German logistics and supply flow

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arctic fox
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Post by arctic fox » 21 Sep 2005 23:28

Thanks everyone for your contributions!

I finally found time to type most parts from the excellent scans that Shrek sent me. The source is Reinhard Frank's
"Trucks of the Wehrmacht."

Sorry for possible typos and the broken lines and paragraphs. I used questionmarks to mark words that I couldn't make out from the scans.

The Tasks of the Back-Line Services

Supply Services

The troop leader of the "supply services" is the supply leader of a division, the corps, or the army. As a specialist in
the quartermaster group, he recommends the utilization of the supply units led by
him to the command offices. The carrying out of smooth supplying of the troops in
the operations area depends essentially on the frictionless cooperation between him
and the other specialists in the division or other command staffs (commissariat
officer, specialist for ammunition, infantry or artillery equipment, etc.). Constant
phone communication between the division supply leader at the division staff and the
masses of his supply units during the movement, rest and quartering is absolutely
necessary for the immediate use of the columns in establishin advanced fuel depots,
ammunition distribution points, and beginning the activity of vehicle repair
platoons.


The supply sercies can be divided into: a) Supply columns, b) motor vehicle columns
for fuel supply, c) repair shop companies, d) field workshops (Army), e) supply
companies and battalions, f) motor parks (Army).


A) Supply Columns:

They supply ammunition, food, weapons, clothing, equipment, war materials and army
supplies of all kinds, and transport weapons and equipment in need of repair,
captured and empty goods (fired ammunition, packing material, casing, cartridges),
and in special cases also wounded and ill persons and animals.

B) Motor Vehicle (Kw.) Columns:

Are divided into small columns with 30-ton load limit on ten medium or heavy trucks,
and large columns with 60-ton load limit in 20 medium or heavy trucks.

Equipment of a Small Supply Column with 30-ton Load Limit:

1 to 2 cars, 1 to 2 motorcycles
2 groups of trucks, each with a total load limit of 15 tons, and a third group
(Wirtschaftsgruppe) of 3-ton capability.

Equipment of a Large Supply Column with 60-ton Load Limit:

2 cars, 2 motorcycles
4 groups of trucks, each with a total load limit of 15 tons, and a 5th group
(?Wirtschaftsgruppe?) consisting on 2 fuel and equipment trucks, each 3-ton load
litmit, and 1 medium truck to carry food and baggage.

Horse-Drawn Columns:

With total load limit of 30 tons on 40 two- or one-horse field wagons or typical
native vehicles.


The motor vehicle columns (as long as they have no off-road vehicles) are limited to
good, firm roads. Compared to horse-drawn columns, they have the following
advantages: five times greater speed (25-30 ?km/h?), five to six times greater range
(150 and more km per day), and a much smaller need for personnel.
The possibility of using horse-drawn vehicles across country, away from good, firm
roads and paths, in ?rough? country and unfavorable weather conditions -- that put
limits on the performance capability of motor vehicle columns -- makes the retention
of horse-drawn wagons for part of the supply column, as well as for the
transportation of the combat troops (combat, food and other vehicles) absolutely
necessary at ?first?. If necessary, ?draft oxen? are suitable for use if horses are
lacking or because of the particular nature of the country.

Columns of pack animals are used to carry supplies in the mountains, where the use
of horses and wagons is impossible. A pack animal carries 50-80 kg of load. The
total load limit of a pack animal column, depending on the carrying ability of the
animals and the terrain, can be up to ?five? tons. In favorable terrain, at
distances up to 15 km and altitudes up to 600-800 meters, on good cart tracks with
grades of no more than ?15%?, small field wagons, mountain carts and sleds can also
be used. In trackless mountain areas, columns of carriers instead of pack animals
are ?foreseen?.

Small and Large Vehicle Columns for Fuel
with carrying capacity of 25 or 50 cbm, complete the need for ?motor? vehicles by
the staffs and troop units of the fighting troops as well as the back-line services
in delivering gasoline, tires, oil, etc.
The vehicle repair platoons (division) provide short-term repair work for motor
vehicles, the field repair shops (army) and ?armorer? platoons (division) repair
weapons and army equipment.
Motor vehicle repair and ?armorer? platoons form the repair shop company.

