impounded or detained was reviewed and most of it forwarded to the addressee. All censorship stamps were destroyed on 30 May 1945. On V-E Day, there were 300 officers and 180 enlisted men engaged in censorship duties; by V-J Day, this number had been reduced to 250 officers and 125 enlisted men. All military censorship of mail and press in the European Theater was ended on
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10 September 1945, and the last military censorship unit was disbanded on 25 September 1945.
145. Civil Censorship.
a. Civil Censorship was imposed on all forms of civilian communications -- letters, books, maps, recordings, plans, etc. The purposes of this censorship before V-J Day was to obtain all possible information of value in the prosecution of the war and to prevent the transmission of harmful information. After V-J Day, the censorship of German communications was continued as a valuable source of intelligence for the occupation authorities and as a means of controlling information. There were four phases in the control of communications in Germany. At first all communications were prohibited, all mail in the Reichspost was impounded, and all message service suspended. Later, communication facilities within Germany were reopened under strict regulations which permitted no communication with the rest of the world except through prisoner-of war, civilian-internee, or International-Red-Cross messages. Still later, restrictions for internal communications were relaxed and limited external communication was permitted. Finally, only moderate control was exercised over internal and external communications.
b. The Civil Censorship Division was under the operational control of the Censorship Branch of the G-2 Division. For operational purposes it was divided into four groups, located at Offenbach, Munich,
Esslingen, and Berlin. From these groups, the Telecommunications Sections operated field stations and mobile teams, the former fixed, permanent stations, and the latter, as the name implies, staying a short time in one location and then moving on to another.
c. Civilians were recruited in the United States, beginning as early as February 1945, for censorship duty in Germany. Most of them had had censorship experience in America during the war. Those who left the United States in April and May received training in France before going to Germany. In July permission was granted for the use of 3,500 Germans in postal censorship. Many proved very efficient, and no evidence was found of willful failure to carry out instructions. Stateless persons were hired in England for work in Germany, and early in 1946 the first Danish employees arrived.
146. Methods of Censorship.
When an intercepted communication revealed information of interest, the information was reported on a form called a submission and passed to what was known as a user agency, i.e., one which could make use of the information either for action or for information. There were about 150 user agencies, which submitted their requirements to the Civil Censorship Division. Censorship maintained a watch list of persons or firms whose communications were to be given special attention.
147. Postal Censorship.
a. Resumption of postal communication within the United States Zone was authorized in October 1945; in December mail between the United States and displaced persons was authorized; international postal service, except between Germany and Spain or Japan and their dependencies, was resumed 1 April 1946. During June 1946, civil censorship examined 3,500,000 international postal communications and prepared 105,000 submissions on them.
b. On being received from the Reichspost, mail to be censored was checked against the watch list for both sender and addressee. If either name appeared on the list, the communication was examined in a special unit. Mail containing no reportable information seldom remained in the censorship station for more than twenty-four hours; that on which a report had to be prepared might remain almost fifty. Small bits of objectionable matter were excised and the communication was released. An objectionable enclosure was extracted. An objectionable communication which could not be rendered unobjectionable by excision or extraction was condemned. An impression of the examiner's stamp was placed on each communication before it was released to the Reichspost. Documents carried by travelers were examined by the postal censorship department.
148. Telecommunications Censorship.
a. Telephone service in Germany was slowly reestablished. Intracity service was functioning in Frankfurt by the end of June 1945. Intrazonal service for essential civilian needs was authorized in the United States `Zone in October, and in February 1946 interzonal service was established. Telegraph service was opened in November 1945. International telecommunications had not been opened by the end of June 1946 because the Allied powers had not been able to reach an agreement.
b. Civilian and common-user telephone lines were monitored, selected lines being connected with observing sets. In Frankfurt, which had 7,000 subscribers, 300 lines were under observations. Recordings were made of conversations which might be of interest to user agencies, and submissions were prepared.
c. Telegraph messages were delivered by the Reichspost to the censorship station and were checked against the watch list before being examined.
During the first year of the occupation, Civil Censorship served as a security and intelligence agency, and revealed the trend of German thinking. Its findings were of special value to the Finance Division, police and fire officials, officers engaged in denazification, and the Decartelization Branch of the Economics Division.
