January 1, 1945

[Kid Panzer]

I thought it would be interesting to discuss the last "massive" Luftwaffe offensive in the west on January 1, 1945. Somewhere between 275-300 Allied planes destroyed, the Germans losing about 200, however, at this point in time the Germans could not afford the Pyrrhic victory since pilots with any decent training was hard to come by at this time.

[Groscurth]

They had some local succes in the bombing of Stavelot, Houffalize and Bastogne. (I mean the death GI's). The US soldiers killed there were a better result then the unmanned destroyed aircrafts, regarding the short time and tactical effects.

[medieval dudes]

Good day Luftwaffe Friends

I would like to understand if this website although not detailed mentions things correctly:

http://www.onwar.com/chrono/1945/jan45/f01jan45.htm

Now focus on this sentence:

Among the German aircraft losses for the day are a considerable number of planes shot down by German anti-aircraft fire.

Is this correct to say that the Germans shot down their own machines. I have a feeling there is an error here but still I am just making sure.

So most German losses seem to come from the Anti-Aircraft guns of the allies as it says... now to what extent were AA guns effective at that time of the war? I just don't understand this cause german AA guns did not do a great job at hitting and destroying considerable amounts of bombers during the large scale bombings the allies conducted over German cities? Why would they be more affective here? (Sorry if to a cetain extent this is getting off topic (or it could initiate people to do so) but I just don't feel starting a new thread on this is necessary if it can be explained quickly )
Thanks in advance....
Greg

[Ron Klages]

Guys,

Operation Bodenplatte was carried out on 1 January 1945 by fourteen Luftwaffe units in an attempt to destroy the Allied air supremacy in NW Europe by attacking 18 Allied airfields. It was a disaster for the Luftwaffe and here are some figures. The German units involved were:

JG 1, I. II. and III. 18 KIA and 6 POW and 1 WIA with 25 aircraft lost
JG 2, I. II. and III. 23 KIA and 10 POW and 4 WIA with 37 aircraft lost
JG 3, I. III. and IV. 11 KIA and 6 POW and 2 WIA with 19 aircraft lost
JG 4, I. II. and IV. 17 KIA and 5 POW and 1 WIA with 23 aircraft lost
JG 6, I. II. and III. 17 KIA and 6 POW and 6 WIA with 23 aircraft lost
JG 7 Me-262 1 KIA and 0 POW and 0 WIA with 21 aircraft lost
JG 11, I. II. and III. 23 KIA and 2 POW and 0 WIA with 25 aircraft lost
JG 26, I. II. and III. 12 KIA and 8 POW and 4 WIA with 27 aircraft lost
JG 27, I. II., III and IV. 11 KIA and 3 POW and 1 WIA with 15 aircraft lost
JG 53, II. III. and IV. 11 KIA and 1 POW and 4 WIA with 27 aircraft lost
JG 54, III. and IV. 7 KIA and 5 POW and 1 WIA with 13 aircraft lost
JG 77, I. II. and III. 7 KIA and 3 POW and 0 WIA with 10 aircraft lost
SchG 4, III. 3 KIA and 1 POW and 0 WIA with 4 aircraft lost
KG 51, Me262As 0 KIA and 0 POW and 0 WIA with 0 aircraft lost

This was nearly 900 aircraft that took off at dawn and 249 were destroyed. 161 pilots were either killed or missing; another 56 became prisoners of war and 24 were wounded. This is a loss of 241 pilots to the Luftwaffe. Also 19 of those lost were commanders with considerable experience a trait that was not present in the Luftwaffe in January 1945.

What did they accomplish? First, 10 of the gruppen never reached their targets so their mission was a total failure. Nine gruppen made ineffectual low level attacks and only eleven gruppen make their attacks per plan on time and in strength. Allied losses were around 200 plus maybe approaching 300 aircraft but very few pilots lost and all lost aircraft were replaced within a week.

Here is some detail regarding JG 26 on that day.
Took off [I./JG 26] at 0814 hours with 48 Fw 190s.
Took off [II./JG26] at 0805 with 40 Fw-190s.
Took off [III./JG26] at 0820 with 40 Bf-109s.

A total of 128 aircraft and the results were:

28 aircraft lost nearly 22% loss rate
15 shot down by own flak or nearly 54% of the units losses
5 shot down by enemy flak
1 crashed due to engine failure
3 lost for unknown causes
1 lost due to collision
3 shot down by British Spitfires

Victory claims by JG 26 were 5 Spitfires and 1 P-47 in air to air battles.

The flak losses were because the planners routed the northern most attack gruppen through the V-2 Flak Area around Rotterdam. The Flak was so effective because the fighters were flying as low as 100 meters and machineguns, 2mm flak guns and the 37mm flak guns all worked well at the low altitude.

