Documents on the US Occupation of Germany 1945

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David Thompson
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Documents on the US Occupation of Germany 1945

Post by David Thompson » 24 Jan 2005 06:50

This is another in a series of research threads designed to improve the factual content of discussions in the H&WC section of the forum. The first document in this series is an extract from The First Year of the Occupation, Part 5 (in vol. 2), Occupation Forces in Europe Series, 1945-1946, Office of the Chief Historian, [US] European Command, Frankfurt-am-Main: 1947, at: ... ar%202.pdf

This extract will be in two parts: The first deals with the disarmament and disbandment of the German military formations at the close of the war, and the second deals with security issues in the newly-occupied country. Here is part 1:

125. Formulation of Disarmament Plans.

When indications of a German surrender or collapse appeared in late 1944, Supreme Headquarters issued instructions outlining the policy and procedure governing the disarming of the German armed forces.(289) As the fighting progressed, these general instructions were followed by directives giving in greater detail the procedure to be observed in disarming the enemy forces.(290) The plans which called for primary and secondary disarmament of the German armed forces, provided as follows: Enemy ground forces would be required to deposit their arms, ammunition, and other equipment in dumps guarded by their own personnel pending its transfer to the Allies;(291) enemy warships and other vessels would proceed to port; naval ammunition, warheads, and other explosives were to be unloaded and all personnel of warships were to go ashore except those needed for care and maintenance; merchant and fishing vessels were to wait for further instructions;

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naval forces on shore were to disarm completely, except for weapons needed for guard duty;(292) German aircraft were to be grounded and immobilized;(293) and disarmament of the German land forces, naval forces and air forces was a responsibility of comparable Allied forces, except that Allied ground forces were to give assistance to the Allied naval and air forces.(294)

126. Disarmament During Combat.

Most Germans were impelled by common sense and by instructions contained in surrender leaflets distributed by the Allies to surrender with their hands in the air and without weapons. Consequently, disarmament of individuals and of relatively small groups during combat consisted mainly in searching the prisoners for concealed weapons and explosives and in collecting abandoned weapons found on the terrain. Submachine guns, machine guns, antitank weapons, antiaircraft artillery, artillery, mortars, and rocket launchers were generally left in place when overrun by combat units and later collected and hauled to Ordnance collecting points, except those whose recovery value had been destroyed by the Germans.(295) Surrender of large groups of Germans was, however, more formal. Whenever a unit let it be known that it desired to surrender, its representatives were permitted to cross Allied lines to receive proper instructions. Surrender was always unconditional. The emissaries were usually told to disarm all enemy elements immediately,
hold them in their areas with all mess and transportation equipment, and concentrate all personnel and equipment. Instructions were also

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given to retain under arms a force sufficient to guard arms and equipment and to preserve order.(296)

127. Disarmament of the German People.

As the Allied armies advanced into Germany, military government was established to enforce policies of the Supreme Commander and certain laws, ordinances, and notices were posted. One ordinance stated that all firearms, including shotguns, and all other weapons, ammunition and explosives were to be surrendered immediately. Violations were to be punished by death or imprisonment.(297) When Supreme Headquarters terminated in July 1945, U.S. Forces, European Theater, which became the highest military authority in the United States Zone of Germany, announced that all military government rulings issued by the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, would continue in force.(298) This automatically included provisions to disarm the German people in the United States Zone. When the Allied Control Council ratified a similar ruling in January 1946, a uniform system to disarm German civilians in the four occupied zones was established.(299) To further effect the disarmament of the enemy, large-scale search operations were conducted in July and November 1945. These resulted in the confiscation of small arms, ammunition, and other unauthorized items. The searches continued on a smaller scale, with decreasing numbers of weapons and other items being found. (300)

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128. Long-Range Program to Render Germany Incapable of Waging War.

After the defeat of Germany in May 1945, steps were taken by the Allies to render that country incapable of ever again becoming a menace to the peace of the world. When Germany surrendered unconditionally, there was no central government in Germany capable of accepting the responsibility for maintenance of order, administration of the country, and compliance with the requirements of the victorious powers. Consequently, the representatives of the supreme commands of the four powers declared in June that their governments assumed supreme authority over Germany. They ordered that Germany and all German armed forces immediately cease hostilities in all Theaters, completely disarm, and hand over their weapons and equipment to local Allied commanders, and that all arms, ammunition, explosives, military equipment, stores, supplies, other implements of war of all kinds, and all war material in possession of the German armed forces be held intact for disposal as the Allied representatives might decide. (301)

129. Enemy Fortifications.

a. In accordance with the Berlin Declaration of 5 June 1945, the Commanding General, U.S. Forces, European Theater, announced in July the policy governing the demolition of fortifications and defensive works in the United States Zone. Major commanders, who were held responsible for this demolition and also for the location and clearance of mine fields in their areas, immediately started necessary operations

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to perform the tasks assigned to them. (302) Work of systematically surveying and demolishing fortifications was started late in October 1945 and progressed satisfactorily, but because of the extent and number of fortifications the work of demolishing them was to be one of the long-range tasks of the occupation.(303) Progress was hampered by redeployment and the shifting of units from one area to another.

b. On 6 December 1945, the Control Council published Directive No. 22, which established two priorities for the demolition of enemy fortifications, defense works, and military installations,
and set definite dates for these to be completed. In General, Priority I included those installations which presented an immediate security hazard or which were readily capable of adaptation for war purposes without extensive preparation. The deadline set for these to be destroyed was 6 June 1947. The second priority included installations which, though not an immediate security hazard, were an integral part of the German security plan. The deadline for the destruction of Priority II installations was 6 June 1951.

.c. Great advances had been made toward the complete elimination of Germany' s war potential by destroying war plants, by converting them to peacetime use, or by dismantling and removing them for reparations. By 30 June 1946, surveys and destruction work had been advanced sufficiently so that meeting the planned target dates seemed to be assured.

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130. Formulation of Disbandment Plans.

Plans for the disbandment of enemy military formations were made in late 1944 concurrently with the plans for their disarmament. (304) The disbandment plan specified that the enemy forces, except prisoners of war and certain others, would be controlled by their own officers under Allied supervision; that captured troops would be used to satisfy the labor needs of the Allies in occupied areas and in Allied and liberated countries; and that, when discharge occurred, certain categories of laborers would be given first priority. According to the plan, responsibility for the documentation and discharge of personnel of all three branches was given to zone commanders. Briefly, zone commanders were to discharge individuals residing in their zones of occupation and to transfer others to their zones of residence, giving the Counter Intelligence Corps information on proposed discharges when requested and giving all individuals a discharge certificate to enable them to receive ration cards at home. Finally, the plan stated that stragglers, deserters, and personnel discharged without authority were to report to certain centers for registration without risk of disciplinary action, and that non-Germans would be treated and disposed of in accordance with policies agreed upon with their respective governments.(305)

131. The Status of "Disarmed Enemy Forces."

To have taken into custody as prisoners of war, who would be entitled to rations equivalent to those of American base troops, the

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large numbers of Germans who were surrendering in April and May would have involved feeding patently beyond the ability of the Allies, even if all available German supplies were tapped. Moreover, it would have been undesirable to furnish troops with rations far in excess of those available to the civil population.(306) Consequently, the War Department approved treating all members of the German armed forces captured after the declaration of ECLIPSE conditions, or the cessation of hostilities, and all prisoners of war not evacuated from Germany immediately after the conclusion of hostilities, as "disarmed enemy forces," and specified that such captives would be responsible for feeding and maintaining themselves. This ruling did not apply to war criminals, wanted individuals, and security suspects, who were to be imprisoned, fed, and controlled by Allied forces. The War Department further directed that there be no public declaration made on the status of the German armed forces.(307)

132. Statistical Analysis.

In September 1944, German prisoners of war who had been captured by the Allied expeditionary Force numbered 545,756.(308) Each day thereafter a few more thousand prisoners were apprehended, and when the year ended 811,796 had been recorded.(309) The one-millionth was captured on 8 March 1945(310), the two-millionth on 16 April (331), and the three-millionth on 1 May.(312) Supreme Headquarters authorized army group commanders on 4 May, to consider the great masses of German troops then surrendering, not as prisoners of

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war entitled to the privileges prescribed in the Geneva Convention, but as disarmed enemy forces. The captured troops were disarmed, retained in their own organizations, and moved into concentration areas to be disbanded as soon as practicable.(313) When hostilities ceased, 4,005,732 prisoners of war had been captured.(314) Additional. prisoners continued to be reported after V-E E Day, and revised statistics show that the total number captured was 6,155,468.(315) Of this total 2,657,138 were prisoners of war and 4,098,330 were disarmed enemy forces.(316)