Supply Companies (division) or Battalions (army), divided into ammunition, rations,
gathering and technical platoons, ?provide? the work force at undloading ?depots?,
motor parks and distribution points, so that drivers and aides of the columns and
trains are generally not needed for loading purposes. The time of loading and
unloading is used by the drivers for overhauling and testing of vehicle, ?motor?,
horses, equipment, etc.

Parks hold supplies of weapons and army equipment to replace equipment of the troops
that is out of actions because of loss, enemy action, damage, etc. If need be,
?branch? parks can be ?advanded?. The supplying of equipment from the army's
unloading depots, parks and field repair shops to the troops (division equipment
collecting points) is directed by the chief quartermaster (?O.Ob.?) at the staff of
the A.O.K. In special cases, the troops receive replacement equipment at the
aforementioned back-line facilities of the army.



Subordination of the Supply Columns (1939)

According to their use and ?affiliation? with the command staffs, one can
differentiate:

Army Supply Columns: They form a transport reseive of the Army High Command for
army supplying. They are assigned by the Quartermaster General (?Gen.Qu.?) to
armies, corps and divisions according to need, ?or? in special cases placed under
the direct command of the Quartermaster General (to replace railroads in case of
damage, interruption, etc.).

Supply Columns of an Army serve that army to keep a portion of the supplies of
ammunition, ratios, etc., in motion, keep the army's supply dumps and parks filled
regularly, and beyond that, to complete ?or? support the supply services of the
divisions subordinate to the army.

Corps Supply Columns generally supply only their own corps' troops with
ammunition, ratios, etc.
The corps supply columns of cavalry corps command, which are given distant marching
destinations as a rule, carry a certain amount of ammunition and food (particularly
oats) with them and are frequently used to assist the cavalry division's supply
columns.

Division Supply Columns form a bridge between the back-line facilities of the army
and the distribution points of the division.

Column Units: When the divisions advance, the division's supply columns are
generally combined with parts of the other back-line services to form a Marching
Unit, and set to follow the motorized units of the combat troops under the command
of an officer from the staff of the division supply leader.
Parts of the division's supply columns carrying artillery ammunition are combined
into a combat unit and moved closer to the battlefield. In this situation they
fill the ammunition needs of the batteries, etc., immediately on orders from the
artillery commander of the division.



Structure of the Back-Line Services in the Division

Supply Services / Supply Troops

Specified strengths, which varied greatly in individual divisions

1939-1941

Infantry Division
- Staff Div. Supply Leader
- 6 small vehicle col., 30 t each
- 1 small fuel column, 30 t
- 1 vehicle repair platoon
- 1-2 wagon columns, 30 t each
- 1 supply co. (?t-mot?), 3 platoons
- 1 ammunitioin command at division supply leader

Infantry Division (mot.)
- 10 small veh. col., 30 t each
- 1 supply co. (mot.), 2 platoons

Panzer Division
- 10 small veh. col., 30 t each
- 1 supply co. (mot.), 2 platoons

Mountain Division
- 4-6 small veh. col., 30 t each
- 2-3 ?mtn.? veh. co., 30 t each
- 1 ?mtn.? supply co. (?t-mot?), 3 pltns.

Jäger Division
- 3-4 small veh. col., 30 t each
- 2-3 vehicle columns, 30 t each
- 1 supply co. (?t-mot?), 3 platoons


1942 - 1945

Infantry Division
- Staff Cmdr. Div. Supply Troop
- 1-3 vehicle comp. 90 t each
- 1 vehicle repair platoon
- 1-3 wagon squads, 60 t each
- 1 supply co. (?t-mot?), 3 pltns.
- 1 ammunition command at staff

Infantry Division (mot.)
- ?4? vhiecle co., 90 or 120 t each
- 1 supply co. (mot.), 2 platoons

Mountain Division
- 2 vehicle co. 90 or 120 t each
- 4 ?mtn.? veh. co., 30 t each
- 1 ?mtn.? supply co (?t-mot?), 3 platoons

Jäger Division
- 1 vehicle company, 120 tons
- 3 ?mtn.? vehicle col., 30 t each
- 1 supply co. (?t-mot?), 3 patns.