There is no way to access this mission and have it come out as anything other than a disaster for the fighters of the Luftwaffe.

Best regards,

Ron Klages

[JonS]

Ron
Thanks for the info and analysis.

There is no way to access this mission and have it come out as anything other than a disaster for the fighters of the Luftwaffe.

Sure there is: just ignore the own-side losses and concentrate only on the Allied planes KO'd

[Huck]

Guys,

There is no way to access this mission and have it come out as anything other than a disaster for the fighters of the Luftwaffe.

Ron Klages

Typical biased overview of the operation. Operation Bodenplatte would have been a total success if there weren't so many losses to own flak. 465 Allied planes were destroyed!! for 62 aircraft lost to Allied aircraft and 172 to flak. To have an equivalent, the total number of Luftwaffe aircraft flying on Eastern Front was around 450, such losses would have meant the total destruction of Luftwaffe on a front, in a single day!! Losses of this magnitude were without precedent during the war.

The operation succeded in cutting the number of USAAF sorties in half for the following month! That Allies were not affected is one big lie, as big as the claim that Bodenplatte completely destroyed the Luftwaffe's ability to fight: despite that it made fewer sorties, USAAF loss rate remained the same for the next month. The number of pilots lost was not a critical problem for Luftwaffe at that point. It was in early summer of 1944, when an enormous number of fighters were delivered and there were no pilots to fly them. But by the end of 1944, the fuel scarcity restricted the operations so much that most Luftwaffe pilots could not fly anyway, this is why Luftwaffe mainted the same efficacy despite the loss of pilots.

[JonS]

See? Like that ...

[Ron Klages]

Huck,

Fascinating how one's ability to be logical can be overcome by absolute dedication to an idea.

The Luftwaffe was the most supreme flying fighting force ever!----BUT THEY LOST DIDN'T THEY?

Oh that is right, they did not have enough gas to get airborne anymore to be supreme again. Those inconsiderate Allies kept them from their right to the fuel. Unfair fight!!!!
The most likely the reason the Allied sorties fell off after 1 January 1945 was that there was no one in the sky to fight.

JG 26 on 4 January had no victories but lost six planes
9 January lost 1 plane but no victories
13 January lost 1 plane no victories
14 January 7 victories but wait a minute JG 26 lost 17 planes
18 January lost a plane but no victories
20 January again lost 1 plane and no victories
22 January 1 victory but quess what--they lost 4 planes
23 January again no victories but quess what--they lost 6 planes
28 January- same story 1 loss no victories
3 February no victories but again 2 losses
6 February o vics 1 loss
7 Feb 0 vics 1 loss
10 Feb 0 vics 1 loss
12 Feb 0 vics 1 loss
13 Feb 0 vics 1 loss
14 Feb Hey guess what 1 vic and 1 loss
21 Feb a good day 8 vics and only 1 loss WE ARE ON A ROLL AGAIN
22 Feb 1 vic but 3 losses
23 Feb 0 vics 1 loss
24 Feb 0 vics 4 losses
25 Feb 2 vics but 8 losses
26 Feb 0 vics and 1 loss
28 Feb 5 vics and 5 losses
All of March with 38 vics but oops 60 losses
All of April with 36 vics but oops 37 losses DARN NEAR BACK TO EVEN
All of May with 1 vics but oops 2 losses SHUCKS, THE WAR IS OVER AND WE CAN NOT BE SUPREME ANYMORE

Not counting 1 January JG 26 lost 168 aircraft but only made 100 claims.

My logic says that JG 26 was essentially not effectivefor the remainder of the war. Your logic says that they did not have fuel to fly yet when in the air they destroyed 1 Allied aircraft for every 1.68 aircraft they lost. Yep, that is winning and we needed a few more Bodenplattes to really bring the Allies to their knees.

Best regards,

Ron Klages

[Ron Klages]

JonS,

You we right and you told me so.......

Ron

[SES]

Hi,
The outcome of an operation or a campaign can be assessed from the tactical, the operational and the strategic level.
Tactically Bodenplatte might for a few days have seen liked a succes and there most have been may red allied faces - from shame and anger.

Operationally from an allied point of view it had no effect what so ever. The losses of fighters were made good in 14 days and the allies lost very few pilots. To claim that the USAAF sortie production was halfed over the next month is nothing, but falsifying history. A number of 9.TAC airfields were hit, but the fields of 8 AF were untouched and they were the force, which produced the effect against strategic target in Germany. Allied tactical air power continued to hammer the retreating German ground forces and interdicted railway lines, which turned "Wacht am Rhein" into "The Retreat to the Rhein".
From a Luftwaffe point of view, the loss of 19 commanders was catastrophic. And it sacked morale to absoulute ZERO. It was the straw that broke the camels back, and had the fighter community senoir leadership approach Göring on 22 JAN 1945 in desperate attempt to change Göring's management of the fighter force. The desperation of the situation is obvious, when generals and colonels get together and in a dictatorship oppose the C-IN-C.

