Dunkirk Halt Order, Can you help me with my essay?

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R-Bob The Great!
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Dunkirk Halt Order, Can you help me with my essay?

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Post by R-Bob The Great! » 11 Apr 2005, 04:03

I am writing an essay for history where I must answer the question "Was Hitler Justified In Halting the Panzers Before Dunkirk". This is just a rough-rough draft that I just patched together really quickly so that it could be exposed on this forum for a longer time, it is supposed to be below 4,000 words (its 4500 currently) and I might need to edit in a some quotes which if anyone could think of off the top of their head that would be fitting, would be greatly appreciated. I will probably cut the entire Blitzkrieg and Fall Gelb paragraph and extend the introduction and conclusions and I havent edited or proofread it once yet so please bear with me. ALso I will have to link the paragraphs together more convincingly as well as a plethora of smaller tasks.

If you have any constructive criticism at all it would be greatly appreciated, the essay is due on Tuesday and so please try and fit in any posts before then.
Was Hitler Justified in Halting the Panzers Before Dunkirk

I. Introduction
On May 10, 1940 the German panzer forces burst through the Ardennes forest and surrounded a little less then half a million Allied soldiers, among them the only mobile units in the French Army and the entire British Expeditionary Force, in a pocket in Belgium centring around Dunkirk. Guderian, commander of the Panzer Corps, stood only about twelve miles short of the Allies' last possible opportunity for escape when he was suddenly he ordered to halt. The reasons for this order remain clouded to this day but at the time Guderian was told that the areas surrounding Dunkirk were too marshy for armour to negotiate which he knew was simply untrue. Whatever the reason many historians peg this decision as the one that cost Hitler Britain's surrender and decided ultimate the outcome of the war.

II. Blitzkrieg
Before dashing headlong into the questions and controversies surrounding the battle of the Dunkirk Pocket itself, it is necessary to have an understanding of its context in the campaign of which it was part. Britain and France both declared war on Germany on September 3, 1939, following Germany's unprovoked attack on Poland. As the Polish Army was being annihilated by the brand new rebuilt Wehrmacht, the Allies vacillated, and Poland became the first victim to the new type of war called Blitzkrieg, masterminded by Germany's best soldier: Heinz Guderian. He theorized in his famous treatise Achtung Panzer that Germany could not win a protracted war of attrition--the First World War was proof of this. Instead Guderian proposed that the new wonder weapon, tanks, such an outstanding failure for the Allies in the First World War, would be the solution to Germany's strategic dilemma. Tanks, each equipped with a radio, would be massed into Panzer Divisionen, Panzer Korps, and later even Panzerarmees. These units of armour would mass at a weak point in the enemy's front, the schwerpunkt, and then force their way through, wreaking havoc in the enemy's rear and destroy any communicative, administrative or logistical facilities, bypassing any points of enemy resistance. Here Guderian was met with a quandary: how would artillery of sufficient calibre be able to keep up with the advancing panzers and their accompanying motorised infantry. Instead of lugging heavy artillery pieces across former no-mans-land at a snail's pace, he contrived the ingenious idea that, rather than having artillery in the conventional sense, he could use the newly developed Stuka dive-bomber to act as his artillery. Germany's Air Force, the Luftwaffe was created for this purpose, to support the army, and no other. The British and French totally failed to see the potential of tanks, their own creations. Allied military doctrine insisted on distributing their armour in "pennypackets" around the battlefield, rather as mobile machine-gun platforms than the offensive war-winning weapons the Germans knew they were. Even after the whirlwind defeat of Poland the Allies continued to cling to these obviously obsolescent beliefs. One German officer commented that his opponents had lost a major opponent when they "did not draw lessons from the blitzkrieg in Poland."

II. Fall Gelb Opening Moves
The German campaign in the West opened on May 10, 1940, with a diversionary attack into Belgium and the Netherlands from the bulk of the slow moving infantry forces, basically a re-run of the Schlieffin Plan that had resulted in such a spectacular failure in the First World War. This was exactly what the Allies expected and the British Expeditionary Force and the French First Army group, the most only mobile elements of the entire Allied armies in France, moved into Belgium to engage the perceived threat. Suddenly and without warning the German panzer spearheads emerged outside the Ardennes Forest, the hinge of the Allied advance and just skirting the "impregnable" blockhouses of the Maginot Line, constructed at great expense in the previous decade. Without waiting a moment for the infantry or artillery to catch up the panzers resumed the advance and with stunning speed they crossed the Meuse River and drove headlong straight across the rear of the Allied armies in Belgium, their ultimate destination being the coast which they reached on the 20th of March.

III. Arras & Repercussions
The entire BEF had moved up into Belgium with the French First Army Group and since the emergence of Von Rundstedt's (Commander of Army Group A, attacking through the Ardennes) panzers in their rear they had taken desperate action with the French to organize a counterattack to check the Germans' stunning advance. Due to a lack of cooperation, and communication between the Allies, their weak leaders and obsolescent doctrine, counterattack was continually postponed until May 22nd. On this day Sixteen heavy Matildas II's and fifty eight Mark I's spearheaded the attack into the rear of General Erwin Rommel's 7th Panzer Division, causing heavy casualties and taking 400 prisoners, the largest bag by the Allies during the campaign. Rommel's tanks were forced to engage the British attack, a strict breach of Bltizkrieg theory, and Rommel was forced to improvise a gun-line, personally directing heavy 88 mm Anti-Aircraft gun fire across open sights at the British tanks. Only after suffering heavy armoured and infantry losses was the assault beaten back. Gerd Von Rundstedt commanding Army Group A was a conservative relic of the First World War and it is generally acknowledged that he was given the command to offset Guderian's dash and "impetuosity". He was very disconcerted by the counterattack at Arras and, fearing more flank attacks, especially from the south, issued a report to Hitler, who was as excitable as Rundstedt himself, greatly overstating the threat of further Allied counterattacks. Rundstedt's actions were to have incalculable effects on the future conduct of the campaign and ultimately the outcome of the war.