133. The Course of Events from V E Day to the Slowing Up of Disbandment.

Members of the Volkssturm who were prisoners of war or who were wearing a uniform when captured were disbanded as members of the disarmed enemy forces. Others were permitted to go home.(317) On 15 May 1945, Supreme Headquarters gave authority to discharge certain categories of prisoners of war and members of the disarmed enemy forces. Those to be discharged first were all men of German nationality who were agricultural workers, coal miners, transport workers, and other urgently needed workers provided that they lived in the area in which they were imprisoned and were not war criminals, security suspects, or members of the SS. All women members of the German armed forces were also to be promptly discharged, provided that they lived in the area in which they were imprisoned and were not war criminals, security suspects, or members of the SS.(3l8) Three days later, Supreme

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Headquarters gave authority to discharge all prisoners of war over fifty years of age, provided that they lived in the area in which they were imprisoned and were not war criminals, security suspects, or members of the SS.(319) On 5 June 1945, nationals of France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxemburg who were prisoners of war or in the status of disarmed enemy forces and not wanted for war crimes by a country other than their own were released to their respective governments. (320) General discharge was authorized late in June for all Germans except war criminals, security suspects, and those in automatic arrest categories. Those whose homes were in the Soviet Zone were held until an agreement on their transfer could be reached. At the same time, it was announced that war crime suspects would be discharged and reimprisoned as civilian internees, and that automatic arrestees and security suspects might be discharged if held in custody for interrogation.(321) In July, authority was given to release to their governments all non-Germans who were not security suspects or wanted as war criminals by a country other than their own, with the exception of Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians, and Poles not claiming Soviet citizenship, and dissident Yugoslav and neutral nationals with ardent Axis sympathies. The last directive relating to the mass disbandment of the German armed forces was issued in August.(322) It required that automatic arrestees be discharged and reimprisoned as civilian internees before being tried as war criminals, and provided that SS members who had joined that organization subsequent to 1 August

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1944 and who were privates could be discharged if cleared by the Counter Intelligence Corps.(323)

134. Situation in July 1946.

a. In July 1946, 216,657 prisoners of war and 66,868 internees were in the custody of the U.S. Army. Of the prisoners of war, 29,900 were in Italy, 242 were in Austria, 176,265 were elsewhere in Europe, and 250 were in the Zone of Interior. Members of the SS still held as prisoners of war totaled 11,064 and consisted of all members of the Waffen-SS above the grade of Scharfuehrer (sergeant) and all members of the Allgemeine-SS above the grade of Unterscharfeuhrer (corporal). They were held as members of an indicated organization pending decision of the International Military Tribunal with reference to the criminality of that organization. The total of 7,969 individuals held in the category of other automatic arrestees included General Staff Corps officers, senior members of paramilitary organizations other than the SS, and high officials of the Nazi Party. These were held in confinement nominally as prisoners of war but really as war crime and security suspects.

b. There were 42,498 prisoners of war who were in the process of discharge. They included individuals recently returned from the United States, personnel of Labor Service units recently rendered surplus, individuals released from hospitals, and those in the routine process of being disbanded.

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c. In the United States Zone and in the liberated countries, there were originally almost 750,000 prisoners of war in Labor Service units. By July 1946 this number had decreased to 105,100, organized into 420 units. It was anticipated that Labor Service units in the United States Zone would be disbanded and the personnel discharged by 30 November 1946. Those units performing tasks in liberated countries were to be disbanded as the need for them ceased, and in any event by 1 July 1947.

d. Prisoners of war in hospitals totaled over 175,000 in August 1945. By July 1946 this number was reduced to 9,634. The hospitals were staffed to a considerable degree with technical personnel of the former German Medical Corps. Although the hospitals operated under the direct supervision of United States medical battalions, they were not military organizations in any sense and were preserved to render necessary medical service to prisoners of war. Individuals requiring hospitalization in excess of thirty days were discharged. The intention was to release all hospitals for civilian use when the military need no longer existed.

e. A total of 71,794 civilian internees of various Nazi and paramilitary organizations other than the SS were being held in internment camps throughout the United States `Zone, awaiting decisions as to their culpability under war crimes provisions.(324)

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David Thompson
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Post by David Thompson » 24 Jan 2005 07:54

Part 2:


135. General.

a. During the first year of the occupation, law, order, and security were maintained, in general, satisfactorily, except as respects security of material and information. In regard to material, pilferage attained alarming proportions reaching two million dollars for the month of December 1945. Security of information was often neglected, owing to indifference after the conclusion of hostilities. As the first year of the occupation drew to a close, nothing spectacular had happened to support or confirm the suspicions of those who had feared underground movements or zone--wide resistance to the occupation forces. The breaches of law and order which did occur received perhaps undue emphasis in intelligence reports.

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b. Most effective in the maintenance of law and order was the policy of completely sealing-off Germany from the outside world and, in a somewhat lesser degree, sealing off the United States Zone from the rest of Germany. From the beginning, the U.S. Army maintained a strict border control. Originally designed as a security measure to prevent the movement of members of the German intelligence services, this later proved valuable in controlling the movement of displaced persons, prisoners of war, and refugees.

c. The zone-wide curfew for the civilian population was lifted on 30 March 1946. This action precipitated a controversy, as some major commands and the G-2 Division of Theater Headquarters were in favor of reinstating the curfew. It was finally determined that the curfew could be reinstated by local tactical commanders, after consultation with Military Government, if the security situation warranted such action.

d. Unannounced check and search operations, covering at times areas as large as one of the two Military District, helped to maintain law and order. During an operation all troop in the area were alerted, road blocks were set up, and search parties systematically combed the area for security suspects, firearms, and black-market operators.

e. The rapid redeployment of trained personnel left military police, the Counter Intelligence Corps, the Criminal Investigation Division, and the Judge Advocate's Offices greatly understaffed.

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This problem was in some instances so acute that the security and law enforcing functions of these agencies were seriously impaired.

136. The Counterintelligence Directive for Germany.

a. The basic policies for security were outlined in the counterintelligence directive for Germany, first issued by Headquarters, 12th Army Group, on 10 April 1945, and remained in force on a Theater-wide basis throughout the first year of the occupation. In addition to providing security for American military interests, the basic counterintelligence missions of the United States forces in Germany were the following: to destroy the enemy secret intelligence services and all security or secret police and affiliated para-miIitary organizations; to dissolve the Nazi Party and prevent its rebirth in any form; to aid in the disposal of the German General Staff Corps; and to detain selected enemy scientists and industrial technologists.

b. All personnel of the German intelligence services, including the secret field police and the security service, were to be interned. All security suspects and war criminals were in the automatic arrest category, as were all members of the Gestapo, all higher police officials, Nazi Party officials, high civil servants, the German general staff, and members of the German paramilitary organizations, with the exception of the lowest ranks.

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137. Civilian Internees.

a. About 150,000 persons were arrested during the first year of the occupation, the large majority in the period immediately following V-E Day. The first decrease in the number of civilian internees, was in October 1945. By the end of 1945 there were 128,000 civilian internees in internment camps in the United States Zone. Concentration of such a large number of security suspects, besides creating problems of supply and guarding, offered the danger that new Nazi cliques might be formed behind barbed wires. Many who had not been connected with the Nazi regime had been interned on technical grounds. In view of these considerations, the automatic arrest policy was amended several times during the first year. On 1 July 1946, the total number of civilian internees in United States enclosures had been reduced to about 70,000.

b. Internment camps were administered by the Theater Provost Marshal. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, was charged with providing trained personnel to screen the internees and to determine whether their confinement was in accordance with directives.

c. War Criminals were not segregated from other security suspects. All civilian internees were kept in enclosures, the population of which was constantly changing as new suspects were added and others released or brought to trial. The camp occupants were inconvenienced by serious overcrowding, unsatisfactory sanitary conditions,

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and lack of educational, religious, and recreational facilities. The war criminals, security suspects, automatic arrestees, and other internees received a basic food ration of 1,700 calories per day -- a ration decidedly above that of the German civil population, which was first 1,500 then 1,250 calories per day. Workers in internment camps received an extra allowance of 700 calories per day, while a hospital ration of between 2,300 and 3,000 calories was provided. In the spring of 1946 Theater Headquarters began preparations for transferring civilian internment enclosures to German authorities.

d. On 20 June 1946 the Chief of Staff of Theater Headquarters ordered that the release of civilian internees be expedited. Accordingly, Third U.S. Army established a board of officers familiar with counterintelligence processing. This board went into civilian internment enclosures in the Third Army area and reviewed the oases of all persons who had been arrested and were held solely on grounds of being security threats. In four weeks the board reviewed approximately 1,800 cases, of which more than 1,100 were ordered released.