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150. Responsibilities and Administration.
a. When the Allied Armies swept across the German border in September 1944, public safety was the responsibility of the Public Safety Branch of the G-5 Division, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force. Administration was carried out through normal staff and command channels, the principal operational agencies being the Public Safety Branches of the armies. The Supreme Headquarters handbook for Civil Affairs and the technical manual Public Safety contained detailed instructions applicable to this field of operations. With the dissolution of Supreme Headquarters on 16 July 1945, control passed to U.S. Forces, European Theater.
b. Full responsibility for the maintenance of public safety rested with the field forces from V-E Day to 31 December 1945, at which time responsibility for all military government operations in the field passed to the Offices of Military Government for the three German Laender.(1) From 1 January 1946, some public safety functions, relating to displaced persons and the maintenance of security of the forces, remained the responsibility of Military District Commanders. (2) After 1 April 1946, the staff supervision of some public safety responsibilities-continued under the Public Safety Branch of the newly reestablished G-5 Division of Theater
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Headquarters.(3) These included execution of policy for the establishment and maintenance of law and order; denazification, reorganization, and reactivation of the German police and fire-fighting forces; supervision of German police operations; investigation of public officials; enforcement of security measures; disposal of staffs, guards, and internees of concentration camps in conjunction with the Counter Intelligence Corps; and control of refugees and displaced persons.(4)
151. Public Safety in Liberated Countries.
The policy placing the responsibility for the establishment of public safety agencies and the restoration of law and order upon the national authorities of each country liberated from German domination was agreed upon at the Quebec Conference in August 1943 and carried out in combined operations in Europe in 1944-45. National police authorities, therefore, restored order in liberated countries and cooperated with the Counter Intelligence Corps and the Provost Marshal in the general maintenance of law and order and in apprehending delinquent soldiers and staging raids where United States soldiers were involved in criminal activity.
152. Public Safety Operations in Aachen.
a. Principal Problems. As the first large German city to surrender to United States forces, Aachen became the proving ground for military government policy. Military Government Detachment; F1G2
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administered the city under the First Army and tackled many problems which were to face all public safety authorities, namely: the re-organization of the police force and the maintenance of law and order until it could assume responsibility; the selection of personnel that would meet the tests of political reliability and efficiency; the opening of police schools for the training of police in democratic police practices and procedure and for the training of cadres for use in later police schools; the designing of police uniforms to mark a break with authoritarian traditions; the rearming of the German police; formation of policy on the character and extent of duties to be assigned to the German police, and the type and amount of supervision to be given in order to assure a high degree of cooperation, discipline, and conformance with Allied directives.
b. Denazification. The denazification of police in Aachen was carried out by the Special Branch of Public Safety, established on 30 October 1944. By the end of the year denazification was generally complete, but some Nazis were retained because no other professional police were available.(5)
c. Prison Administration. Public safety officers were responsible for the supervision of prisons. Difficulties in administering the Aachen prison arose as a result of its use by the First Army, the Counter Intelligence Corps, the Public Safety Branch, and the local German police. On 5 December, a German penal expert was appointed for the prison under the supervision of public safety officers.
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d. Fire Fighting and Civil Defense. As retreating Nazis had removed all fire-fighting equipment from Aachen to the east bank of the Rhine, there was considerable delay in reorganizing the fire department. Civil defense plans were prepared in November for use in case of air raids, but they were never required.(6)
e. Administration of Justice. Military government summary courts tried German and other civilians pending the reorganization of German courts. German civil law which existed prior to 1933 was reinstituted by the Allies and, together with military government laws and ordinances, provided the legal basis of the courts' decisions. (7) Heavy fines and long sentences soon impressed upon the population that violations would not be tolerated.
f. Crime Control. Owing to the apprehensive attitude of Aachen residents, crime control was not a pressing problem. In December an alarming increase in juvenile delinquency was controlled by making the parents responsible for their children's offenses.(8) Incidents involving looting by United States troops, over whom German police had no power, were soon brought to a minimum by military police. (9) Black-market activity was negligible, as was at first the problem of displaced persons. As tactical operations proceeded, however, millions of displaced persons were uncovered and they became involved in numerous criminal incidents in the vicinity of Aachen. Steps were taken to gather them into centers, and tactical commanders
assumed responsibility for their care, control, and repatriation. Policy developed in the Rhineland by the Public Safety Branch, G-5, Fifteenth Army, for the handling of displaced persons proved valuable in operations east of the Rhine.