IV. Halt Befehl
By May 23rd, the three panzer divisions of Guderian's Panzerkorps were mopping up Allied resistance in Boulogne and Calais, two of the three ports remaining to allow a British evacuation, and Guderian was preparing an all-out final effort from his panzers to take the final possible avenue of escape for the encircled and embattled Allied Armies in the North: Dunkirk. The British still were only now disengaging from Von Bock's Army Group B, the decoy army in the north. Guderian was closer to Dunkirk than the entire British Army and there was nothing standing in his way. Early on the 24th, Hitler appeared at Von Rundstedt's Headquarters in a state of nervous collapse and demanded to know Rundstedt's prognosis of the threat to the southern flank were the bulk of the French Army remained and (at least on paper) could easily overwhelm the narrow "Panzer Corridor" separating the greater part of France and her best armies. Rundstedt advised immediate caution and suggested to Hitler a cessation of the advance on Dunkirk, allowing the hard-pressed panzers a day or two of rest and recuperation. Hitler wholeheartedly agreed and left the decision up to Rundstedt, the most conservative general in Germany's Army.
Late in the day on May 24th Guderian received a telegram from Rundstedt's headquarters. It read: "The armoured divisions are to remain at medium artillery range from Dunkirk. Permission is only granted for reconnaissance and protective movements". Guderian was dumbstruck. He was not given the reasons for the halt and in principle it went against everything he had taught as the creator of Blitzkrieg: never lose momentum. He continued the advance anyway, seeking to cut off the Allies from the city but early the next morning a new telegram arrived with the authority of Hitler himself that the advance was not to continue and he was to withdraw to the front lines of the night before. It is important to remember that Guderian did not know the reasons for the halt and assumed there was some other plan in the works he was not aware of. Despite frenzied efforts by virtually everyone of importance in the German Army to have the order rescinded, it was not until the night of May 26th that Guderian finally acquiesced. In this seemingly short space of time the British had built up a strong defensive cordon that defied all German efforts to penetrate it following the abrogation of the order. It was not until June 4 that Guderian's panzers reached the deserted port, just in time to watch as the last destroyers fully laden with troops pulled away. In the end 338,000 men were plucked from the beaches of Dunkirk, an astounding number.

VI. History's Verdict
Most every layman could identify the "Miracle of Dunkirk", as the British quickly christened it, as a catastrophe for the Germans. Later on nearly every German general asked deemed it a disaster of the greatest magnitude for Germany even though at the time it was overshadowed by the whirlwind defeat of France. Most history buffs agree with this assumption without actually having questioned it. Indeed it is quite difficult to find a book that devotes more than a page or two to the controversy surrounding the halt order. Often there are significant factual errors such as the claim that Hitler himself ordered the halt order and absolutely no-one agreed with him over this and the only justification mentioned is the "golden bridge" argument. This was the idea Hitler himself later put forward that, in order to prove his willingness to foster a fair peace between the United Kingdom and Germany, he showed that if he wished he could destroy Britain's armies with impunity but out of the kindness of his heart he did not. Authors that opposed to the "halt befehl" and authors who support it are split roughly down the middle even though popular opinion is incredibly in favour of the idea that it was a mistake. Many of those that support the "halt befehl" are credible historians who have looked into the subject far more extensively than most of those of the other school of thought. Could their claims hold water? Might history have been wrong and Hitler right?

VI. Historians in Favour of the "Halt Befehl"
The foremost author of the school in favour of the halt is Len Deighton. He has written excellent books on the Battle of Britain, the theory of Blitzkrieg, and the early campaigns in the war. He is a hugely popular writer and considered an authority on the Fall of France. Len Deighton is of the belief that the halt order was not a mistake and that it was a perfectly reasonable order to give considering all the factors such as Operation Fall Rot and the "Flanders Marshes". Also he points out that nobody, least of all the Germans, expected the evacuation to happen as it did. The Flanders Marshes is the primary arguments used by many authors subscribing to this view. Dunkirk was in the same region as the hellish Passchendaele battle took place in 1917 and no one could forget the horrific battle where entire trains were submerged into the mud and soldiers drowned in it en masse before they ever reached the front, least of all Hitler; he had fought in the battle in 1917 and still had less than fond memories of it. According to Len Deighton He was deathly afraid of allowing the panzers to get bogged down in the mud where they would undoubtedly sustain heavy casualties. Hitler allowed his memories of Passchendaele as well as Rundstedt's conservative views to influence his own.
Corelli Barnett writes an effective defence of Gerd Von Rundstedt who actually ordered the halt order. He defends Rundstedt saying that he had viable reasons for the halt, especially that the panzers were required for further campaigns in the marsh and should not get bogged down in Flanders when an enemy counterattack was most likely forthcoming. Corelli Barnett is an internationally acclaimed historian whose works should be considered very valuable also, for once, we get to hear Rundstedt's side of the story instead of Guderian's, whom everyone is already aware of thanks to the fact that Guderian was able to "write history". Of course one should be wary that when writing about a particular person they run the risk of developing a bias for them and tend to portray the subject persons side of the story unfairly.
The final notable writer of this opinion is Nicholas Harman who wrote an unremarkable book called Dunkirk: The Patriotic Myth. He claims that Rundstedt is the one who solely is to blame for making the halt order but in his opinion it was the right decision. Indeed, he believes that the Germans were lucky to get off as they did by keep the Allies trapped in Dunkirk and keeping from sustaining heavy losses. In retrospect, he says, it is obvious that the Germans could have advanced but would have suffered heavy casualties, jeopardizing Fall Rot (the new campaign into the south of France). "In the end prudence won," he says, when referring to the clash of philosophies between Rundstedt and Guderian. Also, interestingly, he mentions that Hitler wanted to foster a Flemish independence movement in northern France. This revelation is not mentioned in any other sources nor does he mention his source for it but it is still an intriguing notion. The fact that the book has not been republished and no other books have been written by this author tends to lend to the idea that the author did not write a very illustrious book. Also the fact that it is a sensationalist book would tend to make a ripple in the historical community, which it has not. All these factors point to the book having some glaring defects and therefore a reasonably low reliability.
This sums up the arguments presented by those in support of the halt order. According to these authors Hitler could not risk allowing his precious panzers to become bogged down in the so-called "Flanders Marshes" lest there be another "Miracle on the Marne" as had happened to his predecessors in the Great War. Could he justly be blamed for this? Who could have imagined, as Len Deighton points out, that the British would be able to evacuate in the span of a few short days 338,000 men.