138. General Trends in the Security Situation.

During combat it had been impossible to assess accurately the potentialities of German underground movements which were believed to exist. The first two months of occupation, however, proved that no major German opposition was to be encountered. Nazi plans for

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underground activities were not fully formulated at the time of the collapse. The early apprehension of members of the SS, SD, and Gestapo deprived a potential underground resistance of leadership. There were some signs of subversive activities, but they were uncoordinated and showed none of the characteristics of large-scale planning. The legendary Werwolf organization was soon exploded as a myth of Nazi propaganda. A greater nuisance to occupation authorities were the Edelweiss Piraten, who throughout the first year of the occupation figured prominently in field reports of subversive activities. While there was conclusive evidence of Edelweiss Piraten meetings and planning, the long-range aims of the group appeared to vary in different localities. Basically, the Edelweiss Piraten were groups of disgruntled youths who gathered to annoy occupation authorities, to threaten German women who associated with occupation troops, and to deal extensively in the black market. Other groups, similar in character, were the EORGA organization and the Bundschuh and Regenbogen groups.

b. In October 1945, the first signs of unrest were noted in the civilian population. Petty acts of sabotage such as wire cutting were on the increase and the wall-smearing campaign, more or less insignificant in scope, which had so far been directed against German women associating with American troops, now defied the occupation authorities. Furthermore, a slight increase was noted in the

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number of attacks on United States personnel. Generally, the Germans assumed a bolder attitude, which was expressed in a slight but growing disregard for military government legislation. Illegal mail traffic and other petty security violations increased, and revival of anti-Semitic feeling was reported.

c. From December 1945 until the middle of March 1946 there was a general improvement in the security situation, resulting largely, it appears, from the arming of the civilian police in many areas and the increased use of mobile patrols. Strangely enough, the dreaded winter months with their many hardships produced no adverse effects on civil security. The G-2 Division of Theater Headquarters reported also that the large-scale withdrawals of tactical troops under the redeployment plan did not cause the civil population to disregard security controls and that apprehension in this respect had "proven to be unfounded."

d. During the last two weeks of March:, the security situation deteriorated appreciably and remained at a lower level until the beginning of June 1946. The G-2 Division, reversing its previous position, stated that the hasty withdrawal of United States troops contributed "primarily to the boldness of the German people." With the disappearance of the symbol of authority, German self-confidence returned, together with the belief that the United States would soon withdraw from the occupation altogether. During the

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spring of 1945 security violations of all descriptions, from attacks on American personnel to curfew violations, were on the increase. There was some criticism by Germans of Military Government and of occupation policies. The number of civilians apprehended for carrying weapons increased. Although improvements in the situation were noted in the first week of June, the previous high level was not attained during that month.

139. The Theater Protective Security Plan.

a. A zone wide security plan evolved by Theater Headquarters included an estimate of the situation in the United States-occupied areas of Germany and Austria and in adjacent territories, stated the courses of action open to the occupation forces in meeting civil disturbances, and set forth principles to be used as a basis for the security plans of the lower echelons. It was supplemented by a Theater alert plan, containing a checklist of actions to be taken by major commanders in the event of emergencies which were given code word designations. Both the security and the alert plans provided for mutual assistance among major commands and coordination of action by Theater Headquarters.

b. The security plan dealt in great detail with minor uprisings, in the event of which provision was made for vigilant frontier control and for demonstration flights by the Air Force, but reprisal action against German communities was forbidden. A major uprising was deemed less likely and was considered in less detail.

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140. Security Aspects of the Displaced Persons Problem.

a. Displaced persons were responsible for some crimes of violence, for looting, pilferage, and a large amount of black-market activity. Establishment of camps, shake-down inspections, and stepping up of patrol activities contributed to control.

b. From the outset the military authorities were responsible for the enforcement of law and order with respect to displaced persons. The agreement with the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration of 18 February 1946 provided, however, that the military authorities would consult with camp directors, particularly when the displaced persons in the latters' care might be subjected to search, arrest, and detention. Search operations had to be approved by Military Government. The displaced persons were well aware of the stringent regulations covering the entry into and search of their camps and believed that they were relatively immune from action by law-enforcement agencies. Check and search operations were conducted, however, from time to time in displaced persons centers, and usually yielded large numbers of lethal weapons and black-market supplies.

c. Prior to 30 March 1946, German police were permitted to conduct searches in displaced persons assembly centers, provided concurrence had been obtained from Military Government. But this caused friction, culminating in the Stuttgart riot of 29 March 1946, when displaced persons moved against German police conducting a search

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operation. Shots were fired from both sides and one Jewish displaced person was killed. Order was not restored until an armored car and several jeep loads of District Constabulary arrived. The immediate result was that the Theater Commander prohibited the use of German police in searches and seizures in camps housing persecutees. Six weeks later, on 16 May 1946, Theater Headquarters promulgated Standing Operating Procedure No. 81 on check and search operations in United Nations displaced persons centers, which was intended to establish uniform procedures throughout the United States occupied area of Germany. To prevent recurrence of incidents like the one in Stuttgart, authority to approve check and search operations in Jewish displaced persons centers was limited to the commanding generals of the Third U.S. Army and the Berlin District. Germans were not permitted to participate in such operations in Soviet-administered or Jewish centers, except when required to identify persons or material evidence. In this event their number was to be limited to one or two essential individuals. German police could participate in search operations in other than Soviet-administered or Jewish centers, provided that they did not exceed the number of United States troops engaged in the operation and that they remained under the direct supervision of United States personnel. Troops taking part in such an operation were to be commanded by an officer of at least the rank of captain and were to be carefully briefed as to their objectives, powers, and conduct.

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d. Contributing to the security aspects of the displaced-persons problem was the fact that Allied and neutral nationals were assigned as static guards in depots and large military communities, and on prisoner-of-war details where United States manpower was insufficient. The men used for these purposes were almost entirely displaced persons, mainly from the Eastern European countries. Because of the large number of Poles employed, these organizations were often termed "Polish Guard Companies." This was a misnomer, as the companies were not composed entirely of Poles. During the last week of January 1946, the number of Poles used for guard duties was 23,340, but the total of foreign nationals so employed was 31,836. By 30 June 1946, the Theater total of foreign civilian guards had risen to 41,500 persons, organized into 199 units.

e. The widespread use of these foreign guards was not without perplexing ramifications. The Secretary of State questioned the wisdom of using Polish personnel inasmuch as political repercussions might result from it. Theater Headquarters had to assure the War Department that steps were being taken to effect the repatriation of these displaced persons, but recommended that, since they were available, foreign nationals be retained in service on guard detail until the prisoner-of-war labor companies were disbanded. A more immediate and no less disturbing problem was the conduct of these civilian guards. Frequent reports of crimes perpetrated by uniformed displaced persons, ranging from capital crimes to minor offenses,

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presented a problem with which the German police could not cope and which military police found difficult. Culprits were often mistaken for United States personnel and the American soldier was discredited in the eyes of the civil population. Theater Headquarters ordered in December 1945 that all uniforms in possession of non-Americans be dyed blue or brawn, but it was not until April that this order was complied with.

141. War Criminals.

a. The first comprehensive directive on bringing war criminals to justice was the Joint Chiefs of Staff Directive 1023/10 of 8 July 1945. By its terms, responsibility was imposed upon the Theater Commander to bring about punishment for the following crimes:

(1) Atrocities and offenses against persons or property constituting violations of international law, including the laws, rules, and customs of land and naval warfare;

(2) Initiation of invasion of other countries and of wars of aggression in violation of international treaties;

(3) Other atrocities and offenses, including atrocities and persecutions on racial, religious, and political grounds, committed since 30 January 1933.

b. The term "criminal" was defined as including all persons, "without regard to their nationality or capacity in which they acted," who had committed any of the crimes defined above. It included also

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all persons who had been accessories to these crimes, who took a consenting part therein, who were connected with plans or enterprises involving their commission, or who were members of groups or organizations connected with the commission of such crimes. With reference to crimes against peace, invasion of other countries, and wars of aggression, the term "criminal" included persons who held high political or military positions in Germany or one of its allies or cobelligerents.

c. The Theater Commander was directed also to cause the arrest of all persons whom he suspected of having committed other atrocities and offenses, including persecutions on racial, religious, or political grounds, and of all persons whom the Control Council, or any one of the United Nations or Italy, charged as criminals.

d. As a result of Joint Chiefs of Staff Directive 1067/10, the Theater Commander not only was charged with the punishment of crimes committed against the laws and customs of war in connection with military operations or occupation, but also was directed to punish all crimes, except common law crimes, committed in Germany and territories conquered or annexed by Germany since 1933.

e. By Theater directive of 14 December 1945, the 970th Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment was responsible for the apprehension of suspected war criminals and witnesses. The Counter Intelligence Corps was not to initiate investigations or uncover war criminals, but merely to apprehend those persons designated by the


Theater Judge Advocate, intern them, and render an immediate report of arrest. Issue to counterintelligence agents of such items as food, gasoline, cigarettes, lipsticks, and similar supplies could be requested through channels when required to facilitate the apprehension of war criminals.