Average Strengths

[Unit] Officers NCO Men Vehicles Horses Wagons

Vehicle Company 2 14-17 74-95 45-88 - -
Wagon Squadron 2 19 190 1 203 82
Supply Co. (mot.) 2 14 105 14 - -
Supply Co. (?t-mot.?) 2 22 151 8 10 5
?Mtn.? Supply Company 2 14 173 - 19 ?8?



Transportation of the Combat Troops (Trains)

To carry out supplying on the advance, during combat or at rest, the infantry,
artillery and other regiments were equipped with horse-drawn and motorized vehicles
according to their organization, so that a part of their supplies of ammunition,
food and materials of all kinds, equipment, baggage, etc., ?will be mobile? and can
be carried along, simultaneously guaranteeing two-way supplying between the front
and the back-line facilities of the division (ammunition, food, fuel distribution
points, equipment collecting places, etc.).

According to their tasks, the following can be differentiated:

- the combat trains
- the commissary train
- the baggage train, and
- the light columns


The Combat Trains is composed of the combat vehicles (ammunition units), the
field kitchen and the horses.

The Combat Vehicles (generally horse-drawn) take everything that the troops need to
the battlefield: ammunition and war materials of all kinds, spare parts and tools
for minor repairs, medical and veterinary equipment. On modern rubber-tired combat
vehicles of the rifle companies, some of the marching packs of the men can also be
carried.
On the march, the combat train is gathered in the battalion or other unit under the
leadership of a non-commissioned officer (?Oberfeldwebel? or ?Futtermeister?). When
contact with the enemy is made, the combat wagons move at the end of their company,
in prescribed marching order, under the leadership of the NCO for weapons and
equipment. After the deployment of the rifle company, thy follow their platoons
(every platoon has one combat wagon).
All combat vehicles are drawn by two horses and driven from the seat or the saddle.


The Commissary Train

To carry out regular food supply service, all troop units have commissary vehicles
which form the commissary train. The equipment of the individual troop units differs
in number and type of vehicles, depending on whether or not the untis are motorized.

a) Non-Motorized Troops

As a rule, every unit (company, etc.) has one commissary vehicle (field wagon or
typical native wagon), every horse-drawn or mounted unit (machine-gun company, etc.)
has one truck.
The horse-drawn wagons form the Commissary Train I (V.T. I), the trucks form the
Commissary Train II (V.T. II).
When a unit marches out, the field kitchen carries the food supplies for that day.
V.T. I carries the food for the next day and V.T. II carries the food for the day
after that. In addition to these trhee daily portions of food, two portions of "iron
rations" are carried (one by the field kitchen, one by the men).

b) Motorized Troops

The motorized units have only one truck for food transport -- V.T. (mot.) -- which
can carry food for two days and, for this reason, is received only very other day at
the food distribution point of the division. The V.T. (mot.) generally marches
behind its troop unit if it is not underway to pick up food supplies and is recalled
by special order in this situation. There is no division into Commissary Train I and
II.


The Baggage Train

In the effort to free the combat troops of things that they do not absolutely need
on the march or in battle, trucks have been assigned to all troop units according to
plan. Some 75% of the entire baggage is carried on these trucks. The men have the remaining 25% to

carry as their marching packs. They are urged to leave the greatest part of their marching packs

(coat, blanket, etc.) on the combat wagon.
On the march, the baggage train is organized by regiment and division and follows the division at

some distance.


The Light Columns

For constant resupplying of ammunition, war materials and equipment of all kinds, the ?regiments?

etc. have, in addition to the combat vehicles (combat wagons, limbers, ammunition units), light

columns as well. They form the link between the troops (combat wagons, ammunition units) and the

means of transport (supply columns) ?of? facilities (ammunition distribution points) of the

division. The light columns bring their troop units supplies of ammunition, close-combat

equipment, hand grenades, explosives and fuses, flare and signalling ammunition, means of

camouflage and equipment according to particular plans.
According to their affiliation, the are divided into: light infantry columns, light cavalry

columns, light artillery columns, light engineer columns, light intelligence columns.