VII. Historians Against the "Halt Befehl"
Heinz Guderian was the general in charge of the Panzerkorps relegated to mopping up the coast and he writes of his experiences in his memoirs Panzer Leader. He states quite obviously that the advance should have continued, considering absolutely nothing stood in his way He was on the ground at the time and explains that despite the deluge of May 22/23, Hitler's and Rundstedt's fears of muddy and water-logged ground are simply not true. It is important to keep in mind that this is the opinion of the only person who was actually at the front to observe the conditions there.
Doubtlessly a historian who writes a book titled "How Hitler Could Have Won World War Two: The Fatal Mistakes That Led to Nazi Defeat" would have a valuable opinion on the subject and Bevin Alexander certainly does. It is his opinion that one of the greatest missed opportunities for victory was lost by halting the panzers outside of Dunkirk. According to Alexander, Rundstedt made the logical idea for a pause for rest and recuperation but needlessly extended it and this resulted in the BEF's escape. He also believes Goering bears an even greater part of the blame by making guarantees to Hitler he knew he could not fulfill. This brings us to Goering and the Luftwaffe's role in the fiasco. Hermann Goering was the fat, vain, and grossly incompetent head of Germany's air forces and upon hearing of how close Guderian's panzers were to Dunkirk, Goering, hoping to score a cheap victory for the Luftwaffe, assured Hitler that the Luftwaffe would be able to crush any attempt at evacuation and Guderian's intervention was not necessary. This only reinforced his belief that the panzers could and should be conserved for the attack southwards.
Albert Kesselring commanded the Luftlotte concerned with destroying the Dunkirk pocket and his opinion on the Dunkirk halt order was that Goering was totally to fault. Although he appears to be unfamiliar with the details in the chain of events leading up to and following the halt order (Rundstedt is not mentioned) he does seem to believe that Hitler ordered the halt. However he believes that this is not Hitler's fault since Goering had embellished him with guarantees that the Luftwaffe would be able to dominate the pocket and essentially win a land battle from the air he says, did not heed his and Hans Jeschonnek's (Luftwaffe Chief of Staff) warnings that hte Luftwaffe was already overstretched and was not designed to sink the evacuating ships, which they were called on to do, thus allowing the BEF to escape. This is an excellent book since it illustrates the story of an extremely competent soldier and one of the best generals of the war and brings light on the often forgotten but decisive part Goering and the Luftwaffe played in the whole affair. Documents substantiate his claims that he several times begged Goering and others to rescind the halt order because he knew the true limits of the Luftwaffe, adding further credibility to his account. These authors and others show the obvious shortcomings in the claims made by officers not present at the battlefield who made the decisions during the period May 24-26. Undeniably the halt order was not justified even when taking the arguments of supporters of it at face value. But what happens when one look into their claims and reveals them for what they really are? Could it be that all their justifications are just excuses on the behalf of those whose blunder likely cost Germany the war? It is now necessary to examine each of the justifications for the halt in full and outline the reasons why the advance could and should have continued anyway.

VIII. Rest and Recuperation
The principal argument put forth by those supportive of Rundstedt's actions say that the men were tired and the panzer forces had suffered heavily from attrition; they required rest and time too repair the panzers. One author went so far as to claim that halting after reaching the coast followed the German "textbook" used in the campaign up to that time. But who wrote this "textbook"? None other than Heinz Guderian, the man who most fervently opposed the halt order in the first place. Saying the panzers required a 72-hour halt for the reasons listed above belies a lack of understanding of the principles of armoured warfare. The panzers had suffered heavily from attrition these authors will claim, as much as 50% or 60% but most, indeed the vast majority, of these were due to mechanical malfunction or light damage sustained from infantry weapons. Only a fraction were actual write-offs. These lightly damaged vehicles could easily be repaired in a matter of hours and when the halt was given on the 24th, the panzers' strength had been augmented greatly, almost up to full strength, and most any operations could be undertaken on the 25th, including the capture of the undefended port of Dunkirk. Ultimately this means no rest longer than 24 hours was required, least of all a 72-hour rest which violated the cardinal rules of Blitzkrieg as Guderian had correctly envisioned them.