153. Reorganization and Supervision of the German Police.
a. On V-E Day not only displaced persons, but also criminals, refugees, and surrendering Wehrmacht personnel roamed the countryside, and practically no German police force existed to control them. Public safety officers coordinated their activities with other security agencies of the Army to control this unhealthy situation, and tactical commanders assigned combat troops to assist.(10)
b. Plans for the reorganization of the German police and fire-fighting forces became effective with the issuance of a Theater directive on 7 July 1945.(11) United States policy for the reorganization of German public safety agencies was based on the concepts of decentralization, demilitarization, denazification, and the abolition of the national command hierarchy of the German police, fire, and civil defense agencies.(12) All central control of the German police system was abolished by turning over responsibility to the municipalities and the Laender, and by abolishing altogether certain Nazi organizations, such as those which had formed a part of the SS. (13)
c. The Railway and Waterways Police and various other units were reconstituted as separate units. The Border Control Police,
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abolished by the first forces entering Europe, was reorganized within each Laend with authority over German civilians only. By May 1946 the Border Control Police had a strength of 3,723, with 1,000 employed in carrying out customs police duties.(14) Laend Bureaus of Criminal Identification were organized in December 1945 to assist in the control of crime.(15) Strictly civilian in character, these bureaus operated under the Laend Ministers of the Interior and served as mediums for exchanging information among police departments. During the last six months of 1945, German civilian police increased in strength from 12,000(16) to 24,500.(17)
d. Public safety officers screened appointed and trained municipal and rural police and supervised their operations. Procedures developed during operations in liberated countries were carried over and used successfully in Germany. Drastic limitations were placed upon the powers of the new police, especially in their relations with Allied personnel.(18) All remaining records, property, and equipment were reclaimed for the use of the new police, and suitable persons dismissed by the Nazis were reappointed and gave willing cooperation. A monthly Police Situation Report and a monthly Crime Report were required of all police chiefs and were the basis for supervising arrest procedure, booking of charges, actions in bringing offenders before the proper court, and inspection of prisons.(19)
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154. Denazification and Training.
By December 1945 denazification of the police, carried out through investigation of information given in their individual questionnaires, or Fragebogen, was officially announced as complete
in the United States Zone, although dismissals continued for months.(20) In March responsibility for further denazification passed to the Germans. The shortage of politically reliable experienced personnel made it necessary to set up basic training schools. By the end of January 1946, twenty schools were in operation throughout the zone.(21) Courses were conducted by German police instructors under the supervision of the police chiefs and public safety officers, and were supplemented by in-service training. Special courses were conducted to train German civilian investigators.(22) A selected group of prisoners of war was trained for police work at Chateau Tocqueville, near Cherbourg, France. The program for the training of German prisoners of war for government service, including police work, known as Special Project No. 2, or the "Sunflower Project," was initiated on 30 July 1945.(23)
155. Uniforms and Arms for German Police.
The newly formed police suffered loss of prestige and morale because they were without uniforms. Third and Seventh Armies therefore expedited the release of captured enemy stocks of material to
be used for uniforms.(24) The German police authorities were permitted
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to design their own uniforms, subject to the approval of public safety officers. By 30 April 1946 all police, including the newly formed border police, were uniformed. The rearming of the German police was undertaken first on a local basis upon the request of local public safety officers. Without weapons the German police were helpless to cope with any local situations such as robbing, burning, looting, and murdering of German civilians by displaced persons. A majority of German police remained unarmed through October 1945, but on 6 November the Allied Control Council reached an agreement whereby weapons and limited amounts of ammunition were subsequently supplied to the German police.(25) Progress made in extending and perfecting means of communication and transportation also improved the efficiency of police operations.