142. Military Justice.

a. The statistics of general court-martial cases from July 1942 to February 1946 revealed that the number of purely military offenses constituted 58.1 percent of all cases tried. The number of accused tried for murder and sex crimes was 10.17 percent of the total, and the rest were miscellaneous offenses, of which black-market deals accounted for the largest number. V-E Day brought a sharp drop in rape cases. The number of purely military offenses began to decline in a somewhat less marked manner in June 1945. There was, however, a corresponding rise in the number of noncapital common-law crimes.

b. Approximately 10 percent of all troops in the European Theater were Negroes. The amount of violent crimes, murder, and rape committed by this minority was far out of proportion to its numbers. An analysis of the death sentences executed in the European Theater through 31 October 1945 showed that, of 70 soldiers executed, 55 were Negroes, all of whom died for murder or rape, or both. The one soldier executed for desertion was white. During the same period of time a total of 260 white soldiers and 253 Negroes had been condemned

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to death, the sentences in the cases of 245 whites and 198 Negroes having been commuted. The largest number of Negro offenders had committed violent crime, while with white troops desertion, misbehavior before the enemy, and sentinel offenses were more prevalent.

c. The decline in serious offenses after V-E Day was not in proportion to the decline of troop strength in the Theater and the volume of court-martial cases did not fall as anticipated. In view of the fact that personnel in the Office of the Theater Judge Advocate had been diminished by redeployment, the processing of general court-martial cases through that office was considerably slowed down. Excessive delays often occurred between initial confinement and trial of military personnel. The shortage of trained officer lawyers in the European Theater was the most pressing single problem encountered in the administration of military justice.

d. At the end of the first year of the occupation, the total general prisoner population of the European Theater was concentrated in the Wuerzburg Rehabilitation Center, Wuerzburg. On 30 June 1946 a total of 1,175 military personnel were in confinement.


143. Censorship Policy.

Press censorship policy was formulated by the Press Censor-ship Branch of the Public Relations Division of Theater Headquarters and executed by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, through the Censorship Branch. Operational censorship units in the theater were supervised by the Public Relations Division. From V-E Day until V-J Day, the main mission of military and press censorship was to safeguard information on troop movements from Europe to the Pacific.

144. Military Censorship of Private and Press Communications.

A week after V-E Day, Theater Headquarters notified all major commands of eased censorship restrictions. Locations and identities of units and descriptions of combat experiences could then be passed. Unit censorship for units not alerted for the Pacific was discontinued on 15 May. Base censors still made spot checks to determine whether personal communications contained vital information on the war against Japan or on the European occupation. Material that had been impounded or detained was reviewed and most of it forwarded to the addressee. All censorship stamps were destroyed on 30 May 1945. On V-E Day, there were 300 officers and 180 enlisted men engaged in censorship duties; by V-J Day, this number had been reduced to 250 officers and 125 enlisted men. All military censorship of mail and press in the European Theater was ended on

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10 September 1945, and the last military censorship unit was disbanded on 25 September 1945.

145. Civil Censorship.

a. Civil Censorship was imposed on all forms of civilian communications -- letters, books, maps, recordings, plans, etc. The purposes of this censorship before V-J Day was to obtain all possible information of value in the prosecution of the war and to prevent the transmission of harmful information. After V-J Day, the censorship of German communications was continued as a valuable source of intelligence for the occupation authorities and as a means of controlling information. There were four phases in the control of communications in Germany. At first all communications were prohibited, all mail in the Reichspost was impounded, and all message service suspended. Later, communication facilities within Germany were reopened under strict regulations which permitted no communication with the rest of the world except through prisoner-of war, civilian-internee, or International-Red-Cross messages. Still later, restrictions for internal communications were relaxed and limited external communication was permitted. Finally, only moderate control was exercised over internal and external communications.

b. The Civil Censorship Division was under the operational control of the Censorship Branch of the G-2 Division. For operational purposes it was divided into four groups, located at Offenbach, Munich,


Esslingen, and Berlin. From these groups, the Telecommunications Sections operated field stations and mobile teams, the former fixed, permanent stations, and the latter, as the name implies, staying a short time in one location and then moving on to another.

c. Civilians were recruited in the United States, beginning as early as February 1945, for censorship duty in Germany. Most of them had had censorship experience in America during the war. Those who left the United States in April and May received training in France before going to Germany. In July permission was granted for the use of 3,500 Germans in postal censorship. Many proved very efficient, and no evidence was found of willful failure to carry out instructions. Stateless persons were hired in England for work in Germany, and early in 1946 the first Danish employees arrived.

146. Methods of Censorship.

When an intercepted communication revealed information of interest, the information was reported on a form called a submission and passed to what was known as a user agency, i.e., one which could make use of the information either for action or for information. There were about 150 user agencies, which submitted their requirements to the Civil Censorship Division. Censorship maintained a watch list of persons or firms whose communications were to be given special attention.

147. Postal Censorship.

a. Resumption of postal communication within the United States Zone was authorized in October 1945; in December mail between the United States and displaced persons was authorized; international postal service, except between Germany and Spain or Japan and their dependencies, was resumed 1 April 1946. During June 1946, civil censorship examined 3,500,000 international postal communications and prepared 105,000 submissions on them.

b. On being received from the Reichspost, mail to be censored was checked against the watch list for both sender and addressee. If either name appeared on the list, the communication was examined in a special unit. Mail containing no reportable information seldom remained in the censorship station for more than twenty-four hours; that on which a report had to be prepared might remain almost fifty. Small bits of objectionable matter were excised and the communication was released. An objectionable enclosure was extracted. An objectionable communication which could not be rendered unobjectionable by excision or extraction was condemned. An impression of the examiner's stamp was placed on each communication before it was released to the Reichspost. Documents carried by travelers were examined by the postal censorship department.

148. Telecommunications Censorship.

a. Telephone service in Germany was slowly reestablished. Intracity service was functioning in Frankfurt by the end of June 1945. Intrazonal service for essential civilian needs was authorized in the United States `Zone in October, and in February 1946 interzonal service was established. Telegraph service was opened in November 1945. International telecommunications had not been opened by the end of June 1946 because the Allied powers had not been able to reach an agreement.

b. Civilian and common-user telephone lines were monitored, selected lines being connected with observing sets. In Frankfurt, which had 7,000 subscribers, 300 lines were under observations. Recordings were made of conversations which might be of interest to user agencies, and submissions were prepared.

c. Telegraph messages were delivered by the Reichspost to the censorship station and were checked against the watch list before being examined.

149. Accomplishments.

During the first year of the occupation, Civil Censorship served as a security and intelligence agency, and revealed the trend of German thinking. Its findings were of special value to the Finance Division, police and fire officials, officers engaged in denazification, and the Decartelization Branch of the Economics Division.

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150. Responsibilities and Administration.

a. When the Allied Armies swept across the German border in September 1944, public safety was the responsibility of the Public Safety Branch of the G-5 Division, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force. Administration was carried out through normal staff and command channels, the principal operational agencies being the Public Safety Branches of the armies. The Supreme Headquarters handbook for Civil Affairs and the technical manual Public Safety contained detailed instructions applicable to this field of operations. With the dissolution of Supreme Headquarters on 16 July 1945, control passed to U.S. Forces, European Theater.

b. Full responsibility for the maintenance of public safety rested with the field forces from V-E Day to 31 December 1945, at which time responsibility for all military government operations in the field passed to the Offices of Military Government for the three German Laender.(1) From 1 January 1946, some public safety functions, relating to displaced persons and the maintenance of security of the forces, remained the responsibility of Military District Commanders. (2) After 1 April 1946, the staff supervision of some public safety responsibilities-continued under the Public Safety Branch of the newly reestablished G-5 Division of Theater

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Headquarters.(3) These included execution of policy for the establishment and maintenance of law and order; denazification, reorganization, and reactivation of the German police and fire-fighting forces; supervision of German police operations; investigation of public officials; enforcement of security measures; disposal of staffs, guards, and internees of concentration camps in conjunction with the Counter Intelligence Corps; and control of refugees and displaced persons.(4)

151. Public Safety in Liberated Countries.

The policy placing the responsibility for the establishment of public safety agencies and the restoration of law and order upon the national authorities of each country liberated from German domination was agreed upon at the Quebec Conference in August 1943 and carried out in combined operations in Europe in 1944-45. National police authorities, therefore, restored order in liberated countries and cooperated with the Counter Intelligence Corps and the Provost Marshal in the general maintenance of law and order and in apprehending delinquent soldiers and staging raids where United States soldiers were involved in criminal activity.