IX. Possible Counterattacks
The other principal argument put forward is the threat posed by the remaining albeit immobile French armies in the south so overemphasized by Von Rundstedt to Hitler. If, and this is a big if, the Germans had been overhasty in crushing the Dunkirk pocket it may have given the French enough time to launch a successful counterattack in the vein of the Arras. If the French had been in possession of a talented general, they may have seen the opportunity the German rear presented if the panzers had been bogged down in the fields surrounding Dunkirk. But it is obvious that the assault on Dunkirk, taken without any rest, would have required one, or possibly two panzer divisions. For the invasion of France Germany had ten, and by the 25th or 26th when the panzers would have been in Dunkirk, eight or nine would be available to counter any French offensives. Of course these offensives would not only take time to prepare but would also be obvious to the Luftwaffe reconnaissance aircraft patrolling any potential assembly areas. The French possessed almost no tanks in southern France and it would simply be a matter of time before the slow French infantry divisions, deficient in tactical air support or anti-aircraft guns, would be cut to piece by such brilliant generals as Rommel, Reinhardt, Hoeppner or Kleist, waiting in the wings with their panzers.

X. Flanders Marshes
The low-lying fields had been inundated with rain the previous few days and the panzers of Guderian's corps would be forced to stay solely on the thin roads where they could be easily ambushed. This is perhaps the best argument in favour of the halt order. Indeed, the 1st SS Leibstandarte Motorized Regiment under Guderian's command attempted to push forward on the 22nd but was confined to the thin roads and suffered considerable losses to one such ambush. However the small distance of twelve miles separating the panzers and the port was easily surmountable. The ground would have dried out by the 24th sufficiently to support cross-country panzers, Schutzenpanzerwagens (halftrack troop transports), and even wheels-only vehicles with all probability. Even if this was not the case, imaginative use of motorized infantry and armoured units in collusion was Guderian's trademark and he would easily overcome whatever scant rear blocking forces the British had left behind in the approaches to the port while the main force was preoccupied disengaging from Von Bock's Army Group B in the north.

XI. Goering and the Luftwaffe's Involvement
Most historians finger squarely Goering as the one who is to blame for the eventual escape of the BEF because of his assurances to Hitler that evacuation could be prevented from the air. If it were not for these assurances it is doubtful that Hitler would have supported Rundstedt in his decision to halt the panzers if Goering had not made such rash commitments as he did. Hitler might have been convinced to allow even just one or two of Guderian's panzer divisions to push down on the port. Due to the lack of roads there was really no need of more tanks as they would just congest the roads to Dunkirk (a situation we see again in the Summer of 1942 when Hoth's 4th Panzer Army congests the roads being used by Paulus's 6th Army around the Don Bend before Stalingrad). The port would have been captured before the BEF arrived. Goering cannot be forgiven for such a huge mistake for which he is the only one that can be blamed. Kesselring, Wolfram Von Richtofen (cousin of the famous Red Baron) and Hans Jeschonnek who were in command at various levels in the Luftwaffe all vehemently opposed the decision because they knew the Luftwaffe was far too preoccupied with the French south of the Somme and in the ports of Calais and Boulogne.

XII. Fostering a Peace with Britain
Hitler himself later said that he deliberately allowed the British to escape, knowing that he had the power to destroy them. This explanation alone can be seen to be utterly preposterous or else Hitler would not have ordered the Luftwaffe to impede the evacuation by bombing the beaches and the ships taking the troops off but leaving this aside this justification still should be examined. It is well known that Hitler was a great admirer of the British and their empire and it may have been his wish to co-exist with them in a future Europe. The fact that he forwarded this argument obviously shows that he had lost some of his political wit since his glory-days of the 1930s and, however noble his intentions, hindsight has proved that this was a most inane error. It makes a lot more sense that Britain would be more willing to come to the negotiating table if a quarter of a million of her soldiers were in German captivity.

XIII. Rundstedt's, Hitler's and Goering's Qualifications
This may in fact appear to be a cheap shot against Rundstedt's otherwise illustrious reputation but it is a valid point that should bear examination. As has already been stated, it would appear that everyone with a position of authority in the German Wehrmacht was opposed to the halt order for obvious reasons with the exceptions of course of Hitler, Goering and Rundstedt. Rundstedt even had the nerve to refuse the orders to continue the advance of both Halder, Army Chief of Staff and Brauchitsch, Army Commander in Chief by hiding behind Hitler's authority. Rundstedt had fought in the First World War and gained most of his military education from it, rather than the sweeping reforms bought upon the German Army during the reign of Hans Von Seekt. He was perhaps the most conservative general in the German Army to hold a position of any significance at that time and this made him doubly unsuited for the command of the force that required the most bold and dashing leadership and was to perform the most revolutionary and unorthodox manoeuvres in the living memory of warfare. Hitler too never had any formal military education beyond the cursory training given to a Lance-Corporal of a Bavarian Reserve Regiment.

XIV. Conclusion
After careful and comprehensive study of the subject, one can only come to one conclusion: The halt order was necessary to bring the weakened 1st, 2nd and 10th Panzer Divisions of Guderian Panzer Corps up to strength for perhaps 12 or even 24 hours but beyond that there simply was no viable explanation for extending the halt for nearly three whole days. The two days subsequent to the first 24 hours may perhaps have cost Germany the war. The British were able to retreat into Dunkirk and form a defensive cordon around it and were soon escaping to England by the hundreds of thousands. Such silly explanations as preserving the tanks in case of an southern counterattack or of British peace negotiations by allowing their escape are quite literally lame excuses made up after the fact by Hitler to explain away a mistake that troubled him long afterwards. Had the panzers been allowed to continue the advance on Dunkirk May 23rd, 1940, rather than several days thereafter, Britain would have been naked to the German sword and the world as we know it today would have been altered immensely.

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Tim Smith
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#2

Post by Tim Smith » 11 Apr 2005, 13:49

Looks good, apart from the conclusion.