On the march, the light infantry columns generally march at the end of the main body in the order

of their troop units, the motorized light engineer and other columns follow the main body at a

greater distance in a "motorized echelon."
In place of the light artillery columns, the ammunition echelons of a division's artillery form

the link between the batteries and the division's supply columns.



Renaming the Back-Line Services

In June of 1941 the "back-line services" were renamed "supply troops" in recognition of their

accomplishments.



(New) Structure of the Troops of the Field Army, 1942

1. Combat Troops

2. The Supply Troops are divided into:

a) the supply troops
b) the administrative troops
c) the medical troops
d) the veterinary troops
e) the ordnance troops
f) the motor park troops
g) the water supply troops
h) the police troops
i) the field postal system

2.1. To the Supply Troops there belong:

- Motor transport troops, high commander of the supply troops (army group supply leader),

commander of the army supply troops, commander of the corps supply troops, commander of the

division supply troops

- Motor transport units (regiments) and independent units for large-scale transport ?atcas? (GTR)

- Supply staffs ?z.b.V.?

- Supply column units, motorized (6 col. each 60 tons) and horse-drawn (renamed ?Kraftfahr-,

Kw-Transport or ?Fahrabetilungen? in 1942).

- Supply battalions, motorized and horse-drawn (0-1 motorized and 2-4 horse-drawn companies each)

- Independent vehicle (supply), horse-drawn and pack-animal columns with 10-60 ton capacity

- Motor vehicle companies with 60, 90, 120 and more tons of carrying capacity

- Company columns (10 buses each, also units with 3 columns, plus front aid columns of the German

Reichspost

- Vehicle squadrons (30-90 tons) (former vehicle columns, 1942-43), plus mountain vehicle columns,

pack-animal columns, etc.

- Ammunition administration companies (??? field troops, 1943)

- Fuel administration companies

- Fuel filling companies and commands

- Supply companies for fuel

- Weapon repair companies and platoons

- Engineer park battalions



The Supply Troops 1944/45

- As of the autumn of 1944, the supply troops of the front divisions were gradually gathered into

Division Supply Regiments (with staff and staff company), whereby the supply troops formed a

supply-troop unit, the administrative troops and administrative-troop unit. The medical unit,

motor park troops, sometimes a veterinary company, and the field post office likewise belonged.

Panzer and motorized divisions were assigned not only two or three vehicle repair companies but

also a spare-parts echelon (?75 t?). The extent and composition of these regiments depended on the

types of the various division units and thus showed many variations; precise data are lacking.

Towards the end of the war, there usually remained only one motor vehicle company (120 tons), two

wagon squadrons (30 tons), one supply column and one administrative company (with commissary,

bakery and butcher components) in the infantry divisions, which had grown smaller for lack of men

and material. The last divisions of the 35th Wave, established in March 1945, each had two weak

regiments and could be given only one vehicle column (30 tons), one wagon squadron (30 tons) and

one administrative company.



Large Transport Area (GTR)

The largest independent transport unit of the field army was the "Grosstransport???m (GTR), which

was directly subordinate to the General of the Supply Troops.

The basis of the GTR was formed by the Motor Vehicle Transport Regiments 602, 605 and 616, the

last two originally designated "Commercial Vehicle Transport Regiments."

The Kw.Tr.Rgt. 602 formed of personnel and materials taken from all peacetime motor vehicle units

and was the active regiment. It was divided into staff, staff company, field police platoon, three

units of five companies each, a repair platoon and an information platoon, a total of sixteen

companies. The regiment's transport vehicles were four-ton trucks with four-ton trailers. Its

total strength, with a tonnage of 4500 tons, was 3000 men and 2200 vehicles, including

motorcycles.

Regiments 605 and 616 had the same structure as the active Regiment 602, but except for a small

cadre of active leaders and deputy leaders, were formed completely of men from industry, hence the

name "Commercial Vehicle Transport Regiments." It had vehicles of the most varied types and sizes,

not to mention ages and body types. They had only one thing in common: They were built exclusively

for civilian use and certainly only for use on good roads.

For the most part, they were six-to-ten-ton trucks with trailers, forming road trains with loads

up to 20 tons. The tonnage of Regiment 605 was 6000 tons, that of Regiment 616 was 9000 tons.