152. Public Safety Operations in Aachen.

a. Principal Problems. As the first large German city to surrender to United States forces, Aachen became the proving ground for military government policy. Military Government Detachment; F1G2

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administered the city under the First Army and tackled many problems which were to face all public safety authorities, namely: the re-organization of the police force and the maintenance of law and order until it could assume responsibility; the selection of personnel that would meet the tests of political reliability and efficiency; the opening of police schools for the training of police in democratic police practices and procedure and for the training of cadres for use in later police schools; the designing of police uniforms to mark a break with authoritarian traditions; the rearming of the German police; formation of policy on the character and extent of duties to be assigned to the German police, and the type and amount of supervision to be given in order to assure a high degree of cooperation, discipline, and conformance with Allied directives.

b. Denazification. The denazification of police in Aachen was carried out by the Special Branch of Public Safety, established on 30 October 1944. By the end of the year denazification was generally complete, but some Nazis were retained because no other professional police were available.(5)

c. Prison Administration. Public safety officers were responsible for the supervision of prisons. Difficulties in administering the Aachen prison arose as a result of its use by the First Army, the Counter Intelligence Corps, the Public Safety Branch, and the local German police. On 5 December, a German penal expert was appointed for the prison under the supervision of public safety officers.

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d. Fire Fighting and Civil Defense. As retreating Nazis had removed all fire-fighting equipment from Aachen to the east bank of the Rhine, there was considerable delay in reorganizing the fire department. Civil defense plans were prepared in November for use in case of air raids, but they were never required.(6)

e. Administration of Justice. Military government summary courts tried German and other civilians pending the reorganization of German courts. German civil law which existed prior to 1933 was reinstituted by the Allies and, together with military government laws and ordinances, provided the legal basis of the courts' decisions. (7) Heavy fines and long sentences soon impressed upon the population that violations would not be tolerated.

f. Crime Control. Owing to the apprehensive attitude of Aachen residents, crime control was not a pressing problem. In December an alarming increase in juvenile delinquency was controlled by making the parents responsible for their children's offenses.(8) Incidents involving looting by United States troops, over whom German police had no power, were soon brought to a minimum by military police. (9) Black-market activity was negligible, as was at first the problem of displaced persons. As tactical operations proceeded, however, millions of displaced persons were uncovered and they became involved in numerous criminal incidents in the vicinity of Aachen. Steps were taken to gather them into centers, and tactical commanders


assumed responsibility for their care, control, and repatriation. Policy developed in the Rhineland by the Public Safety Branch, G-5, Fifteenth Army, for the handling of displaced persons proved valuable in operations east of the Rhine.

153. Reorganization and Supervision of the German Police.

a. On V-E Day not only displaced persons, but also criminals, refugees, and surrendering Wehrmacht personnel roamed the countryside, and practically no German police force existed to control them. Public safety officers coordinated their activities with other security agencies of the Army to control this unhealthy situation, and tactical commanders assigned combat troops to assist.(10)

b. Plans for the reorganization of the German police and fire-fighting forces became effective with the issuance of a Theater directive on 7 July 1945.(11) United States policy for the reorganization of German public safety agencies was based on the concepts of decentralization, demilitarization, denazification, and the abolition of the national command hierarchy of the German police, fire, and civil defense agencies.(12) All central control of the German police system was abolished by turning over responsibility to the municipalities and the Laender, and by abolishing altogether certain Nazi organizations, such as those which had formed a part of the SS. (13)

c. The Railway and Waterways Police and various other units were reconstituted as separate units. The Border Control Police,

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abolished by the first forces entering Europe, was reorganized within each Laend with authority over German civilians only. By May 1946 the Border Control Police had a strength of 3,723, with 1,000 employed in carrying out customs police duties.(14) Laend Bureaus of Criminal Identification were organized in December 1945 to assist in the control of crime.(15) Strictly civilian in character, these bureaus operated under the Laend Ministers of the Interior and served as mediums for exchanging information among police departments. During the last six months of 1945, German civilian police increased in strength from 12,000(16) to 24,500.(17)

d. Public safety officers screened appointed and trained municipal and rural police and supervised their operations. Procedures developed during operations in liberated countries were carried over and used successfully in Germany. Drastic limitations were placed upon the powers of the new police, especially in their relations with Allied personnel.(18) All remaining records, property, and equipment were reclaimed for the use of the new police, and suitable persons dismissed by the Nazis were reappointed and gave willing cooperation. A monthly Police Situation Report and a monthly Crime Report were required of all police chiefs and were the basis for supervising arrest procedure, booking of charges, actions in bringing offenders before the proper court, and inspection of prisons.(19)

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154. Denazification and Training.

By December 1945 denazification of the police, carried out through investigation of information given in their individual questionnaires, or Fragebogen, was officially announced as complete
in the United States Zone, although dismissals continued for months.(20) In March responsibility for further denazification passed to the Germans. The shortage of politically reliable experienced personnel made it necessary to set up basic training schools. By the end of January 1946, twenty schools were in operation throughout the zone.(21) Courses were conducted by German police instructors under the supervision of the police chiefs and public safety officers, and were supplemented by in-service training. Special courses were conducted to train German civilian investigators.(22) A selected group of prisoners of war was trained for police work at Chateau Tocqueville, near Cherbourg, France. The program for the training of German prisoners of war for government service, including police work, known as Special Project No. 2, or the "Sunflower Project," was initiated on 30 July 1945.(23)

155. Uniforms and Arms for German Police.

The newly formed police suffered loss of prestige and morale because they were without uniforms. Third and Seventh Armies therefore expedited the release of captured enemy stocks of material to
be used for uniforms.(24) The German police authorities were permitted

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to design their own uniforms, subject to the approval of public safety officers. By 30 April 1946 all police, including the newly formed border police, were uniformed. The rearming of the German police was undertaken first on a local basis upon the request of local public safety officers. Without weapons the German police were helpless to cope with any local situations such as robbing, burning, looting, and murdering of German civilians by displaced persons. A majority of German police remained unarmed through October 1945, but on 6 November the Allied Control Council reached an agreement whereby weapons and limited amounts of ammunition were subsequently supplied to the German police.(25) Progress made in extending and perfecting means of communication and transportation also improved the efficiency of police operations.

156. Reorganization of German Fire-Fighting Agencies.

a. In general, German fire agencies had suffered severe damage as a result of bombings, and the equipment which had been moved by the Nazis to the east side of the Rhine in the early days of the occupation was dispersed in small towns and on the outskirts of municipalities for their protection. The shortage of fire-alarm systems, fire-fighting vehicles, hose, pumps, gasoline, oil, nozzles, and other requirements for efficient fire fighting created serious problems in rehabilitation. The situation was met in various ways,

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and policies were adopted for the strategic distribution of fire-fighting equipment throughout the Eastern and Western Military District.(26)

b. Upon entry into cities and towns, specialist public safety officers proceeded with the reorganization of German fire-fighting forces. Obligatory fire services were dissolved. All fire chiefs and personnel were screened in accordance with regulations relative to the removal from office of Nazis and militarists. As raw recruits often made up the majority of the fire departments, schools and in-service training programs were established. To assist chiefs in clothing their personnel, tactical commanders released stocks of captured German uniforms which were dyed and remodeled before use.(27)

c. Fire protection in each Stadtkreis, in each Gemeinde of 20,000 population or more, and in each smaller city having its own professional fire-fighting service before 1938 was made the responsibility of the Buergermeister. The Landrat was responsible in rural areas and in all Gemeinden not possessing their own fire-fighting forces. Public safety officers maintained constant liaison between the agencies concerned at their level of government in order to insure that military government instructions were carried out. Laend Bureaus of Fire Prevention were organized as purely statistical and advisory agencies exercising no administrative or operational control over German fire services. The submitted monthly reports

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to military government authorities, who used them in supervising the fire services.(28)

d. By the end of December 1945, Bavaria had 7,144 fire companies; Grosshessen 2,746, and Wuerttemberg-Baden 1,301. (29) These companies were required to render assistance to United States military fire-fighting units to augment the protection of military installations.