156. Reorganization of German Fire-Fighting Agencies.
a. In general, German fire agencies had suffered severe damage as a result of bombings, and the equipment which had been moved by the Nazis to the east side of the Rhine in the early days of the occupation was dispersed in small towns and on the outskirts of municipalities for their protection. The shortage of fire-alarm systems, fire-fighting vehicles, hose, pumps, gasoline, oil, nozzles, and other requirements for efficient fire fighting created serious problems in rehabilitation. The situation was met in various ways,
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and policies were adopted for the strategic distribution of fire-fighting equipment throughout the Eastern and Western Military District.(26)
b. Upon entry into cities and towns, specialist public safety officers proceeded with the reorganization of German fire-fighting forces. Obligatory fire services were dissolved. All fire chiefs and personnel were screened in accordance with regulations relative to the removal from office of Nazis and militarists. As raw recruits often made up the majority of the fire departments, schools and in-service training programs were established. To assist chiefs in clothing their personnel, tactical commanders released stocks of captured German uniforms which were dyed and remodeled before use.(27)
c. Fire protection in each Stadtkreis, in each Gemeinde of 20,000 population or more, and in each smaller city having its own professional fire-fighting service before 1938 was made the responsibility of the Buergermeister. The Landrat was responsible in rural areas and in all Gemeinden not possessing their own fire-fighting forces. Public safety officers maintained constant liaison between the agencies concerned at their level of government in order to insure that military government instructions were carried out. Laend Bureaus of Fire Prevention were organized as purely statistical and advisory agencies exercising no administrative or operational control over German fire services. The submitted monthly reports
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to military government authorities, who used them in supervising the fire services.(28)
d. By the end of December 1945, Bavaria had 7,144 fire companies; Grosshessen 2,746, and Wuerttemberg-Baden 1,301. (29) These companies were required to render assistance to United States military fire-fighting units to augment the protection of military installations.
157. Maintaining Public Safety.
To facilitate the maintenance of law and order and the enforcement of security controls (30), the following restrictions were placed upon the German civil population: curfew and travel restrictions; exclusion from designated military areas; prohibition of meetings, parades, and public assemblies; and a ban on possessing certain articles. Public safety authorities were more concerned with crimes incident to or affecting the military occupation than with crimes among the German civil populace. Objectives were, however, the same in both cases----crime prevention, control, investigation, and prosecution. Although the German police was made responsible for the detection and investigation of crimes among the civil population,(31) assistance was given them by military police and by security guards employed by local commanders of tactical forces. (32) Three classes of crime—juvenile delinquency, black-market operations, and depredations of displaced persons--constituted
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the greatest threats to the maintenance of law and order in the United States Zone. As time went on, there was a steady increase in burglary and thievery of all kinds.
158. Juvenile Delinquency.
Disillusioned, drifting, sometimes homeless, Nazi-indoctrinated German youth was a threat to the security of the occupation. There was no evidence during the first year of the occupation, how-ever, to indicate that this lawlessness was organized. The problem was attacked by both military government and local tactical groups, and American correction techniques were introduced. First offenders were remanded to welfare workers or their parents. Parents were made responsible for second offenses of their children under Military Government Notice 23-222.(33) These measures helped German institutions and civil authorities to cope with the problem.
159. Black-Market Operations.
The black market was one of the most serious threats to the orderly maintenance of the occupation. It offered a means of subsistence for possible subversive groups intent upon creating resistance and at the same time led to a vicious circle in that it devaluated the mark and undermined German economy,(34) which resulted in increased use of the black market by the citizenry. Public safety authorities tried in every way to check these activities. Attempts were made to bolster the German economy and to support the efforts of the civil administration to ration food and clothing.(35) A price-control police was organized (36), and violators of price regulations were tried before military government, rather than German civil courts, sentences being imposed on both seller and buyer.(37) Prompt action of local tactical commanders and security agencies kept localized operations in check. Cooperation of German civil authorities and police with Army agencies through public safety officers was valuable, and one of the most important control measures was the restriction of displaced persons.
160. Depredations of Displaced Persons.
The depredations of displaced persons created such a menace to public safety that all agencies concerned took decisive, coordinated action.(38) When responsibility for military government passed from tactical commanders on 1 January 1946, the Army retained responsibility for the control of displaced persons camps.(39) Every effort was made to segregate displaced persons into centers where they could remain until repatriation. As time went on, conditions grew worse. Security guards posted at displaced persons camps, raids by military police and tactical units, and road blocks set up to recover stolen vehicles from displaced persons were only a few of the control measures undertaken. Under operation SYNDICATE, informers were placed in camps to gain
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information.(40) In May 1946 a Theater directive ordered the prosecution in military government intermediate or general courts of displaced, stateless, and other persons possessing firearms or other deadly weapons. Forced repatriation followed conviction.(41) Curtailment of aid to certain classes of displaced persons was finally resorted to in the effort to stem the resurgent tide of plundering. In May 1946 approximately 336,000 registered and 100,000 unregistered and uncontrolled displaced persons were still in the United States Zone.(42)
FOOTNOTES CHAPTER XI (cont'd)
290. Disarmament Memo No 9, SHAEF, 16 May 45, subj: "Primary Disarmament of German Land Forces and Short Term Disposal of Enemy War Material"; Disarmament Memo No 10, SHAEF, 17 Mar 45, subj: "Disarmament of German Air Forces Opposing US and Short Term Disposal of Enemy War Material"; Disarmament Memo No 11, SHAEF, 5 Jan 45, subj: "Disarmament of German Naval Forces and Short Term Disposal of Surrendered Naval War Material and Naval
291. Cf n. 1 above, Apr 45, chap V.
292. Ibid, chap V, p 111.
293. Ibid, chap IT, par IV.
294. Disarmament Memo No 9, SHAEF, 16 May 45, subj: "Primary Disarmament of German Land Forces and Short Term Disposal of Enemy War Material," pars 5, 7, 8 & 9.