The fuel consumption for 100 km of transit on roads was 50 cbm for the regiment, its marching

speed in daylight and in good weather was 30 kph, at night 10 to 15 kph. The regiment had a

marching depth of 40 km when opened up, and up to 120 km on the march. A day's marching including

loading and unloading of goods, stops and tests, averaged 300 km, but at times individual

performances achieved up to twice as much.

Special mention is deserved by the drivers of the GTR. Often called in with their own road trains,

the long-distance drivers formed an elite of capable men. When the formation of new Panzer

divisions was ordered in 1943-44, more than 10,000 officers, non-commissioned officers and men, a

third of their total personnel, had to be provided by the GTR alone. They also proved themselves

in the combat troops, especially as tank drivers. In the GTR there were over 1000 different makes

and models of motor vehicles, which made maintenance tremendously difficult. Only in 1943 could

some simplifications of makes - but not models - be achieved, which necessitated exchanges among

almost all theatres of war.

The GTR reached its highest tonnage, almost 80,000 tons, at the beginning of 1943, and remained at

about 70,000 tons until 1944, with a work forceof 35,000 men. It functioned in all theatres of

war, with emphasis on the east. As a result of losses beginning in 1944, its tonnage that year

sank to 60,000 tons, and amounted to about 45,000 tons by the end of the war.

arctic fox
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Post by arctic fox » 26 Sep 2005 18:00

I have one remaining question regarding the transportation of supplies. Did units exchange supplies with the units of neighboring sectors, so that supplies would move in horizontal instead of vertical direction? I think I have never read about such a thing, but it occured to me that it might have taken place if the supply flow was blocked and only some units had supply shortages.

arctic fox
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Ammunition expenditure and unit of fire variation

Post by arctic fox » 26 Sep 2005 19:00

A subject not yet really discussed on this thread, but one that is directly related to logistics and supplies, is that of ammunition expenditure and unit of fire variation.

I have read that daily expenditure of ammunition was calculated in units of fire, where a single unit of fire included all the ammunition required for the unit for one day's typical combat. Unit would typically use anything from 200% to 10% of unit of fire during one day, depending on the intensity of the battles. Sometimes, because of lack of supplies, the unit might have only limited unit of fire available for them. Sometimes the unit of fire was calculate beforehands so that in the first day of attack the unit had 100% unit of fire, 50% unit of fire for the subsequent days of attack and 30% unit of fire for defence after the attack stopped. Artillery calculated different uses for unit of fire for different firing missions, usually so that a typical firing mission would use 10% unit of fire and "half-fires" 5% unit of fire. Often units were forced to low % of unit of fire if supplies of the parent unit were running low.

Is my above written understanding of this subject correct?

If the supply units were formed so that they could transport 100% unit of fire for all the units each day, how did units deal with the situation when the collective use of supplies was higher than 100% unit of fire (higher than transport capacity of supply units) or when they could not get enough supplies for some other reason? Did they simply live with it and continue with their missions, adjust their missions according to supply situation themselves, did higher level unit adjust the supply flow so that important units could get supplies or did higher level unit change status and missions of the sub-units according to supply situation? I understand that it must have changed from situation to situation, but was there any typical or preferred way to handle it?

Were there any typical unit of fire allocations for different combat situations? I have often read vague statements like anything from 200% unit of fire in heavy attack to 10% unit of fire when the situation is calm, but I wonder if there was more to it.

Does anyone have data regarding how much supplies units required in different combat situations? I have often read some general numbers, like that infantry division needed 200 tons of supplies a day when on advance, and I found "The Eastern Front at a Turning Point: Review of a Logistics Estimate" from CIA website (http://www.cia.gov/csi/kent_csi/pdf/v06i4a07d.pdf) and it has some tables of ammunition expenditure in six different battle situations, but the article states that the information is incorrect. Does anyone know about data like this?

Does anyone have even a general breakdown on the ammunition types of typical ammunition supply (for unit of any level)? Artillery must have taken at least 50% of the ammunition, and if the unit was not in active combat it must have been close to 90%? Mortars must have taken a large share as well? What about infantry and AT guns? I realize that it is all up to combat situation, but I would imagine someone would have gathered data like this.