157. Maintaining Public Safety.

To facilitate the maintenance of law and order and the enforcement of security controls (30), the following restrictions were placed upon the German civil population: curfew and travel restrictions; exclusion from designated military areas; prohibition of meetings, parades, and public assemblies; and a ban on possessing certain articles. Public safety authorities were more concerned with crimes incident to or affecting the military occupation than with crimes among the German civil populace. Objectives were, however, the same in both cases----crime prevention, control, investigation, and prosecution. Although the German police was made responsible for the detection and investigation of crimes among the civil population,(31) assistance was given them by military police and by security guards employed by local commanders of tactical forces. (32) Three classes of crime—juvenile delinquency, black-market operations, and depredations of displaced persons--constituted

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the greatest threats to the maintenance of law and order in the United States Zone. As time went on, there was a steady increase in burglary and thievery of all kinds.

158. Juvenile Delinquency.

Disillusioned, drifting, sometimes homeless, Nazi-indoctrinated German youth was a threat to the security of the occupation. There was no evidence during the first year of the occupation, how-ever, to indicate that this lawlessness was organized. The problem was attacked by both military government and local tactical groups, and American correction techniques were introduced. First offenders were remanded to welfare workers or their parents. Parents were made responsible for second offenses of their children under Military Government Notice 23-222.(33) These measures helped German institutions and civil authorities to cope with the problem.

159. Black-Market Operations.

The black market was one of the most serious threats to the orderly maintenance of the occupation. It offered a means of subsistence for possible subversive groups intent upon creating resistance and at the same time led to a vicious circle in that it devaluated the mark and undermined German economy,(34) which resulted in increased use of the black market by the citizenry. Public safety authorities tried in every way to check these activities. Attempts were made to bolster the German economy and to support the efforts of the civil administration to ration food and clothing.(35) A price-control police was organized (36), and violators of price regulations were tried before military government, rather than German civil courts, sentences being imposed on both seller and buyer.(37) Prompt action of local tactical commanders and security agencies kept localized operations in check. Cooperation of German civil authorities and police with Army agencies through public safety officers was valuable, and one of the most important control measures was the restriction of displaced persons.

160. Depredations of Displaced Persons.

The depredations of displaced persons created such a menace to public safety that all agencies concerned took decisive, coordinated action.(38) When responsibility for military government passed from tactical commanders on 1 January 1946, the Army retained responsibility for the control of displaced persons camps.(39) Every effort was made to segregate displaced persons into centers where they could remain until repatriation. As time went on, conditions grew worse. Security guards posted at displaced persons camps, raids by military police and tactical units, and road blocks set up to recover stolen vehicles from displaced persons were only a few of the control measures undertaken. Under operation SYNDICATE, informers were placed in camps to gain

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information.(40) In May 1946 a Theater directive ordered the prosecution in military government intermediate or general courts of displaced, stateless, and other persons possessing firearms or other deadly weapons. Forced repatriation followed conviction.(41) Curtailment of aid to certain classes of displaced persons was finally resorted to in the effort to stem the resurgent tide of plundering. In May 1946 approximately 336,000 registered and 100,000 unregistered and uncontrolled displaced persons were still in the United States Zone.(42)


290. Disarmament Memo No 9, SHAEF, 16 May 45, subj: "Primary Disarmament of German Land Forces and Short Term Disposal of Enemy War Material"; Disarmament Memo No 10, SHAEF, 17 Mar 45, subj: "Disarmament of German Air Forces Opposing US and Short Term Disposal of Enemy War Material"; Disarmament Memo No 11, SHAEF, 5 Jan 45, subj: "Disarmament of German Naval Forces and Short Term Disposal of Surrendered Naval War Material and Naval
291. Cf n. 1 above, Apr 45, chap V.
292. Ibid, chap V, p 111.
293. Ibid, chap IT, par IV.
294. Disarmament Memo No 9, SHAEF, 16 May 45, subj: "Primary Disarmament of German Land Forces and Short Term Disposal of Enemy War Material," pars 5, 7, 8 & 9.
295. Interview with Maj H.W. Brown, Hist Div, EUCOM, 6 Jun 45.
296, Seventh US Army, Report of Operations, 44-450 vol. III, pp 856-861.
297. Notice, Military Government of Germany, Supreme Commander's Area of Control, subj: "Surrender of Firearms, Ammunition, Weapons, Carrier Pigeons and Radio-Sending Equipment," MGR 23-217.
298. Proclamation No 1, OMG (US Zone), 14 Jul 45, MRG 23-300.
299. Order No 2, Control Council, 17 Jan 46, subj: "Confiscation and Surrender of Arms and Ammunition," MGR 23-151.2.
300. USFET Weekly Intelligence Summary No 10, 20 Sep 45, PP 45-48; USFET Intelligence Summary No 19, 22 Nov 45, p 61, USFET Weekly Intelligence Summary No 26, 10 Jan 46, pp 67-68; USFET Weekly Intelligence Summary No 26, 10 Jan 46, p 65.
301. Office of Military Government for Germany, Berlin Declaration of 5 Jun 45, Title 23, Military Government Legislation, Cl, MGR 23-54.
302. Ltr, USFET, 31 Jul 45, file AG 091.7 GDS-AGO, subj: "Demolition of Fortifications and Defense Works in the US Zone of Occupation."

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303. History of the Allied Kommandantura, Berlin, 1 Apr-31 Oct 46, PP 19-21.
304. SHAEF, Handbook Governing Policy and Procedure for the Military Occupation of Germany (US), Dec 44, chap IV.
305. ECLIPSE Memo No 17, SHAEF, 16 Apr 45, subj: "Disbandment of German and Armed Forces."
306. Cable S-81564, 10 Mar 45, SHAEF to AGWAR.
307. Cable W-72739, 25 Apr 45, AGWAR to SHAEF.
308. SHAEF, G-1 Div, Daily Report of Enemy Prisoners of War, 3 Oct 44.
309. Ibid, 4 Jan 45.
310. Ibid, 12 Mar 45.
311. Ibid, 20 Apr 45.
312. Ibid, 5 May 45.
313. Cable S-87057, 4 May 45, SHAEF to Army Group Commanders; ECLIPSE Memo No 17, SHAEF, 16 Apr 45, subj: "Disbandment of German Armed Forces."
314. Ibid, 12 May 45.
315. SHAEF, G-1 Div, Weekly PW & DEF Report, 22 Jun 45.
316. Ibid, 22 Jun 45.
317. ECLIPSE Memo No 17, SHAEF, 16 Apr 45, Sec F, par 20.
318. Disbandment Directives Nos 1 & 2, SHAEF, 15 May 45.
319. Disbandment Directive No 3, SHAEF, 18 May 45. 320, Disbandment Directive No 4, SHAEF, 5 Jun 45.
321. Disbandment Directive No 5, SHAEF, 30 Jun 4.5.
322. Disbandment Directive No 6, SHAEF, 6 Jul 45.
323. Amendment to Directive No 5, SHAEF, 1 Aug 45.
324. Monthly Report of Military Governor, US Zone, No 4, 20 Aug 46, PP 3-6, subj: "Demilitarization."