Britain would have been 'naked to the German sword' ONLY IF the Germans had managed to land, and maintain, a large invasion force on British soil. If the entire BEF had been captured at Dunkirk, the British Army would have lacked sufficient trained manpower to defeat a large, well-equipped, and adequately-supplied German invasion force.

Historically, the British Army was short of weapons (especially heavy weapons, tanks, AT guns and artillery) in July-August 1940, but had plenty of available manpower due to the rescue of the BEF. Had the BEF been captured, the British Army would have been short of manpower as well. And the large 'Home Guard', even if fully equipped with rifles, could not have been expected to perform well against the best and most experienced divisions in the German Army.

However, the key thing to remember is that the Germans never actually got to the point of launching the invasion, because the RAF won the Battle of Britain, and the Royal Navy remained intact as a fighting force. So losing the BEF doesn't mean that Britain would lose the war.

Instead, the effects of losing the BEF would be felt in the Mediterranean theatre of war. Reinforcing the 8th Army in Egypt would have been much more difficult in late 1941 and early 1942 had the BEF been lost. Early in the Desert War, the Western Desert Force (later renamed 8th Army) consisted mainly of colonial infantry divisions - Indian, South African, Australian and New Zealand divisions. Only the tank formations like the 7th Armoured Division were British. Once the colonial divisions were exhausted, replacing and reinforcing them with British infantry divisions would have been more difficult if the entire BEF had been captured. Even if the British had still managed to raise the necessary divisions, they would have been formed of green recruits rather than BEF veterans, and would be consequently lower in quality than historically.

It is therefore possible that the 8th Army may have suffered a more serious defeat in 1941-42, resulting in Rommel's Afrika Korps winning the First Battle of El Alamein, and actually capturing Alexandria and Cairo. Losing Egypt would not necessarily mean that Britain would lose the war, since the Axis probably wouldn't be able to hold it for more than a year at the very most. But it would certainly be a very severe blow to British morale, and would almost certainly prolong the Desert War well beyond early 1943. The historical invasions of Sicily and Italy in 1943 might be postponed by 6-9 months, or even longer. In fact the invasion of mainland Italy might have been cancelled altogether in favour of Operation Overlord - meaning that Germany could be defeated before Italy.


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Lkefct
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#3

Post by Lkefct » 11 Apr 2005, 19:26

One of the great shocks that many of germany's leaders had in the period immediately after the war was how many British troops where acutally evacuated. Many of the decision markers where shcoked to know that 300,000 got out at Dunkirk. Had they known how many where trapped, they might easliy have tried a lot harder and lauched a more concerted effort to elimnate the pocket. As kesselring stated, after he learned that 300,000+ had been evacuated, he stated that even 100,00 would seem a greatly aggagerated figure. It is easier to view the stop order when one considers it in that context, that it was a smaller encirclement.

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R-Bob The Great!
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#4

Post by R-Bob The Great! » 12 Apr 2005, 19:47

OK well I worked in your suggestions and here is the finished product. Tell me what you think.

I. Introduction
On May 10, 1940 the Germany's famous panzer forces burst through the Ardennes forest at the junction of the Franco-Belgian-German borders and drove straight to the English Channel surrounding a little less then half a million Allied soldiers in the process, among them the only mobile units in the French Army and the entire British Expeditionary Force. Heinz Guderian, commander of the premier Panzer Corps, stood only about twelve miles short of the Allies' last possible opportunity for escape when he was suddenly ordered to halt. The reasons for this order remain clouded to this day but at the time Guderian was told that the areas surrounding Dunkirk were too marshy for armour to negotiate which he knew was simply untrue from personal visits to the front. Then why in fact was the decision taken and why does controversy surround it to this day? This work seeks to define the reasons given for the halt and, after painstaking research, come to a verifiable conclusion that shows that the halt order was in fact a mistake and the only excuses were poor ones made up subsequent to the actual events taking place. It is important to come to a conclusion for history's sake, in order to understand exactly how close the British came to disaster. With Britain's armies shattered and destroyed it was only a matter of time before she would be brought to her knees with a humiliating settlement that would allow the man who is widely regarded to this day as the incarnation of evil to retain hegemony over Europe.

II. Blitzkrieg & Its Application in France
Before dashing headlong into the questions and controversies surrounding the battle of the Dunkirk Pocket itself, it is necessary to have an understanding of its context in the campaign of which it was part. Throughout the inter-war years the German Army struggled with the idea of how to win the next great European war that would inevitably arise. It took Germany's best soldier, Heinz Guderian, to hit upon the idea of a war of movement, later named Blitzkrieg, which had been ignored by the High Commands of the Allied Armies (Liddell Hart did come up with theories similar to those of Guderian but they were not accepted by Britain's Imperial General Staff and that is outside the scope of this work). Guderian proposed that the new wonder weapon–tanks–would be the solution to Germany's strategic dilemma of prolonged wars of attrition. Tanks would be brought together into large self-sustaining units and concentrated at the decisive point in the battle, the schwerpunkt, where they would overwhelm the enemy's defences. In the words of Guderian "Klotzen nicht kleckern" (boot'em don't spatter'em). From there they would drive unceasingly into the enemy's rear, neutralizing all administrative, logistical, and command centres while bypassing any points of enemy resistance; these would be left to the foot-slogging infantry following up in the rear. The keys to Blitzkrieg as Guderian envisioned it were mobility and communication. Mobility was essential: the assault was to break clean of the enemy front lines, advance and must never halt until the enemy armies are in disarray and lack any significant offensive capacity. The final ingredient was close-air support for the panzers bought about by unprecedented ease of communication between the panzers and ground support aircraft done by equipping every tank and aircraft with a radio.
The German campaign in the West opened on May 10, 1940, with a diversionary attack into Belgium and the Netherlands from the bulk of the slow moving infantry forces, basically a re-run of the Schlieffin Plan that had resulted in such a spectacular failure in the First World War. This was exactly what the Allies expected and the British Expeditionary Force and the French First Army group, the only mobile elements of the entire Allied armies in France, moved into Belgium to engage the perceived threat. German panzer spearheads suddenly emerged on the Allies flank and, outflanking the French Maginot Line, they unhinged the Allied forces in Belgium and drove straight to the coast, reaching it on the 20th, cutting off half a million Allied troops.