OK, enough questions for now. :)

Ron Klages
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Location: Lynnwood, Washington

Data Source

Post by Ron Klages » 27 Sep 2005 17:29

arctic fox,

If you go to the site below you will find the US Army Documant TM-E 30-451 THE HANDBOOK ON GERMAN MILITARY FORCES published in March 1945. Scroll down to chapter 6 and there you will find a good description of supply for the Wehrmacht.

This site only has the text but if you go to the section on source resources you fill find an address to a place where the entire document, including charts and photos can be downloaded. The documentis numbered 30-410 in error and is in three sections. Scroll down the listing and you will see it.

Best regards


Ron Klages


http://www.lonesentry.com/manuals/tme30/

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Post by arctic fox » 29 Sep 2005 12:16

Ron,

I have this manual and its contents have been discussed in this thread. I value the mentioned manual highly, but I don't know how trustforthy its information is, as it is a wartime document made by US forces.


I was reading about the battle of St.Lo and encountered a passage which mentioned that 2nd Battalion of 8th Parachute Regiment had to take supplies from another battalion, because it was so low on supplies. I think I can judge even from this lone incident that units did exchange supplies if supply situation was critical.

-AF

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Max
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Post by Max » 01 Oct 2005 04:35

Mechanized Juggernaut or Military Anachronism?: Horses and the German Army of World War II
by R. L. DiNardo


Book Description
One of the great misconceptions of the Second World War is the notion that the German Army was the epitome of mechanical efficiency--combining lightning speed with awesome military power. DiNardo argues that, although the elite panzer divisions were indeed formidable units, about 75 percent of the German Army were infantry divisions who relied primarily on the horse for transport. So, DiNardo asks, how modern was the Wehrmacht during World War II? Could it have achieved a higher level of modernity than it actually did? This book takes an unusual approach to the study of the much mythologized German Army--showing how its extensive use of horses made it a throwback to the 19th century.

Review
DiNardo overturns the myth of mechanized Wehrmacht presenting a lot of facts and statistics which prove the opposite: the German Army of World War II had never enough vehicles of any kind and due to Hitler's premature attack in Poland it couldn't reach the same level of mechanization as the British or the US Army. The Germans used hundreds of thousands of horses on all fronts and that was one of the reasons the trapped 6th Army didn't attempt to break out from Stalingrad: the Soviets had captured most of its horses and the heavy weapons couldn't move at all! This is a very interesting and thought provoking book which will change many of your perceptions regarding World War II in Europe.


http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/de ... 7?v=glance

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Post by Pax Melmacia » 04 Sep 2006 09:58

We always hear that the Wehrmacht was mostly horse-driven. I'm wondering how they compare horse-driven transport with the motorized to arrive at such a statistic. Is it something like: X number of horses equals the transportation capacity of one Krupp Protze truck?

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Post by Iron_Bismarck » 30 May 2007 23:52

Max wrote:Mechanized Juggernaut or Military Anachronism?: Horses and the German Army of World War II
by R. L. DiNardo


Book Description
One of the great misconceptions of the Second World War is the notion that the German Army was the epitome of mechanical efficiency--combining lightning speed with awesome military power. DiNardo argues that, although the elite panzer divisions were indeed formidable units, about 75 percent of the German Army were infantry divisions who relied primarily on the horse for transport. So, DiNardo asks, how modern was the Wehrmacht during World War II? Could it have achieved a higher level of modernity than it actually did? This book takes an unusual approach to the study of the much mythologized German Army--showing how its extensive use of horses made it a throwback to the 19th century.

Review
DiNardo overturns the myth of mechanized Wehrmacht presenting a lot of facts and statistics which prove the opposite: the German Army of World War II had never enough vehicles of any kind and due to Hitler's premature attack in Poland it couldn't reach the same level of mechanization as the British or the US Army. The Germans used hundreds of thousands of horses on all fronts and that was one of the reasons the trapped 6th Army didn't attempt to break out from Stalingrad: the Soviets had captured most of its horses and the heavy weapons couldn't move at all! This is a very interesting and thought provoking book which will change many of your perceptions regarding World War II in Europe.


http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/de ... 7?v=glance

This would imply that the allies had far better logistics support than the Germans, would it not?