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FOOTNOTES Chapter XII (cont'd)

1. GO 337, Hq USFET, 14 Dec 45.
2. Ibid.
3. SHAEF, Public Safety Manual of Procedures, Sep 44.
4. Ibid.
5. SHAEF, TM Public Safety, Feb 45, app. "A", p 51.
6. MG Det F1G2, Daily Journal, Nov 44.
7. First US Army, Report of Operations, JA Sec, Feb 45.
8. MG Det F1G2, Daily Journal, 26 Dec 44; First US Army, After Action Report, G-5 Sec, Feb 45.
9. SHAEF TM Public Safety, Sep 44.
10. 12th Army Group, G-5, After Action Report, (MS) Aug 45.
11. USFET, Hdbk, Ada MG in US Zone of Germany, 7 Jul 45.
12. SHAEF, Public Safety Manual of Procedures, Sep 44.
13. SHAEF, TM Public Safety, Apr 45.
14. Hq USFET, Theater Commander's Weekly Staff Conference Report, No 22, 21 May 46, p 13.
15, OMGUS, Monthly Report of the MG, No. 8, 20 Mar 46. 16. USFET, G-2 WINSUM. No. 47, 3 Jul 45.
17. OMGUS, Monthly Report of the Military Governor, No 7, 20 Feb 46, p 8.
18. SHAEF, TM Public Safety, Feb 45.
19. Interview with Maj F.E. Morgan, Chief of PS Br, G-5, USFET, 26 Feb 47



20. Hq USFET, Theater Commander's Weekly Staff Conference Report, No 1, 18 Dec 45, G-5 Sec.
21. OMGUS, Monthly Report of the Military Governor, No. 7, 20 Feb 46, p 9.
22. Third US Army, Report of Operations 1 Oct-31 Dec 45.
23. USFET, Report of Operations, PM Sec, 1 Oct-31 Dec 45.
24. Third (and Seventh) US Armies, Report of Operations, 1 Sep-31, Dec 45.
25. OMGUS, Regulations, Title 23, MG Legislation, Chg #1$ 12 Apr 46,
26. Third US Army, G-5 Report of Operations, 1 Oct-31 Dec 45.
27. Seventh US Army, WMD, G-5 Report of Operation, 8 May -31 Dec 45.
28. Hq USFET, Theater Commander's Weekly Staff Conference Report, No 2, 2 Jan 46, p 19.
29. OMG(US), Monthly Report of the Military Governor, 20 Feb 46.
30. SHAEF, 1 Public Safety, Feb 45, p 28.
31. Ibid.
32. Cf n. 19.
33. OMGUS, Title 23, MG Regulations, No. 23-222.
34. Hq, Third US Army, G--2 WINSUM, Apr 46.
35. Stars and Stripes, vol I, no. 156, 10 Oct 45, p 3.
36. News of Germany, vol I, no. 30, 22 Sep 45, p 4.
37. Cf n. 35.
38. OMG(US), Mont Re sorts of the Military Governor Jun -Jun 46.
39. GO 337, Hq USFET, 14 Dec 45.

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20. Hq USFET, Theater Commander's Weekly Staff Conference Report, No 1, 18 Dec 45, G-5 Sec.
21. OMGUS, Monthly Report of the Military Governor, No. 7, 20 Feb 46, p 9.
22. Third US Army, Report of Operations 1 Oct-3 - 31 Dec 45.
23. USFET, Report of Operations, PM Sec, 1 Oct-31 DEW 45.
24. Third (and Seventh) US Armies, Report of Operations, 1 Sep--31 Dec 45.
25. OMGUS, Regulations, Title 23, Legislation, Chg #1, 12 Apr 46.
26. Third US Army, G-5 Report of Operations, 1 Oct- 1 Dec 45.
27. Seventh US Army, WMD, G-5 Report of Operation, 8 May-31 Dec 45.
28. Hq USFET, Theater Commander's Weekly Staff Conference Report, No 2, 2 Jan 46, p 19.
29. OMGUS), Monthly, port of the Military Governor, 20 Feb 46.
30. SHAEF, TM Public Safety, Feb 45, p 28.
31. Ibid.
32. Cf n. 19..
33. OMGUS, Title 23, MG. Regulations, No. 23-222.
34. Hq, Third US Army, G--2 WINSUM, Apr 46.
35. Stars and Stripes, vol I, no. 156, 10 Oct 45, p 3.
36. News of Germany, vol I, no. 30, 22 Sep 45, p 4.
37. Cf n. 35..
38, OMG(US), Monthly Reports of the Military Governor, Jun 45-Jun 4 .
39. GO 337, Hq USFET, 14 Dec 45.


40. Hq Third US Army, G-2 Wkly Int Sum, 23 Feb-1 Mar 46) p 2.
41. Hq USFET, WINSUM, No. 47, 6 Jun 46, p 7.
42. Hq USFET, Theater Commander's Weekly Staff Conference Report, No. 21, 14 May 46.

David Thompson
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Post by David Thompson » 24 Jan 2005 08:02

The text of JCS 1067 can be found at:

JCS 1067 and US military government in Germany

The histories of the US Army Occupation Forces in Europe can be seen in pdf format at:

Archives of the US Army in Europe ... pation.htm

There is an official general history by Earl F. Ziemke, "The US Army in the Occupation of Germany 1944-46" on-line at:

and Harry S. Truman Library oral history interviews with Gen. Lucius Clay and Harding Bancroft are available at: and

Previous discussions on the subject of the US occupation of Germany can be found at:

Morgenthau Plan
Plunder in postwar Germany
Soviet containment and Marshall Plan

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Post by David Thompson » 27 Jan 2005 12:00

of all German Forces to the Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force, General Dwight D. Eisenhower, and to the Supreme High Command of the Red Army

Berlin. May 8, 1945. [3]

1. We the undersigned, acting by authority of the German High Command, hereby surrender unconditionally to the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force and simultaneously to the Supreme

[3] Department of State Bulletin, July 22, 1945.

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High Command of the Red Army all forces on land, at sea, and in the air who are at this date under German control.

2. The German High Command will at once issue orders to all German military, naval and air authorities and to all forces under German control to cease active operations at 2301 hours Central European time on 8th May 1945, to remain in the positions occupied at that time and to disarm completely, handing over their weapons and equipment to the local allied commanders or officers designated by Representatives of the Allied Supreme Commands. No ship, vessel, or aircraft is to be scuttled, or any damage done to their hull, machinery or equipment, and also to machines of all kinds, armament, apparatus, and all the technical means of prosecution of war in general.

3. The German High Command will at once issue to the appropriate commanders, and ensure the carrying out of any further orders issued by the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force and by the Supreme High Command of the Red Army.

4. This act of military surrender is without prejudice to, and will be superseded by any general instrument of surrender imposed by, or on behalf of the United Nations and applicable to GERMANY and the German armed forces as a whole.

5. In the event of the German High Command or any of the forces under their control failing to act in accordance with this Act of Surrender, the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force and the Supreme High Command of the Red Army will take such punitive or other action as they deem appropriate.

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6. This Act is drawn up in the English, Russian and German languages. The English and Russian are the only authentic texts.

Signed at Berlin on the 8th day of May, 1945

On behalf of the German High Command

On behalf of the Supreme Commander Allied Expeditionary Force

On behalf of the Supreme High Command of the Red Army

At the signing also were present as witnesses:

General Commanding in Chief First French Army

General, Commanding United States Strategic Air Forces

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Post by David Thompson » 27 Jan 2005 12:07

This document is commonly known as the Four-Power Declaration:
Declaration regarding the defeat of Germany and the assumption of supreme authority with respect to Germany by the Governments of the United States of America, The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the United Kingdom, and the Provisional Government of the French Republic.

The German armed forces on land, at sea and in the air have been completely defeated and have surrendered unconditionally and Germany, which bears responsibility for the war, is no longer capable of resisting the will of the victorious powers. The unconditional surrender of Germany has thereby been effected, and Germany has become subject to such requirements as may now or hereafter be imposed upon her.

There is no central government or authority in Germany capable of accepting responsibility for the maintenance of order, the administration of the country and compliance with the requirements of the victorious powers.

It is in these circumstances necessary, without prejudice to any subsequent decisions that may be taken respecting Germany, to make provision for the cessation of any further hostilities on the part of the German armed forces, for the maintenance of order in Germany and for the administration of the country, and to announce the immediate requirements with which Germany must comply.

The representatives of the supreme commands of the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and the French Republic, hereinafter called the "Allied representatives," acting by authority of their respective

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Governments and in the interests of the United Nations, accordingly make the following declaration:
The Governments of the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Kingdom, and the Provisional Government of the French Republic, hereby assume supreme authority with respect to Germany, including all the powers possessed by the German Government, the High Command and any state, municipal or local government or authority. The assumption, for the purposes stated above, of the said authority and powers does not effect the annexation of Germany.

The Governments of the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Kingdom, and the Provisional Government of the French Republic, will hereafter determine the boundaries of Germany or any part thereof and the status of Germany or of any area at present being part of German territory.

In virtue of the supreme authority and powers thus assumed by the four Governments, the Allied representatives announce the following requirements, arising from the complete defeat and unconditional surrender of Germany with which Germany must comply:


Germany, and all German military, naval and air authorities and all forces under German control shall immediately cease hostilities in all theatres of war against the forces of the United Nations on land, at sea and in the air.

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(A) All armed forces of Germany or under German control, wherever they may be situated, including land, air, anti-aircraft and naval forces, the SS, SA and Gestapo, and all other forces or auxiliary organizations equipped with weapons, shall be completely disarmed, handing over their weapons and equipment to local Allied commanders or to officers designated by the Allied representatives.