295. Interview with Maj H.W. Brown, Hist Div, EUCOM, 6 Jun 45.
296, Seventh US Army, Report of Operations, 44-450 vol. III, pp 856-861.
297. Notice, Military Government of Germany, Supreme Commander's Area of Control, subj: "Surrender of Firearms, Ammunition, Weapons, Carrier Pigeons and Radio-Sending Equipment," MGR 23-217.
298. Proclamation No 1, OMG (US Zone), 14 Jul 45, MRG 23-300.
299. Order No 2, Control Council, 17 Jan 46, subj: "Confiscation and Surrender of Arms and Ammunition," MGR 23-151.2.
300. USFET Weekly Intelligence Summary No 10, 20 Sep 45, PP 45-48; USFET Intelligence Summary No 19, 22 Nov 45, p 61, USFET Weekly Intelligence Summary No 26, 10 Jan 46, pp 67-68; USFET Weekly Intelligence Summary No 26, 10 Jan 46, p 65.
301. Office of Military Government for Germany, Berlin Declaration of 5 Jun 45, Title 23, Military Government Legislation, Cl, MGR 23-54.
302. Ltr, USFET, 31 Jul 45, file AG 091.7 GDS-AGO, subj: "Demolition of Fortifications and Defense Works in the US Zone of Occupation."
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FOOTNOTES--CHAPTER XI (cont'd)
303. History of the Allied Kommandantura, Berlin, 1 Apr-31 Oct 46, PP 19-21.
304. SHAEF, Handbook Governing Policy and Procedure for the Military Occupation of Germany (US), Dec 44, chap IV.
305. ECLIPSE Memo No 17, SHAEF, 16 Apr 45, subj: "Disbandment of German and Armed Forces."
306. Cable S-81564, 10 Mar 45, SHAEF to AGWAR.
307. Cable W-72739, 25 Apr 45, AGWAR to SHAEF.
308. SHAEF, G-1 Div, Daily Report of Enemy Prisoners of War, 3 Oct 44.
309. Ibid, 4 Jan 45.
310. Ibid, 12 Mar 45.
311. Ibid, 20 Apr 45.
312. Ibid, 5 May 45.
313. Cable S-87057, 4 May 45, SHAEF to Army Group Commanders; ECLIPSE Memo No 17, SHAEF, 16 Apr 45, subj: "Disbandment of German Armed Forces."
314. Ibid, 12 May 45.
315. SHAEF, G-1 Div, Weekly PW & DEF Report, 22 Jun 45.
316. Ibid, 22 Jun 45.
317. ECLIPSE Memo No 17, SHAEF, 16 Apr 45, Sec F, par 20.
318. Disbandment Directives Nos 1 & 2, SHAEF, 15 May 45.
319. Disbandment Directive No 3, SHAEF, 18 May 45. 320, Disbandment Directive No 4, SHAEF, 5 Jun 45.
321. Disbandment Directive No 5, SHAEF, 30 Jun 4.5.
322. Disbandment Directive No 6, SHAEF, 6 Jul 45.
323. Amendment to Directive No 5, SHAEF, 1 Aug 45.
324. Monthly Report of Military Governor, US Zone, No 4, 20 Aug 46, PP 3-6, subj: "Demilitarization."
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FOOTNOTES Chapter XII (cont'd)
1. GO 337, Hq USFET, 14 Dec 45.
3. SHAEF, Public Safety Manual of Procedures, Sep 44.
5. SHAEF, TM Public Safety, Feb 45, app. "A", p 51.
6. MG Det F1G2, Daily Journal, Nov 44.
7. First US Army, Report of Operations, JA Sec, Feb 45.
8. MG Det F1G2, Daily Journal, 26 Dec 44; First US Army, After Action Report, G-5 Sec, Feb 45.
9. SHAEF TM Public Safety, Sep 44.
10. 12th Army Group, G-5, After Action Report, (MS) Aug 45.