III. Arras Counterattack & Repercussions
It was not until the 22nd of May that the British were able to organize a counterattack. On this day a few dozen British Infantry Tanks (Mk. I and II) spearheaded the attack into the rear of General Erwin Rommel's 7th Panzer Division, inflicting heavy casualties. Rommel frantically radioed to Rundstedt that he was under attack by hundreds of tanks and swiftly moved to counter the threat using tanks (a strict breach of Bltizkrieg theory) and anti-aircraft guns aimed over open sights. Only after Rommel's personal direction of the anti-tank fire was the assault beaten back. Gerd Von Rundstedt commanding Army Group A, a conservative relic of the First World War, was very disconcerted by the counterattack at Arras and, fearing more flank attacks, especially from the south, issued a report to Hitler stating this. Hitler, who was as excitable as Rundstedt took this to heart as will be seen. Rundstedt's actions were to have incalculable effects on the future conduct of the campaign and ultimately the outcome of the war.

III. Halt Befehl
By May 23rd, the three panzer divisions of Guderian's Panzerkorps (1st, 2nd, and 10th) were mopping up Allied resistance in Boulogne and Calais, two of the three ports remaining to allow a British evacuation, and Guderian was preparing an all-out final effort from his panzers to take the final possible point of egress for the encircled and embattled Allied Armies in the North: Dunkirk. The British still were only now disengaging from Von Bock's Army Group B, the decoy army in the north and Guderian was closer to Dunkirk than the entire British Army; there was nothing standing in his way. Early on the 24th, Hitler appeared at Von Rundstedt's Headquarters in a state of nervous collapse, demanding to know Rundstedt's prognosis of the threat to the southern flank where the bulk of the French Army remained and (at least on paper) could easily overwhelm the narrow "Panzer Corridor" that separated the better part of France from her best armies. Rundstedt advised immediate caution and suggested to Hitler a cessation of the advance on Dunkirk, allowing the hard-pressed panzers a day or two of rest and recuperation. Hitler wholeheartedly agreed and left the decision up to Rundstedt; the most conservative general in the Wehrmacht.
Late in the day on May 24th Guderian received a telegram from Rundstedt's headquarters. It read: "The armoured divisions are to remain at medium artillery range from Dunkirk. Permission is only granted for reconnaissance and protective movements". Guderian was dumbstruck. He was not given the reasons for the halt and in principle it went against everything he had taught as the creator of Blitzkrieg: never lose momentum. He continued the advance anyway, seeking to cut off the Allies from the city but early the next morning a new telegram arrived backed by the authority of Hitler himself that the advance was not to continue and he was to withdraw to the front lines of the night before. It is important to remember that Guderian did not know the reasons for the halt and assumed there was some other plan in the works he was not aware of. Despite frenzied efforts by virtually everyone of importance in the German Army to have the order rescinded, it was not until the night of May 26th that Rundstedt finally acquiesced: the advance was allowed to continue. In this seemingly short space of time the British had built up a strong defensive cordon that defied all German efforts to penetrate it following the abrogation of the order. It was not until June 4 that Guderian's panzers reached the deserted port, just in time to watch as the French rear-guards embarked on waiting destroyers and departed for England, to fight again another day. In the end 338,000 men were plucked from the beaches of Dunkirk, a truly astounding number.
Most every layman could identify the "Miracle of Dunkirk", as the British quickly christened it, as a catastrophe for the Germans. Later on, nearly every German general asked deemed it a disaster of the first magnitude for Germany, ranking with such memorable battles as Tunis, Stalingrad and Kursk, even though at the time it was overshadowed by the whirlwind defeat of France. Popular opinion overwhelmingly supports the view that Hitler made the decision for the sole reason that he hoped this would demonstrate the British people his benevolence and hopefully bring the British to the negotiating table. This is true although the reasons for it are flawed. Surprisingly, among authors those opposed to the "halt befehl" and authors who support it are split roughly down the middle. Many of those that support the "halt befehl" are credible historians who have looked into the subject far more extensively than most of those of the other school of thought. Could their claims hold water? Might history have been wrong and Hitler right?