(B) The personnel of the formations and units of all forces referred to in Paragraph (A) above shall, at the discretion of the Commander in Chief of the armed forces of the Allied state concerned, be declared to be prisoners of war, pending further decisions, and shall be subject to such conditions and directions as may be prescribed by the respective Allied representatives.

(C) All forces referred to in Paragraph (A) above, wherever they may be, will remain in their present positions pending instructions from the Allied representatives.

(D) Evacuation by the said forces of all territories outside the frontiers of Germany as they existed on Dec. 31, 1937, will proceed according to instructions to be given by the Allied representatives.

(E) Detachments of civil police to be armed with small arms only, for the maintenance of order and for guard duties, will be designated by the Allied representatives.


(A) All aircraft of any kind or nationality in Germany or German-occupied or controlled territories or waters, military, naval or civil, other than aircraft

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in the service of the Allies, will remain on the ground, on the water or aboard ships pending further instructions.

(B) All German or German-controlled aircraft in or over territories or waters not occupied or controlled by Germany will proceed to Germany or to such other place or places as may be specified by the Allied representatives.


(A) All German or German-controlled naval vessels, surface and submarine, auxiliary naval craft, and merchant and other shipping, wherever such vessels may be at the time of this declaration, and all other merchant ships of whatever nationality in German ports, will remain in or proceed immediately to ports and bases as specified by the Allied representatives. The crews of such vessels will remain on board pending further instructions.

(B) All ships and vessels of the United Nations, whether or not title has been transferred as the result of prize court or other proceedings, which are at the disposal of Germany or under German control at the time of this declaration, will proceed at the dates and to the ports or bases specified by the Allied representatives.


(A) All or any of the following articles in the possession of the German armed forces or under German control or at German disposal will be held intact and in good condition at the disposal of the Allied representatives, for such purposes and at such times and places as they may prescribe:

I. All arms, ammunition, explosives, military

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equipment, stores and supplies and other implements of war of all kinds and all other war material;

II. All naval vessels of all classes, both surface and submarine, auxiliary naval craft and all merchant shipping, whether afloat, under repair or construction, built or building;

III. All aircraft of all kinds, aviation and antiaircraft equipment and devices;

IV. All transportation and communications facilities and equipment, by land, water or air;

V. All military installations and establishments, including airfields, seaplane bases, ports and naval bases, storage depots, permanent and temporary land and coast fortifications, fortresses and other fortified areas, together with plans and drawings of all such fortifications, installations and establishments;

VI. All factories, plants, shops, research institutions, laboratories, testing stations, technical data, patents, plans, drawings and inventions, designed or intended to produce or to facilitate the production or use of the articles, materials, and facilities referred to in Sub-Paragraphs I, II, III, IV and V above or otherwise to further the conduct of war.

(B) At the demand of the Allied representatives the following will be furnished:

I. The labor, services and plant required for the maintenance or operation of any of the six categories mentioned in Paragraph (A) above; and

II. Any information or records that may be required by the Allied representatives in connection with the same.

(C) At the demand of the Allied representatives all facilities will be provided for the movement of

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Allied troops and agencies, their equipment and supplies, on the railways, roads and other land communications or by sea, river or air. All means of transportation will be maintained in good order and repair, and the labor, services and plant necessary therefor will be furnished.


(A) The German authorities will release to the Allied representatives, in accordance with the procedure to be laid down by them, all prisoners of war at present in their power, belonging to the forces of the United Nations, and will furnish full lists of these persons, indicating the places of their detention in Germany or territory occupied by Germany. Pending the release of such prisoners of war, the German authorities and people will protect them in their persons and property and provide them with adequate food, clothing, shelter, medical attention, and money in accordance with their rank or official position.

(B) The German authorities and people will in like manner provide for and release all other nationals of the United Nations who are confined, interned or otherwise under restraint, and all other persons who may be confined, interned or otherwise under restraint for political reasons or as a result of any Nazi action, law or regulation which discriminates on the ground of race, color, creed or political belief.

(C) The German authorities will, at the demand of the Allied representatives, hand over control of places of detention to such officers as may be designated for the purpose by the Allied representatives.

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The German authorities concerned will furnish to the Allied representatives:

(A) Full information regarding the forces referred to in Article 2 (A), and, in particular, will furnish forthwith all information which the Allied representatives may require concerning the numbers, locations and dispositions of such forces, whether located inside or outside Germany;

(B) Complete and detailed information concerning mines, minefields and other obstacles to movement by land, sea or air, and the safety lanes in connection therewith. All such safety lanes will be kept open and clearly marked; all mines, minefields and other dangerous obstacles will as far as possible be rendered safe, and all aids to navigation will be reinstated. Unarmed German military and civilian personnel with the necessary equipment will be made available and utilized for the above purpose and for the removal of mines, minefields and other obstacles as directed by the Allied representatives.


There shall be no destruction, removal, concealment, transfer or scuttling of, or damage to, any military, naval, air, shipping, port, industrial and other like property and facilities and all records and archives, wherever they may be situated, except as may be directed by the Allied representatives.


Pending the institution of control by the Allied representatives over all means of communication, all

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radio and telecommunication installations and other forms of wire or wireless communications, whether ashore or afloat, under German control, will cease transmission except as directed by the Allied representatives.


The forces, nationals, ships, aircraft, military equipment and other property in Germany or in German control or service or at German disposal, of any other country at war with any of the Allies, will be subject to the provisions of this declaration and of any of the proclamations, orders, ordinances or instructions issued thereunder.


(A) The principal Nazi leaders as specified by the Allied representatives, and all persons from time to time named or designated by rank, office or employment by the Allied representatives as being suspected of having committed, ordered or abetted war crimes or analogous offenses, will be apprehended and surrendered to the Allied representatives.

(B) The same will apply in the case of any national of any of the United Nations who is alleged to have committed any offense against his national law, and who may at any time be named or designated by rank, office or employment by the Allied representatives.

(C) The German authorities and people will comply with any instructions given by the Allied representatives for the apprehension and surrender of such persons.

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The Allied representatives will station forces and civil agencies in any or all parts of Germany as they may determine.


(A) In the exercise of the supreme authority with respect to Germany assumed by the Government of the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the United Kingdom, and the Provisional Government of the French Republic, the four Allied Governments will take such steps, including the complete disarmament and demilitarization of Germany, as they deem requisite for future peace and security.

(B) The Allied representatives will impose on Germany additional political, administrative, economic, financial, military and other requirements arising from the complete defeat of Germany. The Allied representatives, or persons or agencies duly designated to act on their authority, will issue proclamations, orders, ordinances and instructions for the purpose of laying down such additional requirements, and of giving effect to the other provisions of this declaration. All German authorities and the German people shall carry out unconditionally the requirements of the Allied representatives, and shall fully comply with all such proclamations, orders, ordinances and instructions.


This declaration enters into force and effect at the date and hour set forth below. In the event of failure on the part of the German authorities or

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people promptly and completely to fulfill their obligations hereby or hereafter imposed, the Allied representatives will take whatever action may be deemed by them to be appropriate under the circumstances.


This declaration is drawn up in English, Russian, French and German languages. The English, Russian and French are the only authentic texts.

BERLIN, JUNE 5, 1945.

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Re: Documents on the US Occupation of Germany 1945

Post by translators » 16 Apr 2011 14:07

Hello, can you tell me if the BAOR were involved in the censorship stations?

David Thompson
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Re: Documents on the US Occupation of Germany 1945

Post by David Thompson » 22 Apr 2011 00:58

An opinion post from murx, which added nothing of factual interest to the thread, was removed by this moderator pursuant to many previous warnings - DT. ... 0#p1571170 (sourcing) ... 1#p1569271 (sourcing) ... 1#p1567561 (sourcing) ... 5#p1567555 (sourcing) ... 3#p1567553 (sourcing) ... 0#p1567220 (sourcing) ... 7#p1547717 (sourcing) ... 1#p1539871 (sourcing) ... 1#p1514191 (sourcing) ... 3#p1522883 (sourcing) ... 7#p1527767 (off-topic flamebait) ... 5#p1579865 (topicality) ... 4#p1531164 (topicality) ... 2#p1530622 (topicality) ... 5#p1528525 (topicality) ... 1#p1528381 (topicality) ... 3#p1528083 (topicality) ... 7#p1527767 (topicality) ... 2#p1525842 (topicality) ... 0#p1516900 (topicality) ... 6#p1514396 (topicality)

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