11. USFET, Hdbk, Ada MG in US Zone of Germany, 7 Jul 45.
12. SHAEF, Public Safety Manual of Procedures, Sep 44.
13. SHAEF, TM Public Safety, Apr 45.
14. Hq USFET, Theater Commander's Weekly Staff Conference Report, No 22, 21 May 46, p 13.
15, OMGUS, Monthly Report of the MG, No. 8, 20 Mar 46. 16. USFET, G-2 WINSUM. No. 47, 3 Jul 45.
17. OMGUS, Monthly Report of the Military Governor, No 7, 20 Feb 46, p 8.
18. SHAEF, TM Public Safety, Feb 45.
19. Interview with Maj F.E. Morgan, Chief of PS Br, G-5, USFET, 26 Feb 47
FOOTNOTES—CHAPTER XII (cont.)
20. Hq USFET, Theater Commander's Weekly Staff Conference Report, No 1, 18 Dec 45, G-5 Sec.
21. OMGUS, Monthly Report of the Military Governor, No. 7, 20 Feb 46, p 9.
22. Third US Army, Report of Operations 1 Oct-31 Dec 45.
23. USFET, Report of Operations, PM Sec, 1 Oct-31 Dec 45.
24. Third (and Seventh) US Armies, Report of Operations, 1 Sep-31, Dec 45.
25. OMGUS, Regulations, Title 23, MG Legislation, Chg #1$ 12 Apr 46,
26. Third US Army, G-5 Report of Operations, 1 Oct-31 Dec 45.
27. Seventh US Army, WMD, G-5 Report of Operation, 8 May -31 Dec 45.
28. Hq USFET, Theater Commander's Weekly Staff Conference Report, No 2, 2 Jan 46, p 19.
29. OMG(US), Monthly Report of the Military Governor, 20 Feb 46.
30. SHAEF, 1 Public Safety, Feb 45, p 28.
32. Cf n. 19.
33. OMGUS, Title 23, MG Regulations, No. 23-222.
34. Hq, Third US Army, G--2 WINSUM, Apr 46.
35. Stars and Stripes, vol I, no. 156, 10 Oct 45, p 3.
36. News of Germany, vol I, no. 30, 22 Sep 45, p 4.
37. Cf n. 35.
38. OMG(US), Mont Re sorts of the Military Governor Jun -Jun 46.
39. GO 337, Hq USFET, 14 Dec 45.
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FOOTNOTES- --CHAPTER XII (cont' d )
20. Hq USFET, Theater Commander's Weekly Staff Conference Report, No 1, 18 Dec 45, G-5 Sec.
21. OMGUS, Monthly Report of the Military Governor, No. 7, 20 Feb 46, p 9.
22. Third US Army, Report of Operations 1 Oct-3 - 31 Dec 45.
23. USFET, Report of Operations, PM Sec, 1 Oct-31 DEW 45.
24. Third (and Seventh) US Armies, Report of Operations, 1 Sep--31 Dec 45.
25. OMGUS, Regulations, Title 23, Legislation, Chg #1, 12 Apr 46.
26. Third US Army, G-5 Report of Operations, 1 Oct- 1 Dec 45.
27. Seventh US Army, WMD, G-5 Report of Operation, 8 May-31 Dec 45.
28. Hq USFET, Theater Commander's Weekly Staff Conference Report, No 2, 2 Jan 46, p 19.
29. OMGUS), Monthly, port of the Military Governor, 20 Feb 46.
30. SHAEF, TM Public Safety, Feb 45, p 28.
32. Cf n. 19..
33. OMGUS, Title 23, MG. Regulations, No. 23-222.
34. Hq, Third US Army, G--2 WINSUM, Apr 46.
35. Stars and Stripes, vol I, no. 156, 10 Oct 45, p 3.
36. News of Germany, vol I, no. 30, 22 Sep 45, p 4.
37. Cf n. 35..
38, OMG(US), Monthly Reports of the Military Governor, Jun 45-Jun 4 .
39. GO 337, Hq USFET, 14 Dec 45.
FOOTNOTES -- CHAPTER XII (cont' d)
40. Hq Third US Army, G-2 Wkly Int Sum, 23 Feb-1 Mar 46) p 2.
41. Hq USFET, WINSUM, No. 47, 6 Jun 46, p 7.
42. Hq USFET, Theater Commander's Weekly Staff Conference Report, No. 21, 14 May 46.