IV. Historians in Favour of the "Halt Befehl"
The foremost author of the school in favour of the halt is Len Deighton. He has written excellent books on the Battle of Britain, the theory of Blitzkrieg, and the early campaigns in the war. He is a hugely popular writer and considered an authority on the Fall of France. Len Deighton is of the belief that the halt order was not a mistake and that it was a perfectly reasonable order to give considering all the factors such as saving the tanks for further offensives in the south and the "Flanders Marshes". The Flanders Marshes is the primary arguments used by many authors subscribing to this view. Dunkirk was in the same region as the hellish Passchendaele battle that took place in 1917 and none could forget the horrific battle where entire trains were submerged into the mud and soldiers drowned in it en masse before they ever reached the front, least of all Hitler; he had fought in the battle in 1917 and still had less than fond memories of it. According to Len Deighton he was deathly afraid of allowing the panzers to get bogged down in the mud where they would undoubtedly sustain heavy casualties. Hitler allowed his memories of Passchendaele as well as Rundstedt's conservative views to influence his own.
The other notable writer of this opinion is Nicholas Harman who wrote an unremarkable book called Dunkirk: The Patriotic Myth. He claims that Rundstedt is the one who solely is to blame for making the halt order but in his opinion it was the right decision. Indeed, he believes that the Germans were lucky to get off as they did by keep the Allies trapped in Dunkirk and keeping from sustaining heavy losses. In retrospect, he says, it is obvious that the Germans could have advanced but would have suffered heavy casualties, jeopardizing Fall Rot (Case Red, the new campaign into the south of France). "In the end prudence won," he says, when referring to the clash of philosophies between Rundstedt and Guderian. The fact that the book has not been republished and no other books have been written by this author tends to lend to the idea that the author did not write a very illustrious book. Also, it is a sensationalist book would tend to which should have made a ripple in the historical community, but did not. All these factors point to the book having some glaring defects and therefore a reasonably low reliability.
This is a sample of the arguments presented by those in support of the halt order. According to these authors Hitler could not risk allowing his precious panzers to become bogged down in the so-called "Flanders Marshes" lest there be another "Miracle on the Marne" as had happened to his predecessors in the Great War. Could he justly be blamed for this? Who could have imagined, as Len Deighton points out, that the British would be able to evacuate in the span of a few short days 338,000 men.

V. Historians Against the "Halt Befehl"
Heinz Guderian was the general in charge of the Panzerkorps relegated to mopping up the coast and he writes of his experiences in his memoirs Panzer Leader. He states quite obviously that the advance should have continued, considering absolutely nothing stood in his way He was on the ground at the time and explains that despite the deluge of May 22/23, Hitler's and Rundstedt's fears of muddy and water-logged ground were unfounded. It is important to keep in mind that this is the opinion of the only person who was actually at the front to observe the conditions there.
Doubtlessly a historian who writes a book titled "How Hitler Could Have Won World War Two: The Fatal Mistakes That Led to Nazi Defeat" would have a valuable opinion on the subject and Bevin Alexander certainly does. It is his opinion that one of the greatest missed opportunities for victory was lost by halting the panzers outside of Dunkirk. According to Alexander, Rundstedt made the logical idea for a pause for rest and recuperation but needlessly extended it and this resulted in the BEF's escape. He also believes Goering bears an even greater part of the blame by making guarantees to Hitler he knew he could not fulfill. This brings us to Goering and the Luftwaffe's role in the fiasco. Hermann Goering was the fat, vain, and grossly incompetent head of Germany's air forces and upon hearing of how close Guderian's panzers were to Dunkirk, Goering, hoping to score a cheap victory for the Luftwaffe, assured Hitler that the Luftwaffe would be able to crush any attempt at evacuation and Guderian's intervention was not necessary. This only reinforced Hitler's belief that the panzers could and should be conserved for the attack southwards.
Albert Kesselring commanded the Luftlotte (roughly Air Army) tasked with destroying the Dunkirk pocket and his opinion on the Dunkirk halt order was that it was a mistake and Goering was totally to fault. He appears, however, to be unfamiliar with the details in the chain of events leading up to and following the halt order (Rundstedt is not mentioned) and he does seem to believe that Hitler ordered the halt. However he believes that this is not Hitler's fault since Goering had embellished his impossible guarantees that the Luftwaffe would be able to dominate the pocket and essentially win a land battle from the air. Kesselring says Goering did not heed his and Hans Jeschonnek's (Luftwaffe Chief of Staff) warnings that the Luftwaffe was already overstretched and had not been equipped to sink the numerous ships taking off troops, which they were called on to do. This is an excellent book since it illustrates the story of an extremely competent soldier and one of the best generals of the war and brings light on the often forgotten but decisive part Goering and the Luftwaffe played in the whole affair.
These authors and others show the obvious shortcomings in the claims made by officers not present at the battlefield who made the decisions during the period May 24-26. Undeniably the halt order was not justified even when taking the arguments of supporters of it at face value. But what happens when one look into their claims and reveals them for what they really are? Could it be that all their justifications are just excuses on the behalf of those whose blunder likely cost Germany the war? It is now necessary to examine each of the justifications for the halt in full and outline the reasons why the advance could and should have continued anyway.

VI. Rest and Recuperation
The principal argument put forth by those supportive of Rundstedt's actions say that Guderian's men were tired and the panzer forces had suffered heavily from attrition; they required rest and time too repair the panzers. One author went so far as to claim that halting after reaching the coast followed the German "textbook" used in the campaign up to that time. But who wrote this "textbook"? It was none other than Heinz Guderian, the man who most fervently opposed the halt order in the first place. Saying the panzers required a 72-hour halt for the reasons listed above belies a lack of understanding of the principles of armoured warfare. The panzers had suffered heavily from attrition these authors will claim, as much as 50% or 60% but most, indeed the vast majority, of these were due to mechanical malfunction or light damage sustained from infantry weapons. Only a fraction were actual write-offs. These lightly damaged vehicles could easily be repaired in a matter of hours and when the halt was given on the 24th, the panzers' strength had already been augmented greatly, almost up to full strength, and most any operations could have been undertaken on the 25th, including the capture of the undefended port of Dunkirk. Ultimately this means no rest longer than 24 hours was required, least of all a 72-hour rest which violated the cardinal rules of Blitzkrieg as Guderian had correctly envisioned them.