Strategically Bodenplatte had no effect on the allies.
bregds
SES

[Erich]

everyone can quit guessing with estimation of losses and victories and purchase John Manhro/the late Ron Pütz's Bodenplatte book from Hikoki publications. A masterpiece of research. many unknown photos included amongst the text.......

E ~

[jimbotosome]

I have the Condensed Analysis of the Ninth Air Force ISBN: 0912799137 which the US put out after WWII to document the Ninth Air Force. This manual documents successes and problems in tactics that should be reviewed for the formation of the new USAF that happened shortly after the war. This book records that 600 German aircraft were used in the Jan 1 1945 raid and that 50% of them were shot down by the P-47s Fighter Bombers that were used in the Ninth (the Ninth was the Tactical Air Command that was responsible for ground support, the Eigth for Strategic Bombing). It said that the assault did destroy about 200 planes on the ground by the attacks on the Ninth's TAC bases which are located near the front lines. The manual also said that within a week these aircraft were replaced and back to full strength. It was effectively a suicide mission and a net loss of aircraft. The Ardennes Offensive sped up the end of the war. You kind of feel for the Germans in WWII. Such a fantastic Army/Air Force subjected to folly of an idiot.

[Kristian S.]

Hallo!
Alone german day-fighter forces lost 214 pilots, of this 151 KIA and 48 MIA. 63 became allied POW. Added to these 18 Pilots were wounded, they could be considered as partial losses; they were just less ore more out of action for a certain time.
While there seems no debate about the losses of pilots, with the exception of minor flaws, the records of material losses encounter difficulties, because there is now draw up availiable, and presumable also not existing, that deals with causes for the plane losses. In every Geschwader planes were lost by enemy action, by own Flak and technical difficulties with the pilots staying untouched. So one can count 60 -70 planes to the to the 232 pilot-losses. Overall this means that the german airforce suffered about 300 fighters lost on January 1st 1945. In relation to the total number of planes participating in this mission this means a loss ratio of 30%. The enemy reports 137 wrecks - 98 in the british sector and 39 in the american sector, of these 57 planes were shot down by fighters and 80 by enemy Flak. If you add the 48 planes of the MIA and the 18 of the WIA this means roughly 200. The rest is supposed to be downed by own groundfire. But these numbers cannot be reliable because many of the planes shot down by german Flak went down on enemy territory and are included in the number of 137. But in general the total number seems not too far off the real numbers. Completely absurd is the frequently repeated number of 59 unit commanders that is said were the costs of "Bodenplatte".How this number came into being is unknown. The loss-ratio of unit-commanders can be seen in this overview:

2 Geschwaderkommodore (with Oberst Druschel of SG4=3)
6 Gruppenkommandeure
10 Staffelkapitäne (one WIA)
---------------------------------
18 Verbandsführer
+214 Mannschaften (17 WIA)
---------------------------------
231 pilots

While doing some statistics it should not left unmentioned that JG 4 and JG 53 lost no unit-leader. JG 6 lost the most, 6 overall. The smallest pilot losses suffers the JG 77, the most JG 4. As single unit the III. Group of JG 54 had the highest losses. Of 17 started planes only 7 got back. Tis is a loss ratio of nearly 60 %.
"Bodenplatte" means the total defeat. The piston fighter equipped units of the Reichsluftverteidigung (Reichs air defense) will never recover from this blow. Further actions are meaningless for the ongoing war and they are not able to pose a threat for the enemy formations flying in with overwhelming strenght. The whole operation is still controversial. The loss of 151 fallen and missing pilots within four hours while debatable success can only be considered as insanity.

Source: Werner Girbig: Start im Morgengrauen. Stuttgart 1973

[Andreas]

everyone can quit guessing with estimation of losses and victories and purchase John Manhro/the late Ron Pütz's Bodenplatte book from Hikoki publications. A masterpiece of research. many unknown photos included amongst the text.......

E ~

Hi Erich

Would you mind telling us the numbers then?

I need another book like a hole in the head (yeah I know, I said that before and it did not stop me), so I would like to avoid the purchase of this particular one.

All the best

Andreas

[Andy H]

Huck wrote:

this is why Luftwaffe mainted the same efficacy despite the loss of pilots.

whilst somebody called Gen.Lt Adolf Garland (Inspekteur der Jagdflieger) described Bodenplatte as:

having sacrificed the very life-blood of the Luftwaffe

Which seems more credible in their analysis

Regards

Andy H