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Post by Iron_Bismarck » 31 May 2007 00:10

arctic fox wrote:...
Large Transport Area (GTR)

The largest independent transport unit of the field army was the "Grosstransport???m (GTR), which

was directly subordinate to the General of the Supply Troops.

The basis of the GTR was formed by the Motor Vehicle Transport Regiments 602, 605 and 616, the

last two originally designated "Commercial Vehicle Transport Regiments."

The Kw.Tr.Rgt. 602 formed of personnel and materials taken from all peacetime motor vehicle units

and was the active regiment. It was divided into staff, staff company, field police platoon, three

units of five companies each, a repair platoon and an information platoon, a total of sixteen

companies. The regiment's transport vehicles were four-ton trucks with four-ton trailers. Its

total strength, with a tonnage of 4500 tons, was 3000 men and 2200 vehicles, including

motorcycles
.
Ahh, so motorcycles really were integral to Germany's logistical support?

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Post by Iron_Bismarck » 31 May 2007 00:25

Just a helpful hint for novices like me:

"Logistics productivity is measured in tons per day"

Source

Naval Expeditionary Logistics: Enabling Operational Maneuver from the Sea (1999)
Commission on Physical Sciences, Mathematics, and Applications
http://books.nap.edu/html/naval/appendixd.html

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Post by Jon G. » 31 May 2007 08:16

Iron_Bismarck wrote:Ahh, so motorcycles really were integral to Germany's logistical support?
Iron_Bismarck, before you posted this gem of yours, did you have your next post present in your mind? What exactly does the presence of motorcycles in unspecified numbers in German truck regiments tell you about their integral role in Germany's logistical support?
..."Logistics productivity is measured in tons per day"...
That is one way of calculating the productivity of one part of the chain. Now you just need to calculate the logistical needs (keeping in mind that these can & will change over the time x-axis), and also include distance and a host of other factors to arrive at an overall picture.

This thread takes a stab at that:

http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=114753

By the way, how many tons per day do you think the 2 to 2200 motorcycles in the GTR could move?

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Post by Andreas » 31 May 2007 08:35

Iron_Bismarck wrote:This would imply that the allies had far better logistics support than the Germans, would it not?
What is your next astonishing discovery going to be? That night and day alternate?

Iron_Bismarck wrote: Ahh, so motorcycles really were integral to Germany's logistical support?
You need to brush up on your English, it appears you have trouble telling "integral" and "integrated" apart.

All the best

Andreas

Art
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Post by Art » 07 Feb 2008 11:06

Christoph Awender wrote: No matter of the combat situation every unit had to have the "erste Munitionsausstattung" (first ammo load) which consisted of:
a) Feldausstattung (Field load) which is the ammo stored in the vehicles (Gefechtswagen, Protzen etc...) of the companies, batteries etc.. and the 1. and 2.Munitionsstaffel (ammo squadrons)
b) The ammo transported in the Leichten Kolonnen (light columns)
c) The ammo in Divisionsnachschubkolonnen (divisional supply columns)
What was the size of normal combat load (or Munitionsausstattung) and its breakdown for small arms, mortars, artillery pieces and how it changed during the war? I will be grateful for any information.

ML59
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Re: German logistics and supply flow

Post by ML59 » 08 Apr 2012 19:34

Re-reading this very interesting thread I cannot avoid to be disappointed by the fact that I was not able to find anywhere an important information I'm looking for since some time: how big was the German motor vehicles park at the start of Barbarossa? I saw hundred of times the figure of 600.000 vehicles plus about same number of horses being cited again and again but without any reference to primary sources. For years I just took it at front face value but recently I got into the very detailed American official document "The effect of strategic bombing campaign on Germany" that is fully stuffed with statistic of any kind, including the number of motor vehicles in the German Armed Forces pool, and their figures don't match the claim of 600.000 motor vehicles used in Barbarossa. At that time, according to the report, this figure represented the total number of vehicles in the Wehrmacht (total motor pool for all services). Who is right? Anybody can help with some evidence and good sources?

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