VII. Possible Counterattacks
The other principal argument put forward is the threat posed by the remaining, albeit immobile, French armies in the south so overemphasized by Von Rundstedt to Hitler. If, and this is a big if, the Germans had been overhasty in crushing the Dunkirk pocket it may have given the French enough time to launch a successful counterattack in the vein of the Arras attack. If the French had been in possession of a talented general, they may have seen the opportunity the German rear presented if the panzers had been bogged down in the fields surrounding Dunkirk. But it is obvious that the assault on Dunkirk, taken without any rest, would have required one, or possibly two panzer divisions. For the invasion of France Germany had ten, and by the 25th or 26th when the panzers would have been in Dunkirk, eight or nine would be available to respond to any French counter-offensives. Of course these attacks would not only take time to prepare but would also be obvious to the Luftwaffe reconnaissance aircraft patrolling any potential assembly areas. The French possessed almost no tanks in southern France and it would simply be a matter of time before the French infantry divisions, deficient in tactical air support or anti-tank guns, would be cut to piece by such brilliant generals as Rommel, Reinhardt, Hoeppner or Kleist, waiting in the wings with their own panzers.

VIII. Flanders Marshes
The low-lying fields that surrounded Dunkirk had been inundated with rain the previous few days, turning them into a marshy morass for the time being, and the panzers of Guderian's corps would be forced to remain on the thin roads where they could be easily ambushed. This is obviously the best argument in favour of the halt order. However the small distance of twelve miles separating the panzers and the port was easily surmountable and the ground would have dried out by the 24th sufficiently to support cross-country vehicles. Even if this was not the case, imaginative use of motorized infantry and armoured units in collusion was Guderian's trademark and he would easily overcome whatever scant rear blocking forces the British had left behind in the approaches to the port while the main force was preoccupied disengaging from Von Bock's Army Group B in the north.

IX. Goering and the Luftwaffe's Involvement
Most historians squarely finger Goering as the one who is to blame for the eventual escape of the BEF. It was his faulty affirmations that any evacuation could be prevented from the air. In light of this it is doubtful that Hitler would have supported Rundstedt in his decision to halt the panzers. Had Hitler been convinced to allow even just one of Guderian's panzer divisions to continue to push on the port it is abundantly shown that the port would have fallen with relative ease. Due to the lack of roads there was really no need of more tanks as they would just congest the roads to Dunkirk (a situation we see again in the Summer of 1942 when Hoth's 4th Panzer Army congested the roads being used by Paulus's 6th Army around the Don Bend ultimately resulting in the disastrous Battle for Stalingrad). Goering cannot be forgiven for such a massive mistake. Kesselring, Wolfram Von Richtofen (cousin of the famous Red Baron) and Hans Jeschonnek who were in command at various levels in the Luftwaffe all vehemently opposed the decision and attempted to warn Goering of the risk this posed of stretching the Luftwaffe to the limit, but he turned a deaf ear.

X. Fostering a Peace with Britain
Hitler himself later said that he deliberately allowed the British to escape, knowing that he had the power to destroy them and, presumably, they would know this too. This explanation alone can be seen to be utterly preposterous or else Hitler would not have ordered the Luftwaffe to impede the evacuation by bombing the beaches and the ships taking the troops off. The fact that Goering claimed he would "not leave one stone upon another on Dunkirk," illustrates his intentions clearly enough. This is plentiful evidence to dismiss these claims out of hand.



XI. Rundstedt's and Hitler's Qualifications
This may in fact appear to be a cheap shot against Rundstedt's otherwise illustrious reputation but it is a valid point that bears examination. As has already been stated, it would appear that everyone with a position of authority in the German Wehrmacht was opposed to the halt order for obvious reasons with the exceptions, of course of Hitler, Goering and Rundstedt. Rundstedt even had the nerve to refuse the orders to continue the advance from both Halder, Army Chief of Staff and Brauchitsch, Army Commander in Chief by hiding behind Hitler's authority. Rundstedt was perhaps the most conservative general in the German Army to hold a position of any significance and this made him doubly unsuited for the command of the force that required the most bold and dashing leadership and was to perform the most revolutionary and unorthodox manoeuvres in the living memory of warfare. Hitler too never had any formal military education beyond the cursory training given to a Lance-Corporal of a Bavarian Reserve Regiment.

XII. Conclusion
After careful and comprehensive study of the subject, one can only come to one conclusion: The halt order was necessary to bring the weakened 1st, 2nd and 10th Panzer Divisions of Guderian Panzer Corps up to strength for perhaps 12 or even 24 hours but beyond that there simply was little viable explanation for extending the halt for nearly three whole days. The two days subsequent to the first 24 hours can be seen to have cost Germany the war. The British were able to retreat into Dunkirk and form a defensive cordon around it and were soon escaping to England by the hundreds of thousands. Such silly explanations as preserving the tanks in the event of French counteroffensives from the south or of British peace negotiations by allowing their escape are quite literally lame excuses made up after the fact by Hitler to explain away a mistake that obviously troubled him long afterwards. Had the panzers been allowed to continue the advance on Dunkirk May 24th, 1940, rather than several days thereafter, Britain's armies would have been smashed and Britain would have been naked to the Germany's sword. Germany and Italy would be free to pursue a Mediterranean strategy and the British would, would have had no armies to fight Rommel in Africa or List in Greece. Egypt would have fallen, presumably Malta would have followed suit, and British would have been be obliged to abandon the Mediterranean. Without a base in the Mediterranean, the undefended (at least by any army) British Isles would face the increasing threat of invasion while the strength of their navy and air force would have dwindled, apace with their ability to wage war with not even a glimmer of hope on the horizon. Without the men of the British Expeditionary Force saved at Dunkirk, no Mediterranean strategy could have been pursued and Italy would have had a free hand instead/ A return to the continent, as in 1944, would have been out of the question. Had Rundstedt, Goering and Hitler not committed such a foolish blunder, as ignorant as to be seen as treasonous, the outcome of the Second World War would certainly have been in question, or perhaps German victory would have been assured...

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